At the Command of God?

On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties

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At last! I have now reached the end of this journey and arrived at my destination: A dissertation in Political Science. All along the journey, I have learnt a lot. I have learnt that Islamist parties are not so strange, and I have learnt that people in different parts of the world are not so peculiar: Most of us deal with the same joys and problems, even if we deal with them in different ways. Writing this dissertation has thus been enlightening for me in various ways, academically as well as personally. A lot of the journey has been undertaken alone, but I would not have been able to reach the destination without the help and support of many different people. This is my opportunity to thank you all!

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FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Islamist Parties in the Political Process

In the Muslim world today, the Islamist political current is a prominent feature. Militant Islamists aiming at overthrowing the current system with force in order to establish an Islamic state operate alongside moderate Islamists with a religious message on the political scene in these countries. Whereas the militants work against the political process, the moderates show a willingness to participate in the political process. Moderate Islamists have participated in the political process – often in the form of political parties – in several cases where the ruling regimes have opened up the political space, for example by holding parliamentary elections. Even if their fortunes have shifted, Islamist parties remain important actors on the political arena in the Muslim world and according to outside analysts, they often "represent the only means of expressing popular opposition to regimes generally regarded as corrupt and inefficient."

Many analysts have studied the shifting fortunes of the Islamist parties and movements. The analytical perspective in this book is different. In this study, I make an in-depth analysis of the Islamist parties per se and especially how they organise and work. Such a study is important in order to

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2 For instance in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Egypt (there however under the name of other parties), Islamist parties have contested elections since the 1980's, in Turkey since the 1970's. In the 1990's, Lebanon, Yemen, Jordan and Algeria witnessed Islamist parties competing in parliamentary elections. Also in other parts of the Muslim world, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, Islamists have proven willing to participate in the political process. Also where they have not been allowed to stand in elections, such as in Tunisia, Islamist parties have been formed. For an overview of Islamist parties in the political process, see Wimelius, 2003: 176-182.
3 Guazzzone, 1995: 17. Guazzzone here speaks only about the Arab world, but her analysis is valid for other parts of the Muslim world as well (cp. also Ghadian, 1997).
4 These have put forward many explanations to the occasional success of Islamist parties and movements. Usually, the explanations are sought in the cultural, political and socio-economic crisis prevailing in the Middle East and its negative effects on the people, which make them look for new solutions. Islamist parties have stood out as untried alternatives in this situation (Shahin, 1997: 8-14, Guazzzone, 1995: 4-9).
better understand the logic of the Islamist parties. I am thus interested in the Islamist party as an organisation, and more specifically in how Islamist parties organise and work externally and internally, i.e. how they link to the people outside as well as inside the party.

Political linkage on a broad level denotes the way in which the interests and opinions of the citizens are communicated – or linked – to the state. This is a most fundamental aspect in any political system. The communication is carried out through various intermediaries, e.g. interest groups and opinion polls. However, the political party is often regarded as the “one agency that can claim to have as its very raison d’être the creation of an entire linkage chain” – linking the citizen to the state.¹ The starting point for this study is thus the following question: How do Islamist parties organise their political linkage?

**A Theoretical Challenge**

In order to learn more about the organisational logic of Islamist parties, it is however not enough to find out how such parties organise and work. It is also of importance to find out why the Islamist parties link to the people the way they do. What determines the way in which linkage is organised in Islamist parties?

Different determinants of why Islamist parties and movements organise the way they do are identified by regional experts, even if they rarely are formed into generalised theoretical models. On the one hand, many analysts of political Islam note that Islamist parties and movements present similar organisational traits in different aspects, and they often attribute these traits to the religious, Islamist ideology of the parties.² According to those scholars there thus seems to be – at least in some respects – a specific “Islamist” way of organising a political party.

At the same time, it is often repeated that ”these (Islamist) movements take myriad forms” and that ”Islamist movements … are politically active in such diverse countries…; it is no wonder therefore that they are not alike”.³

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¹ Lawson, 1988: 15-16.
This suggests that Islamist organisations are shaped by the specific countries in which they exist.¹

Thus, according to one line of reasoning, Islamist parties organise their linkage in similar ways, on the basis of their common ideology. However, according to a different line of reasoning, Islamist parties organise in different ways, as they exist in widely diverse countries.

As noted, these explanations are very general and rarely founded in more elaborate theoretical models. Theoretical discussions on why parties organise the way they do (not least regarding linkage) are however found in the traditional body of party theory, developed in the West. Thus, this body of theories may help us to develop the theoretical tools needed for a deeper analysis of why Islamist parties organise the way they do.

How a party organises and works is, in the traditional Western body of theory, often regarded as a result either of party-specific characteristics (“party-centred explanations”) or of institutional characteristics (“institutional explanations”); there are thus two different research traditions emphasising different factors in accounting for the organisation of parties. Like the regional analysts, these two models point to characteristics of the party itself as well as to the national, institutional context, but they do so in a more specified manner. This makes it possible to penetrate deeper into the issue of what explains the way in which Islamist parties organise. More precisely, it enables a discussion of what it is in the party-specific characteristics or in the national institutional context that makes Islamist parties organise the way they do. Therefore, I turn to the traditional theoretical discourse on parties in developing the analytical framework of this study.

In Western party theory, religious ideology as a determinant per se of party linkage is something that is not well researched, as I will return to shortly. Focus has been on other kinds of parties than religious ones.

¹ This view is substantiated by Esposito & Voll, who emphasise that it is “important to examine a number of different political contexts and how the various new-style Islamic movements operate within those contexts” (Esposito & Voll, 1996: 8). Also Fuller points to the importance of “the conditions … under which Islamist movements are evolving” (Fuller, 1997: 142) and Alexander underlines that “(a)ctions by state elites and arrangements of state institutions … (have) powerful consequences for the particular form that movements take” (Alexander, 2000: 469. Cp. also Vitalis, 1997: 97-102). In this context, it should be noted that scholars in this field primarily refer to the Islamist movements as a whole. However, from their examples it is clear that they have both movements and parties in mind and they make no distinctions between them in this regard (cp. e.g. Esposito & Voll, 1996, Fuller, 1997, Guazzzone, 1995: 14-15, Vitalis, 1997).
Ideology has, however, often been regarded as an important determinant of party linkage. Maybe, then, there is reason to talk about a particular religious way of organising political linkage? This is something that I will look into in this study.

However, ideology has not been regarded as the sole factor of importance for the development of a particular kind of party organisation. Also other factors – party-centred as well as institutional – are seen as important in this regard. If such factors are decisive for the organisation of linkage in Islamist parties, this if of course interesting in itself.

On the basis of these considerations, the core questions of this study can now be formulated: How do Islamist parties organise their political linkage – and why do they organise the way they do? Can the organisation of linkage in Islamist parties be attributed to party-specific factors or to institutional factors as those are outlined in the traditional, Western theory on parties? To find this out is the first step in the analysis (part I, Chapters 4 to 6).

In Chapters 4-6, the traditional models are applied to the party in question and the linkage of the Islamist party is studied in depth in the light of these models. Conclusions are then drawn as to whether the models can explain the way in which the particular party organises its linkage.

The second step in the study looks into the role played by the religious ideology in determining the organisation of linkage and discusses whether we indeed may speak about a particular religious way of organising political linkage (part II, Chapter 7).

Chapter 7 starts with a comparison between the Islamist parties included in the study, as to their political linkage. This comparison serves to answer the question of whether Islamist parties organise in similar ways or differently and it forms the basis of a discussion on to what extent the religious ideology of the parties can be regarded as decisive for their organisation of linkage.

To evaluate the impact of national contextual factors on the organisation of linkage, a comparison between Islamist and other, non-Islamist parties in the different countries is also carried out. This analysis serves to answer the question of whether there indeed seems to be a particular “Islamist” way of organising political linkage or whether the linkage of Islamist parties is a product of the national context (i.e. institutional structures and other national characteristics).

To go yet one step further, part II is concluded by a comparison
between the linkage of the Islamist parties and an embryonic model of Christian Democratic party linkage. On the basis of such a comparison, we may discuss whether there indeed are reasons to speak about a more general religious way of organising party linkage.

This analysis is continued in the last chapter of the study, Chapter 8, where the different determinants of party linkage in the Islamist parties, both those suggested by the traditional theories on parties and religious ideology in itself, are discussed.

This study rests on the assumption that the way in which Islamist parties organise their linkage may be explained along the lines of the traditional theories on parties, which are largely moulded on experiences from the Western world. Not all agree with this standpoint. Badie, for example, asserts that Islamist parties can be understood and explained only by using context-specific concepts and explanations. Whether this is so is an empirical question, which the results of this study can provide a contribution to settling.

This dissertation thus addresses not only the issue of how the linkage of Islamist parties can be explained, but also the wider issue of the general applicability of the traditional, Western body of theories on parties. Even if attempts have been made to include also particularities of parties in other parts of the world and thus to broaden the scope of party studies (the most extensive of these is Janda’s cross-national survey from 1980), much of the experiences that make up the foundations of party studies are taken from the liberal democratic contexts of Western Europe and America. Parties are however common property also in other parts of the world. Party theory therefore needs to be broadened by including experiences also from non-Western contexts.

However, this approach does not suggest that the theoretical tools applied do not have to be adjusted to the specific context. The context that I deal with here is without doubt different from the one in which the theoretical models developed. Other factors than those pointed out by the models may thus be important. Therefore, an eye will be kept out for such circumstances, but it is easier to find deviations if there is a steady theoretical frame of analysis to start from.

If theoretical models on parties rarely have been based on parties in the third world, the same can be said for religious parties. Religious parties have for a long time to a large extent been neglected in traditional party

1 Badie, 1989.
theory. While Socialist, Conservative, Liberal and other parties operating on the Western political arena have attracted much scholarly attention and have been popular objects of research and theory-building, less systematic analysis has been bestowed on religious parties (i.e. parties representing individuals with a religious outlook, who think that society should be based on religious tenets in one way or another). Even though religious parties have often played a crucial role in Western European politics and the importance of religion as a dimension of cleavage has long been recognised, the organisation of religious parties has largely been ignored by the party scholars.

By this study, I thus want to shed more light on religious parties, and more precisely on Islamist parties. If the traditional theories here utilised are found to be inadequate for explaining the linkage of Islamist parties, these theories need to be amended to accommodate also the experiences of Islamist parties. This study may constitute a first step in this process. If the traditional theories utilised are found to be adequate for explaining the linkage also of Islamist parties, the notion of their universality is strengthened.

Thus, the application of analytical tools from the traditional body of theories on parties to a new empirical field will teach us more about the field as well as about the theories. This in turn may contribute to a wider understanding of a broader range of parties world-wide. More precisely, this study thus aims at making a contribution both to the theoretical understanding of religious parties in general and hence to party theory, and to the empirical understanding of important actors on the political scene in the Muslim world today.

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1 Demker, 1998: 52.
2 Cp. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, Hanley, 1994, Halliday, 1994: 94. One reason for this theoretical neglect of religious parties is that Christian Democratic parties often has been regarded as conservative parties and have been grouped together with those in theoretical analyses. We will return to the fact that religious parties largely have been theoretically neglected in Chapter 7.
3 For a similar approach concerning the applicability of Western party theory in a different empirical field, see Perkins, 1996.
Chapter 1: Introduction

**A Democratic Dilemma?**

By studying how Islamist parties link to the people, an opportunity is further given to discuss an issue that has been hotly debated to say the least: The relationship between Islam and democracy.¹

Whether Islamist parties have a place in a democratic political system is a long-standing debate among Islamist party activists as well as among scholars and others (not least secularists). According to some, Islam and democracy are inherently incompatible and Islamist parties participating in democratic political processes are an insoluble paradox.² These analysts contend that the aim of Islamist parties is to hi-jack democracy by taking power democratically and then abolish it (one man, one vote – once).

Other Islamists and scholars claim that Islam and democracy indeed may be compatible. They point to new interpretations of the Islamic dogmas and to the fact that Islam historically has been able to combine with the most differing political systems and ask why Islam should not be able to combine with democracy on a practical level.³

The debate on the compatibility of Islam and democracy has generally been held on an ideological level and the answers to the questions have been sought in the ideological character of Islam. However, in party studies it is often pointed out that party organisation *per se* has certain effects for democracy in different ways. The investigation of how Islamist parties link to the people, carried out in this study, provides an opportunity for a discussion on to what extent Islamist parties are promotive of or detrimental to democracy *in practice*.⁴ What is analysed here is then how the internal structure of Islamist parties is related to different sets of normative criteria or ideals regarding how a party should be organised in order to be promotive of democracy on societal level.

Obviously, Islamist parties may contribute to – or counteract – democracy in numerous other ways than only through the way they are

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¹ In this context, it can be noted that the compatibility between a religion and democracy is an issue that has been discussed also in relation to other religions than Islam: “In Lipset's day, all religions except Protestantism were regarded by political scientists as incompatible with liberal democracy. More recently, this view has been substantially modified by events” (Potter, 1997: 29).


⁴ That it is important to look at what Islamists actually are doing in this respect rather than at what they *think* of democracy is pointed out by Norton, “as we are not psychologists” (Norton, 2 February, 1998).
internally organised. However, this analysis may supplement other approaches to the issue of whether Islam and democracy are compatible.

This analysis is not carried out throughout the empirical chapters, but is conducted on the basis of the evidence that has emerged in the study, in Chapter 8.

**Islamist Parties – Some Conceptual Clarifications**

Both "Islamist" and "party" are terms which have been used in many different ways. Here I discuss how the terms are defined and used in this study.

**What is Islamism?**

Islamism, i.e. the political usage of an ideology based on Islam as guide in political action, is a truly multifaceted phenomenon. Before discussing how I use the concept in this work, I must point out what it does not stand for. Islamism is not to be confused with Islam as a religion and civilisation. Not all Muslims are Islamists. According to many Muslims, Islam should play no role in political life what so ever; for these Muslims, religious devotion is a strictly personal concern. The Islamists are of another conviction. According to them, religion should be the foundation of political action. Many different terms have been used to denote the phenomenon here discussed. Apart from Islamism such terms as revivalism, fundamentalism, Islamic resurgence, political Islam (in English) and intégriste (in French) are found. Each of the terms has different histories. The terms fundamentalism and intégriste, for example, stem in the Christian experience, whereas revivalism was (at least initially) used to refer to the increasing role of (any) religion in political life. Today, they have all more or less exclusively come to refer to the increased political importance of Islam. The terms listed have also all been used in a pejorative way, even if that was not intended initially. It seems impossible to find a value-neutral term to denote the phenomenon of the political usage of Islam. Thus, I settle for the label Islamism. To the advantage of this term speaks the fact that Islamism is the term used by the Islamists themselves.¹ Islamism is also the term favoured by scholars in the field.

However, as noted above, Islamism is far from a homogenous phenomenon. Movements, individuals and parties who refer to themselves as

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Islamist make up a wide array of tendencies regarding how to interpret and use Islam in political life. Thus, Islamism can be categorised in numerous ways, depending on the objective of the categorisation. Two of the most common categorisations are based on a) how the Islamic law, Sharia, is to be interpreted for political usage and b) the plan of action chosen by the Islamists. It must however be emphasised that these distinctions are categorisations of tendencies. In reality it is not always easy to fit individual movements or parties into one category; movements and parties might obviously also move between the categories.

Scholars usually distinguish between two ways of approaching the interpretation of Islam when it is to be used politically. According to (neo)fundamentalists or conservatives, the Islamic law, Sharia, consists of rules that are already existing and unchangeable – given by God – and these rules must be applied. No space for interpretation is given. Pragmatists or modernists see the Sharia as a guide in how to handle day-to-day issues. According to them, Islamic values and principles should inspire the present law and society, but the law must be interpreted to conform with present day society. Even if the range allowed for interpretation stretches from the progressive to the restrictive, some leeway for imaginative interpretation is thus given here.

The second kind of categorisation is based on the approach that the Islamists have chosen for political action. Radicals, militants or revolutionaries aim at overthrowing the current system with force if necessary, in order to make room for the true Islamic state. According to those, a parliamentary system is contrary to their goals, per definition. Moderates or reformists, on the other hand, have chosen to participate in the (parliamentary) political process in order to create the Islamic state from within.

It is interesting to note that these categorisations are not new in the Muslim world. In previous times of Islamist revival, the same


\[2\] Why different organisations make different interpretations is a subject of discussion among scholars. Not least Tripp has discussed this matter. Tripp asserts that the form taken by the Islamist movement in a certain country depends upon how the state treats this movement in that country; mild treatment results in moderate Islamists which challenge the state in areas where the government has failed to carry out its obligations, whereas fierce treatment leads to militant Islamists, which challenge the state with violence (Tripp, 1996: 61-66).
categorisations have been discerned, both regarding how to interpret the Sharia and regarding what kind of political action to use.¹

Islamism can thus be fundamentalist or modernist and radical or reformist. It is important to note that these two categorisations do not necessarily overlap, even if fundamentalists more often are radical and pragmatists more often are moderate.²

This study deals with moderate and reformist Islamists, who are active in the (parliamentary) political process. By focusing on Islamist parties that participate (or want to participate) in the political process, I have accordingly cut out from analysis those Islamists that exclusively favour a violent, anti-systemic approach to the creation of a state based on Islam and who refuse to act in the political process. By this choice, I have thus selected one part of what has been referred to as the Islamist movement for analysis. My intention here is to study only parts of this movement that act as parties, even if they constitute a part of a wider social movement.

What is a Political Party?

Many party scholars have provided their own definition of the concept "political party". Demker discusses such definitions of "party" and summarises the criteria that are set up by different scholars.³ These criteria include requirements that a party should have some form of organisation, that it should participate in elections, that it should carry a label, compete for government positions, present candidates for representative organs and embrace a basic idea or programme.

Party scholars also often include requirements for some constancy in party activity in order for a group to be regarded as a party. Sartori speaks about relevant parties, Janda about parties of a certain strength and stability.⁴ To this end, some requirements for representation in the national legislature are usually included. Representation in the legislature is however not a concern of mine, as long as the long-term aim of the party is to enter parliament. Sometimes, parties use election boycott as a means to protest

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¹ Cp. e.g. Mernissi, 1992; Tibi, 1997 and Sunar, 1997.
² Further, it must again be emphasised that in practice not all Islamist parties fall neatly into the categories outlined here. In some cases, radicals do join elections in order to revolutionise the state from within. Another possibility is for moderate parties to connect to militant wings. Indeed, Islamist parties constitute a heterogeneous population. In today’s world, where media often equates all expressions of political Islam with fundamentalism these possible variations are important to keep in mind.
³ Demker, 1993: 56.
against certain conditions in the political system which they find unfair. Parties that have boycotted elections will here be regarded as parties, as long as their basic standpoint is to participate in elections (and have done so previously).

On the basis of these considerations I will employ the following criteria in determining what is regarded as a political party: To be regarded as parties, Islamist groups should present some form of organisation, compete for government positions and present candidates for representative organs at elections, carry a label and embrace a basic idea or programme.¹

Having made clear the kind of Islamist parties that I am to analyse here, it is now time to proceed to the theoretical framework of the study.

¹ It should be noted that I thus employ “objective” criteria and not self-definition by parties themselves.
CHAPTER 2

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE ORGANISATION OF LINKAGE

In his well-known book, *Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (1951/1964), Maurice Duverger distinguishes between different categories of political parties on the basis of different party-specific characteristics, such as the ideological orientation, origin, experiences and societal setting of the party. Duverger asserts that these different party types present specific traits regarding different aspects of their organisation, and not least regarding linkage.\(^1\) In connecting certain party characteristics to a specific way of organising, Duverger thus suggests that the organisation of the party (including its linkage) is influenced in different ways by the particular party characteristics. Could this reasoning be applied to Islamist parties as well? Do certain characteristics of an individual Islamist party result in a particular kind of linkage? Or may the linkage of an individual Islamist party be the result of other factors, such as institutional ones? This is what I study in part I of this study. To find this out, I look closer at the predominant theoretical models explaining why political parties organise the way they do (party-centred as well as institutional). These theoretical models will then serve as the frame of analysis in part I of this study. How part II of the study is carried out is discussed in Chapter 3.

\(^1\) Duverger speaks about the middle class party type, the Socialist party type and the Communist/Fascist party type (Duverger, 1951/1964: 1-3). In this context, it should be noted that classics play a substantial role in party organisational studies. This is to a large extent due to the history of the field. While the first studies – and theories – of parties (such as Ostrogorski, 1902, Michels, 1911, Duverger, 1951/1964 and Kirchheimer, 1966) were directed at the party organisation, the interest in parties was largely directed elsewhere during the 1970s and 1980s, in the wake of a feeling of party decline and the invention of the survey method. This fact was lamented by the party scholars themselves (cp. e.g. Janda, 1983: 319). Some attempts were however made to fill up the gap (most ambitiously by Janda, 1980, with a massive cross-country survey of parties). In recent decades scholarly interest has yet again been turned towards the study of party organisation (cp. e.g. Panebianco, 1988, Katz & Mair 1992, 1994, 1995). Interestingly enough, in this surge of newly-awakened interest in party organisation, the old classics are to a large extent still referred to and built upon in the analysis of present-day parties, and contemporary theoretical discussions are often easily traced back to the classics. Even if new party organisational phenomena are largely discussed, such as the rise of the cartel party (Katz and Mair, 1995), there is also evidence that the old party types still linger – as concepts and sometimes as organisational ideals (cp. e.g. Heidar & Saglie, 1994: 125-155, Scarrow, 1996, Tesrell, 1998 and Gunther & Diamond, 2003).
Explaining the Organisation of Political Linkage

What factors determine the way in which a party organises and works, i.e. *links*, to the people? A classical issue in party studies is whether it is primarily characteristics specific to the party itself and its particular situation that is decisive for the way in which the party organises (what I here refer to as party-centred explanations) or whether it is mainly the institutional environment that makes parties operate in certain ways (here referred to as institutional explanations). Here, I draw together – and later make use of – explanations of both kinds in creating an analytical framework for understanding what factors are important for the organisational choices of political parties.

The different kinds of real-life parties, as found in the empirical – often Western – context, have traditionally been the starting-point for party scholars. On the basis of observations of these parties, different theories have been developed to explain why these parties organise the way they do, also regarding linkage (even if linkage seldom has been the main focus of interest). In one respect these theoretical attempts however coincide, and that is regarding what types of parties that are at play. Both the party-centred and the institutional explanations thus speak about the same *linkage types*. These party types are thus frequently recurrent; one might even say that they make up the backbone of party organisational studies. However, the two explanations are at odds regarding why different parties organise as different types.

The four types in question are the *mass integration party type*, the *total integration party type*, the *catch-all party type*, and the *clientelistic party type*. In this study, I make use of these types in analysing the Islamist parties. I will return to how this is done shortly, first I will however dwell a little on the most central concept in this context: Political linkage.

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1 Cp. Scarrow, who discerns these two different sets of factors that may explain what she calls organisational strategies of parties – ideological origin and organisational legacies on the one hand, and institutional environments (such as electoral systems and levels of public funding) on the other. Further, Scarrow states that “…competing theories about the organizational development of parties lead to very different expectations about which trends might emerge…” (Scarrow, 1996: 24-25).
What is Political Linkage?

Parties serve several functions in the political system. In party theoretical works, a next to infinite number of specified "lists of party-functions" are found.¹ Even if these lists differ in certain respects, not least because of the different perspectives of the list-makers, some functions recur more often than others. Among these are interest articulation and interest aggregation, goal definition, socialisation and communication, elite recruitment and government formation. Political parties play a role in all these functions, even if different parties tend to emphasise different functions, depending on the objectives of the party.

Nevertheless, these functions can all be subsumed under the linkage function, broadly defined. All of the functions listed above are in some way related to the notion of a connection between the citizens and the state, mediated via the political party. As we have seen, Lawson asserts that "(c)reating linkages is itself an extremely important function of politics" and that "(t)he political party is the one agency that can claim to have as its very raison d’ être the creation of an entire linkage chain".² Linkage has thus been regarded as the "meta-function of political parties".³ As such, linkage is indeed a truly multifaceted phenomenon and it is notoriously difficult to define. Until there is a common agreement on what is to be understood by ‘political linkage’, it is therefore up to each analyst to define the specific meaning of the concept in the particular context at hand. What follows here is thus my definition of political linkage, as it is used in this study.

² Lawson, 1988: 15-16. Linkage is made up of several different aspects. Lawson (1988: 33-34) discerns three sets of connections or kinds of links that form the political linkage chain: (a) the connection between the individual and the political organisation, (b) the connection between the political organisation and the state and (c) the connection between the individual and the state. Here, I will focus on the first set of connections, between the political party and the individual.
³ Widfeldt, 1997: 12, emphasis added, cp. also Neumann, 1956: 397, Kirchheimer, 1966: 189. My study is based on the assumption that political parties fill the function of creating political linkage in all political systems around the world (even if they differ in what other functions they fulfil), i.e. they represent the same phenomenon (cp. Rudebeck 1967, Janda, 1980 and Randall, 1988). However, this is not a study in a strict functionalist tradition, claiming that a specified set of functions must be fulfilled in a society, and focusing on the functions per se (cp. Widfeldt, 1997: 10). Instead, one agent fulfilling some functions is focused: the political party. The functions of parties are regarded as flexible, but they have one thing in common – in one way or another they aim at linking (parts of) the electorate to the state.
Even if political linkage between the citizens and the state is a function fulfilled in some way in every political system, the function of party linkage has become especially important in democratic political systems. In fact, (liberal) democracy as we know it has invariably come to be expressed through political parties in practice, even if parties not necessarily are a sine qua non for democracy.

**Political Linkage as Used in this Study**

In this study, it is "the direct contacts between citizens and parties" that are examined. More specifically, it is the way in which parties organise and work in order to connect to the citizens that is under study. More precisely still, political linkage in this study refers to the way in which parties organise and work externally and internally in order to establish and maintain contacts with supporters/voters/citizens (externally) and members (internally).

The concept of linkage is thus divided into two dimensions regarding a) where the linkage effort takes place; externally with citizens outside of the party and internally with members within the party and b) the linkage phase; the establishment of linkage and the efforts to maintain this linkage.

Both these dimensions are regarded as important in the party theoretical discourse. The French political scientist Jean Charlot emphasises the need to study both the external and the internal aspects of the party: "All political parties have two faces – a public face looking towards the media, the voters and the rest of the world, and an inward-looking face reserved for the initiated, activists … and leaders. (...) To come as close as possible to reality, the party must be analyzed in its fundamental duality".

In discussing the extent to which "the creation of links has been a hidden function of politics", despite its centrality, Lawson moreover asserts that "(t)he work of acquiring an understanding of how linkage is established and maintained is most advanced in the study of links between citizen and state, and in particular in the study of the role of political parties in creating that linkage". In this way, Lawson underlines the importance bestowed on the different linkage phases in the party theoretical discourse.

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1. That linkage also is carried out in non-democratic political systems is discussed for example by Rudebeck (1967).
Together these two dimensions result in four aspects of party linkage work that are under study here – how a party works to establish external linkage, to maintain external linkage, to establish internal linkage, and to maintain internal linkage.\(^1\)

Establishment of external linkage here refers to the party’s efforts to establish relations with citizens outside the party. What is studied more precisely in this regard is (a) what activities it undertakes in order to establish connections with the targeted group, (b) what groups the party targets in this work and (c) what part of the party organisation it is that carries these activities out.

The party maintains the external linkage when it undertakes activities to maintain the contacts with the citizens that it already has succeeded in establishing linkage to. What is studied in this regard is (a) what kinds of activities the party employs to maintain the external linkage, (b) what groups the party targets in this work and (c) what part of the party organisation it is that undertakes them.

A party establishes internal linkage when it ties individual members to the party organisation. What is studied in this regard is how open the party is for membership; more specifically, (a) what the party policy is on member recruitment and (b) what the requirements are for becoming a member in the party.

Maintenance of internal linkage refers to the procedures (if any) through which the party ensures continuous contacts and communication with the party members. In this regard, what is studied is (a) what activities are undertaken to maintain internal linkage, (b) what part of the party organisation it is that performs these activities and (c) to what extent intra-party communication (regarding election of leaders and formulation of

\(^{1}\) I thank Ann-Marie Ekengren for her comments, helping me to reach this definition. The way in which a party establishes and maintains external and internal linkage makes up an important part of the party’s organisational work (cp. e.g. Duverger, 1951/1964, Kirchheimer, 1966, Wright, 1971 and Scarrow, 1996). However, it does not comprise all aspects of the party organisational work. In the party organisation there are also other activities that fall outside linkage as here defined. Such aspects of party organisational activities include party financing, allocation of funds and administration, like record keeping (cp. i.e. Janda, 1980 and Wright, 1971: 31-45). Further, nothing about how the party acts in parliament or government is included in the concept of linkage as here defined, nor is an analysis of the relation between member and voter behaviour, the degree of representativeness of member and voters (Widfeldt, 1997) or the content of party policies. For the parties, especially party policy might be regarded as one aspect of political linkage. However, the policy in itself is an aspect that I disregard in this context. Here, political linkage is exclusively a phenomenon related to the organisation and activities of political parties.
policy) is prescribed. The different modes in which parties may organise and work to establish and maintain external and internal linkage will be outlined later, in connection with the different ideal types which constitute the frame of analysis of this study.

Now I have defined what I regard as political linkage in this study. However, it must be noted in this context that only to study how parties work and organise externally and internally to establish and maintain contacts with the citizens is not enough to be able to explain why different parties link the way they do. Thus, also the reason(s) why parties organise and work the way they do towards the people must be examined. As we will see soon, the general models, in my reading, stipulate that the actual linkage of a party follows from its linkage objective and motivation, which in turn are based on either party specific characteristics or institutional arrangements. The party’s linkage objective, i.e. what the party wants to accomplish by its specific organisation of linkage and its motivation or reasons stated for organising in this way, are both closely intertwined with the concept of linkage. As these concepts however are qualitatively different from the four aspects of linkage, the linkage objective and motivation are not included in the definition of linkage, but seen as closely interrelated to it (theoretically ”causing” a particular linkage, according to the models as I outline them).

When the concept of linkage is discussed in party theoretical works, it is often done in an abstract way and on a level of principles. However, I study party linkage as it is carried out. Still, linkage consists of different components at different levels of abstraction. Thus, I study linkage as it is ideally conceived by the party, as it is planned by the party (strategy) and as it is acted out by the party in practice.

The linkage ideal in my definition refers to how the party leadership ideally conceives of the party linkage, i.e. as it is presented in the party statutes and as party representatives describe the ideal. Even if consideration is given to legal regulations and maybe also to financial shortcomings when the ideal linkage is formulated by the party, it can be assumed that the ideal linkage visualised is somewhat unrealistic. For different reasons, the party’s actual linkage behaviour will differ from this linkage ideal. This is also clear for the party leadership; the leadership understands that the party cannot

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1 The linkage objective and motivation thus constitute the causal mechanism, which links the explanatory, independent variables to the outcome of the dependent variable (cp. George & Bennett, 1997). The models, identifying explanatory variables, causal mechanisms and outcomes of the dependent variable, thus constitute entire causal paths (cp. Stensöta, 2004: 21).
achieve this ideal way of organising linkage. Therefore the party develops what I here refer to as a linkage strategy. The linkage ideal is still important, however; it is the foundation on which the linkage strategy is based. The linkage strategy refers to the party leadership’s plan of action regarding linkage. The linkage strategy is expressed in the guidelines going out to the party people in the field, and it outlines how the party is supposed to organise its linkage in practice. However, linkage is not always acted out in the way it is supposed to. In fact, the actual linkage in practice may diverge a great deal from what is planned by the party leadership. Therefore, I also study the linkage behaviour in practice.

Having discussed how I understand the concept of linkage in this study, it is now time to turn to how different theories explain why parties organise their linkage in line with different linkage types. First, I make an outline of the general theoretical models – party-centred and institutional – as I construe them on the basis of the theoretical works on parties. Thereafter, I specify these models and fill them with due content in accordance with my understanding of the theories. Then, I develop the analytical framework of the study.

General Theoretical Models

Party-Centred Explanations

When studying closer the four empirically based theoretical party types mentioned above – the mass integration party type, the total integration party type, the catch-all party type, and the clientelistic party type – as they are outlined by different party scholars, I find that the types are to be considered as specifications of a more general theoretical model. This theoretical model includes not only the types but also the factors explaining why different parties organise according to the different types. According to this general theory, a party that exists in a specific societal setting, that has a certain background and certain experiences, and that holds a certain orientation (ideological or pragmatic), will develop a certain linkage objective regarding what is to be accomplished by the way in which it links to the people. In order to reach this linkage objective in the most efficient way, the party develops a particular kind of linkage, according to my understanding of this general theory.¹

It is important to note that this evaluation of efficiency does not per se result in a specific linkage outcome; what is at stake is efficiency given the linkage objective of the party. Different linkage objectives thus lead to different ways of organising the linkage.\textsuperscript{1} The motivation of a party, according to this general party-centred explanation is to act in line primarily with the specific orientation. This orientation is in turn largely based on the societal setting, background and historical experiences of the party. The four different party organisational types then specify the different linkage objectives and the resulting forms of linkage, on the basis of the specific societal setting, background, experiences and orientation of the party at hand. The full causal explanation of the party-centered general model can thus be spelled out: A party has a particular orientation which is a result (at least partly) of the societal setting in which it exists and its particular background and experiences. The party acts in line with and is motivated primarily by its orientation (based on its societal setting, background and experiences), when it develops a particular linkage objective. This linkage objective (and motivation) in turn lead to a particular type of linkage.

The empirically founded theoretical types presented above and the general theoretical model – of which the types are specifications – as I have found them in party theoretical works are thus principally party-centred. They emphasise party-specific characteristics, which in line with this argument make the party embrace a particular linkage objective, which in turn makes the party organise in a certain way.\textsuperscript{2} Thus, parties are regarded as actors in their own right, that act on the basis of party-specific characteristics, but they are also influenced by external conditions to different degrees.\textsuperscript{3} The party-centred model can graphically be illustrated in the following manner:

\textsuperscript{1} Generally, it is assumed that a party’s linkage objective is to maximise votes and that it evaluates what kind of strategies (including organisation) that would be most efficient in reaching this aim (cp. Downs, 1957). However, it must be noted that evaluation of efficiency also is at hand for example when a party with an ideological linkage objective evaluates what kind of organisation is the most efficient in furthering those ideological objectives. An organisation that furthers certain ideological objectives does not necessarily look the same way as an organisation that furthers electoral goals.

\textsuperscript{2} The “party-specific characteristics” referred to here are – to be correct – specific primarily to the party at hand (such as orientation, party background and experiences). However, “societal setting” – which is not specific only to one party – also forms part of the model, even if this factor in some ways is more indirect than the other ones.

Chapter 2: How to Understand the Organisation of Linkage

Figure 2:1. The general party-centred theoretical model.

The figure presents the theoretical assumptions of the general party-centred model as to how different factors influence the linkage of parties. Dotted arrows are weaker from a causal point of view than compact arrows.

I will return to the specific party organisational types later, here I will however point out how the different independent variables are connected to the linkage objective – and to each other – according to the general party-centred theory, as I understand it.

Generally, the assumption is that the societal setting at least indirectly influences how the party wishes to organise. It is assumed that the societal setting primarily influences the party’s orientation but also its background and experiences. These are factors which in turn influence the linkage objective and hence the linkage of the party. That is, the party’s background, experiences and orientation are to some extent consequences of the societal setting in which the party developed and exists. Of importance in this context is the state of the society. It is argued that if the society in which the party developed and exists is rural and pre-modern or is undergoing a rapid modernisation (including industrialisation and urbanisation) and is marked

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1 Even if the societal setting is a factor exogeneous to the party, it is here included in the party-centred explanations, as mentioned earlier. If this seems illogical, it should be remembered that it is the division between the party-centred and the institutional research traditions that forms the basis of the division into different general models as here laid out, and not – primarily – whether factors are endogeneous or exogeneous to the party. Social setting is a factor dealt with by party-centred theorists and not by institutional theorists in this context. Therefore, it is here included among party-centred factors.
by cleavages of different kinds, or if it is a case of a stable, modern (industrialised, urbanised) and rather homogeneous society, this will have particular consequences for the party (I will return to what these consequences are later). Partly this has to do with the availability of public mass media. If public mass media techniques are widely available for parties, certain organisational strategies will follow.¹ If not, other means of communication must be devised. Another crucial societal factor in this context is how the welfare is organised in the particular society. The line of reasoning goes accordingly: If the state fails to provide welfare for its people, this will have particular consequences for the parties, as they try to fill the void in different ways. If, on the other hand, the state is capable of providing welfare, the parties need not do this. Also the general outlook or attitude in the society is of crucial importance in this regard, and such outlooks are intimately connected to the societal development at hand. According to the theory, parties will thus think of their organisation differently in a society marked by an individualistic outlook than in a society with an interest-based or a particularistic outlook.²

The background and the experiences of the party are important for its way of thinking about its organisation in a more direct manner. According to the general theory, the origin of the party is important. If the party originates outside of parliament and in a more general social movement, it will think of its organisation in a different way than if it originates within the parliament and has no regular contacts with the civil society. Closely connected to the origin of the party is further the attitude of the state towards the party. Here the argument is that if the party is opposed or even repressed by the state, party organisation will be far more important than if the party is accepted and does not have to fight for its existence. On the flip side of the state’s attitude towards the party we find the party’s attitude towards the state, and this is also a factor of importance in this context. Here the argument is that a party that is opposed to, or even an enemy of, the state in its present form will put a lot more emphasis on party organisation and non-

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¹ By “public mass media” is here understood mass media operated by others than political parties directly, including mass media run by private companies and the state.

² An individualistic outlook in this context implies the idea that all individuals (with the same rights and responsibilities) stand basically alone to fend for themselves in the political process and in society as a whole. An interest-based outlook implies the idea that individuals have to join forces on the basis of different interests (primarily of economic kind) to succeed in politics and society at large. A particularistic outlook implies the idea that individuals (by birth) belong to particular communities, for example the family, and that such primordial ties are important in politics and society as a whole.
electoral activities than will a party that basically accepts the state in place. In this context, *experience of power* is also pointed out as an important factor. If the party has a history of being in power, centrally or locally, it is expected to regard its organisation differently than if it has no (or limited) experience of power.

According to the general party-centred theory as I understand it, the background and experiences of the party thus have direct – and continuous – influence on how the party perceives its mission and thus on how it thinks about its organisation. Indeed, “the circumstances of a party’s origins…can crucially influence the party’s subsequent behaviour”. However, the origin and the experiences of a party not only influence the linkage objective directly, they also influence – even if they are not the sole determiner of – the orientation of the party, according to the general party-centred theory as here laid out.

The orientation of the party is the last, and generally regarded as the most important, factor in accounting for the particular linkage objective, and thus linkage, of parties. According to the general party-centred theory, the party will think of its organisation differently if it is an *ideological* party primarily intent on building the society according to its ideas, or whether it is a *pragmatic* party, primarily intent on getting to power. The ideological-pragmatic divide is the principal division between parties on the basis of their orientation. However, also ideological and pragmatic parties differ between themselves.

Ideological parties differ primarily on their ultimate aim; they may want to reform society in line with their *restricted* ideology or they may aim at a *revolution* according to their *totalitarian* ideology; accordingly they will organise differently. Ideological parties are however generally *collectivist* in

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1 Shefter, 1994: 27, 31. Also Panebianco states that “(a) party’s organizational characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor” (Panebianco, 1988: 50, cp. also Duverger, 1951/1964: xxxiii and Sartori, 1994: 77, 96). The continued importance of the origin and initial experiences of parties is also proved by more recent research, e.g. Teorell, 1998.


3 Whereas ideological parties generally are principle- and policy-oriented, pragmatic parties are generally vote- and office-oriented, even if these general orientations empirically tend to blur (cp. e.g. Müller & Ströms argument: “Policy pursuit is … presented as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, office seeking”, Müller & Ström, 1999: 8).

4 “Reformist” refers to the ambition to work within the political system and participate in elections; “restricted” means that the ideology is not all-encompassing; it covers only one part of life and there is some degree of flexibility in its interpretation. “Revolutionary” means that the state should be overthrown, with violence if needed, and “totalitarian” refers to the view
their outlook, emphasising common action (primarily by a class).

Pragmatic parties, however, coincide in their ultimate aim. The two types want come to power, but they differ regarding what they emphasise in order to get there. Either they are individualistic, in that they appeal to everyone by emphasising issues not risking to deter anyone, or they are particularistic, in that they appeal primarily to primordial groups (ethnic, family or others), by emphasising particularist needs and interests. Each of these approaches leads to different types of organisation.

In this context, it is important to note that “orientation” as used here does not coincide with the term “ideology”, which denotes a basic pool of political ideas. Thus, even if ideology and orientation often go together, it may be the case that parties which subscribe to the same ideology have different orientations, when it comes to whether they are reformist/restricted, revolutionary/totalitarian, individualistic or particularistic.

The orientation of a party is naturally the result of many different factors. As mentioned above, the general party-centred theory, as discussed here, however points to the importance of the societal setting and the background and experiences of the party in influencing the party’s orientation. A particular societal setting together with a particular background and particular experiences thus result in a particular orientation of the party, according to the general theory as laid out here.

Not least the societal setting of the party is thus intimately connected to the orientation of the party. Thus, if the societal setting changes (for example with modernisation) so does the orientation of the party, runs the argument.\(^1\)

With the background and, to an important extent, the experiences of the party, the case is different however. These factors are closely connected to the orientation of the party, but also to the linkage objective directly, in the early life of the party. However, contrary to the societal setting, the background and – at least the initial – experiences of the party obviously do not change. The influence of the particular origin (background and experiences) of the party thus remains the same over time.

As long as the societal setting stays the same, the influence of the origin of the party may thus coincide with, and have similar impact on the orientation of the party, as the influence of the societal setting. However, if the societal setting changes, the impact of this context and the impact of the

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party’s origin may contradict each other and have different effects on the orientation of the party and thus on its linkage objective and linkage. In such cases, it is usually the impact of the recently developed societal setting on the orientation of the party that is regarded as most decisive, whereas the impact of the party’s origin still exists but has less influence. Generally, then, parties are expected to change their orientation, and therefore their linkage objective and linkage outcome, with changing societal circumstances, even if elements affected by the party’s origin persist.

After having discussed on a general level how the different independent variables are expected to influence the linkage objective and thus the linkage of parties according to the party-centred theoretical model as I understand it, it is now time to turn to the next kind of explanation, which focuses on the impact of institutions.

**Institutional Explanations**

While the party-centred explanations direct their focus at party-specific characteristics, things are different with the institutional explanations. According to (the new) institutional theory, institutions are viewed as having a long-term influence on the actions of actors in different ways and according to different logics. Institutional theory is subdivided into different kinds of “institutionalisms”, each of which has its own conceptualisation of the logic at play. Institutionalist scholars disagree on how many subdivisions there are and what signifies the different perspectives. However, according to Torfing, “(t)hree major perspectives, which have developed in relative isolation from each other, can be identified: (1) rational choice institutionalism, which focuses on the institutional constraints on the rational action of individual actors; (2) historical institutionalism, which focuses on how institutions structure and mediate conflicts between collective actors; and (3) social constructivist institutionalism, which focuses on how interests, rationalities, and information are socially constructed within institutional frameworks”.

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1 Cp. Janda, who states “...the passage of time obviously can mute and even nullify the effect of extra-parliamentary origin...” (Janda, 1980: 39).
Common to these (and other) different versions of the new institutional theory is however the view that different institutional contexts in different ways influence and sets the parameters for the actors operating within them, by providing particular constraints and incentives.¹ Thus, “institutions influence actors’ strategies, that is, the way they try to reach their goals”.²

However, how these goals and preferences are defined is something that different institutional approaches disagree upon. The basic dividing line is whether the preferences are exogenous to the institution, i.e. derived outside the institution (in the rational choice variant), or whether they are endogenous, derived from and defined by the institution (in the historical and social constructivist variants).³ Even if the origin of the preferences has certain effects, not least regarding the possibilities to change the institution, the end result is the same on a general level: Institutions influence how goals are perceived in the institutional context at hand, though in different ways. In this way, institutionalists argue that “institutions are the variable that explain most of political life...”.

The institutions thus matter to the way in which actors perceive their goals — and to how they act to reach them.

A central issue in the institutional theory is what makes up an institution. A common, but not very specific, answer is that “political institutions are “the rules of the game””.⁶ To specify this definition somewhat, these rules (and thus institutions) may further be divided into “formal” and “informal”.⁷ Formal institutions include explicit rules such as

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¹ Cp. e.g. Peters, 1999: 141-151, Torfing, 2001. In the words of Ellen Immergut: “Institutions do not determine behavior, they simply provide a context for action that helps us understand why actors make the choices they do” (Immergut, 1998: 26).

² Rothstein, 1996: 146. Obviously, institutions in their turn are affected by politics (cp. e.g. Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 10). That aspect will however not be of consequence in this context, as I do not primarily study developments over time.

³ Peters, 1999: 146-147, Rothstein, 1996: 146-151 and Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 9. According to Thelen & Steinmo, historical institutionalism in contrast to rational choice institutionalism “argue that not just the strategies but also the goals actors pursue are shaped by the institutional context” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 8, italics in original).

⁴ Peters, 1999: 150. However, institutionalists emphasise that institutions are not the only thing that matters. As Thelen & Steinmo point out, it is a matter of “political agency and political choice within institutional constraints (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 12, italics in original), and they underline the importance of focusing on the “interaction of ideas, interests, and institutions” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 14, cp. also p. 16, 18, 23 and 27).

⁵ Thus, according to Thelen & Steinmo, “institutional factors … shape … the objectives of political actors” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 6).


laws and written regulations, whereas informal institutions are more difficult to define. In the literature, such diverse things as ‘routines,’ ‘customs,’ ‘compliance procedures,’ ‘habits,’ ‘decision styles’ or even ‘social norms’ and culture’ are referred to as informal rules.¹

In line with the institutional approach, the way a particular party organises is thus influenced by different specific institutions in the context at hand, institutions over which the parties have no direct control (at least in the short run). Like the party-centred explanation, the institutional explanation thus constitutes a general theoretical model, something which is pointed out by Rothstein: "To say that 'institutions matter' does not tell us anything about which institutions are more important than others and for what issues. The value of the institutional approach may only emerge when it is combined with a more substantial theory from which we can draw hypothesis about why some agents, resources and institutions are more important than others".² In party theory, many different institutions – of formal as well as informal kind – are regarded as having an influence on parties. For reasons that I will return to later, I have in this study chosen to look closer at the impact of the following institutions: the electoral system and the legal regulations for parties. As I will return to soon, these two institutions affect parties in different ways.

The assumption based on the institutional explanation on a general level it is thus, to summarise, that the institutional arrangements affect the linkage objectives of the parties, and hence make the parties organise in specific ways. The underlying motivation is that the party adapts to the institutional parameters at hand and develops the particular linkage objective in order to act in line with the institutions.³ Another full explanation of the way in which parties organise their linkage is thus the following: A party exists in an environment with certain institutions. These institutions influence the party to embrace a certain linkage objective, as the party’s

² Rothstein, 1996: 154, emphases in original.
³ According to the institutional theories, actors adapt to the institutions either because they find that it is rational to do so, as stated by the rational choice perspective, or because the institutions form the goals and actions of the actor, as stated by the historical and social constructivist perspective respectively. In this context, as we will return to, I tend towards the rational choice variant of institutionalism, as I assume that the institutional influence is largely conscious.
motivation is to act in line with the institutions. This particular linkage objective in turn leads to a particular linkage. Graphically, the institutional model as laid out here looks in the following way:

**Figure 2.2. The general institutional theoretical model.**

| Institutions (electoral system + legal regulations) | Linkage objective in line with motivation | Linkage outcome |

Comment: The figure presents the theoretical assumptions of the general institutional model as to how different factors influence the linkage of parties.

**How to Explain the Linkage of Islamist Parties: Party-Centred or Institutional Explanations?**

Against this theoretical backdrop, I may now return to the theoretical questions at the core of this study: What explains the kind of linkage found in Islamist parties? Is the linkage mainly a function of party-specific factors as suggested by the party-centred models as laid out here, or is it mainly a function of institutional factors as suggested by the institutional explanations?

These questions are here posed on a very general theoretical level, in line with the general theoretical formulations of the models as I understand them. To be able to carry out a study, the theoretical models have to be filled with content. In this context, they will be filled with the theoretical assumptions that I extract from the theories. These assumptions are made primarily for parties in the West. By making use of party-centred as well as institutional explanations as they are laid out in the Western context, in the analysis of the linkage of Islamist parties, I am able to discuss whether and how these explanations explain why Islamist parties link the way they do to the people.

If these assumptions (or some of them, as they are largely competing) are met and can be successfully used to explain the linkage of Islamist parties, we can further conclude that the general models can be applied also outside the Western context in which they were developed. However, if these theoretical perspectives cannot explain the way in which Islamist parties organise their linkage, the party theoretical discourse have to be developed on the basis of the findings made in this study.
As we will see soon when these general theoretical models are filled with content, it is a notable feature that the models generally do not combine party-centred and institutional traits (as these are defined in this context). Even if it is possible to think, also theoretically, that linkage outcomes are a result of a particular combination of party-centred and institutional traits, as here defined, such theoretical combinations are largely absent in the traditional party theoretical discourse. However, it is often stated that a mixture of both party-centred and institutional factors usually explains the way in which linkage is organised in parties in practice.\(^1\)

Here I combine these approaches. First, I study whether any of the general explanatory models – either the party-centred or the institutional (as they are specified in the Western context and as laid out here) – is able to explain the way in which linkage is organised in Islamist parties. In doing so, I am able to discern whether any of the models is applicable and how (both on general and specified level).

Empirically, different factors probably influence the organisation of linkage in Islamist parties. What I do here is to discern what factors that seem most decisive in this sense.

Graphically, the explanations utilised in this study can thus be presented as follows:

\(^1\) Cp. Sväsand, 1994: 104-108. One exception to this general theoretical separation of party-centred and institutional explanations is put forth by Swanson & Mancini who combine the two approaches (Swanson & Mancini, 1996: 18, cp also p 17).
Figure 2.3. The general explanatory models in the study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party-centred explanations:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal Background/Experiences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orientation</td>
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<td>Linkage objective in line with motivation</td>
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<th>Institutional explanations:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linkage objective in line with motivation</td>
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Comment: The figure presents the theoretical assumptions of the explanatory models used in this study as to how different factors influence the linkage of parties.

This is what the explanations look like on a general level in this context. Next I proceed to outlining the more specified theoretical models, first the party-centred and then the institutional models.

**Party-Centred Models of Political Linkage**

In the party theoretical literature, different models have been developed to distinguish between parties encountered in different historical settings, primarily in the West. These models also account for how parties organise and why they organise the way they do. These models are the mass (integration) party model, the total integration party model, the catch-all...
As I argued earlier, a general theoretical structure underlies those models: A party has a certain orientation, a particular background and particular experiences as a result (at least partly) of the particular societal setting in which it exists. In order to act in line with this orientation, background, experiences and societal setting, the party develops a particular linkage objective and hence linkage outcome. In outlining the party-centred explanations of how parties organise their linkage and why, it is these four models that I use as points of reference.

1 The mass integration party is e.g. discussed by Kirchheimer (1966), Panebianco (1988, mass bureaucratic party model), Wright (1971, party democracy model), Duverger (1951/1964, Socialist party), Lipset & Rokkan (1967), Bartolini (1983), Katz & Mair (1995), Heidar & Saglie (1994, medlemsparti, member party) and Teorell (1998, folkrörelseparti, social movement party). The total integration party is e.g. discussed by Neumann (1956), Duverger, (1951/1964), Friedrich & Brzezinski (1965) and Unger (1974). The catch-all party is e.g. discussed by Kirchheimer (1966), Panebianco (1988, professional party model), Wright (1971, rational-efficient party model), Epstein (1967), Katz & Mair (1995), Heidar & Saglie (1994, medieparti, media party) and Teorell (1998, kampanjparti, campaign party). The clientelistic party is e.g. discussed by Ostrogorski (1902), Epstein (1967), Randall (1988), Chubb (1982), Nelson (1979) and Scott (1969). In studying the linkage of parties, Lawson discerns four possible forms that party linkage can assume. These forms are in accordance with the models presented here: Parties with participatory, directive, electoral and clientelistic linkage (Lawson, 1988: 16-17). Indeed, there are slight differences between the descriptions of these different types. However, regarding linkage they basically converge.

2 These factors are the ones mentioned most often in the party-centred explanations. However, other factors also occur. Panebianco for example points to the age of the party itself as an important factor, as the party changes character with the passage of time (Panebianco, 1988: 53). Here I will however disregard this factor as it lies outside the scope of this study to carefully analyse party internal developments over time.

3 Apart from the four models here outlined, at least three other party models have been suggested in the party theoretical literature: the cadre party or party of individual representation (Duverger, 1951/1964; Neumann, 1956), the cartel party (Katz & Mair, 1995) and the populist party (i.e. Minogue, who discusses “populism as a political movement”). However, I will not take these models into account here. The cadre party developed before the introduction of general suffrage by the elites in power; groups of notables formed parties around common interests, which only later – with introduction of general suffrage – connected to extra-parliamentary groups and developed into catch-all parties. As I am concerned with parties under mass suffrage, the cadre party which need no links to the people at all is not applicable here. The cartel party type is characterised by its close relation to the state. In the cartel party, which is a type evolving from the catch-all party in a process that “remains at an early age” (Katz & Mair, 1995: 17), the patterns of the catch-all party “has…been even further pushed forward” (Katz & Mair, 1995: 20). The cartel party is totally run from the centre, with an atomistic conception of party membership. Considering the novelty of the cartel party and its character of an extrapolation of the catch-all party type regarding linkage, it will not be taken into account here. Also the populist party type springs to mind in this context. However, populist parties are more about a particular populist message, than about organisation. According to Widlund, populist movements “legitimise
However, what is the rationale for using these models in explaining the linkage of Islamist parties? Are there any foundations for believing that they actually can explain the linkage of Islamist parties?

Islamist parties have not so far been systematically discussed from a party theoretical point of view. Therefore, there are few previous coherent theoretical assumptions in this regard to start from. But many Islamist parties have backgrounds and experiences similar to mass integration parties and some of them have totalitarian ideologies like the total integration parties. Many Islamist parties have further developed and exist in the specific societal setting that according to the party theoretical discourse breed clientelistic parties. At the same time, the Islamist parties sometimes operate in (more or less) modernised societies and under the pressure of electoral competition, circumstances that are regarded as producing catch-all parties.

On the basis of these observations, I therefore argue that each of these party-centred explanations may apply to Islamist parties and none of them themselves by appeals to...‘the people’, often in combination with expressions of anti-establishment sentiments; in this work two features stand out in the ideal typical populist party, namely “the presence of a ‘demagogue’ or a charismatic leader, on the one hand, and the actual or desired feature of a direct relationship between the leader and his or her supporters, on the other” (Widlund, 2000: 36-37). Between the leader and the people there is, ideally, a direct and unmediated relationship and “local actors are not ascribed any independent mobilising function”; indeed the populist party is marked by its “weak, intermediary levels of organisation” (Widlund, 2000: 38, 40 cp. also Svåsand, 1994: 114-117 and Müller-Rommel, 1998). In playing down the importance of organisation, the populist party thus seems to have a lot in common with the catch-all party when it comes to party linkage. The inclusion of the catch-all party as a model will thus suffice in this context.

All religious parties work for some increase of the role of religion in political life. The extent of these religious claims however differs significantly between parties – from restricted religious parties with an ideology vaguely inspired by religious values, to totalitarian religious parties that work for the implementation of a strict religious rule for all and in all areas of life. Cp. Duverger who asserts that “(i)n so far as Christian parties declare that their political and social position is the inevitable outcome of religious principles, they are totalitarian; in so far as they recognize the liberty of the Christian in this respect they are restricted” (Duverger, 1951/1964: 119-120).

The Muslim world has not been isolated from the impact of modernisation. Also parts of the Muslim world has experienced an increase in the levels of material standards, and in the use of mass media. Even if de-ideologisation not is a concept that is suitable to describe the contemporary Muslim world, popularisation of politics is. If de-ideologisation of politics is interpreted in terms of popularisation of ideology, i.e. choosing policies with a wide popular scope (an interpretation that indeed does not diverge too far away from Kirchheimer’s original ideas), the Muslim world fits well into the description. However, the process of modernisation has not been homogeneous between the countries. Some countries are ahead of other countries regarding different aspects of modernisation.
can be generally discarded \textit{a priori}. It is up to the empirical investigation to single out which model or models seem(s) applicable in each case, if any.\footnote{1}

Next, I present the different party-centred models purporting to explain why certain parties adopt certain types of linkage, and what the types look like (regarding linkage objective and how external and internal linkage is established and maintained), as I have extracted them from the party theoretical discourse. I start with the models that emphasise \textit{integration of party members} in different ways ("member parties") and continue with the models that focus \textit{voters} and \textit{electoral concerns} ("electoral parties"). In the empirical analysis, I then position the Islamist parties under study in relation to those extracted models.

I want to point out that what follows are ideal typical concepts, fruitful in an analysis of the kind drawn up here. These ideal types are however not expected to be found in real life, as I will return to in Chapter 3.

\textbf{The Mass Integration Party Model}\footnote{2}

\textit{Societal Setting, Background, Experiences and Orientation of the Party}

The first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in Western Europe was an era of social upheaval, with "sweeping industrialization, radical urbanization and international migration … world wars and total revolutions".\footnote{3} It was a time when the suffrage just had been made universal and the masses just had entered the political process, but when class cleavages still were deep. In this era, the state not always succeeded in providing education, security and welfare schemes for its citizens, and public mass media techniques were not generally available for parties. This era saw the birth of a new kind of party, according to the party scholars - the mass integration party. This kind of

\footnote{1 The different party types derived from party theoretical works have a strong foundation in the historical development in the Western world, where they all developed in \textit{different} historical settings. Is it therefore feasible to apply them to Islamist parties existing at the \textit{same} time in the contemporary world? Of course, this is an empirical question that we will find an answer to in the analysis of the parties. I would however argue that as scholars today do not agree on whether parties evolve in a homogeneous manner (cp. e.g. Gunther & Diamond, 2003), it is indeed possible that the linkage of Islamist parties may be explained by either explanation here presented. Further, also in the Western context the different party types have co-existed in time (cp. Katz & Mair, 1995, Koole, 1996).


\footnote{3 Neumann, 1956: 404."}
party had, as a part of a wider social movement, started to organise its members outside of the political system on the basis of shared interests (primarily of economic kind) to fight for democratic rights, before the introduction of universal suffrage. Once the rights of participation were gained, the mass integration party took on (at least to some extent) the tasks that the state failed to fulfil. The objective of this party type, as that of the wider social movement, was continued integration and mobilisation of the masses into society. In this context, it was a question of integration on different levels – social integration into the new industrial society and political integration into the new political system, both brought about via integration into the party. Thus mass integration parties were concerned with long-term goals, of both political and social kind, beside the more short-term objectives, like winning elections.

It was first and foremost Socialist parties that developed the characteristics of the mass integration party, according to the party scholars. However, religious (i.e. Christian Democratic and primarily Catholic) parties were often placed side by side with "class mass parties" regarding their objective as well as their way of organising. Indeed, Duverger asserts that the religious parties of Catholic and Christian Democratic kind imitated the Socialist parties in this regard.

Duverger emphasises that the objective of integrating the masses into society, and the kind of linkage it entailed, has to be understood against the background of the mentality of the working-class as formed by the circumstances: "The Socialist parties were formed essentially for the working-class masses, who by their very nature are given to communal institutions and discipline". The working-class was initially shut out from the political process and it experienced success politically only when it joined forces, according to Duverger: "For the European working classes … freedom was a collective conquest... (T)he proletariat discovered the weapon of its liberation: common action". But great numbers was not enough.

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1 Here, "integration" refers to the bringing in of large parts of the citizenry into political society, i.e. "integrating them (the members) into the party behind shared values and a common purpose" (Padgett & Burkett, 1986: 71).
3 Cp. e.g. Duverger, 1951/1964: 13, 27, 46, 177. As we will return to, however, the Christian Democratic parties did not wholly resemble the Socialist parties regarding linkage; instead they differed from them in important respects.
4 Duverger, 1951/1964: 170, cp. also 26, 30, 33, 67.
masses have been liberated not by numbers but by discipline…(thus)…the parties of the masses had a natural tendency to be disciplined parties”.\(^1\)

According to Duverger, class mass parties thus displayed a collectivist mentality.

The objective of integrating the masses into the party and thus into society also to a large extent stemmed in the orientation based on the Marxist/Socialist ideology. The fact that common action was part and parcel of the Marxist/Socialist ideology made the Socialist parties prone to form parties of the mass integration kind, which in a collectivist way took care of the members "from cradle to grave” and extended its activities beyond the purely political field. According to Duverger, "(i)t was the Marxist conception of the class party that led to…massive structures: if the party is the political expression of a class it must naturally seek to rally the whole class, to form it politically…".\(^2\) In this way, the mass integration party was ideologically motivated.

The mass integration party type is thus marked by its focus on ideology; it is a party with an ideological orientation. But it is an ideological party with restricted as opposed to totalitarian ideological claims. Thus, the ideology is not all-encompassing; it covers only a part of life and there is some degree of flexibility in the interpretation of the doctrine.\(^3\) As a party with restricted ideology, the mass integration party aims primarily at reforming the society in accordance with its ideology. To be able to do this, the party is in need of electoral support. Winning votes in elections is therefore important for the mass integration party. But winning votes is never the sole objective for the ideal typical mass integration party. Instead, the mass integration party acts in different ways to influence the state and the society.

Another way in which the background and the experiences of the mass integration parties influence the development of their particular linkage

\(^2\) Duverger, 1951/1964: 66.
\(^3\) According to Duverger, “(t)wo elements are to be distinguished, one material, one spiritual” when it comes to the outlook of parties (Duverger, 1951/1964: 117). Thus, a restricted party is not all-encompassing in that it does not organise the whole life of the member, whereas "(t)here is no longer any distinction between public and private life: there is only party life” in a totalitarian party (Duverger, 1951/1964: 117). This is the material aspect. The spiritual aspect refers to the “freedom of choice” in the party. Whereas a restricted party “implies only a political attitude and leaves a freedom of choice in other spheres”, “totalitarianism is spiritual”, with a doctrine encompassing all aspects of the universe which leaves no room for individual interpretation (Duverger, 1951/1964: 118).
objective and hence their particular type of linkage is emphasised by Bartolini: "Socialist parties developed as outsiders in hostile environments, opposed through various means by established authorities and needing to mobilize resources in order to overcome their ostracism. (...) The combination of various factors, ranging from the need to recruit leaders from the lower classes to the need...to raise levels of political consciousness among the working class” lead to the linkage objective of integration into the party and hence to an organisation of the mass integration kind.¹ The Socialist parties, which also had no prior experience of being in power, needed to build political competence within the working-class to be able to reach their goal of integrating the masses into society. Such political competence was built by integrating members into a mass integration type of party.

Not only the state’s attitude to the party is of importance in this context however, but also the party’s attitude towards the state. Even if the mass integration parties accepted the state per se, they were “in opposition—negation to…the existing order ” and they wanted to reform the state.² This led them to aim at integrating their members into the party and organise in a particular way to make such reform possible. Contrary to the total integration parties, which I will turn to shortly, the mass integration parties however endorsed a restricted and not totalitarian view of its members in this work.

In explaining why mass integration parties obtained the linkage objective they did and thus their particular type of linkage, Duverger also points to a specific aspect of the fact that Socialist, as well as Christian Democratic, parties were generally a part of a wider social movement. Duverger points out that as the social movement as a whole generally was older than the party, it had formed and developed its objectives and the methods to reach those before the party did so. When the party was created, it was therefore to a large extent influenced by the institutions already developed in the movement. Thus, the mass integration parties were "externally created parties” and “the shape of (such) a party is essentially established by a pre-existing institution of which the true activities lie outside elections and parliament...".³ According to Duverger, the origin of

³ Duverger, 1951/1964: xxx. Such "pre-existing institutions” were for example labour unions, in the case of Socialist parties, and Christian groups and clergy in the case of religious parties.
the political party is thus of decisive importance to its organisation.\footnote{1} Origin is further a factor with lingering effects, according to Duverger “(the) influence exerted by genesis upon permanent structure” is substantial.\footnote{2} Indeed, ”(i)t is the whole life of the party which bears the mark of its origin”.\footnote{3}

In summary, the mass integration party type, according to the mass integration party model as I construe it, develops in a society which is marked by rapid modernisation, where the state largely fails to provide welfare for its people and where support is sought in a collectivist manner in one’s own class. Here, the mass integration party develops as a part of a social movement, outside the existing political order, before the introduction of universal suffrage, and it displays a collectivist mentality based on the positive experiences of joining forces. The mass integration party further embraces an ideology focused on common action and an interest for social as well as political aspects of life. Its orientation is ideological and it is intent on reforming the political order. This general outlook makes the mass integration party oppose the current rule of the state, and the rulers in turn are opposed to the party. Thus, the mass integration party aims at working for the integration of a specific social group (i.e. a class) into the political order via integration into the party and it therefore develops a linkage of mass integration kind.

**The Ideal Typical Mass Integration Party Type of Linkage**

**Linkage Objective**

As we saw above, the mass integration party has long-term goals beside the more short-term electoral goals. The mass integration party works for the integration of the (mass) group it targets into society on different levels – social integration into the newly formed industrial society as well as political integration into the political order; thus, it works for the reform of the society at its base. The integration of the masses is to be accomplished via integration of members into the party. To achieve the integration of the targeted (mass) group, the party thus aims at drawing the targeted masses

\footnote{1}{It must be noted that there are exceptions to the “genesis-thesis”. Thus Socialist parties can have their origin in parliament, as evidenced by Duverger (Duverger, 1951/64: xxx-xxxi, xxxv).}
\footnote{2}{Duverger, 1951/1964: xxi-iii and xxx.}
and to integrate members into the party. This constitutes the **linkage objective** of the mass integration party. The **motivation** on the part of the party is thus to act in line with its ideological orientation based on its setting, experiences and origin. Ideally then, the mass integration party makes up a channel for integrating individuals and groups into the existing political order; as such it acts as a "relay between the population and the government structure".¹

### Establishing External Linkage

As we have seen, the mass integration party has an interest wider than the strictly political. Thus, the **activities** to establish external linkage of the mass integration party are not limited to electoral ones, even if short-term activities of campaigning character in times of election also are important.²

The mass integration party is primarily characterised by its long-term and continuous activities to establish external linkage, activities of political/ideological and social kind.³

In this work, the mass integration party **targets** a specific, *a priori* well-defined (mass) group in society. This group is generally made up of a large part of the population, and membership in the group more or less

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¹ Kirchheimer, 1966: 189.
² **Campaigning activities** include advertising candidates by mass media or in other ways (e.g. posters, billboards, mail), promoting candidates through direct voter contacts in times of election, holding public meetings and rallies, registering voters, transporting them to the polls, providing baby-sitters (Janda, 1980: 79-80), personally talking to voters, door-to-door canvassing, collecting money, distribution of campaign literature (pamphlets, direct mailing), telephone campaigns (Wright, 1971: 338), and use of mass media (Katz & Mair, 1995: 7-13, Epstein, 1967/1982: 257, Wright, 1971: 338, Janda, 1980: 79-80).
³ **Political/ideological activities**: Operating party schools (distinguished from general education), passing resolutions and platforms, publishing position papers (Janda, 1980: 84), party worker training; ideological activities, including policy clarification and publishing ideological/policy documents; personal contacts with voters (continuous); distribution of political literature; policy discussion, policy formulation and political education (Wright, 1971: 343). Not least the importance of party-run (mass) communications media, such as party press, publishing houses, radio and TV, is underlined (Janda, 1980: 84, Lipset & Rokkan, 1967: 15, Katz & Mair, 1995: 10, Duverger, 1951/64: 67). **Social activities**: Providing food, clothing, shelter, running employment services (not patronage jobs), providing basic education (not primarily political) and providing recreational facilities (Janda, 1980: 87). Janda here refers to provision of welfare to party members, but I extend this variable to include any welfare activities provided by the party. Janda includes yet another activity in this category, namely “interceding with government on citizen’s behalf”. However, I place that variable in the category “service activities”. Bartolini mentions social activities such as education (not only political), provision of medical care, legal assistance and protection to workers and to groups of potential supporters of the party (Bartolini, 1983: 180).
permeates the life of the individual – the group consists of a social class in the case of class parties and a denominational clientele in the case of religious, Christian Democratic parties. Thus, the mass integration party does not try to curry favour with diverse strata of society and to recruit voters from the population at large. Instead, it tries to mobilise as many individuals as possible within the specific group it targets.

A wide variety of different party bodies at different levels spread across the country perform these activities to establish external linkage on the part of the mass integration party and work to make inroads into the group the party targets. To this end, the mass integration party for instance connects to, or creates, ancillary and affiliate organisations. Ancillary organisations are bodies with less formal ties to the party; these bodies are limited and specialised in nature, compared to the political party which is broader in outlook. By focusing on limited issues, ancillary organisations try to mobilise people who agree with the party on a particular issue, but who do not necessarily subscribe to the party’s general objectives. Through these ancillary organisations a more or less thorough penetration of the targeted group is aimed for by the mass integration party, and it enters into “apolitical” spheres of society, such as the family, social and cultural spheres.

Also affiliate organisations, such as youth and women’s organisations, fill this function of penetrating into more apolitical areas of life. Affiliate organisations however have a closer relation to the “main” party organisation than do the ancillary organisations. Not only ancillary and affiliate organisations are however used to establish linkage with the targeted group. To this end, the local branch of the party also approaches supporters and potential supporters with a wide variety of activities. Thus, the local branch is of vital importance in the mass integration party.

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1 Duverger, 1951/1964: 106-109, 119, 124. According to Duverger, there are two types of ancillary organisations. One kind are those which are for the members; these make possible for the members to live most of their life in close association with the party in one way or the other. We will return to these soon. Another kind of ancillary organisation is those turning to supporters (Duverger, 1951/1964: 106-109). These are usually not linked to the party as closely as the ones mentioned above, but their objective is to mobilise voters. It is these latter ones that thus are utilised to establish external linkage. Examples are “Youth Associations, Women’s Clubs, Sports Clubs; Old Soldiers’ Clubs, Intellectual or Literary Clubs, Societies for amusement and leisure; Trade Unions, Friendly Societies, Co-operative Societies; Leagues of International Friendship, Taxpayers’, Tenants’, Housewives’ Associations; Patriotic or Pacifist Movements, and so on” (Duverger, 1951/1964: 107). Sometimes, the same ancillary organisations however cater both for members and supporters (Duverger, 1951/1964: 107, Gunther & Diamond, 2003: 178).
Apart from these performers of activities to establish external linkage, the mass integration party is helped by the wider social movement of which it forms part and together with which it pursues a joint strategy toward a common goal (in the case of Socialist parties regularly a labour union). Through such co-operation, a more or less thorough penetration of the targeted group is possible on the part of the mass integration party.

**Maintaining External Linkage**

The long-term and continuous activities of political/ideological and social character and the intermittent activities of campaigning character found in the mass integration party are not only aimed at reaching out to and establishing external linkage with the targeted group, they also have the function of tying people who are already supporters (target) closer to the party. These activities thus also fill the function of maintaining external linkage.

As was the case regarding the activities to establish external linkage, there is a variety of bodies that perform these activities to maintain external linkage; the extensive local party branches are important in this context, but the mass integration party also develops specific ancillary organisations, which cater especially for supporters. Affiliate and interest organisations are used in this work as well.

**Establishing Internal Linkage**

The members are the focus of the linkage work of the mass integration party. Voters are of course important, but members are more highly regarded, not least because the members are expected to be loyal to the party. The recruitment policy of the mass integration party is to a large extent focused on the quantity of members, not least because party financing to a large extent is dependent on membership dues. In terms of activities, on-going membership campaigns are thus undertaken to recruit new members. However, quantity is not all; also the quality of the members is important in the mass integration party and the membership requirements are rather formal. A certain level of commitment to the party cause (and sometimes of activity) is required from the members, and they are generally required to pay membership dues.

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1. This movement is generally concerned with activities of broad social scope and has a well-developed and entrenched organisation – often in the shape of interest organisations – outside parliament, to the benefit of the mass integration party.
Maintaining Internal Linkage

As we saw above, the mass integration party works to integrate its members into the party and thus into the political order. It does this through various activities. Importantly, the mass integration party provides opportunities for the members to participate in the party internal decision-making process. By making the members part of this process, the members become part of the wider political process according to the reasoning of the party. Another way to make members part of the political process is to educate them politically and the mass integration party provides continuous activities of political/ideological character to that end. Further, the party provides various continuous, multifaceted and far-ranging activities of social character for the members. In this way, the party caters for the members "from the cradle to the grave" and thus exerts influence over different spheres of the individual’s daily life.¹

These many functions and extensive activities are performed mainly by the extensive and strong membership organisations of branch kind at the grass root level that are characteristic of the mass integration party. However, also affiliate and ancillary organisations catering specifically for members serve to fill this function.² The ancillary organisations for members also make it possible to retain members who are not otherwise active in the party.

As referred to above, members are at the centre of the mass integration party’s linkage work; the members are also given significant influence in the party – they are allowed to participate in the internal decision-making of the mass integration party on a continuous basis. In the regular branch meetings, members not only get political education from the higher ranks of the party organisation. They are also given the opportunity to discuss policy issues and, not least, hold elected representatives accountable for their actions and for their truthfulness to the party programme. Discussions are held at every level of the organisation and elections to the representative bodies at the higher levels in the party are carried out on a regular basis. In this manner the lower levels are connected to the higher levels of the party in a democratic way. The mass integration party is thus

¹ Neumann, 1956: 405. Such services are extended to party members, but also, as we saw above, to groups of (potential) supporters of the party (Bartolini, 1983: 180).
² As Gunther & Diamond as well as Duverger point out, in practice the same ancillary organisations that cater for supporters may also be utilised by members (Gunther & Diamond, 2003: 178, Duverger, 1951/1964: 107).
internally democratic – there is an extensive, continuous and reciprocal *intra-party communication* between the lower and the higher levels on policy matters and recurrent party internal elections for party representatives by the members in the party.¹

**The Total Integration Party Model²**

*Societal Setting, Background, Experiences and Orientation of the Party*

Parties of total integration are parties that aim at the creation of a fundamentally new society along the lines of its totalitarian ideology and an end to the present system; the tool in this work is the organisation of the total integration party.

It was the Communist, National Socialist and Fascist parties, established in Europe in the inter-war period, that took on the characteristics of the total integration party; these were all parties of a totalitarian conviction trying to operate within a democratic society. These were further parties with substantial differences; they had only one thing in common which, according to Duverger, had lasting impact on their organisation – their commitment to a totalitarian ideology.³

Like the mass integration party, the total integration party is thus marked by its ideological orientation, it is an ideological party. But unlike the mass integration party, it is an ideological party with totalitarian ideological claims. Thus, the ideology is all-encompassing, meaning that it

¹That these ideals not always are borne out in practice was noticed most famously by Michels (1915) who formulated the “Iron Law of Oligarchy” with mass integration parties in mind. However, the ideal remains.

²This ideal type is primarily based on Neumann, 1956: 404-405, Barghoorn, 1956: 228-238, Duverger, 1951/1964: 1-3, 27-72, 116-124, 168-182, Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1965: 45-59, Unger, 1974: 61-82, www.kpmlr.o.se and Gunther & Diamond, 2003: 179-183. Cp. also Lawson’s *directive* linkage (Neumann, 1988: 17). According to Lawson, directive linkage is presented by parties which also hold power, in authoritarian states. However, I argue that the kind of linkage that Lawson refers to in this context also is found in parties with a totalitarian ideology, regardless of whether they are in power or not. The label “total integration party” is used by Neumann (1956: 405). Among scholars in the field, “total integration” is used interchangeably with “totalitarian party”. For the sake of homogeneity, I will here use only the term “total integration party”.

³The differences between the Communist cell-based party and the Fascist militia-based party mirror differences in philosophy – and mentality. While the communists put forward the masses and egalitarianism as model, the fascists exalt the elite and aristocratic ideals. The two basic kinds of the total integration party find in those classes respectively the necessary social basis for the planned revolution of society (Duverger, 1951/1964: 2-3).
pervades the entire life of its adherents and there is no flexibility in the interpretation of the doctrine.¹

The total integration party is further a party that aims at revolutionary (rather than reformist) change of the system at hand. Winning votes in general elections is thus of no particular importance for the total integration party; it primarily aims at working for the coming of a new society by extra-parliamentary means.² Electoral struggles are thus of secondary importance for the total integration party, efforts are instead directed towards education, agitation and propaganda and, at times, violent methods.³ However, the total integration party often do participate in elections, as they regard it as a means to present themselves and their ideology to the people.⁴

The total integration party developed in a largely similar societal setting that earlier had shaped the mass integration party, i.e. a rapidly modernising society with deep, interest-based cleavages, where the scope of state-administered welfare was limited and where public mass media was not generally available to parties. Similar (but not identical) historical experiences that made the (Socialist) mass integration parties form in a certain way, also shaped the organisation of (Communist) total integration parties to a certain extent. Like the mass integration party, the total integration party is created outside of parliament and power; but mainly after the introduction of universal suffrage. Further, the total integration party either regards itself as the political expression of a broader social movement, or at least has connections to such. It is marked by a collectivist mentality focused on the common action of a particular social group (or class), and it needed to organise this group to reach influence, something which, at least in the case of Communist parties, was justified by the Marxist ideology.

Unlike the mass integration party, the total integration party was an outright enemy of the state. At the same time they were generally opposed – or ever repressed – by the state in place. These particular origins and experiences contributed to the far-reaching ideological conclusions of

² Duverger, 1951/1964: 2, 35-36.
³ Duverger, 1951/1964: 2, 35-36, 38-39. Especially the Fascist party of the militia type is not interested in electoral and parliamentary action (unless in times of election, when they take advantage of the electoral machinery). The militia "is an instrument for overthrowing a democratic regime and not for organizing it" (Duverger, 1951/1964: 38).
⁴ Duverger, 1951/1964: 39. Ultimately, however, "they (cell and militia parties) employ electoral and parliamentary machinery in order to destroy it, and not so as to act within its framework" (Duverger, 1951/1964: 39).
changing the state and the society at its base. It is thus this ideological orientation in conjunction with its origin and experiences that motivates the specific linkage objective of the total integration party, and hence its type of linkage.

To sum up, the total integration party model as laid out here stipulates that the total integration party is a party with a totalitarian ideology, focused on the common action of a particular social group, aiming at revolutionise the society. It develops outside parliament and power, mainly after the introduction of universal suffrage, with a view to overthrow the state. It develops in a society with interest-based cleavages undergoing rapid economic and political change, where the state fails to provide for its citizens. On the basis of its origin, experiences and ideological orientation, the total integration party aims at totally integrating its members into the party, as a first step in its drive to change society fundamentally. It therefore organises its linkage in a total integration manner.

The Ideal Typical Total Integration Party Type of Linkage

**Linkage Objective**

The ideological objective of the party of total integration is, ultimately, the creation of a new society along the lines of its totalitarian ideology. In this work, the party of total integration, like the party of mass integration, aims at integrating a particular group. Unlike the party of mass integration, however, it is not the present society that the masses are to be integrated into. Rather it is a question of total integration of the members into the party and its totalitarian ideology, in order both to make the members work for the coming of the new society and to prepare them for integration in this coming society. Such total integration into the party constitutes the *linkage objective* of the total integration party. The *motivation* on the part of the total integration party for organising and working the way it does is thus to act in accordance with its ideology, which is based on its setting, origin and experiences.

**Establishing External Linkage**

The efforts to establish external linkage are limited in the total integration party – members and not supporters are what is valued. Even if the main focus of the party’s activities is the all-encompassing activities of esoteric ideological kind for members only, the total integration party also carries out
activities aimed at recruiting more supporters, and thus potential future activists, to the party. Such activities are primarily of long-term and continuous kind and of political/ideological and social character. Some campaigning activities are also carried out by the total integration party. Primarily, these activities are performed indirectly. Indeed, Duverger claims that “campaigns must be conducted by other bodies (than cells)”.¹ This is also the case regarding the other kinds of activities. These activities are thus carried out by various ancillary groups controlled by the party; such as sport associations, trade unions, professional societies, youth organisations and cultural associations.

Like the party of mass integration, the party of total integration targets a specific segment of the electorate; unlike the mass integration party, however, the total integration party is more selective in its targeting. Further, there is a difference between the Communist cell party and the Fascist militia party in this regard. While the Communist party directs itself at hard-working labourers, the Fascist party directs its attention at the middle-classes.

Maintaining External Linkage

As in the case of activities to establish external linkage, not much effort is spent by the total integration party on maintaining the external linkage that it has succeeded in establishing. However, the same activities that are used to establish external linkage, i.e. mainly long-term and continuous activities of political/ideological and social kind, performed by primarily ancillary organisations, may also be used to maintain linkage to the supporters (target) of the total integration party.

Establishing Internal Linkage

To be a member of the total integration party is to be an activist. The activists are at the core of all party concerns. Lukewarm members are shunned – and periodically expelled. Quality rather than quantity is prioritised. Even if members are recruited on an ongoing basis, not least via ancillary organisations, no far-reaching efforts are spent on attracting members (recruitment policy). Consequently, membership in the total integration party is not bestowed on just anybody. On the contrary, there are strict requirements to become a member – often the member-to-be is tried in different stages to make sure that he or she fulfils the strict requirements

¹ Duverger, 1951/1964: 35.
placed on members (membership requirements). If entry into the party is highly regulated, the same can be said about withdrawal from it – in practice, it is difficult to leave the party at all. The exception is the expulsion of members who fail to live up to the strict requirements.

Maintaining Internal Linkage

To accomplish the total integration aimed at, the party of total integration is a party of extreme encapsulation. Every aspect of the member’s life is organised and catered for by the party – his working-life as well as his (and his family’s) private life; his material needs as well as his spiritual needs. The party thus organises not only the time of the member, but the mind of the member as well; his conceptual views of the world are given by the party and every means is used to instil in him the totalitarian ideology, on the basis of which he is to work for the coming of the new society. Thus, "(r)ea] totalitar[ianism is spiritual".¹ To this end, a multitude of encapsulating, multifaceted and continuous activities of political/ideological as well as social character are devised for the members.

These encapsulating activities are performed by different kinds of organisational structures. The basic organisational body of the Communist party is the working-place cell, while that of the Fascist party is the army-like militia. These basic organisational bodies are small and the members can be kept under constant surveillance by the leaders. For leisure time purposes, there is also an all-encompassing range of activities arranged by diverse ancillary organisations in which the member is expected to participate. These not only serve to fill the leisure time of the members, but also to show the members how the doctrine is to be acted out in reality – and to accomplish “a spiritual organization of the whole of his thought”.²

The total integration party is thus a party that demands strict discipline, complete engagement and unconditional surrender of the members to the party organisation, its ideology – and the party’s leaders. From this follows that the monolithic rule by the leaders is undisputed within the party, as are their dictates on policy matters as well as on who is included in the party leadership. The decisions (and orders) are, however, continuously communicated to the lower levels of the party organisation and

¹ Duverger, 1951/1964: 118.
² Duverger, 1951/1964: 118. As pointed out previously, there may be different ancillary organisations for members and supporters. However, ancillary organisations may also have dual functions – to attract presumptive members and to fill up the time of those people who are already members.
the lower levels are strictly supervised. However, attempts may be made – especially in Communist parties – on the part of the leadership to lend a shimmer of legitimacy to internal party processes by listening to the lower levels of the organisation prior to the decisions at the top. If this is done, however, the leaders expect strict discipline once the decisions are taken. Elections of leaders at different levels may also be staged, but in practice it is always a question of co-optation and nomination of leaders from above (intra-party communication).¹

The Catch-All Party Model²

**Societal Setting, Background, Experiences and Orientation of the Party**

In his influential article, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems" (1966), Otto Kirchheimer argues that the mass integration parties (of the left) existing in the early 20th century together with the even earlier cadre parties (of the right) developed into catch-all parties in their quest for success at the polls, along with modernisation.³ Kirchheimer underlines that this was a tendency found in all parties regardless of their ideology; also religious parties were therefore part of this development.

According to the catch-all party model, the better conditions for the citizens, the greater ability of the state to take care of the economic well-being and security of the citizens, the de-ideologisation of the public debate, the spread of "secular" and "mass consumer-goods" orientations, the lessening relevance of class lines and denominational structures, and the concomitant rise of individualistic orientations led to a general “middle classification” influencing all layers of society, making the society more

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¹ This system is called “democratic centralism” in Communist parties. In Fascist parties, no elections take place.
³ In this sense, the catch-all type of organisation is contagious, according to Kirchheimer, who states that "(a) party is apt to accommodate to its competitor’s successful style because of hope of benefits or fear of losses on election day" (Kirchheimer, 1966: 188). Today, however, not all agree with this conclusion, claiming that parties do not have to develop in a uniform manner (cp. e.g. Scarrow, 1996, Vogt, 1994: 223, Wolinetz, 1979). The catch-all party type as here outlined is based on the European parties, of the right as well as of the left, as they developed after the war (Katz & Mair, 1995: 12-13; Kirchheimer, 1966: esp. 184-185; Wright, 1971: 7, 17-54) and on the modern parties developing in America, from the 1950s on (Epstein, 1967: 257-260).
homogeneous, or at least marked by softer class and denominational lines. This together with the spread of mass media techniques, facilitating the communication between party leaders and the electorate at large, all of which followed in the wake of modernisation, meant that parties no longer needed to fulfil the function of integrating the citizens into society; at this point, universal suffrage was also long institutionalised and the masses did not need to be brought into the political process. Instead, the parties could focus on coming to power through winning elections.

Further, in this situation, the voters no longer seemed attracted to all-encompassing ideologies appealing to specific groups in the electorate, but rather seemed to prefer parties more prone to day-to-day pragmatic political solutions. These changes had consequences for the organisation of the parties, according to the catch-all party model. According to this model, the parties had to adapt to the new situation in order to have a continuing influence and the result of this adaptation was the catch-all party. This need for adaptation applied not least to the old mass integration parties, whose objective transformed from the broad-ranging task of integrating individuals into society to the narrower political task of winning as many votes as possible in elections, according to Kirchheimer.1 In Kirchheimer’s version, the ultimate goal of catch-all parties is thus to win power by appealing to the widest possible audience. The party programme is something that is moulded largely on what is believed to be popular with the people: “Lacking an explicit ideology”,2 the catch-all party concentrates “on issues which are scarcely liable to meet resistance in the community”.3 The catch-all party is thus basically a party of pragmatic orientation, primarily intent on getting to power.

The orientation of the catch-all party was also influenced by the general outlook in society, which was marked by the “middle classification”,

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1 Kirchheimer however notes that “the catch-all performance meets definite limits in the traditional framework of society” (Kirchheimer, 1966: 185). He exemplifies with the Christian Democratic party in Italy, and remarks that this party “cannot successfully appeal to the anticlerical elements in the population” (Kirchheimer, 1966: 185). This would seem to exclude religious parties from development into catch-all parties. However, Kirchheimer continues to state that “nothing prevents the party from phrasing its appeals so as to maximise its chances of catching more of those numerous elements which are not disturbed by the party’s clerical ties. The solidary element of its doctrinal core has long been successfully employed to attract a socially diversified clientele” (Kirchheimer, 1966: 185). Thus, religious parties are not excluded from a development towards catch-all parties.


3 Kirchheimer, 1966: 186.
following in the wake of modernisation. The middle class is, Duverger argues, individualistic and so are the catch-all parties. Discussing the earlier cadre party, that later developed into a catch-all party, Duverger contends that "(t)he middle class … is not fond of collective action". Indeed, "the middle class, profoundly individualistic and generally liberal-minded … found all real discipline repugnant"… (For the middle classes) "originality is a strength." As the working class develops into a middle class along with modernisation, the collectivist mass integration party thus develops into an individualistic catch-all party, according to this line of reasoning.

As we saw above, some catch-all parties developed from the earlier cadre parties, which were formed within the parliament before the introduction of universal suffrage. However, origin is of little importance for catch-all parties. Indeed, these parties have no common background. Also previous mass integration parties, which had been externally created, developed into catch-all parties.

An aspect that does influence the particular linkage objective and hence linkage organisation of the catch-all party is however the fact that it commonly has had at least some experience of being in power, something which makes it possible for the party to relate to the citizens in other ways.

1 Duverger, 1951/1964: 26, emphasis added.
2 Duverger, 1951/1964: 169-170, cp. also 103, 30, 67. Indeed, "this feeling (dislike of regimentation and refusal to give up personal independence) is very strong in some agricultural and middle-class circles and explains why membership is a less well-developed feature in right-wing parties and in agricultural areas" (Duverger, 1951/1964: 103, cp. also 30, 67).
3 It is interesting to note that Duverger thus supports the catch-all thesis applied to mass integration parties. He observes that the working class becomes better off and develops into a middle class with modernisation. Along with this development, its mentality shifts in a more individualistic direction. As a result, both the linkage objective and, accordingly, the organisation of linkage in the (mass) class parties will shift: "An analysis of the Socialist parties would probably confirm these results. With them there can be observed a progressive decline of the branch system (of the mass integration kind) which seems correlated to their gradually becoming more middle-class" (Duverger, 1951/1964: 27). When Kirchheimer (1966) and Epstein (1967) thus put forward the same thesis – that the social and economic development undermined the traditional bases of the mass integration parties and worked in favour of a more inclusive and less ideological party, a catch-all party, it was thus not in contradiction to Duverger’s argument. Indeed, Duverger did thus not only (as many analysts claim) espouse the “contagion-from-the-Left”-thesis, according to which “the middle classes, realizing that cadre parties were inadequate, were to make serious attempts to create mass parties” (1951/1964: 67) and that thus "the Right is obliged to follow the example (of Leftist party organisation of the mass integration kind) in order to retain its influence" (1951/1964: xxvii). As becomes evident here, Duverger also subscribes to Kirchheimer’s catch-all party logic and Epstein’s "contagion from the Right"-thesis, but in a different societal setting.
than via the party organisation. Further, the catch-all party is in no way opposed to the state in place; it wishes to be at its helm, not to reform it or – indeed – overthrow it. Instead, the catch-all party is generally fully accepted by the state apparatus.

In summary, societal modernisation makes the society more homogeneous and the citizens more individualistic and pragmatic, and less interested in all-encompassing ideologies, according to the catch-all party model as I construe it. This in turn makes the parties that operate in this environment aim exclusively at winning elections, instead of taking a wide social interest in the citizens. These parties therefore organise their linkage in a way that makes it possible to "catch all", in order to win elections and come to power.

**The Ideal Typical Catch-All Party Type of Linkage**

**Linkage Objective**

The catch-all party thus concentrates fully on the electoral scene, searching wide public support and immediate success at the polls. Its political goal is narrow and short-term – the catch-all party wants to come to power by winning as many voters as possible in elections. In the words of Wright, “the electoral function is considered paramount (in the catch-all party type)… (T)his (party type) entails a conception of party activities and roles drawn almost exclusively in power-oriented vote-mobilization terms”.¹ The linkage objective of the catch-all party is thus to maximise votes by appealing to the public at large, on the basis of its motivation to act according to its pragmatic orientation based on its setting and experiences.

**Establishing External Linkage**

The catch-all party tries to maximise its number of votes by approaching as many voters in the society as possible (target).² Catch-all parties strive to become big parties, with supporters (but not necessarily members) from all walks of life.

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¹ Wright, 1971: 335.
² Another way in which the catch-all party tries to maximise its vote is by concentrating on general policy issues, which are not expected to meet opposition in the electorate at large and thus risk to deter voters. But this strategy is not part of linkage as here defined, as it is not directly related to party organisation or activities. Therefore, this aspect will be disregarded in this context.
The activities of the catch-all party to establish external linkage are almost exclusively focused on elections, and they are therefore intermittent, limited and short-term; social or ideological issues form no part of the catch-all party’s interest. From this focus on elections follows that election campaigns are extremely important for the catch-all party. It is mainly through campaigning activities, performed primarily by the national party leadership, that the catch-all party experiences anything like direct political linkage in relation to the citizens, even if connected – but independent – interest organisations are utilised to this effect as well.

**Maintaining External Linkage**

These intermittent contacts with the citizens in times of election are not always regarded as sufficient, however. Occasional, short-term activities of campaigning character may therefore be carried out mainly by the party leadership (performer) also between elections, like media debates. The function of these activities is then to maintain the links with the supporters of the party (target). Such activities are not undertaken on a regular basis, however.

Another, more regular, way in which catch-all parties work to maintain the external linkage is by connecting to interest organisations, which are “ideological or economic in nature or a combination of the two” (performer). Interest organisations have closer, more long-term contacts with the public than the catch-all party itself. In this way, the catch-all party gains access to a more permanent base of voters. The party and the interest organisations however enjoy a great deal of independence from one another. It is important for the catch-all party to “modulate its interest-groups relations in such a way so as not to discourage potential voters who identify themselves with other interests”.

**Establishing Internal Linkage**

Members are not regarded as important by the catch-all party; it is the voters, not the members, that make parties win elections. The catch-all party accepts members, but it has no particular interest in a large and strictly defined membership. Hence, the catch-all party does not work to recruit new members (recruitment policy). But individuals who want to become

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members are admitted to the party without any restrictions (*membership requirements*).

**Maintaining Internal Linkage**

As the catch-all party is entirely focused on elections, party internal activities catering for the members of the party are largely absent. Indeed, “while the organizational activities are perceived as necessary, they are viewed as necessary for the performance of the major task of campaigning”.¹ The occasional and limited *activities* of campaigning character that are carried out mainly by the top leadership (*performer*) naturally reach also the members and may work also to maintain internal linkage, even if this is not what they are primarily designed for. More important in this context is that members sometimes take part in these campaigning activities in support of the party leaders. According to Katz & Mair, ”members are organized cheerleaders for (the) elite” – especially in times of elections.² In this sense too then, such campaigning activities may serve to maintain the internal linkage in the catch-all party.

The focus on general elections strengthens the leadership of the catch-all party, but the rest of the organisation is not paid much attention. The catch-all party’s connections with interest organisations however ensure at least some permanence in the relation also to members who are involved in such organisations. However it cannot be said that such interest organisations work to maintain internal linkage *in* the party – after all, they are separate organisations. The role of the party members in the party internal processes is thus very limited in the catch-all party. In Katz’& Mair’s words, the relationship between the ordinary members and the party elite in the catch-all party is ”top down” and, according to Wright, the catch-all party type “tends to be characterized by little, intermittent, and often inefficient communication, dealing mainly with electoral strategy”.³

In the catch-all party, the party leadership is in control of the party’s internal decision-making process, both regarding policies and selection of leaders.⁴ The policies adopted are then occasionally communicated down to

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¹ Wright, 1971: 339.
⁴ Gunther & Diamond, 2003: 186. The democratic ideal of the catch-all party is based on the expectation that citizens are to participate in other kinds of organisations and activities if they want to be active in political life. Instead of being primarily accountable to the members of the party, the leaders of the catch-all party are held accountable to the electorate at large at
lower party levels. As leaders thus play a pre-eminent role in shaping the policies of the party, leadership selection becomes important in the catch-all party. While the party leadership usually is formally elected, the party leaders typically supervise the election process closely and demand from the elected representatives to be responsive to the party views (intra-party communication).

The Clientelistic Party Model

Societal Setting, Background, Experiences and Orientation of the Party

One model of party organisation that is largely lacking when the parties of Western Europe are discussed is the clientelistic party type. However, it is more frequently recurring when turning the interest to southern Europe (not least Italy), to early 20th century America, Japan – and to the Third world, not least the Muslim world. Indeed, according to Roy "(i)t is a commonplace to speak of patronage as the usual mode of operation in political life in the Middle East".

In the literature on the political situation in the Third World, it is repeatedly stated that clientelism and patronage is something that marks much of the political process in this part of the world, in countries where general franchise has been fairly recently introduced. Further, these societies are generally marked by a particularistic outlook. This situation in Third World countries is often compared to the situation in the United States around the turn of the last century. In the American context, the mass general elections, when the electorate is able to choose between different "teams of leaders", i.e. different (catch-all party) leaderships.


2 Patron-client relations and patronage is a multifaceted phenomenon and it has been studied in numerous ways. Many scholars make a basic distinction between, on the one hand, the broad patron-client bond found in traditional societies and, on the other hand, clientelism as a strategy on the part of a mass-based political party – a political machine – to gain and manage political power, found in developing and modern societies (cp. Weingrod, 1967/1968: 379, Chubb, 1982: 4). Others criticise this dichotomous approach and contend that the phenomenon is even more complex (cp. Roniger, 1994: 12). My object here is however to focus on the party directed clientelism as it has been outlined in the literature.


integration parties found in Europe never existed. Instead, parties aiming at drawing votes from as large sections of society as possible with the help of clientelistic practices were formed at the introduction of general suffrage, as a result of the specific circumstances at hand. Epstein thus considers the American clientelistic party as a counterpart to the working-class parties of Europe, it was the party that appealed to the American masses. Regarding clientelism in the Third World, it is argued that several of the conditions that led to clientelism in the US at that time, are present in many developing countries – with the same results.

Important societal characteristics that make parties aim at maximising votes through clientelistic practices, and thus organise as parties of clientelistic linkage, are either rapid societal change and urbanisation or rural, pre-modern settings. Characteristic of such societies is that mass media techniques are poorly developed (or not useful) for parties and the state is not taking care of basic welfare functions (such as education, legal aid and medical care). In the Third World, this lack of public welfare often results in a poor, needy and uprooted mass without sufficient means of support in the absence of state-run social welfare programmes. This lack of welfare makes leaders compete for support with the help of concrete, material inducements. The populations thus make up potentially fertile soil for

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1 Epstein, 1967: 104-111. In a wider perspective, it can also be noted that there are similarities between mass integration parties and clientelistic parties in that both promise (and provide) different kinds of material benefits (cp. e.g. Nelson, 1979: 192). The difference is that in mass integration parties such “inducements were more typically embodied in general legislation”, while in the case of clientelistic parties, they were “particularistic and often outside the law” (Scott, 1969: 1149). While material benefits for mass integration parties thus are part primarily of the party policy and not the party linkage, they are part and parcel of the linkage of the clientelistic party. The motivations for providing material benefits also differ widely between the mass integration party and the clientelistic party. We will return to this discussion when presenting the activities of clientelistic parties.

2 Even if some, e.g. Chubb, make a distinction between, on the one hand, the political machine “in its classic form in American big-city politics of the 19th and early 20th centuries” and, on the other, the political machine “as a major instrument of mass mobilization in the present-day politics of many developing nations” (Chubb, 1982: 4), many scholars in the field emphasise that the two types of political machines rest on the same logic of trading favours for votes and that the clientelism found in the Third World can be compared to the “classical” clientelism found in the US in an earlier period (cp. Nelson, 1979: 170,171, 191-213, Scott, 1969: 1142-1158). The ideal typical type of party clientelistic linkage as here presented is thus based on the American case as well as on the Third World case. Regarding the American type, Ostrogorski (1902) and Epstein (1967: 104-110) are used, while Randall (1988: 174-190), Chubb (1982: 4, 71-77), Nelson (1979: 170,171, 191-213) and Scott (1969: 1142-1158) are used regarding patronage of the “developing” type.

3 According to Gunther & Diamond “(t)he clientelistic party…is a confederation of notables
Chapter 2: How to Understand the Organisation of Linkage

political parties offering material benefits and services. Furthermore, where rapid societal expansion takes place, this expansion provides much of the resources necessary to fulfil the clientelistic obligations on the part of the clientelistic parties.¹

The fragmentation of authority and power in local governments is another reason for development of clientelistic objectives and thus practices on the part of the parties, according to the analysts. This fragmentation makes it difficult for the local authorities to meet the needs of the poor, and it often results in an absence of an overarching control on favouritism and corruption, resulting in ready access to resources by the party in power.

Another factor that is important for the development of a clientelistic party is its relation to the political power. Shefter for example notes that "(i)nternally mobilized parties (i.e. parties created in parliament, without roots in a broader social movement) will tend to be patronage oriented".² However, also parties created out of parliament with roots in a broader social movement, such as the Indian Congress Party, may take on clientelistic traits. What is important in this regard, as many scholars point out, seems to be that clientelistic parties frequently has a history of being in power – on either national or local level, or on both.³ Like the catch-all party, the

¹ Theorists often regard the phase of clientelistic parties as transitory and argue that such parties are most likely in transitional societies. These scholars argue that the political machine of clientelistic kind will disappear by itself along with the social context in which it found itself successful, and be replaced by parties which instead recognise the occupational and/or class considerations developing in the population (cp. Scott, 1969: 1148-1149, 1157; Nelson, 1979: 196, 204). Chubb however disagrees and points to the political machines in southern Italy which took on a more permanent character (Chubb, 1982: 74-76, cp. also Gunther & Diamond, 2003: 177). Obviously, in Italy the tangentopoli scandals in 1992 changed that. Also Gunther & Diamond (2003) point out that the corruption that easily follows in the wake of clientelistic parties may lead to the destruction of the parties.

² Shefter, 1994: 31. Shefter later qualifies this statement, claiming that this is so – unless a bureaucracy was developed prior to the mobilisation of the masses into politics. If a bureaucracy was in place before mass mobilisation, internally mobilised parties did not have the same opportunity to make use of patronage as those internally created parties that mobilised a mass base before such bureaucracy was in place (Shefter, 1994: 31, 34-36). Shefter also contends that "(t)he relationship between party origins and subsequent behaviour…is somewhat looser in the case of internally mobilized parties than it is with externally mobilized parties (Shefter, 1994: 34).

³ Cp. Nelson who points out that clientelistic parties “are normally parties in power” (Nelson, 1979: 193). Power provides a party with ready access to resources to distribute. Even if distribution of patronage in the form of state resources only is possible for governing parties, opposition parties too may be able to distribute similar goods with a material content, such as opportunities for upward mobility. Also opposition parties thus have the possibility to
clientelistic party is thus not in any way opposed to the state in place; indeed its objective is to lead the state. The state and establishment in turn generally accepts the clientelistic party; it is not seen as a threat to the state itself.

Another factor that favours a clientelistic character on the part of political parties is, according to the analysts, societal heterogeneity, along ethnic as well as class lines. In a situation of ethnic heterogeneity, the parties aim at building majority coalitions on the basis of different ethnic groups through clientelistic practices, instead of relying on the support of one particular group. According to Epstein, such societal fragmentation and heterogeneity also contribute to the lack of an "organized or organizable working-class" that formed the basis of the mass parties in Europe. Such a lack in turn makes way for clientelistic parties. Epstein asserts that the clientelistic party "was a means, without class-conscious ideological goals, to mobilize masses of voters".1

The clientelistic party is thus a party of pragmatic orientation, primarily intent on getting as many votes as possible in elections in order to come to (or stay in) power. But the clientelistic party is not individualistic as the catch-all party. Instead, it is influenced by a traditional dependency on – and loyalty to – a leader and by the particularistic (community and family-oriented) orientations that flourish in the developing part of the world.2 Where such orientations are prevalent, particularistic appeals and patronage is a common way of doing politics, according to this reasoning. Parties developing in such a context thus tap into the tradition by trading favours for votes, as clientelistic parties.

To summarise, the clientelistic model as laid out here thus states that parties that develop after the introduction of universal suffrage in heterogeneous societies, marked by either rapid societal change or traditionalism, particularistic orientations and absence of state-run welfare programmes, especially if they have some experience of being in power, distribute patronage, even if their resources generally are more limited. However, opposition parties with no history of being in (and no prospect of coming to) power probably rarely develop clientelistic traits. Parties in power on lower levels, such as in municipalities, of course also have ample opportunity to distribute patronage, even if they are in opposition at the national level.

1 Epstein, 1967: 106.

In line with this, Jackson & Rosberg "conclude that two general conditions are necessary for clientelism to emerge: states with (1) weakly institutionalized and highly personalized governments and (2) pluralistic societies and particularistic cultures" (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982: 46).
acquire a pragmatic orientation. These circumstances make such parties aim at winning as many votes in elections as possible, in order to come to power, by the way of particularistic appeals and patronage, and they thus develop a clientelistic type of linkage.

The Ideal Typical Clientelistic Party Type of Linkage

Linkage Objective

The clientelistic party aims at winning power by winning elections. In order to secure the maximum number of votes, the clientelistic party enters into different kinds of clientelistic deals with members of the electorate. In those deals, material as well as non-material rewards are promised in return for votes. Thus, the main characteristic of the clientelistic party is that it aims at securing votes through different kinds of vote-buying. In doing so, the clientelistic party rejects a unified ideological stance. Indeed, ideology plays a very limited role in the clientelistic party – winning votes is the only thing that counts. The linkage objective of the clientelistic party is then to maximise votes, and it does so by trading favours for votes, in accordance with its motivation to act in line with its pragmatic orientation based on its setting and experiences.

Establishing External Linkage

The clientelistic activities, used to establish external linkage, take the shape of various particularistic rewards and incentives and they are referred to as “service activities” in this context. (State) resources, services and other material goods, favours and incentives (especially jobs) are distributed by the clientelistic party to voters and presumptive voters, in exchange for votes.\(^1\) Indeed, "(t)here is … no sphere of public, political, and economic...

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\(^1\) Examples of such service activities are the "provision of the kinds of assistance (jobs, favours, aid, and advice) which were the hallmark of the old-style city machine" (Wright, 1971: 340), service activities also include “aiding ‘constituents’ with advice, patronage jobs, funds, intercession with government authorities, or other benefits” (Wright, 1971: 337), such as employment, legal services (like help to clients having broken the law), economic relief, primitive welfare functions (Scott, 1969: 1150). More concretely, service activities include help in finding a job, medicine, a doctor, a loan, a “hod of coal”, as well as intervention in problems with the police and community improvements such as clean water or electric lighting and prospect of economic and social progress; the political machine itself also provides a channel for upward mobility. Loyalty from voters is also at attracted by the presence of party workers at weddings and funerals, by arrangements of boxing matches, by exchanging of friendly greetings in the street, by memberships in clubs. Indeed, the voter is usually given more non-material inducements (Nelson, 1979: 192, 207-208, Ostrogorski,
activity into which the Machine does not penetrate”, according to Ostrogorski.\(^1\) Apart from these service activities, that form the backbone of the attempts of the clientelistic party to establish external linkage, not least campaigning activities – such as meetings – play an important role in the clientelistic party’s attempts at reaching out to the voters. In times of election, the clientelistic party holds meetings of “every kind”, catering for electors from every walk of life.\(^2\) Door-to-door canvassing was further the most preferred method of vote-getting in the traditional American clientelistic party. This work of service and campaigning character is predominantly short-term and intermittent, and it takes place mainly in times of election. However, some of the service work is of long-term and continuous character.

More political or ideological activities are not on the agenda of the clientelistic party. According to Randall, “more purely ideological appeals, going beyond people’s immediate material interest, play a limited direct role in mobilization” in the clientelistic party.\(^3\) Rather, they try to “respond to the incentives which motivate their clientele than to transform the nature of those incentives”.\(^4\)

The target of these service and campaigning activities varies somewhat in the clientelistic party. In establishing client networks, the

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1 Ostrogorski, 1902: 378-380, Janda, 1980: 87). These material and non-material goods and services are largely designed to alleviate the sometimes difficult conditions of the members of the electorate; many of them were thus “social-service” activities (Epstein, 1967: 107. Epstein includes political clubs in those activities). The traditional American political machine worker has been called “something of a social worker not recognized by the profession” (Scott, 1969: 1150). The objective of these activities is however primarily to win votes for the party, and not to improve the position of the poor by making for basic social and economic changes; for all their social content, what these activities did was to “(establish) a debt on which the (party) could draw at election time” (Epstein, 1967: 107, cp. also Nelson, 1979: 213). Thus, whereas the “social-service” activities of clientelistic parties in many ways coincide with “social” activities provided by mass integration parties, the motivations behind provision of such goods differ widely. While the motivation of the clientelistic party is first and foremost to gain more votes, the motivation of the mass integration party for providing the same (or similar) activities is ideological and in general an offshoot of its stated, ideologically based, policy goals. More precisely, in relation to linkage, such activities of the mass integration party are a way to integrate the masses into the party. To find out whether social activities provided by a party is of clientelistic or mass integration kind, one thus has to look deeper into what motivate the provision of these activities.

2 Ostrogorski, 1902: 308.


4 Scott, 1969: 1147.
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clientelistic party sometimes targets wide strata of the society, sometimes particular groups in the electorate, even if the latter course often seems to be a less viable long-term strategy. In Ostrogorski’s words, the client network "is like a huge spider’s web spread by the Machine over the district. Every new elector is drawn into it at once. As soon as he moves in...a visit is paid him, an attempt is made to win him". However, Ostrogorski too points to the flexibility of the target in the clientelistic party, as he points out that the many meetings of the clientelistic party, "(s)ometimes (are) promiscuous, sometimes (are directed at) special groups".

The heterogeneity of the electorate targeted makes substantial flexibility and pragmatism necessary on the part of the clientelistic party. "Party candidates (do) not face one electorate but several; each ethnic group (has) its own special interests and demands and a successful campaign (depends) on assembling a temporary coalition on the basis of inducements suited to each group". Focus thus seems to be on reaching each and everyone in the electorate; in this sense patronage serves "as a major instrument of mass mobilization". In this work no particular social group is thus targeted by the party, but the target of the particular activities varies.

This "patronage in return for votes"-arrangement requires the clientelistic party to have an organisation which manages to reach out to the (presumptive) voters. It needs to be a flexible party of wide, multifaceted capacities to ensure that patronage can be distributed in the appropriate manner. The required kind of organisation is secured through client networks, of more or less formal character (performers). These client networks may be established in two ways. Either it is a two-step process in which the party targets local notables who in their turn control the local vote. The party here activates and politicises pre-existing personal links, by trying to gain allegiance from locally influential people. Or the party leadership itself establishes direct connections with the electorate, via – often fragmented – local party organisations, which tap into local client networks. Apart from the client networks and fragmented local party organisations, the clientelistic party also frequently has special associations for particular groups such as women, student, youth, peasants etc. (i.e. ancillary

1 Ostrogorski, 1902: 380.
2 Ostrogorski, 1902: 380.
3 Scott, 1969: 1149.
organisations) “only to mobilize support”; interest organisations, such as trade unions, may also be attached to the clientelistic party to the same effect.¹

**Maintaining External Linkage**

The drive of the clientelistic party towards mobilisation prior to elections contributes to giving the clientelistic party an irregular character, even if certain clientelistic activities carried out by the party extend beyond the election. As one analyst puts it, "between elections, organized activity is typically dormant”, however "parties…continuously seek to serve their supporters (target) by assisting them in their frequent dealings with the state bureaucracies” and by "tak(ing) into account debts that are built up over considerable periods of time”.²

The party workers are thus active, if to a considerably lower degree, also between elections. To ensure a more permanent existence in society, the clientelistic party may further use "parapolitical secondary associations” or ancillary organisations, such as associations of shopkeepers, artisans, industrialists et c., as channels for patronage.³ Moreover, as we saw previously, interest organisations, not least trade unions, are often attached to clientelistic parties; these may ensure a permanent source of party patronage, not least as by providing jobs for party supporters (performers).

**Establishing Internal Linkage**

In the clientelistic party it is the patronage networks, and the clients/supporters attached to those, that are of primary concern, not a mass membership or an elaborate membership organisation. Members are nothing that are sought because of their value *per se*, instead members are valued primarily in relation to their success as vote-getters. Indeed, there are different opinions on how to define the term “member” in the clientelistic party. Here, I include “members” as well as “workers” in the definition of party members.⁴ These members/workers are usually inactive, especially

² Weingrod, 1967/1968: 397, 386, emphasis added. Cp. also Nelson, who states that, “(i)n the United States model, the lowest echelon of machine workers were in constant, day-to-day contact with their constituencies and maintained support through a continuing flow of particularistic favors” (Nelson, 1979: 193).
⁴ While some, like Epstein, are reluctant to call the workers “members” as “they remain a source of votes, not of dues or policies” (Epstein, 1967: 104), others, like Nelson, 1979, seem
between elections. However, "(d)uring election campaigns party members become exceedingly active".¹

According to Nelson, “there is no shortage of persons willing to work for the (clientelistic) party in exchange for material benefit”, not in the developing countries, nor in early 20th century America; what is limited is usually “the resources available to attract and hold party workers”.² People thus mainly come to the party to become members and the efforts by the local leadership directed at recruiting members/workers are therefore generally limited in the clientelistic party; “(o)nly enough ‘members’ are needed for efficient vote-getting” (recruitment policy).³ There are further generally no restrictions to enter the clientelistic party (membership requirements).⁴

Maintaining Internal Linkage

The daily party work in the clientelistic party is to a large extent carried out by a reliable, responsive cadre of members/workers. This cadre of party members/workers constitutes the regular and permanent machinery of the organisation.

To maintain the internal linkage with the members/workers of the party, these are provided with (substantial) material benefits, so called party internal patronage. Indeed, “holding loyal party workers … often have made heavier claims on the (clientelistic) machines’ resources than did maximizing the vote. (In fact) most material rewards were retained by members of the machine itself, and many of the incentives to voters … were symbolic or nonmaterial”.⁵ The activities to maintain internal linkage with

¹ Weingrod, 1967/1968: 397, cp. also p 386.
⁴ There are exceptions, but mostly the clientelistic parties are inclusive regarding members (cp. Randall, 1988: 178-179).
members/voters in the clientelistic party are thus basically of service character. These activities are performed by the local party organisation. The often fragmented local party organisations are not necessarily represented in all parts of the country. Where they exist, the local organisations are strictly ruled from the top.

The clientelistic party is to a large extent focused on the leadership of the party (an individual or a group) – the leadership, and especially the party leader, play a pre-eminent role in the party. This focus on the party leadership together with the focus on client networks rather than on the membership of the party, leads to a virtual absence of party internal communication. As far as any communication takes place, it is (predominantly) one-way; from the top – down. The party leadership thus tightly controls selection of leaders as well as decisions on policy issues, even if staged elections may take place (intra-party communication).¹

The Party-Centred Models Summarised
In order to give an overview of the different party-centred models explaining the organisation of party linkage, as here extracted on the basis of the party-centred theoretical discourse, a summary of these models is presented below.

First, the factors that are regarded as resulting in different kinds of linkage, i.e. the societal setting, the background/experiences and the orientation of the party, are outlined for each model. After these factors, the different linkage types are summarised.

¹ According to Nelson, clientelistic parties "are disciplined hierarchies. The party head, whether a single boss or an inner circle, controls nominations tightly, and the choices are rarely contested" (Nelson, 1979: 193).
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2:1. Factors resulting in different types of linkage according to the party centred theoretical models.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Societal setting of party</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of society</td>
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<tr>
<td>General outlook in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party background/ experiences</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table summarises the factors that are regarded as resulting in different types of linkage, according to the party-centred models.
Next, the different linkage objectives and different “stages” of linkage (regarding how parties organise and work in order to establish and maintain external as well as internal linkage) as outlined by the different models are summarised.

As I pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, these different types are the same according both to the party-centred and the institutional explanations, both explanations agree that the parties invariably organise their linkage (predominantly) in line with one of these types. However, the reason why parties organise according to these types differ between the explanations. As I will return to in Chapter 3, it is these linkage types that are used as the analytical framework of the study. In the empirical analysis, the task is to analyse the different cases and determine whether they can be regarded as organising their linkage in line with any of the linkage types.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage objective and motivation of the party</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To draw a mass group and integrate members into the party (linkage objective) in order to act in line with the ideological orientation on the basis of setting, origin and experiences (motivation)</td>
<td>Total integration of the members into the party (linkage objective) in order to act in line with the ideological orientation on the basis of setting, origin and experiences (motivation)</td>
<td>Maximisation of votes by appealing to all (linkage objective) in order to act in line with the pragmatic orientation on the basis of setting and experiences (motivation)</td>
<td>Maximisation of votes by trading favours for votes (linkage objective) in order to act in line with the pragmatic orientation on the basis of setting and experiences (motivation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table summarises the four different linkage objectives and motivations according to the party-centred models.

¹ Mostly parties do not adopt a pure party type. As Lawson points out, these types are often combined in practice, they are thus not mutually exclusive (Lawson, 1988: 17). However, one type often dominates. Analytically it is important to keep the separate types apart.
### Table 2:3. Summary of linkage outcome in the different ideal types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage outcome</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishing external linkage</td>
<td>Through long-term and continuous work of political/ideological and social character and short-term activities of campaigning character in times of election (activities), towards well-defined mass group (target) by nationally diffused local branches as well as ancillary, affiliate and interest organisations (performer)</td>
<td>Through long-term, continuous work of political/ideological and social character towards a well-defined group (target), primarily by ancillary organisations (performer)</td>
<td>Through short-term, limited and intermittent work of campaigning character in times of election (activities) towards population at large (target) by central party leadership and related interest organisations (performer)</td>
<td>Predominantly through short-term, intermittent work of service and campaigning character in times of election and some long-term, continuous work of service character (activities) towards wide segments as well as more specified groups in society (target), by leadership at national level and fragmented local organisation, via local client networks and related ancillary and interest organisations (performer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining external linkage</td>
<td>Through long-term, continuous work of political/ideological and social character and intermittent activities of campaigning character (activities) towards supporters (target) by local branch as well as ancillary, affiliate and related interest organisations (performer)</td>
<td>Through long-term, continuous work of political/ideological and social character (activities) towards supporters (target), by ancillary organisations (performer)</td>
<td>Through intermittent activities of campaigning character (activities) towards supporters (target) by party leadership and indirectly via long-term activities of ideological character by interest organisations connected to, but independent from, the party (performer)</td>
<td>Through some long-term, continuous work of service character (activities) towards supporters (target), by local party workers as well as by related ancillary and interest organisations (performer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage outcome</td>
<td>Mass integration party</td>
<td>Total integration party</td>
<td>Catch-all party</td>
<td>Clientelistic party</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Establishing internal linkage</strong></td>
<td>Through on-going efforts to recruit members in targeted group, emphasis primarily on quantity but also on quality (recruitment policy), formal requirements to enter party (membership requirements)</td>
<td>Through limited efforts to recruit members in targeted group, emphasis on quality (recruitment policy), strict requirements to enter party (membership requirements)</td>
<td>No efforts to recruit members, no emphasis on members (recruitment policy), no requirements to enter party (membership requirements)</td>
<td>Through limited efforts to recruit members/workers, limited emphasis on members per se, important only as vote-getters (recruitment policy), generally no requirements to enter party (membership requirements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maintaining internal linkage</strong></td>
<td>Through continuous, multifaceted, far-ranging activities of political/ideological and social character towards members (activities), mainly by the branches, but also by ancillary and affiliate organisations (performer) and continuous, reciprocal communication between lower and higher party levels on policy matters and recurrent elections to every level (intra-party communication)</td>
<td>Through encapsulating, multifaceted, continuous activities of political/ideological and social character towards members (activities), especially by cell/militia, but also by ancillary organisations (performer) and continuous, top-down communication on policy matters from higher to lower party levels and possibly controlled elections of party leadership (intra-party communication)</td>
<td>Through occasional, activities of campaigning character towards members (activities) by the party leadership and via interest organisations (performer), and occasional top-down communication on policy matters from higher to lower party levels and (supervised) elections to top leadership (intra-party communication)</td>
<td>Through long-term activities of service character towards members/workers (activities), by fragmented local party organisations (performer), and infrequent top-down communication from higher to lower party levels on policy matters, possibly controlled elections of party leadership (intra-party communication)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table summarises the linkage outcomes in the four ideal typical linkage types.
The ideal types outlined above will be used as points of comparison in the investigation of the linkage of the Islamist parties. I will return to how this is done in Chapter 3. Now, it is time to turn to the institutional explanations of political linkage.

Institutional Models of Political Linkage

As we saw earlier, institutions affect the way in which actors behave, according to the (new) institutional theory. In line with this argument, different institutional factors that are alleged to have a bearing on party organisation – and the organisation of linkage – are discussed in party theoretical works. Examples of such institutions are the electoral system, laws regulating party behaviour and public subsidies to parties. These factors affect the parties within a national context in different ways, and they obviously also affect Islamist parties.

The institutional factors constitute a competing explanation to why parties organise the way they do in relation to the party-centred explanations. According to the institutional theory, different institutions provide incentives for the parties to work and organise according to the four party types outlined earlier. Thus, whereas these outcomes, according to the party-centred explanations, follow from the background, experiences, societal setting and, primarily, the orientation of the parties, the institutional theory claim that the outcomes follow primarily from the institutional arrangements at hand. According to the institutionalist way of thinking, outcomes are a result of the fact that actors, in this case parties, act in line with the incentives provided by the institutions (even if there is always some room for individual choice). The linkage objective of the parties, according to this view, largely results from the institutions at hand. Some institutions result in linkage objectives geared to an organisation of integration kind, whereas other institutions result in electoral linkage objectives. The underlying motivation of the parties, according to the institutionalist perspective, is to act in line with the particular institutions at hand, either because they find that it is rational to do so, as stated by the rational choice perspective, or

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1 Cp. e.g. Scarrow, 1996: 24-25 (electoral system, public funding); Harmel & Janda, 1982: 12, 13, 14, 47-48, 63 and 64 (the structure of the legislature, the type of electoral system, and the frequency of elections; presidential form of government; public funding, manner of selecting delegates to national party conventions; breadth of the franchise; separation of powers and presidential or parliamentary system and vertical structure of the political system); Bartolini, 1983: 208-209 (public financing); Katz, 1980: 30-34 (district magnitude and intraparty electoral choice) and Rae, 1967 (electoral laws and district magnitude).
because the institutions form the goals and actions of the party, as stated by
the historical and social constructivist perspective respectively.¹

Here, I have chosen the following institutional variables for analysis:
The electoral system and the legal regulations for parties.² The electoral
system is a crucial institution in any political system, and all parties have to
relate to the specific electoral system at hand, in one way or another.³ The
same goes for the legal regulations of parties; all parties in a country have to
at least formally follow the legal regulations if they want to be able to work
as parties. Common to these two formal institutions, the electoral system
and the legal regulations of parties, is then that they apply to all the parties in
the particular national context at hand equally, even if the parties on their
part may decide to relate in different ways to them.⁴ Another common
feature is that these two institutions are unusually “strong”; not many
institutions are regarded as having such a big impact on parties, as these two
generally are regarded as having. This strong impact also makes parties
highly aware of these particular institutions, and one can assume that parties
therefore tend to relate to them in a fairly reflected way.⁵

Electoral System

The electoral system of a country is often referred to as an important factor
in explaining the organisation of parties in party theoretical works.
According to Katz, “(e)lectoral law influences party structure because
candidates, as individuals attempting to maximize their chances of victory,
pattern their behavior in ways determined by those laws”.⁶ Reynolds &
Reilly, in their handbook on electoral systems, put forth the same view: “Political institutions shape the rules of the game under which democracy is practiced… (The electoral system effects) the internal cohesion and discipline of parties… (and it can) influence the way parties campaign and the way political élites behave, thus helping to determine the broader political climate…”.

Further, not least Duverger elaborates the ways in which “the electoral system influences the organization of parties”. Thus, the contention is that the electoral system at hand influences the calculations made by parties and thus their linkage objectives (as the motivation of parties in this perspective is to act in line with this institution). This in turn affects the way in which linkage is organised. More precisely, it is claimed that the electoral system in place gives parties incentives to organise as either mass integration, total integration, catch-all or clientelistic parties.

Basically, three kinds of electoral systems are distinguished: The majoritarian system, the system of proportional representation and the semi-proportional representation. These different electoral systems provide incentives for different party types, according to the scholars in the field.

conclusions of his book “A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems”, Katz states that “(s)uccessful politicians have developed party organizations appropriate to those (electoral) systems” (Katz, 180: 123). Katz here puts forth a rationalistic argument. As we have seen, there might be other reasons for acting in line with institutions than rationalistic ones.

Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 7-8. Darnolf also points out that the activities of parties are affected by the electoral system (Darnolf, 1997: 27). However, Reynolds & Reilly point out that the same electoral system may have different consequences in different contexts: “(T)he effects of a certain electoral system type depends to a large extent upon the socio-political context in which it is used. Electoral system consequences depend upon factors such as how a society is structured in terms of ideological, religious, ethnic, racial, regional, linguistic, or class divisions; whether the country is an established democracy, a transitional democracy, or a new democracy…” (Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 8). When discussing the impact of an electoral system in a given country, such characteristics must thus be taken into consideration.

Duverger, 1951/1964: 243. Duverger however notes that it is not only the electoral system that affects the parties, parties may also affect the system (Duverger, 1951/1964: 234 and 359; cp. also Katz, 1980: 32-33). Even if this “reverse” effect obviously is present, we will disregard it in this context as such an influence can only be studied over time.

Reynolds & Reilly points out that “there are countless electoral system variations, but essentially they can be split into nine main systems which fall into three broad families. The most common way to look at electoral systems it to group them by how closely they translate national votes won into parliamentary seats won” (Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 17). Reynolds & Reilly divide the electoral systems into the following electoral system families, with subcategories (Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 18): (1) Plurality-Majority: First Past the Post (FPTP, in UK, India, Pakistan), Block Vote (in Palestine, Maldives, Jordan 1989), Alternative Vote (in Australia, Nauru) and Two Round (in France, Mali); (2) Semi-Proportional Representation: Parallel (in Japan, Georgia) and Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV, in Jordan 1993, 1997, Vanuatu); and (3) Proportional Representation: Mixed Member
As to the electoral system of *proportional representation* many party analysts point out that this electoral system breeds well-organised parties. Duverger for example points to “the collective nature of proportional representation: the party must have organization, discipline, structure”.¹ Scarrow too contends that proportional representation provides incentives for parties to “develop strong, nationwide organizations which can maximize overall votes”.² Not only the proportional system *per se* breeds well-organised parties, however. Also the multi-member districts, that are linked to the system of proportional representation, promote well-organised parties; “multi-member districts demand more party organization than single-member districts”.³

Another feature connected to proportional representation is list-voting, and it is often pointed out by party scholars that “(i)t remains a fact that list-voting, through its collective character, naturally diminishes the influence of personalities, necessitates an agreement between several individuals, and gives their common ideas and tendencies predominance over the individual qualities of each, all points which naturally tend to increase the influence of parties”.⁴ Candidates are thus not the focus in systems of proportional representation, but the ideology and the party organisation are. Indeed, it is established that “(p)roportional representation increases the influence of parties over candidates”.⁵ This fact, that centralisation of parties follows from proportional representation, is stressed by various party scholars. LeDuc, Niemi & Norris for example emphasise that “(p)roportional representation list systems, where voters are choosing between parties and their programmes, tend to promote greater campaign centralization”.⁶ Reynolds too stresses this circumstance, claiming that proportional representation leaves “much power entrenched within party headquarters and wielded by senior party membership. A candidate’s position on the party list, and therefore his or her likelihood of success, is dependent on currying favor with party bosses, whose relationship with the electorate is of secondary

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¹ Duverger, 1951/1964: 249.
³ Harmel & Janda, 1982: 47.
⁴ Duverger, 1951/1964: 358; cp. also p 244 and Harmel & Janda, 1982: 47.
⁵ Duverger, 1951/1964: 358.
importance”.¹ Also other scholars note that “(i)n proportional systems …voters typically cast their ballots for party lists of candidates… Party officials usually select the candidates who will appear on the lists, and proportional voting focuses attention more on the party with its ideological and political commitments than on individual candidates. Proportional systems thus appear to limit the influence of personalization in politics”.² Proportional representation thus entails centralisation of power to the party headquarters; the party and its ideology rather than the individual candidates are what matters.

The fact that the ideologies of parties are important in systems of proportional representation is something further underlined by Katz. He contends that “rational candidates competing under PR will stress in their campaigns the virtue of their party’s entire platform taken as a whole” and, hence, “parties competing in PR systems will tend to be ideological in their approach”.³ Katz continues to state that, “one additional link must be pointed out between PR and ideological parties… In PR systems, voters choose parties rather than individuals… The importance of the corporate identity of the party is increased, and particularly the importance of the sense that its issue stands represent a unified programme rather than a number of isolated proposals of individual candidates. Correspondingly, the general organizing principles underlying specific proposals, that is the ideology, become more important”.⁴ Ideology thus becomes important for parties operating under a proportional representation system. In line with this argument, Cox points out that proportional representation “can increase the dispersion of parties across the ideological spectrum, as more parties seek out an electoral niche”.⁵

⁴ Katz, 1980: 28. This is also something that Katz finds empirical support for in his study of how electoral systems affect parties: “Overall then, there is considerable support for the hypothesis that electoral formula affects the level of ideological concern among political parties… (The) parties considered here provide evidence of a higher incidence of ideology among parties competing under PR systems than among those in plurality systems” (1980: 47). Further, “(b)oth the extensive and the intensive analyses showed ideological style to be associated with proportional electoral formulae. With the ICPP data, significant correlations were observed between electoral formula and ideological style, as indicated by issue extremism, consistency, and appeal to a codified party doctrine” (Katz, 1980: 115).  
⁵ Cox, 2000: 236. Other analysts note that this feature of PR might provide “(a) platform for extremist parties” (Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 65).
According to these party scholars, parties under the electoral system of proportional representation thus, ideal typically, are well-organised and focused on ideology and the party organisation, instead of on single candidates. Further, party analysts point out that the party organisation is generally spread in many different parts of the country under proportional representation. As Darnolf puts it: “In a proportional system … a won vote is a won vote. Thus, it generally does not make much difference where, geographically, the parties direct their efforts to attract voter support”.¹ An organisation that is more widespread however has better opportunities to catch many votes. This point is also stressed by Reynolds: “The incentive under national proportional-representation systems is to maximize the overall vote, regardless of where those votes might come from. Thus parties often strive to constitute lists of candidates which will appeal to a broad cross section of society” on the basis of its ideology.² This applies particularly in (moderately) divided societies where proportional representation systems “facilitate minority parties’ access to representation… This fulfils the principle of inclusion, which can be crucial to stability in divided societies… (PR systems) encourage parties to present inclusive and socially diverse lists of candidates. (…) List PR gives the political space which allows parties to put up multi-racial, and multi-ethnic, lists of candidates”, acting on the basis of a common interest.³ In the same vein, PR “(restricts) the growth of ‘regional fiefdoms’. Because PR systems reward minority parties with a minority of the seats, they are less likely to lead to situations where a single party holds all the seats in a given province or district”⁴.

In conclusion then, party scholars agree that the electoral system of proportional representation provides incentives for parties to develop a linkage objective and thus party linkage characterised by “organization, discipline, structure”, centralisation, ideological orientation and national dispersion, but also minority representation and “inclusive and socially diverse lists” on the basis of common interests, in (moderately) divided societies.⁵ As we have seen, most of these characteristics are present in the ideal typical integration parties (of primarily mass kind). Therefore, it can be

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¹ Darnolf, 1997: 27.
⁴ Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 63.
concluded that given that parties are influenced by the institution of the electoral system, proportional representation gives rise primarily to parties of (mass) integration type.¹

Party analysts have also some, if decidedly fewer, things to say regarding what kind of parties *semi-proportional electoral systems* breed. The Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), for instance, "encourages parties to become highly organized" and it "gives voters a choice among a party’s list of candidates".² It is also pointed out that "(a)s SNTV gives voters only one vote, the system contains few incentives for political parties to appeal to a broad spectrum of voters in an accommodatory manner. As long as they have a reasonable core vote, they can win seats without needing to appeal to ‘outsiders’".³ In this sense then, the Single Non-Transferable Vote furthers parties of integration marked by their high degree of organisation and their focus on limited groups. However, it is further stated that "the fact that multiple candidates of the same party are competing for the same voters means that internal party fragmentation and discord can be accentuated, and that ‘clientelistic’ politics, where politicians offer subtle electoral bribes to groups of defined voters, is exaggerated".⁴ In this sense then, the Single Non-Transferable Vote seems to further electoral parties of clientelistic variety. According to these observations, parties under semi-proportional systems like the Single Non-Transferable Vote develop a linkage objective and thus a party linkage characterised by a particular mix of traits of integration (such as a high degree of party organisation and centralisation) and clientelistic traits (such as internal fragmentation and “clientelistic” politics).

Finally, when it comes to *majoritarian electoral systems*, party scholars point out that such systems invariably result in a focus on candidates and issues, instead of a focus on party and ideology, something

¹This is the main conclusion regarding what kind of party organisation follows from the electoral system of proportional representation, even if “(t)he result varies according to the type of proportional representation” (Duverger, 1951/64: 358). Some party analysts however claim an opposite outcome: "Parties in systems with a plurality vote have developed strong constituency organisations. (…) In democracies with a proportional election system, on the other hand, the constituencies are too big to form basic units. In some countries the conferences of constituency delegates are more of the nature of single-purpose meetings and they do not do the continuous work a constituency unit does in Britain or the USA". (Von Beyme, 1985:189). Most analysts however support the main conclusion as put forth above.

²Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 51.
³Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 52.
⁴Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 52.
which in turn leads to less centralisation of the party and a lower degree of party organisation.¹

According to Katz, “plurality electoral systems act to encourage single issue campaigns, or campaigns based on personality or locality”.² He continues to state that “(s)ince the choice of voters is for candidates rather than for parties, candidates may attempt to minimize or even ignore their party affiliation, and the commitment to a specific platform that this implies. This naturally increases the relative importance of personality. Because local candidacies are encouraged, localistic considerations will be of particular importance to some candidates (facing a local party challenge) and of some importance to most candidates (hoping to prevent such a challenge in the future)”.³ In turn, this logic leads to “more flexible parties”, for which ideology is less important, according to Katz.⁴ Other things than ideology are thus important in majoritarian systems: “(M)ajority systems privilege the role of the individual representative and thus foster personalization. Candidates may seek support from ideologically heterogeneous groups of voters by stressing their personal appeal rather than party affiliation and political program”.⁵ In this sense, the majoritarian system “retains the link between constituents and their Member of Parliament… (and it gives) rise to a parliament of geographical representatives: MPs represent defined areas of cities, towns, or regions rather than just party labels… (Further it) allows voters to choose between people rather than just between parties. Related to the previous point is the advantage that voters can assess the performance of individual candidates rather than just having to accept a list of candidates presented by a party, as can happen under some List PR electoral systems”.⁶

Centralisation is consequently reduced in parties under a majoritarian system, as compared to parties under proportional representation, as we

¹ “Majoritarian systems” in this context refer both to plurality systems (based on simple majorities) and to majority systems (based on absolute majorities). These two systems are often grouped together as plurality-majority systems (cp. e.g. Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 18).
⁵ Swanson & Mancini, 1996: 17-18. Indeed, the majoritarian electoral system also in other ways counteract ideological parties, not least ideological parties of extreme variety: “It excludes extremist parties from parliamentary representation. Unless an extremist minority party’s electoral support is geographically concentrated, it is unlikely to win any seats under (the plurality) First Past the Post. This contrasts with the situation under straight PR systems, where a fraction of one per cent of the national vote can ensure parliamentary representation” (Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 28-29).
recall: "Proportional representation list systems, where voters are choosing between parties and their programmes, tend to promote greater campaign centralization than do plurality or single transferable vote electoral systems where voters are choosing among candidates".\(^1\) Party organisation is also weakened as a result of the “voting for individual candidates in single-member districts with simple plurality vote".\(^2\)

Another consequence of the majoritarian systems is that they further concentration on particular districts. According to Scarrow, the single-member constituencies, which prevail in majoritarian systems, provide strong incentives for parties “to target their organizational efforts on marginal districts”.\(^3\) Darnolf makes the same point: “In majority systems, parties are forced to make certain strategic decisions. In order to effectively utilize their limited resources, parties emphasize constituencies they believe they have a realistic chance of winning, while holding a lower profile or not running in others. This is particularly important for the opposition, which often has fewer resources and therefore must be frugal in order to be able to compete for power”.\(^4\) This in turn might lead to “‘regional fiefdoms’ where one party wins all the seats in a province/district. In some situations, (the majoritarian system) FPTP tends to create regions where one party, through winning a majority of votes in the region, wins all, or nearly all, of the parliamentary seats”.\(^5\)

Further, majoritarian systems, like the FPTP, in some contexts “advantages broadly-based political parties. In severely ethnically or regionally-divided societies, FPTP is praised for encouraging political parties to be ‘broad churches’, encompassing many elements of society, particularly when there are only two major parties and many different societal groups. These parties can then field a diverse array of candidates for election”.\(^6\) Thus, in extremely divided societies “plurality-majority systems…funnel the party system of a country, and thus voter choice, into a competition between two broadly based political parties… (and the majoritarian) First Past the Post will encourage broadly based multiethnic political parties. Because the system gives incentives for political elites to coalesce into two broad organizations, these parties may encompass many

\(^1\) LeDuc, Niemi & Norris, 1996: 162.
\(^2\) Harmel & Janda, 1982: 47.
\(^3\) Scarrow, 1996: 24.
\(^4\) Darnolf, 1997: 27.
elements of a diverse society”. Depending on the social structure in the country, majoritarian systems may however also encourage “the development of political parties based on clan, ethnicity, or region. In some situations, (the majoritarian) FPTP can encourage parties to base their campaigns and policy platforms on hostile conceptions of clan, ethnicity, race, or regionalism”. Whether the majoritarian systems breed exclusionary or inclusionary parties thus depends on the social structure of the country. The rule seems to be that majoritarian systems bring about inclusionary parties (of primarily catch-all type) in homogeneous as well as extremely divided societies with many different minorities, whereas they bring about more exclusionary parties (of primarily clientelistic type) in countries with moderate, but significant, divisions. Indeed, “all single-member district systems are exclusionary in a number of important aspects. These electoral systems may exclude smaller parties from fair representation. (…) In divided societies plurality-majority systems are also criticized for encouraging the development of political parties based on clan, ethnicity, or region”.

In conclusion, party analysts thus agree that parties under majoritarian electoral systems develop linkage objectives and thus party linkage focused on candidates and issues rather than on party organisation and ideology. Consequently, parties under majoritarian systems are less centralised and have a low degree of party organisation. In all these senses then, parties under majoritarian systems carry the traits of electoral parties of either catch-all or clientelistic kind; majoritarian systems must thus be said to breed electoral parties. However, different social structures seem to breed

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1 Reynolds, 2000: 63-64.
2 Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 30.
3 Reynolds, 2000: 64. Majoritarian systems thus tend to exclude minorities from fair representation: “As a rule, under (the majoritarian) FPTP parties put up the most broadly acceptable candidate in a particular district so as to avoid alienating the majority of electors”. In the same way, majoritarian systems exclude women from parliament (Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 30).
4 Something to bear in mind is that in the discussions on electoral systems, party scholars will will often argue in favour of or against certain systems on the basis of the different merits of the systems. Indeed, often party analysts will have their own favourite electoral system. Thus, “(p)roponents of single-member plurality interpret the centrist incentives of single-member plurality as producing candidates who make broad, inclusive, and moderate appeals, while arguing that the dispersive incentives of proportional representation will produce candidates who pander to extremists and special interests. Proponents of proportional representation, in contrast, interpret the centrist incentives of single-member plurality as leading to a ‘no choice’ election for voters…, while arguing that the dispersive incentives of proportional representation lead to elections with real choices in which varieties of opinion can be articulated clearly and approved or disapproved at the polls” (Cox, 2000: 236-237). Here, the
different kinds of electoral parties. While majoritarian systems in homogeneous or extremely heterogeneous social contexts primarily seem to breed catch-all parties, majoritarian systems in moderately divided societies primarily seem to breed clientelistic parties “based on clan, ethnicity, or region”.

To draw the evidence together, it thus seems as the electoral system of proportional representation in most aspects breeds parties of integration (of primarily mass kind). The semi-proportional electoral system is regarded as giving rise to a particular mix of party types: Parties that display a high degree of organisation and centralisation, like the parties of integration, and internal fragmentation and clientelistic traits, like the clientelistic party. Finally, majoritarian electoral systems are regarded as breeding electoral parties of primarily catch-all kind, at least in homogeneous or extremely divided societies. In moderately divided societies, however, more exclusionary parties are encouraged. But it is not a case of exclusion on ideological grounds, as is the case in parties of integration, but on the basis of clan, ethnicity or region. In this sense, it seems as majoritarian electoral systems in moderately divided societies tend to produce particularist, clientelistic parties.

In this context, it should be noted that in the theoretical discourse on the effects of electoral systems on parties, all parties are expected to be primarily vote-maximising. Other objectives, such as those found in the party-centred explanations, are not present here. Thus, organisation in line with different linkage types is only moulded on vote-maximising concerns in this perspective. The link between “objective” and “outcome” is therefore not “causal” to the same extent as was the case in the party-centred models. Instead, the linkage is viewed as a whole, and the party will organise its linkage in accordance with the type that it finds most effective, given the particular electoral system at hand.

### Laws Regulating Party Organisation

The national laws regulating how parties are to be organised and how to act in order to be able to work as parties, are obviously of critical importance in shaping the organisation of political parties. Therefore, these laws are included in this study.

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intention is not to evaluate the different systems, but only to spell out their consequences for party linkage.

1 Reynolds, 2000: 64.
Legal and other regulations may promote or work against certain forms of party organisation – or they may be completely silent on the issue. Therefore, the type of party favoured by the legal regulations in a country depends on how these legal regulations are laid out in the particular context at hand. The effects of the legal regulations in the cases included in this study will be discussed on a general level in Chapter 3 and more specifically in each empirical chapter (Chapters 4-6).

Laws that are important in this context are the laws that include regulations of political parties, such as the Constitution and equivalent laws, political party laws and laws on election of deputies. Such laws are thus, in the theoretical perspective of the (new) institutional theory, expected to influence the parties to develop a particular linkage objective and thus party linkage. The particular influences in the particular cases however have to be defined on the basis of the particular laws in question.

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In line with the (new) institutional theory, institutions have a significant impact on how parties behave, as parties are driven by a motivation to organise and act in line with the institutions at hand. Different institutions thus give incentives to different behaviours. Together, the electoral system and the party regulations in a country thus generally further some particular linkage type, while they hinder others. What type or types of parties are furthered or hindered by the electoral system and the legal regulations depend(s) on their character in the particular context at hand. However, the types furthered or hindered are invariably parties of either integration (mass or total) or electoral (catch-all or clientelistic) kind.

Thus, even if it in the summary table below looks like the institutions are rather indecisive in leading to a particular outcome, this is not the case in practice. Generally, the electoral system in combination with the legal regulations make for rather specific predictions on the basis of the theoretical discourse.

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1 As noted previously, scholars in the institutional tradition of party theory usually assume all parties to be of vote-maximising kind. More precisely then, the motivation of parties in this line of thinking is to organise in the best way to maximise votes given the particular institutions at hand. For their particular linkage, it is thus the institutional arrangements that matter most.
Table 2:4. Expected outcomes of different institutions according to the institutional explanations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral system</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Proportional Representation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X (primarily in homogeneous or extremely divided societies)</td>
<td>X (primarily in moderately divided societies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal regulations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the expected outcomes of different institutions according to the institutional models. “X” signifies what party type/types is/are expected to follow from the institution at hand. “(X)” signifies a weak expectation. Note that what type of party is furthered in practice depends on the particular context at hand.

The specified expectations in a particular case thus present a prediction of parties organised in either mass integration, total integration, catch-all or clientelistic manner, or a specific combination of these. The linkage objectives and motivations of those party types are summarised in table 2:5 below. As for the linkage outcomes of these types, they are outlined in table 2:3 presented earlier.

Table 2:5. Summary of linkage objectives and motivations according to the institutional explanations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage objective and motivation</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>organisation as mass integration party (linkage objective) in order to act in line with institutions (motivation)</td>
<td>organisation as total integration party (linkage objective) in order to act in line with institutions (motivation)</td>
<td>organisation as catch-all party (linkage objective) in order to act in line with institutions (motivation)</td>
<td>organisation as clientelistic party (linkage objective) in order to act in line with institutions (motivation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents a summary of the linkage objectives and motivations according to the institutional models. Note that the linkage outcomes are the same as those outlined in table 2:3.

How these institutional factors, and the other independent variables and explanations to party linkage discussed earlier in this chapter, are analysed in this study is outlined next, in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 3

TO CARRY OUT THE STUDY

After having drawn up the theoretical framework of the analysis in part I of this study, time has now come to discuss the way in which the analysis is carried out and to elaborate further on how the analysis in part II of the study is conducted. In this chapter the analytical process, the selection of cases and the data collection of the study are presented, together with a discussion on how the study was carried out in practice.

Analytical Process

*Caution ultimately is not an empirical, but a philosophical, phenomenon. It is imputed rather than shown; argued for rather than proven.*

The empirical analysis of this study is carried out in two parts. First, in part I, the explanations outlined in Chapter 2 are tried out on each Islamist party individually. Here, the intention is to find out to what extent these theoretical models may explain the way in which linkage is organised in Islamist parties. This analysis is carried out in Chapters 4-6.

More precisely, the analysis in part I takes place in the following manner: Each of the party-centred models (the mass integration party model, the total integration party model, the catch-all party model and the clientelistic party model) and the institutional models (on the basis of the electoral system and the party legal regulations) are tried out on each Islamist party, in order to find out if any of them may explain the way in which the Islamist party organises its linkage. Thus, in each case I first specify which models are applicable in that context by taking into consideration the setting and the particular characteristics of the Islamist party at hand (according to table 2:1 for the party-centred explanations) and the institutional setting (according to table 2:4 for the institutional explanations). Then, I go on to examine the linkage of the Islamist party under study, i.e. the linkage objective and its motivation, and how the party

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1 Katz, 1980: 117.
establishes and maintains external and internal linkage. The analytical framework presented in tables 2:2, 2:3 and 2:5, together with the operationalisations presented in Chapter 2 are used as criteria in this analysis of the linkage of each Islamist party. Depending on the specific outcome in each case, a conclusion is drawn as to the applicability of the different models; i.e. whether it can be said that a particular model is able to explain the outcome at hand.

To be able to draw conclusions as to what factors can be regarded as decisive for the linkage outcome, and hence what model(s) is/are applicable, it is important that outcomes are produced “in the right manner”, in accordance with the model. For a model to be regarded as explanatory, the factors that it points out should be present in the particular case and they should be referred to in party documents or by party representatives as a motivation for the particular linkage objective, which in turn should result in the linkage outcome predicted (in line with the general explanations as I construe them, cp. figures 2:1-2:3 in Chapter 2). For example, if the model predicts a certain outcome and this outcome indeed presents itself, but not as a result of the “right” motivation, the model cannot be said to explain the outcome.\(^1\) In the same vein, the same outcome may disqualify one model but support another as a result of how the outcome is produced. The problem with equifinality (i.e. that different factors lead to the same outcome) is thereby defused.\(^2\)

By this analysis, it can be established whether the linkage of the Islamist parties may be explained by any of the specific models presented. It may also be established that none of the models can accurately explain the

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\(^1\) By placing such heavy emphasis on motivations provided by the party itself, I thus study only conscious influences and influences which the party voluntarily refers to. Obviously, this approach risks missing important influences, influences that are unconscious to party representatives, or which they for some reason do not wish to refer to. However, I would find it problematic to attribute motivations to the party that is not stated or at least suggested by the party itself. What is sought in this context is thus not the “hidden intentions” of the Islamists, even if the presence of such are frequently discussed in the general debate on Islamism. As we will return to in Chapter 4, the discourse on hidden intentions is a quagmire. Not only is it next to impossible to find out anything about such intentions, it is also questionable if it is desirable to do so. Like in the case of intentions, I find that it is safer and more ethically defensible to listen to what people actually say. Thus, I agree with Turkish sociologist Göle: “I think it is a terribly sad story for political scientists, or sociologists, to try to figure out the (hidden, secret) intentions of people, because then you can project anything” (Göle, 10 May, 1999).

kind(s) of linkage found in one or more of the Islamist parties under study. In the latter case, there is a need for a new theoretical model. By this analysis I will thus not only find out what kind of linkage the studied Islamist parties provide, but also whether any of the explanations stemming in a Western context is applicable to each of three different Islamist parties, existing in three different countries. On the basis of this investigation, I am thus able to discuss whether any of the models presented in Chapter 2 seems to be able to explain the linkage of the Islamist party under study, or whether a new theoretical model is needed.

Obviously, outcomes in reality are never as clear-cut as the theory expects them to be. And, obviously, the party studied does not need to match either of the types perfectly. In real life, it is empirically possible that a party displays traits from different types. Indeed, all real life parties are to some extent hybrids of different ideal types. However, traits indicative of one type often dominate, whereas other traits are present, but subordinate. In the analysis, this distinction between dominant and present traits is continually made. Dominant traits are traits that are specifically emphasised by the interviewees (inside and outside the party) and/or by written documents, and that are frequently recurrent. Present traits, on the other hand, are traits that are mentioned by interviewees and/or by written documents, but with less emphasis and which are not as frequently recurrent. For the different aspects, I argue on the basis of the data that a trait should be regarded as either dominant or present in the case at hand.

The analysis in part I of this study is thus primarily aimed at finding out whether the stipulated theoretical models may help us in explaining the linkage outcome in the different particular cases. Here, generalisation is not an issue. What is to be explained is the particular case at hand.

The analysis in part II of the study goes beyond this objective. Here, the Islamist parties are put into a comparative context and the intention is look deeper into if, and to what extent, the religious ideology of the parties explains the way in which their linkage is organised. If the religious ideology does not seem important, the organisation of linkage in the Islamist parties may be attributed either to national contextual variables, such as institutional factors, or to other party-centred factors than the religious ideology.

As the organisation of linkage in religious parties is something not largely dealt with in the traditional party theory, the analysis in part II is thus an attempt at theory development in this regard. The findings here may thus potentially be generalised to all religious political parties in the world.
However, as it is a case of theory development, discussions will be tentative at this stage.

Three different comparisons are carried out in part II of the study. In the first of these, a comparison between the three Islamist parties in the different countries is carried out, in order to find out whether these parties organise their linkage in similar ways or not. The comparison takes place on the basis of the analyses in Chapters 4-6. To carry this analysis one step further, each Islamist party is then compared to other, non-Islamist parties in the same national setting, regarding the way in which they organise their linkage. The intention of these comparisons is to find out whether there might be a particular “Islamist” way of organising party linkage or whether other factors seem decisive for the way in which linkage is organised.¹

If the Islamist parties in the three countries organise their linkage in a largely similar way and in a way that does not coincide with the way in which linkage is organised in the other (non-Islamist) parties in the different countries respectively, it indeed seems like Islamist parties do organise their linkage in a specific way.

If, on the other hand, the Islamist parties in the three countries organise differently – and in a way similar to the other parties in the respective country, other factors than the Islamist ideology (most likely national factors, such as institutions) would seem decisive for the type of linkage developed.

If Islamist parties organise in different ways regarding linkage, but also in ways different from the other parties in the respective national context, other factors in the party-centred explanations might be best posed to explain the outcome.

If the Islamist parties organise their linkage in ways similar to each other, but also similar to the other parties in the different national contexts, other explanations – common to parties in all the countries under study –

¹ This approach focuses primarily the impact of the (institutional) environment in the country at hand. Cp. Scarrow, who asserts that “because institutional environments are usually national in scope, and because they affect the competition of all parties within the system, focusing on institutional factors produces expectations of intra-national organizational convergence, and of cross-national organizational divergence” (Scarrow, 1996: 25). Cp. also Harmel & Janda, who state that “(t)his assumption has two implications: (1) parties within the same country come to resemble one another by adapting to the same environment and (2) causal primacy resides in the environment – it is the environment that shapes parties and not parties that shape the environment”. However, also other factors – not least the societal setting – may be important for the way in which the parties in a specific country organise their linkage (Harmel & Janda, 1982: 11).
seemingly apply.¹ By comparing the Islamist parties with other (non-Islamist) parties in the same national context, I am able to settle which of these scenarios applies.

The last comparison carried out in part II of the study is a comparison between the Islamist parties and an embryonic model of Christian Democratic party linkage. If there are traits in the organisation of linkage in the Islamist parties that are similar to each other – and that are also similar to those found in an embryonic model of Christian Democratic party linkage – we may indeed start to speak about a “religious” way of organising party linkage. If there are no similarities in this regard, however, there seems to be no evidence of a “religious” type of party linkage, and – depending on the outcome in part I – the party-centred or institutional models might be better posed to explain the linkage of Islamist parties. Part II is thus primarily theory-developing, aiming at finding out the impact of a “new” independent variable, not previously systematically included in the body of Western party theory: Religious ideology. These analyses are carried out in Chapter 7 and 8.

Even if empirical outcomes are not clear-cut, as they rarely are, this theoretically based outline in two parts will make it possible to draw conclusions as to what factors result in what type of linkage in Islamist parties. In this way, this approach will develop our understanding on how the linkage of Islamist parties is to be explained.

Selection of Cases

One way to investigate the linkage of Islamist parties would be to make a survey of all Islamist parties participating in elections as to their way of organising political linkage. Considering that little has been done in this field so far, this would however entail an enormous amount of work and little opportunity to go into specifics. Therefore, I instead conduct case studies, with strategically selected cases.

The two different parts of the study make different demands regarding the desired characteristics of the cases (i.e. parties) to be selected for

¹ Cp. Scarrow, 1996: 25. Scarrow underlines that imitation of party organisation is common, both between countries and between parties. Accordingly, intra-national convergence does not have to be the result of institutional factors, but of imitation. To find out what is causing a particular outcome, it is therefore of utmost importance to isolate the motivation for that outcome, as is done in this study.
analysis. In part I, i.e. the three single case studies, it is sufficient that the cases selected do not – in fact – make up different incarnations of the same party. To investigate basically the same case twice (or thrice) would contribute little added value (not least empirically).\(^1\)

In part II – the theory-developing comparison between parties, aimed at finding out whether the Islamist (or religious) ideology is a decisive factor for the organisation of linkage – variation is more important. Here, it is desirable that the cases display at least some variation on factors other than the religious ideology. Thus, the cases should preferably vary on party-centred characteristics other than basic ideology (the origin and experiences of the party, its societal setting and its orientation) and on national factors (such as institutional factors, but also other factors such as the size and history of the countries which may have an impact on the organisation of parties). The reason for this need of variation is that if covariation on these factors exists, it might be difficult to say something about the impact of the variable under study – the Islamist (religious) ideology.

As stated earlier, the basic idea in part II of this study is that if Islamist parties in different countries, with different institutional and other national characteristics, present a similar kind of linkage, these national factors cannot be considered as important for explaining the linkage of these parties. This impression is strengthened if the linkage of the Islamist parties also is different from that of other, non-Islamist parties in the same national context. However, if the Islamist parties in these countries present different kinds of linkage, this may very well be due to the different institutional and other national characteristics of the country at hand – especially if the linkage presented is similar to the linkage of other, non-Islamist parties in the same national context.

In part II of this study, I thus try to vary different, potentially important, independent variables, save one – the Islamist ideology of the party.\(^2\) In this way, I am able to evaluate the impact of this one variable on

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\(^1\)If variety is established between the cases one can thus avoid Galton’s problem (cp. Lijphart, 1975: 171-172), i.e. to study basically the same case several times: "If the similarity within a group of systems is a result of diffusion, there is only one independent observation" (Lijphart, 1975: 171, citing Przeworski & Teune, 1970: 52.). In such circumstances, the cases are thus not independent from each other.

\(^2\)In this way, the logic behind the "most different systems"-design, comparing Islamist parties in different countries, is combined with the logic behind the "most-similar-system"-design, comparing Islamist parties with other non-Islamist parties in the same national context, in the theory-developing part II. C. Frendreis, who states that "the two designs seek to eliminate irrelevant variables through the same logical method – by detecting a lack of covariation
Chapter 3: To Carry Out the Study

linkage – and discuss what seems to be the most important factor for explaining the political linkage of Islamist parties. Is it institutional (or national) factors, is it party-centred factors (not including religious ideology) or is it the Islamist ideology _per se_?

In order to make sure that the cases have the characteristics desired, a strategic selection of a limited number of cases – led by theoretical considerations – is thus necessary.

Regarding the Islamist parties to be selected, the following criteria should be fulfilled to make possible the analyses outlined above: (a) the parties selected should be Islamist parties according to the given definition, (b) different explanatory factors (such as those pointed out by the party-centred and institutional models, but also other potentially important characteristics) should preferably vary between the cases\(^1\), (c) the Islamist parties should represent variation in the population so that basically the same case is not studied several times.

To meet the first requirement, i.e. to select parties with an Islamist ideology, is no problem. Here, there is the whole universe of Islamist parties which participate in elections in Muslim countries to choose from.\(^2\)

The second requirement is more difficult. Here the different explanatory variables included in the study – i.e. the parties’ specific origins, experiences, orientations and societal settings as well as the electoral system and legal regulations in the countries where they operate, as well as other potentially important national factors, such as the size and history of the countries – have to be isolated. These factors should preferably vary between the selected cases. This requirement makes the universe of Islamist parties to select from narrower. However, it does not make sense to find out these things about every party – and every country housing Islamist parties – before the last requirement is included.

To generate variation between the cases – the third requirement – Islamist parties from different parts of the Muslim world should be selected.

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1. The party-centred factors are the origin and experiences of the party, its societal setting and its orientation (but not basic ideology), the institutional factors are the electoral system and party regulations. The selection of cases follows the logic outlined by Frendreis in his application of the “most different systems design” (Frendreis, 1983: 255-272).

2. According to Wimelius, there were Islamist parties in 18 of the 57 member countries of the OIC (the Organisation of Islamic Conference) in 2002 (Wimelius, 2003: 177).
It would, for example, not be a good idea just to select Islamist parties from the Arab world only, as these could be suspected to vary less amongst themselves. For the same reason, “independent” parties are to be selected, i.e. parties which are not organisationally dependent on other parties. These are substantial criteria to select parties from. Are there any Islamist parties in the Muslim world that fulfil those criteria?

According to Roy, "Islam (is) divided into three geographic and cultural tendencies: the Sunni Arab Middle East, the Sunni Indian subcontinent, and Irano-Arab Shiism; Turkey, isolated from the Arab world, has its own organizations. These groups are as distinct politically as they are geographically…”¹ In three of these distinct areas (the Arabian, the Sunni Indian and the Turkish) there are specific parties that have developed their own organisations and thus have stood as some kind of prototypes. In Iran, on the other hand, the Islamic revolution in 1979 made the whole state Islamic.²

These three independent Islamist parties are (or were at the time of selection) the Turkish Fazilet Partisi (Virtue party), the Egyptian al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), and Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami (Party of Islam).³ These three Islamist parties would thus fit the third criterion fairly well, as they both are “independent” parties and present variation.⁴ But do they fit the other two criteria?

The first criterion is easily met; they are all Islamist parties active in the political process and they have presented candidates at elections. This was initially my line of reasoning and my initial decision was to study the Virtue Party, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Party of Islam. However, a closer examination of the Muslim Brotherhood carried out in Cairo in 1998 gave at hand that even if the Brothers had presented candidates at elections under the name of other parties (as the Brotherhood had failed to be granted

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² During the 1980s, political parties were banned in Iran, but in 1998, the ban was removed. Parties are however of little importance in Iran, candidates are what matters (www.landguiden.se (Iran)). A specific prototypical Islamist party was thus not founded in Iran.
³ Cp. Roy, 1994: 110. As we will return to, the Virtue Party was later closed down.
⁴ As leaders of the reformist (i.e. political) Islamist movement in their respective cultural spheres (cp. Roy, 1994: 110), these parties sometimes get together and discuss common problems – among them organisation (Abd El-Sa’atar, 9 December, 1998; compare also the discussion in Chapter 8). How much impact these meetings and discussions have on the actual organisation of linkage is difficult to assess. It is however worth noting that scholars attribute different strategies to these three parties (Roy, 1994: 46).
party status in Egypt) and even if they, in the more liberal era of the early 1990s, had operated as a party de facto (if not de jure), this was no longer the case. Repeatedly, I was made aware that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt at the end of the 1990s was severely repressed. Therefore, I had to think again regarding what party to choose from the Arab cultural grouping. The choice fell on the Islamic Action Front (IAF, Jabhat al-‘Amal al-Islami) in Jordan, closely related to the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. While having close ties to its mother organisation in Jordan, and to that in Egypt, Islamic Action Front is a party in its own right, allowed to operate by the regime. I will return to the special relationship between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood – and its implications for this study – in Chapter 5.

The Turkish Virtue Party, the Jordanian Islamic Action Front and the Pakistani Party of Islam, thus fulfil the first and the third criteria set up in this context. They are all Islamist parties that have presented candidates at elections and they represent variation. But what about the second criterion? According to this criterion, other explanatory variables should vary as much as possible between the cases. Do these factors vary between these suggested cases? Here, I will evaluate this by making a brief outline regarding the position of the parties in relation to the variables at hand.

Starting with the variables pointed out as important by the party-centred models as laid out here, we can note that all these parties exist in societies that undergo processes of modernisation and urbanisation but where rural, pre-modern traditions linger. They are further societies where the state not always is taking care of the welfare of the people. All three societies are also marked by particularistic outlooks (societal setting). In this sense, there is thus little variation between the cases. However, as these processes are very general and spread over most of the Muslim world, it would be difficult to find cases with a different societal setting.

Proceeding to the next variable, party background, it can be

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1 Interviews with Habib, 8 December, 1998, Abd El-Sa‘tar, 9 December, 1998, El-Ansari, 2 December, 1998, Abu El-Alla Madi, 30 November, 1998 and El-Ghazali, 13 December, 1998. Indeed, Muslim Brother Abd El-Sa‘tar, states that “if two of us meet, we will be arrested by the police” (Abd El-Sa‘tar, 9 December).

2 Even if both the Islamic Action Front and the Party of Islam have boycotted elections due to different reasons, they have showed a willingness to participate in elections on several occasions.

3 These outlines will be further developed in chapters 4-6.
established that the Virtue Party was created essentially in parliament and that the party is not organisationally based in a broad social movement, even if it has certain connections to civil society. The Virtue Party has also generally been opposed by state. The Islamic Action Front, on the other hand, was established outside of parliament, just after the (re)introduction of democracy, by a social movement; the Muslim Brotherhood. It is also basically accepted by the state, even if it sometimes is counteracted. The Party of Islam, however, was created long before democracy was introduced in Pakistan and it was created as a social movement. The Party of Islam is basically accepted by the state and at times it has been particularly favoured in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Thus, when it comes to the background of these three parties, they are distinctively different, even if they also have things in common. Especially the creation of the different parties varies. However, all of them have at least some relations with the civil society.

Regarding the orientation of the three Islamist parties, it can be determined that they vary to some extent. The Virtue Party is here the odd one out, with its basically pragmatic approach to politics. The Islamic Action Front and the Party of Islam are more alike when it comes to orientation. Both present an ideological orientation of reformist variety, but both also contain a totalitarian element in that both see the Islamic ideology as all-encompassing. Between them, I regard the Islamic Action Front as the most reformist and the Party of Islam as the least reformist. One difference between them is that while the Islamic Action Front decisively is only a political party, the Party of Islam is a social movement and a party at the same time. If the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is included into the equation, however, this difference largely disappears. However, as orientation is closely connected to ideology (even if they are not identical theoretically or empirically, as we have seen here), and as ideology is the one variable that should not vary, this similarity is of little consequence – especially as the Virtue Party with its pragmatic orientation is included for comparison.

Taken together, the three parties here discussed – the Virtue Party in Turkey, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and the Party of Islam in Pakistan – vary to a sufficient extent on the variables pointed out by the party-centred explanations as here construed.† The Virtue Party differentiates itself most clearly from the other parties, but the remaining two parties are in no sense

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† Other aspects in which the parties vary are size, degree of success and position in the state. We will return to this in the empirical chapters.
identical. Thus, the variation between the parties must be regarded as satisfactory.

However, to what extent are the countries in which these parties exist different on variables regarded as important in this context? First, I consider the institutional structures, here defined as electoral system and legal regulations on parties.

The electoral systems also differ between the countries here discussed. In Turkey, a modified system of Proportional Representation is employed. Jordan has experienced different electoral systems, both the majoritarian Block Vote system and the semi-proportional Single Non-Transferable Vote. Pakistan employs the old British First Past the Post-system. Regarding electoral systems, there is thus variation between the cases. Also regarding the legal regulations on parties, there are differences between the countries. In Turkey, for example, parties have to be well-organised, while parties in Jordan are not in focus – there it is the candidates that are focused. Still, there are some regulations on parties in Jordan. In Pakistan, there are very few legal regulations on political parties. Thus, also when it comes to institutional arrangements, there is sufficient variation between the countries here discussed. Variation must also be said to be at hand on other variables that are discussed in this context, such as the size and the history of the countries.¹

There is thus sufficient variation between the countries here discussed on the different potentially important explanatory variables. The cases therefore fulfil the criteria set up in this respect.

Thus, I choose to make a comparative case study of three Islamist parties (the Virtue Party, the Islamic Action Front and the Party of Islam), existing in different parts of the Muslim world (Turkey, Jordan and Pakistan). These parties and countries represent variation geographically as well as and culturally and regarding theoretically important characteristics. Here, I study the relevant aspects of these parties and countries as they were

¹Turkey, with a population of 65 million people (in 1998) and an area of 779 000 km² is an heir of the great Ottoman empire. According to Freedom House, the Turkish polity is a presidential-parliamentary democracy and it was rated as partly free in 1999 (www.freedomhouse.org (Turkey)). Jordan with its population of nearly 5 million (in 1998) and an area of 89 000 km² has a history as protectorate under British mandate, and thereafter independence. According to Freedom House, the polity is a traditional monarchy and limited parliament, in 1999 rated as partly free (www.freedomhouse.org (Jordan)). Pakistan had a population of 132 million (in 1998) and an area of 796 000 km². According to Freedom House, in 1998-1999 Pakistan was ranked as partly free; in 1999-2000 this rank changed to a not free military rule (www.freedomhouse.org (Pakistan)).
at the time of the data collection for this study (Turkey: 1999, Jordan: 1999, Pakistan: 1999 and 2000).\footnote{In this study, the parties will be called by their English names. In this context, it should also be noted that the Virtue Party was closed down in 2001, but that is of less consequence here. All information on that party was gathered well before its closure. Also studies of the other parties were carried out in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Events since mid-2000 are thus not included in this study, except occasionally in footnotes.}

\section*{On the Collection and Analysis of Data}

In this section, we will look deeper into how the data for the study were collected and analysed.

\subsection*{The Interviews}

The data for this study was collected in different ways. However, interviews have been the most important source of information – interviews both with party representatives and with outside observers, such as scholars and journalists. These interviews have been used to collect information on the linkage objective, motivation and linkage outcome of, primarily, the Islamist parties, but also for information on the other, non-Islamist parties included in the study for comparison. Interviews have also been used to collect information on background variables important for the analysis.

In all, 98 persons have been spoken to in the quest for data for this study. Mostly, it was a case of formal, taped interviews. In some cases, however, more informal conversations have taken place.\footnote{In the list of references, it is indicated whether an interview was formal or informal and whether it was taped or if notes were taken. It can also be noted that some persons were interviewed on different occasions, the number of interviews is larger.} How these interviews are distributed between the different countries and between the different categories of interviewees is presented in table 3:1.\footnote{What is here listed is, to be correct, the persons spoken to. As some persons were interviewed on different occasions, the number of interviews is larger.}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Country & Category of Interviewee & Number of Interviews \\
\hline
Turkey & Party Representatives & 30 \\
& Outside Observers & 15 \\
\hline
Jordan & Party Representatives & 20 \\
& Outside Observers & 10 \\
\hline
Pakistan & Party Representatives & 18 \\
& Outside Observers & 6 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Distribution of Interviews by Country and Category}
\end{table}
Table 3.1. Distribution of interviews between countries and categories of interviewees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party representatives, Islamist parties</th>
<th>Outside observers</th>
<th>Party representatives, other parties</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the distribution of interviews between Turkey, Jordan and Pakistan and between the different categories of interviewees (party representatives from Islamist parties, outside observers and party representatives from other parties). The total number of interviewees is 97. To be noted: In Jordan, interviews with Muslim Brothers have been included in the number of interviews for party representatives of Islamist parties. In addition to these interviews, 5 interviews were carried out in Cairo, Egypt.

Interviews give specific answers to specific questions. This has been important for this study, as little systematic, party theoretically based analysis of the linkage of the selected parties has been carried out previously. However, also material published by the parties themselves has been important primary sources. Next is outlined how different sources have been utilised.

Different Sources for Ideal, Strategic and Actual Linkage: Interviews and Party Documents

As was discussed in Chapter 2, political linkage is in this study analysed on three different levels – a) the ideal level, i.e. how the party leadership ideally conceives of the party linkage; b) the strategic level, i.e. the party leadership’s plan of action regarding linkage; and c) the actual linkage behaviour, i.e. how linkage is actually carried out, in practice. The data for these three levels have to some extent been collected from different sources, as the data needed are of different kinds.

Information on the linkage ideal has been sought primarily in the party statutes, and in other material published by the party. Also what party representatives state as the ideal of the party is regarded here. The ideal of

the party is the ultimate goal of the party regarding its linkage. Such goals are outlined in party statutes and in similar party material. As a source for data on these matters, party statutes are therefore well-suited. Indeed, it can be said that what is outlined in party statutes per definition is the party’s ideals.

Party documents are however occasionally silent on important issues related to linkage. In such cases, centrally placed party representatives, who are expected to be well versed in the ideals of the party, are well-placed to provide information on the ideal of the party.

As I regard the linkage ideal of the party as that which is stated by the party, data on the linkage ideal do not have to be “double-checked”, for example in interviews with outside observers.

The linkage strategy of the Islamist parties is construed on the basis of what party representatives say their strategy is and on the basis of the guidelines going out to the party workers on this matter.

The same situation applies regarding the linkage strategy, as regarding the linkage ideal, i.e. what the party – through its guidelines or representatives – states as its strategy is here regarded to be its strategy, and it does not have to be double-checked against other information, even if such a procedure may take place. Even if this approach has pitfalls, it at least mirrors what the party wishes to present as its strategy.

In this context, it should be noted that it sometimes has been difficult to separate the party’s linkage ideal from its linkage strategy. When this has been the case, the two are presented together, as a representation of how the party would like to act when it comes to its political linkage. However, when it has been possible to separate the two, they are presented separately.

The linkage behaviour in practice, although difficult to study in a comprehensive manner, is reconstructed on the basis of what party representatives say that the party is doing when it comes to actual linkage work. Of course, it is interesting in itself to study the picture that the party wishes to present regarding its linkage activities. However, when it comes to judging the actual behaviour of the party in practice, there is reason to double-check the information. In a way different from the ideal and strategy of the party, the actual behaviour does not coincide with what the party wants it to be. Therefore, also outside observers have been interviewed regarding the actual linkage behaviour of the different parties. To a limited extent, direct observation is also used to assess the actual linkage behaviour of the political parties.
Different kinds of interviews were thus of crucial importance for collecting information on different aspects of linkage, even if other sources than interviews were used as well. Interviews with party representatives were of central importance on all levels, regarding the linkage ideal, strategy and actual linkage performance in practice. Interviews with outside observers have been utilised to double-check the information primarily on the linkage behaviour in practice, but also to some extent the information on the linkage ideal and strategy of the party. Party documents have primarily been used to collect information on the linkage ideal and strategy of the parties.

**Interviews with Representatives of Islamist Parties**

The information needed for this study was thus gathered predominantly through interviews. In the Islamist parties, interviews with primarily party representatives in the party headquarters, with special knowledge on linkage procedures, have been undertaken. As I am interested both in party internal matters as well as in party external activities, I have aimed at interviewing the following categories of party representatives in each party: The head of organisation (typically concerned with party internal matters) and the head of elections (typically concerned with party external activities, not least in times of general elections). As Islamist parties generally are organised in a gender-separated manner, the heads of the women’s departments were also interviewed, to find out how the party women are organised and what activities they do.

In Turkey and Jordan, I interviewed the persons occupying these posts. Apart from these party representatives, I further interviewed party representatives in other positions. Through these additional interviews, missing information could be completed and the information already received could be double-checked. I will return to a discussion on how the information received was evaluated shortly.

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1 In the Virtue Party, Turkey, I interviewed Irfan Gündüz (Head of Organisation), Ali Gören (Head of Elections) and Gülten Celik (Head of Women’s Commission). In the Islamic Action Front, Jordan, I interviewed Mahmoud Aweida (Head of Membership & Organisation), Nael Al-Masalha (Head of Elections) and Arwa Kilani (Head of the Women’s Department).

2 These included, among a few others, Oya Akgönenc (candidate in the 1999 elections), Remzi Cetin (MP from Konya and candidate in the 1999 elections) and Mete Gündogan (senior advisor to the Virtue Party and candidate in the 1999 elections) in Turkey and Abdel-Latif Arabiyat (General Secretary of Islamic Action Front), Hamnam Said (Deputy Secretary General) and Nawal Faori (ex-member of the Islamic Action Front, the first woman elected to the Shura council in Jordan).
In Pakistan, the structure of the party is somewhat different from the structure of the Turkish and Jordanian parties. There I interviewed, among others, two deputy secretary-generals, the deputy secretary for information and representatives of the women’s department.\(^1\)

Taken together, I interviewed 10 party representatives from the Virtue Party in Turkey, 11 representatives from the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and 12 party representatives from the Party of Islam in Pakistan.\(^2\)

**Direct Observation**

Initially, the intention was to study at least some grass-root work of the parties as well. However, there was too little time for in depth studies of grass-root work. Some direct observation of grass-root work has however been carried out. Such direct observation was most extensive in Turkey, where I had the opportunity to follow the 1999 election campaign on location in different ways.\(^3\) In Jordan and Pakistan, direct observation was more a matter of short glimpses.\(^4\) During such direct observations, field notes were written down as soon as possible and always in direct conjunction with the events observed.

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\(^1\) Muhammad Ashraf Malik (Deputy Secretary General), Farheed Ahmad Paracha (Deputy Secretary General), Mansoor Jafar (Deputy Secretary for Information), Kouser Firdaus (Assistant Secretary General, Female Wing Islamic Party) and Raheel Qazi (daughter of the party leader Qazi Hussein Ahmad and in charge of the External Department of the Women’s wing).

\(^2\) To some extent, the number of party representatives – and who – I interviewed was in the hands of the respective party to decide. As long as I covered the compulsory positions, I was happy to accept more interviews, provided that the party representatives interviewed were or had been centrally placed.

\(^3\) These observations will be described in more detail in chapter 4. Here, it may suffice to note that the most extensive direct observations were carried out during the three-day tour through the province of Balikesir, which I conducted with Mete Gündogan (candidate of the Virtue Party in the 1999 elections) and his team, on 6-8 April, 1999. During these observations, insights from Richard Fenno’s “Watching Politicians. Essays on Participant Observation” (1990) were invaluable.

\(^4\) In Jordan, two mayors of the Islamic Action Front were interviewed, in order to get closer to the grass-roots: Yasser Al-Omari (mayor of Zarqa and member of the executive office of the Islamic Action Front) and Nabil Ahmad Al-Kofahi mayor of Irbid Municipality). In Pakistan, I was taken around the party headquarters of the Party of Islam in Mansura, Lahore, where many examples of the party’s activities, such as girls’ schools and a hospital, are to be seen. I also interviewed party representatives at lower levels, in order to get closer to the grass-roots; among those representatives were Muhammed Matin (member executive, Islamabad) and Tariq Khan (Deputy General Secretary in Islamabad). We return to these examples in Chapters 5 and 6.
Chapter 3: To Carry Out the Study

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Interviews with Outside Observers, Representatives of Other Parties and Other Sources

Outside observers were interviewed to get a second opinion on primarily the linkage behaviour in practice of the Islamist parties under study, to get information on other parties in the country and to get other general information. These outside observers were primarily scholars; some journalists were also included in this category. In Turkey, I spoke to 16 such outside observers, in Jordan 17 and in Pakistan 21.¹

Data on the linkage of the other (non-Islamist) parties selected for comparison in the three countries, primarily come from interviews with leading party representatives of those parties as well as from outside observers.² Due to the time restrictions, it was however not possible to gather information on the linkage on different levels in those parties. Thus, a general evaluation of linkage had here to suffice.

For information on background and context, important not least for the initial positioning of the cases in relation to the different explanatory models, written sources and statistics on the three cases have also been used, in addition to the sources mentioned above.

¹ For a listing of these, consult the list of references. The difference in number of interviews between the different countries in this respect reflects two things – accessibility of interviewees and my previous knowledge of the case in question. Whereas I have studied the Islamist party in Turkey previously (Jonasson, 1996) and had at least some prior knowledge on Jordan and the Islamic Action Front/Muslim Brotherhood, my initial knowledge on Pakistan and the Party of Islam was more limited, hence the need for more interviews in Pakistan. In addition to the interviews referred to here (and in the list of references), numerous conversations with different people, undertaken at the most various occasions, of course add to the general picture. However, these are not referred to in the analysis.

² Interviewees from non-Islamist parties were, in Turkey, Akin Izmirlioglu, chief advisor, Nationalist Movement Party, Nahit Mentese, senior representative, True Path Party and Mustafa Selmanpakoglu, Republican People’s Party. In Jordan, Munir Hamarneh, General Secretary, Communist Party, Huda Fakhuri and Walid Abdul-Hadi, (former) members of the Baath Party and Awwad M Al-Khaldi, Secretary General, Constitutional National Party were interviewed. In Pakistan, Syed Iftikhar Hussein Gilani, Senior Leader of Pakistan People’s Party and Sartaj Aziz, Senator, Senior Leader, Pakistan Muslim League were interviewed. An interview with another Islamist party was also carried out in Pakistan. In this party, the Minhaj-ul-Quran, Colonel Fazal-Ameem and Mrs Rashid were interviewed (due to the less formal arrangements of those interviews, I failed to obtain the full names of the interviewees; however, the interview was taped like all others). In all, 10 interviews with party representatives from other parties were carried out (4 in Pakistan, 3 in Jordan and 3 in Turkey).
Interviews as Interaction

Before going into further detail as to how the interviews were carried out, one important issue has to be highlighted. Interviews are always an interaction between different subjects, the interviewee(s) and the interviewer (and in some cases also an interpreter). These subjects influence each other in different ways during the interview, ways that affect what is being said and how. The interviewer perceives the interviewee in a particular way and the interviewee perceives the interviewer in a particular way. What one can do as an interviewer in this situation is, in my experience, primarily to show respect and openness for the interviewee, both regarding how questions are asked and regarding one’s behaviour. In this way, the interviewee is given the best opportunity to speak freely, without too much undue influence. I have done this to the best of my ability.

Evaluation of Data

Still the interviewee and his/her answers will be affected in different ways, depending on the interviewer in question. One cannot rule out the possibility that the interviewee has a notion about what the interviewer “likes to hear”, something that might affect the reply. This might especially be true for party representatives who obviously want to present a positive image of their party. What I am able to study here is thus primarily the picture as the interviewee wants to present it. As discussed previously, this picture of course is interesting in itself. It gives an idea of what the Islamists themselves regard as important features to convey. However, it is desirable to have at least some opportunity to double-check the picture given, lest the interviewer is lead totally astray.

As discussed earlier, this applies especially to the activities of the parties in practice. There is less reason to believe that interviewees interfere with the picture regarding the ideal and strategy of the party (which are under control by the party), even if that of course may happen. As to information on the ideal and strategy of the party, party material and party representatives thus have been regarded as largely sufficient in this context.

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1 I will return to the usage of interpreters shortly.
2 It was interesting to note into what “category” I was placed by different interviewees. Generally, I was placed into the category of highly educated by men, in a manner that largely gender neutralised our relationship. By women, on the other hand, I was placed into the woman category, in addition to that of highly educated. Thus, I found it only an advantage to be a (highly educated) woman in this context. Only by these categories I was accepted in both quarters, male and female.
Chapter 3: To Carry Out the Study

If the data provided by these sources point in the same direction, the conclusion is straightforward. If the data provided diverge, the different sources are posed against each other and evaluated. To a certain extent, information is also drawn from outside observers in such cases. On the basis of a general evaluation of the information received, conclusions are drawn. Such evaluations are presented in the text together with the conclusions.

As mentioned previously, information on the actual activities of the parties has however not only been sought in interviews with party representatives, but also in interviews with outside observers and in written secondary sources. These have provided an opportunity to ensure that the picture given is reliable.¹ If the party representatives and outside observers agree on a description on the actual practice, there is reason to believe that the picture presented is reliable. No additional information has then been sought. If the pictures diverge, there is reason to be more vigilant and a discussion and argumentation based on an evaluation of the sources precedes the conclusion. Such discussions are presented in the text.

In this context it should be noted that there are also reasons to listen carefully to the party representatives themselves. Sometimes, they will be very frank and admit various shortcomings regarding their linkage activities in practice. Such evidence – that runs counter to the obvious interests of the interviewee – is usually regarded as particularly trustworthy.

Throughout the text, I thus present not only the picture as given by the party representatives when it comes to the linkage behaviour in practice, but also that of the outside observers. An attempt has been made to double-check all pieces of information given by party representatives, with information provided by outside analysts. Most of the time, outside analysts were able to provide information that either supports or contradicts the statements of party representatives. Sometimes, especially on party internal matters, outside observers had no valuable information, however. In those cases, I argue for the conclusion reached on the basis of other information collected.

In this manner, the information collected on the linkage of the different parties has been treated and evaluated in ways that are customary when dealing with source material.²

¹ Obviously, the tendencies of the outside observers have to be taken into account here – do they have an interest in presenting the party in a particular manner? Throughout this study, few such tendencies have actually been detected, maybe because the outside observers generally have been renowned scholars. However, if such tendencies have been detected, they have been taken into account in the analysis.

² Cp. i.e. Thurén, 1986. Thurén points out the importance of evaluating especially the
The Interview Guides

The interviews were carried out on the basis of semi-structured interview guides. The basic idea was to pose the same questions to all interviewees in the same category – the party representatives in the central headquarters of the Islamist parties, the party representatives of the other, non-Islamist parties interviewed and the outside observers, respectively.

However, the interviews were not always carried out in exactly the same manner. I tried to avoid a high degree of standardisation of the interviews, by asking the questions in an order that was natural for the specific interview and by letting the answers by the interviewee to some degree trigger following-up questions in an unanticipated direction. On the whole, I however did my best to stick to the original interview guide.

When interviewing Islamist party representatives, I started out to ask general questions about the organisation of the party – how the party is organised on different levels, if it has ancillary or affiliate organisations, how decisions are taken in the party and how the bodies on different levels are selected. Then, questions were asked about the membership recruitment policy of the party and what is required to become a member. Thereafter, the external and internal activities of the party were looked into, and questions were asked on what kinds of activities are carried out, by what bodies and to what people these are directed. At the end of the interviews, the more “difficult” questions about the linkage objective and motivation behind the way in which the party organises its linkage were asked, i.e. questions about what the objective of the organisation and activities is and why. In some interviews, questions on the orientation of the party were also asked at the end of the interview.

Whereas the specific questions on particular aspects of party linkage were usually readily understood by the interviewees, the questions on linkage objective and motivation – which definitely are more abstract – took more explaining. Usually, I eventually succeeded in explaining what I was getting at and the interviewees could give me their view on why the party

authenticity, independence, tendency and time-relations of the source material. All these aspects have been taken into account here. Importantly, different perspectives have actively been sought. In the text, I have taken care to refer not only to the person who has made a statement, but also whether he/she is a party representative or an outside observer. In this way, the reader is made aware of the potential special interests of the interviewee.

1 By studying only certain aspects of different Islamist parties, and by posing the same general questions to the different cases, I thus carry out a focused, structured analysis (George & Bennett, 1997).
organises and acts the way it does. In this way, information on the linkage objective and motivation was obtained.¹

In the interviews with outside observers, I started out to ask general background questions, relating for example to different social, institutional and political circumstances, information on which was important for my general understanding of the country and its political life. I then went on to ask questions regarding how parties in general organise and work towards members and voters in the country at hand. For each question, I asked specifically for the particular situation of the Islamist party in this regard. These questions were similar to the ones posed to the party itself, but less detailed.

The interviews with other (non-Islamist) parties were conducted in much the same manner as were the interviews with the Islamist parties, even if interviewees were not quite as hard pressed for details.

The interview guides, in their “ideal typical” form, are found in appendix 1.²

**Methodological Considerations**

At the very beginning of the interview, the interviewees were asked if the interview could be tape-recorded and few had anything against that. The interviews have thus been taped as far as possible and extra notes were taken on the side. The tapes were later transcribed by myself, in full.³ In presenting

¹ Especially the motivations of actors are difficult to uncover. In this context, it was primarily through interviews with party representatives that information on such motivations (and linkage objectives) was sought. In some cases, interviews with outside observers were also used for clues. However, for a party to be regarded as having a particular motivation for its type of linkage, this motivation has to be referred to by the party itself, either by party representatives or in party publications. Thus, I have only included direct motivations. Other methods to reveal motives, such as general motivations or other actions related to the activity studied with a known motivation, were not regarded as useful in this case (cp. Hadenius, 1984).

² By referring to the interview guides in appendix 1 as ideal typical, I wish to point out that questions were not always posed in the same order or phrased in the same way. Different things were highlighted during different interviews. In short, the ideal typical interview guide was never completely followed, but it at all times structured the interviews.

³ Even if it took a tremendous amount of time, these full transcriptions were an invaluable source of information in the analysis of the data. Things that did not at first seem important took on importance as my overall knowledge on the case grew. An additional benefit of transcribing the interviews myself was the “feel” for the material that it brought. Hearing the interviews during transcription was also advantageous as it brought memories of the interview situation back to life. Thoughts that had crossed my mind at that time came back to me and I could use them in the analysis. Hearing oneself asking questions also gives a valuable perspective on oneself as an interviewer. In listening to the interviews again, I was sometimes
quotations from the interviews in the analysis, I have occasionally adjusted them somewhat, to make them easier to read.

One problem regarding the collection of data has been that I unfortunately do not master the languages necessary to conduct the interviews in the native languages of the interviewees. Therefore, I have had to conduct the interviews in English where possible. All interviews in Pakistan were thus conducted in English, while I had to rely on the help of interpreters (partially or wholly) in 5 out of 29 cases in Turkey and in 13 out of 31 cases in Jordan.

By engaging reliable interpreters and by having double-checked the information given in the interviews against other interviews and against other source material, I hope to have minimised the problem this situation poses.¹

Analysis of the Data
The data collected through interviews and other sources were then analysed in the light of the criteria developed in Chapter 2. First, the data on the societal setting in the country at hand, as well as on the background, experiences and orientation of the Islamist party, were used to decide what party-centred model(s) is/are applicable in that particular case. In the same manner, information on the institutions in the particular country was used to decide what institutional models are applicable. Thereafter, the linkage objective, motivation and outcome of the Islamist party at hand were analysed.

Continually an evaluation of whether traits from the different ideal types (the mass integration type, the total integration type, the catch-all type and the clientelistic type) are dominant, present or absent in the linkage of the party under study is carried out. In the summary of each aspect, dominant (D) and present (P) traits are indicated. This evaluation is based on the criteria developed in Chapter 2. As has been discussed previously, whether a

¹ In some cases, the interviewees actually knew English, but were not confident enough to speak it in such a situation. In such cases, the interviewees could check on the interpreter themselves, guaranteeing the correctness of the translations. Sometimes, the interpreter’s translations were then corrected (in minor details) by the interviewee.
trait is *dominant* or *present* in a particular party depends on what emphasis the trait in question is given – by the interviewees or other source material – and how often the interviewees or the material return to it. If it is clearly emphasised as being important and returned to on several occasions, the trait is regarded as “dominant”. If it is mentioned, but not particularly emphasised, the trait is regarded as “present”. If an aspect is not mentioned at all, it is regarded as absent, and it is not included in the summary. Throughout the text, I do my best to support and argue for the conclusions in this regard on the basis of the evaluation of the data.

Each “stage” of the party linkage (i.e. the linkage objective, the motivation, the efforts to establish external linkage, the efforts to maintain external linkage, the efforts to establish internal linkage and the efforts to maintain internal linkage) is then summarised as to what traits are *dominant* in what aspects (for example, in the activities, target and performer of the efforts to establish external linkage). In each stage, results are mutually exclusive between the types, even if the types may converge on single aspects. At the end of the Chapters 4 to 6, there is a summary of what traits dominate in the different stages of linkage. The theoretical models are then returned to and a conclusion is drawn as to which of these models (if any) seems to be able to explain the case at hand.

In Chapter 7, the linkage summaries of the three parties are drawn together and a comparison between the parties is carried out. As has been discussed earlier, comparisons are further carried out between the Islamist party in the particular country with other, non-Islamist parties in the same country. Finally, a comparison between the linkage of the Islamist parties and the linkage of an embryonic Christian Democratic party type is carried out. The chapter ends with a discussion on whether there seems to be an Islamist, or even more general religious, way of organising linkage.

The study concludes in Chapter 8, after briefly returning to a discussion on the linkage of the Islamist parties in the light of party democratic theory, with a discussion on which of the explanations used is best posed to explain the linkage of the Islamist parties.
ANALYSIS PART I:

CAN TRADITIONAL THEORIES EXPLAIN THE LINKAGE OF ISLAMIST PARTIES?
CHAPTER 4

EXPLAINING THE LINKAGE OF THE TURKISH VIRTUE PARTY (Fazilet Partisi)

After having laid out the theoretical and methodological foundations for this study, it is now time to turn to the empirical analysis. First among the parties to be studied is the Virtue Party in Turkey. I will begin by sketching the societal setting, and the political, ideological and institutional parameters in the case of the Virtue Party. This overview will make it possible to outline the theoretical expectations in this case. Thereafter, I will move on to the linkage of the Virtue Party. On the basis of this analysis, conclusions regarding the theoretical expectations are then drawn. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the theoretical implications of the findings.

The Turkish Political Context

Societal Setting in the Turkish Context

Starting out by determining the societal setting in Turkey, it can be established that Turkey is a society undergoing rapid modernisation, socio-economic change and industrialisation. Substantial urbanisation also takes place.¹ This development has led to better socio-economic conditions for many Turks. The general picture of modernisation and rapid socio-economic development applies foremost to the Western parts of Turkey. Here, the societal development of recent decades together with the general opening up to the outside world have resulted in a spread of consumer-oriented and individualistic ideals, primarily in the urban middle classes.

One step in the development process was the liberalisation of the state monopolised broadcasting media market in the beginning of the 1990s, which resulted in an explosion of private radio and TV-channels that can be – and are – used for discussing the positions of different political parties. Since 1994 there are restrictions on what can be broadcasted, however. The press is further relatively free, if with some taboos (like criticism of the military). Concentration of ownership moreover makes for less

¹ In 2000, 59.3 per cent of the population lived in cities (akg.die.gov.tr). According to the World Bank, 65.2 million people lived in Turkey in 1998 (devdata.worldbank.org, Turkey).
independence on the part of the press. Further, only few Turks regularly read newspapers.¹

On the vast countryside, not least in the East, the traditional, pre-modern, rural life however still prevails. These parts of the country have not experienced the same degree of societal change as the Western parts, nor have the many thousands who have moved to the shanty-town districts surrounding the larger cities in the West in the hope of a better future. Here conservative values and particularism remain strong.

The social welfare system is further not particularly extensive in Turkey and education is not highly prioritised.² Generally, it is only by having a job, money and good connections that you can enjoy a satisfactory level of social welfare. If you are poor, unemployed and without connections, you generally have to rely on family for your subsistence.³ In this situation, particularistic, family-oriented values – characteristic of traditional societies – continue to flourish alongside dawning interest-based orientations, which still however remain largely absent. Particularistic values thus exist in the traditional rural settings, but they are present in the modern, highly developed areas as well. Indeed, all over Turkey, particularistic orientations are common. According to Günes-Ayata, “we have a culture that legitimises patronage… (in Turkey) family values expect you to act in that direction”.⁴

Another societal feature of Turkey is the cleavages along ethnic lines. Turks consider themselves as being the descendants of a variety of nationalities. The founding father of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, tried to overcome this complexity and the cleavages that followed by emphasising “Turkishness”. The general idea was that every citizen in Turkey was to be considered a Turk.⁵ Most of the people accepted this idea,

¹ www.landguiden.se.
² According to the World Bank, the rate of illiteracy of people aged 15 and above was 16.2 per cent in 1998 (devdata.worldbank.org,Turkey).
³ Sahin refers to a nation-wide study, in which people were asked where they turned when needing help. The resounding answer was that they sought the help of a family member or a person of influence (Sahin, 17 May, 1999).
⁴ Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999, also Erder, 6 May, 1999, speaks about the “communal-conservative society”. One result of such particularistic sentiments is a political practice employed among large segments of the Turkish population, especially in back-ward, rural areas: dependency voting. Dependency voting takes place when individuals do not make a political choice on the basis of personal decisions, but on the basis of decisions of the local landlord or religious leader. Where this takes place, the power of those local strong men is vast (Toprak, 1981: 109).
but far from everyone. The Kurds are the most conspicuous exception; Kurds were not always willing to conform to the general ideology on Turkishness and many Kurds regarded themselves as a separate ethnic minority. The clashes between the Turkish Republic and the Kurds is (one of) the most bitter conflicts in the history of Turkey, however there is no general animosity between Turks and Kurds. Other than the Kurds, the minorities are relatively small in Turkey today.\footnote{Apart from divisions on ethnic lines (for example, some Armenians, Greeks and Jews still live in Turkey), there are some religious divisions in Turkey. Not least the difference between the Sunnis and the Alevi stands out in this respect. Today, about 30 per cent of the population in Turkey are Alevis, according to Cornell, 2001: 105 (11-20 per cent according to www.landguiden.se).}

Turkey thus presents a complex societal picture. Even if Turkey in some respects (and in some areas) presents a societal setting which would be conducive to the establishment of ideal typical catch-all parties, such as usage of mass media techniques for party propaganda and development of an individualistic outlook in the urban middle classes, most societal characteristics in the case of Turkey (such as the rapid modernisation in the West, the pre-modern context in the East, the heterogeneous make-up of the population, the limited extent of the state-administered welfare and, not least, the general particularistic outlook) are such that generally make fertile soil for clientelistic parties. While societal traits which according to the analytical framework would result in catch-all parties are present, societal traits that are conducive to clientelistic parties clearly dominate in the Turkish context.

Table 4.1. Expectations on the basis of the societal setting of Turkey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal setting</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the societal setting in Turkey, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation, P: Present expectation.

The Origin, Background and Experiences of the Virtue Party

Even if it has always been constitutionally illegal in Turkey to exploit religion for political purposes, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), the first predecessor of the Virtue Party, was established in January...
1970, on a platform with references to Islam.\footnote{Jonasson, 1996. To separate religion from politics through “secularism” was one of the main goals in Kemal Atatürk’s revolution; only through secularism, Turkey could become a modern state in Atatürk’s analysis.} The National Order party was formed primarily by the subsequent party leader Erbakan, after he had been elected as an independent candidate to parliament. Together with like-minded independents, he formed a party within the parliament, around an ideological commitment. Once formed, the National Order Party allegedly had a well-established network in society to tap into, through its connections with the Nakshibendi Order.\footnote{Toprak, 1988: 125, Ayata, 1995: 17. That religious orders have connections with different political groups is common in the Turkish context. Indeed, according to scholar Fulya Atacan, “mostly tarikats (religious orders) have connections with political parties. They are like pressure groups, they have followers and political parties try to establish connections” (Atacan, 7 May, 1999).} Indeed, Erbakan was encouraged by the leader of the Order to form the party.\footnote{Özdalga, 2002: 129. Erbakan had a close relationship with Nakshibendi sheiks until 1990, when the Nakshibendi withdrew their support for Erbakan, as he put the party above the Order (Özdalga, 2002: 141-142).} However, in no sense a pre-existing social movement formed the party.

The National Order Party was closed in 1971 when the military intervened in Turkish political life. The National Order Party was accused of mixing politics with religion and aiming at restoring a theocratic order in Turkey. This did not deter the party founders though – in 1972 the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) was set up, as a direct, but for legal reasons not recognised, continuation of National Order Party. This time, however, the party displayed less – though still obvious – emphasis on religious matters and Erbakan refrained from entering as leader.\footnote{He joined only after seven months.} The National Salvation Party wielded significant political influence in the 1970s, disproportionate to its standing in the electorate; indeed for a short period it formed part of a governmental coalition.

However, the National Salvation Party was closed in 1981, along with all other parties, as a result of the military coup in 1980. The party leaders were tried and convicted at court on charges of conspiration against the secular nature of the state.\footnote{Özbudun, 1987: 145.} Again, the party however refused to give up – and the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) was established in 1983. Even if new parties, according to the law, could not be based on old, closed ones, the Welfare Party was a continuation in purpose and outlook of the National
Chapter 4: Explaining the Linkage of the Turkish Virtue Party

Salvation Party.\(^1\) Again Erbakan stayed away from the leadership until the situation had stabilised – this time also for legal reasons, as he was not allowed to enter politics until 1987. The Welfare Party polled poorly in the 1984 local elections, in the 1987 national elections and in the 1989 local elections.\(^2\) In the 1991 general elections, the Welfare Party co-operated with two other parties, and together they obtained 62 seats (of which the Welfare Party initially controlled 40 seats).\(^3\) In the 1994 local elections, the Welfare Party however polled 19 per cent of the aggregated national votes and was awarded the mayorships in Istanbul and Ankara and 400 other cities and towns, to the big surprise of many observers.\(^4\)

In the general elections of 1995, the Welfare Party came out as the biggest party in Turkey, with 21.4 percent of the vote. In June 1996, the Welfare Party formed a government coalition with the True Path Party and the republic of Turkey was for the first time in its history headed by an Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan.

During the rule of this government, the military – who has taken on the task of safe-guarding the Kemalist reforms – initially kept a low profile and watched carefully every move. While the military was not keen on working against a democratically elected government, not least as it wanted Turkey to be accepted by the European Union, it felt its responsibility as the ultimate guarantor of the republican principle of secularism. From February 1997, the military started to counteract what it regarded as the Islamisation of society. This process ended with the forced resignation of Erbakan from the post of Prime Minister in June 1997, through what has been called a "soft" or civil coup. Later, a case was filed against the Welfare Party, in which the party was accused of constituting a "focus of anti-secular activities". In February 1998, the party was banned.

Already on 17 December 1997 a new party had been established, however – the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), and the leaders of the Welfare Party joined this new party one by one.\(^5\) General elections were held

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\(^1\) Landau, 1994: 588.
\(^2\) 1984 local elections: 4.8 per cent, 1987 national elections: 7.2 per cent and 1989 local elections: 9.8 per cent.
\(^3\) The other parties were the Nationalist Work Party and a tiny Reformist Democracy Party. Together they polled 16.9 per cent of the vote. It was an uneasy marriage, though, and the alliance soon split.
\(^4\) Taniyici, 2003: 471.
\(^5\) Erbakan and a few other leaders were however banned from entering into politics for five years, and could therefore not join the new party. Again for legal reasons, the party could not further recognise its connections with the Welfare Party. Indirectly, the Virtue Party however
held in April 1999. The Virtue Party was expected to do well in these elections, but they only came in third place, with 15.4 per cent of the vote and 111 of the seats in parliament. Again a case was again opened against the Virtue Party and again the party was closed down, in June 2001, as a result of its alleged anti-secular activities.

This is, in short, the history of the Virtue Party (and its predecessors). How may the party-centred theoretical model(s) be applied in this case? The one trait that stands out most clearly in the history of the Virtue Party is the constant opposition by the state and the establishment towards the party – and the continuous willingness on the part of the party to challenge the establishment by incessantly setting up new parties when the old ones are closed down. This opposition from the state largely reminds of the situation of an ideal typical integration party. Like the mass integration party, the Virtue Party also has roots in a broader social movement, even if it was not explicitly set up by a pre-existing external institution. In these senses, then, the mass integration party model seems applicable to the Virtue Party.

On the other hand, Virtue Party, like its predecessor the Welfare Party, has experience of power, primarily on local level but also – in the case of the Welfare Party – on national level. This experience of power suggests that the electoral party models of catch-all and clientelistic kind might be applicable in this case. However, experience of power is something fairly new for the Virtue Party and not an “institutionalised habit”. Thus, even if traits that would result in an electoral party according to the models are present in the

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1 In the local elections held at the same time, the Virtue Party polled 16.5 per cent.
2 In line with its history, the Islamists did not give up however. Instead of one new party, two new parties were formed on the ashes of the Virtue Party – the Justice and Development Party (AK Partisi, AKP) and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP). In the elections in November 2002, the Justice and Development Party won a landslide victory (34.3 per cent of the votes and 363 seats in the parliament) on a pragmatist and much diluted religious bid. For the first time in decades, one party was able to form the majority in the parliament. The Felicity Party, however, polled poorly and received only 2.5 per cent of the votes.
3 That the Virtue Party perceives itself as working in a difficult environment is also underlined in the organisational guide of the party. Here it is stated that, “(o)ur opponents make extensive and purposeful efforts to, in different ways, delay or completely stop our work. They want to crush our unity and community” (Party organisational guide, 1998: 23). Party representatives also refers to attempts, as they see it, by the state to intimidate the party – not least in the election campaign, e.g. through stopping the cars of candidates (Gündogan, 8 April, 1999). However, both the party documents and party representatives pledge that the party will not give up.
Virtue Party, it is the traits that according to the models would result in a party of mass integration kind that dominate.

Table 4.2. Expectations on the basis of the origin, background and experiences of the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin, background and experiences</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of origin, background and experiences of the Virtue Party, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation, P: Present expectation.

The Ideological Orientation of the Virtue Party

In Turkey, the ideological orientation of the Virtue Party – and particularly its predecessors – is the subject of a heated debate. Especially what the “true” ultimate goal of the Islamists is, is something fiercely contested. Their opponents claim that the ultimate aim of the Islamists is a revolution – to overthrow the secular state of Turkey and to introduce a totalitarian Islamic state, but that they hide these intentions until they have come to power.¹

That this is the case is vehemently rejected by the party: “(In the media, there are lots of people saying that the Virtue Party is a double-character party. They mean that we are after changing the society entirely, from the place where it is now to a more Islamically oriented society, which is wrong … this is a complot theory”.² Instead, the Virtue Party representatives assert that the party does not want an Islamic state in the sense referred to by its opponents, but a country run in accordance with the traditional culture of Turkey and, according to the party representatives, the traditional culture of Turkey is Islam.³

Most, if far from all, outside observers agree to this view.⁴ The main opinion among those analysts seems to be that the Virtue Party to a large

² Gündogan, 17 May, 1999.
⁴ In this context, it can be noted that it would be combined with serious difficulties to establish anything about the “hidden intentions” of the Islamists. One could also question the desirability of doing so. What I study is therefore how the party describes and understands its orientation. That this is the only honest route is emphasised by Göle, when speaking about the democratic mind of the Islamists: “I think it is a terribly sad story for political scientists, or
extent is a part of the political system in Turkey, and that it does not aim at overthrowing it in order to create an Islamic state. Rather, the party wants to provide for those people that do nurse religious feelings.

Further, the party itself – and most analysts – state that the Virtue Party must be regarded as a pragmatic party – it wants to come to power. Even if it would be too far to say that the Virtue Party wants to come to power regardless of what is needed to get there (still, it has some, if vague, ideological foundations), it phrases its appeals in the most inclusive way. Thus, it emphasises broad and general subjects, like "welfare", "democracy" and "human rights" in its appeals. According to the party statutes, the party should work to provide the people with peace, freedom, justice and respect and in the 1999 elections, the Virtue Party campaigned under catch-words of "democracy", "human rights", "freedom", "rule of law" and "development".

In this way, traits that according to the party-centered models would result in electoral parties, and especially electoral parties of catch-all kind (the appeal is universal and not particularistic), dominate in the Virtue Party. However, some traits that would be conducive to a mass integration kind of party are also present in the Virtue Party, even if there is no focus on the common action of a class. After all, the party has a vague, but distinctly reformist and restricted, ideological foundation.

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1 E.g. Göle, 10 May, 1999, Sahin, 17 May, 1999, Atacan, 7 May, 1999, Heper, 29 April, 1999. In this sense, the Virtue Party is by many perceived as different from its predecessor, the Welfare party, cp. e.g. Özdalga, 2002: 143-144, Taniyici, 2003. Taniyici argues that the ban of the Welfare Party was an external shock that made the Virtue Party emphasise democracy, basic human rights and freedoms (Taniyici, 2003). However, some analysts also suggest that the Virtue Party might use democracy as a means as long as it is beneficial, and that it in that sense is not "truly" democratic. Cp. also Özbudun, 28 April, 1999, Özdalga, 2002: 144.

2 Toprak, 5 May, 1999.


5 Party statutes, § 2.
Table 4.3. Expectations on the basis of the orientation of the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the orientation of the Virtue Party, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation, P: Present expectation.

Applying the Party-Centred Explanations to the Virtue Party and the Turkish Case

In summarising the theoretical assumptions on what linkage outcome is to be expected in the Virtue Party on the basis of the party-centred explanations, we encounter the first problem with these theoretical models. When applied to the Virtue Party, the party-centred models in fact point in entirely different directions. In the Western context, the different parts of the models (at least ideal typically) go together, e.g. a party developing in a society marked by rapid modernisation, that has roots in a broader social movement and that has experienced opposition from the state, tend to be ideological. Regarding the Virtue Party, the different parts of the models do not go together in such a neat way, but point in different directions.

The societal setting of the Virtue Party would suggest that the party organises primarily as a clientelistic party, even if traits expected to lead to organisation as a catch-all party also are present in this regard. The origin, background and experiences of the party however suggests organisation primarily as a mass integration party, while some traits in this regard would suggest organisation as an electoral party. The orientation of the Virtue Party would primarily predict organisation as a catch-all party, even if traits that would lead to organisation as a mass integration party also are present. However, no characteristics suggest organisation as a total integration party.
In this situation, we can move on by breaking down the general party-centred theoretical model in its constituent parts and study what parts – if any – seem decisive for the linkage outcome of the Virtue Party. In this way, the model – or anyway parts of the model – may be proved useful in the analysis. Indeed, this procedure is a way of specifying the rather multifaceted general model. If such a specification proves to be relevant in the empirical study, it thus would entail a theoretical contribution.

In specifying the general model, it can thus be asserted that emphasis on the societal setting of the Virtue Party primarily predicts organisation as a clientelistic party. Emphasis on the origin, background and experiences of the Virtue Party would instead primarily predict organisation as a mass integration party. Finally, emphasis on the orientation of the Virtue Party would suggest organisation primarily as a catch-all party.

Instead of one prediction on the basis of the general party-centred model in the case of the Virtue Party, we can thus bring forward three theoretically based expectations, depending on what characteristic of the Virtue Party is emphasised. The empirical analysis will show whether any of those characteristics indeed is useful for predicting the linkage outcome of the Virtue Party.

**Table 4.4. Summarised expectations on the basis of the societal setting, origin/background/experiences and orientation of the Virtue Party.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicability of Party-Centred Explanations</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal setting of the party</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin, background and experiences of the party</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation of the party</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the societal setting, origin/background/experiences and orientation of the Virtue Party, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation, P: Present expectation.
Chapter 4: Explaining the Linkage of the Turkish Virtue Party

Figure 4.1. Specified party-centred models in the case of the Virtue Party.

Comment: The figure presents the expectations of linkage objective and linkage outcome in the Virtue Party on the basis of societal setting, origin/background/experiences and origin respectively, in line with the specified party-centred models.

Institutional Environment: Electoral System and Laws Regulating Party Organisation

Electoral System and Electoral Laws

Turkey has a party-list proportional representation election system of the d’Hondt variety, with a very high threshold (10 per cent). Thus, a party needs a minimum of 10 per cent of the nation-wide valid votes to be represented in parliament.\(^1\) This system is designed to ensure a certain

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\(^1\) This section has been checked and approved by Mr Sabri Coskun, former Deputy President, Higher Council of Elections in Turkey. I am deeply grateful for his help in this regard.

\(^2\) Earlier, there was also a constituency quota to be filled in order for the constituency to be able to send MPs to the parliament, but it was removed before the 1999 elections (Korkut, 12 May, 1999). The electoral system has been changed several times in the history of the Turkish Republic; until 1961 a majority system was in operation, it was then replaced by a proportional representation system according to the d’Hondt method, which slightly favours larger parties. The d’Hondt method has been the basic system since, but it has gradually been altered, through amendments, in favour of larger parties – much due to the political instability
degree of proportional representation, but to prevent the massive fragmentation of party politics which has been witnessed in Turkey from the 1970s on, by favouring bigger parties.\(^1\) Since 1995, the number of MPs in the Turkish parliament is 550 and they are elected for a maximum term of five years by universal and direct suffrage.

To be able to run in an election, a political party must have organised in at least half of the provinces and in one third of the districts in each province, six months prior to the elections. Furthermore, the parties must have nominated two candidates for each parliamentary seat in at least half of the provinces.\(^2\) They must further either have held their general convention, or have parliamentary groups and they must have nominated at least two candidates for each parliamentary seat in the provinces in which they intend to contest the elections.\(^3\)

Local elections are also held every five years.\(^4\) For both the provincial and the municipality elections, there is a system of proportional representation in use, qualified by a 10 per cent threshold, that the parties must exceed to take part in provincial assemblies and town councils.\(^5\)

Further, every Turkish citizen over a certain age is eligible to vote (18 years).\(^6\) Every Turk over 30 years of age is eligible to become a deputy, with certain exceptions.\(^1\)

\(^1\) However, the election results during the 1990 show that it has failed to do so; during the 1990s, several parties polled around 15-20 per cent of the vote, creating no obvious majority. However, in the 2002 elections, this trend of fragmentation was broken, as the Justice and Development Party received 34.3 per cent of the votes and 363 seats in the parliament.

\(^2\) epic.at.org/epic/countryresults (Turkey).

\(^3\) In 1991 elections, preferential voting was employed. However, this feature was later removed (Korkut, 12 May, 1999).

\(^4\) These include: (1) election of members of provincial councils, (2) election of mayors of greater municipalities, (3) election of mayors of municipalities, (4) election of members of municipal councils, (5) election of village muhtar (headmen) and members of village council of elders, and muhtar of quarters and members of councils of elders.

\(^5\) However, for mayoral posts, the simple majority system is used (www.byegm.gov.tr/REFERENCES/Structure.htm). Additional features in the Turkish electoral system are that voting is made virtually compulsory by a fine for registered voters who fail to vote without showing "good cause" for their behaviour; the fine is relatively modest, though. Absentee voting is also accorded in parliamentary elections.


The right to vote is, however, limited for people serving in the armed forces, students in military schools and detainees/convicts in prisons. Legally incompetent persons and people disqualified from holding public service cannot vote.
On the basis of this outline, we can establish that there are aspects of the Turkish election laws that favour well-organised parties, like the ideal typical party of (mass) integration. Not least the organisational requirements for participation in elections give incentives for a high degree of organisation and also for national dispersion of the organisation, and thus incentives for organisation in accordance with the mass integration party type.

As we have seen, the proportional electoral system is further *per se* generally considered to favour ideological and well-organised parties. In addition, list-voting is claimed to work against the influence of personalities and to shift the focus to the ideas of the party. Geographical diffusion of the organisation is also generally encouraged by the PR system, as “a won vote is a won vote”, regardless of where it is won. In a moderately divided society like Turkey, the proportional representation further favours minority parties, appealing to particular groups on the basis of common interests, like parties of integration, and work against “regional fiefdoms”, and accordingly clientelistic parties. Also greater coordination of the party organisation and predominance of the party over the candidates are features claimed to follow from the system of proportional representation. In these ways, the PR system thus encourages parties to organise primarily as mass integration parties.

However, in the Turkish context, there are also traits in the electoral system that favour organisation as electoral parties, and in particular electoral parties of catch-all kind. The particular amendments to the pure PR-system in the Turkish case, and not least the very high threshold of 10 per cent, designed to promote large parties with broad appeals, constitute incentives to organise primarily like the ideal typical catch-all party.

The electoral system and laws in Turkey thus give mixed incentives regarding the way in which parties should organise their linkage. On the one hand, there are features favouring the development of ideal typical parties of mass integration, on the other hand there are features favouring ideal typical catch-all parties.

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1 Constitution, article 76 (www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/politicalparties.htm, www.ipu.org/purline-e/reports/2323.htm and epic.at.org/epic (Turkey).
Table 4.5. Expectations on the basis of the electoral system and electoral laws in Turkey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the electoral system and laws in Turkey, according to the institutional theoretical models. P: Present expectation.

The Turkish Party Regulations According to the Constitution, the Political Parties Law and Other Relevant Laws

The Turkish legal rules on parties (foremost in the Constitution of 1982, the Political Party Law of 1983 and the Law on the Election of Deputies of 1995) are very specific as to how a party should organise and what its ideology can consist of. In July 1995, the parliament made some amendments to the 1982 Constitution, some of which touched upon political parties and, not least, their relations with other segments of society. These constitutional amendments had however not yet been implemented in the relevant laws at the time of the main fieldwork for this study, in 1999. Here, I will thus present the laws that were in operation at the time of the data collection.

In the Constitution, the rules pertaining to political parties are listed primarily in articles 68 and 69. Apart from the statement that political parties are indispensable elements of the democratic political system, certain restrictions on the ideology of the parties are laid down. Thus, it is stated that:

- The statutes and programmes of political parties shall not be in conflict with the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, human rights, national sovereignty, and the principles of the democratic and secular republic.
- Political parties whose aim is to support or establish the domination of a class or group, or any kind of dictatorship, cannot be formed.
- Political parties shall not engage in activities outside the scope of their statutes and programmes, and shall not go beyond the
limitations set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution; those that contravene them shall be dissolved permanently.¹

Yet another provision in the Constitution relating to the programme of political parties clarifies this point. According to article 24, “no one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feeling, or sacred religious objects ... for the purpose of ... political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the State on religious tenets”.² On the basis of these legal regulations, it is clear that religious parties, if they are in conflict with the secular principles of the republic, are not allowed.

In the Political Party Law, there are further restrictions on parties’ programmes, purposes and activities, which state that political parties cannot operate on a religious basis.³

Thus, there are rather strict regulations on party ideology in the Turkish legal framework, not least against mixing religion with politics. However, also regarding the organisation of parties, the Turkish rules are quite strict. The Constitution (articles 68 and 69) prescribes that:

- Political parties shall not organise and function abroad, shall not form discriminative auxiliary bodies such as women's or youth

¹ Article 14 of the Constitution states that none of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of people, or establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas. The sanctions to be applied against those who violate these prohibitions, and those who incite and provoke others to the same end shall be determined by law. No provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that would grant the right of destroying the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution.

² Article 24 of the Constitution. In 1991 the ban forbidding politics on the basis of religion was deleted from the penal code, however (Zürcher, 1994: 305).

³ Article 78 is related to this issue. In the same vein, article 84 states that political parties cannot violate the Atatürk period revolutionary laws, article 86 states that political parties cannot aim at changing the secularist character of the Republic and article 87 states that parties cannot exploit religion or anything sacred, neither can parties organise religious ceremonies.
branches (this was however allowed according to the 1995 amendments), nor shall they establish foundations.¹

- Political parties shall not have political ties with or engage in political co-operation with associations, unions, foundations, co-operatives, and public professional organisations and their higher bodies in order to promote and further their party policies, nor shall they receive material assistance from these bodies. (This was however allowed according to the 1995 amendments).

- The internal functioning and the decisions of political parties shall not be contrary to the principles of democracy.²

The internal structure of parties is also highly regulated. The parties are to be organised along the same lines as the administrative division of the country with national, provincial and district organisations as well as a party group in parliament. According to the expressed intention, the parties should thus be hierarchically linked and internally democratic organisations, where a sub-provincial convention open to all registered members of political parties elect the delegates representing them at provincial conventions. Representatives who are going to attend the biennial national conventions are elected at the provincial conventions. At the national congresses, the national leadership of the party is elected and party policy decided upon.³

All internal party elections for selection of candidates as well as the party’s membership lists are subject to external judicial control through the sub-provincial election committees. The committees should review the membership lists every six months, in order to encourage proper record-keeping and prevent irregularities.⁴

Even if the party life is highly regulated, founding a party is however not difficult in Turkey. Thus, all citizens of Turkey over 18 years of age, with the exception of civil servants and members of the Armed Forces, may form and become members of political parties provided that they conform with the procedures in this regard. Prior permission for the formation of a

¹ Further, parties shall not take instructions from foreign bodies, shall not participate in the decisions and activities of foreign bodies which are prejudicial to the independence and integrity of Turkey. If parties act in contravention with this paragraph shall be closed permanently (article 69 of the Constitution).

² Thus, the internal workings and decisions of political parties must conform to democratic principles (www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/politicalparties.htm).


political party is not required and the parties are free to function in accordance with the laws and the Constitution.\footnote{The Constitution, article 68 and www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/politicalparties.htm.} Some restrictions are however in operation. Thus, the founding members and administrators at every level of a political party which has been permanently dissolved shall not become founding members, administrators, or comptrollers of a new political party (for five years); nor shall any new political party be founded, the majority of whose members are former members of a political party previously dissolved.\footnote{Article 69 of the Constitution.}

Taken together, the Turkish legal system seems to be conducive to very well-organised parties with hierarchically linked bodies on different levels and with democratic internal procedures. In these senses, the legal regulations promote ideal typical integration parties of mass kind.

However, in other aspects, the legal regulations work against such parties. For example, parties cannot “aim to support…a class or group”, something which is done by the ideal typical mass integration party. In this sense, ideal typical catch-all parties, bridging social and class cleavages are favoured. Nor may a Turkish party “form discriminative auxiliary bodies such as women’s or youth branches”; also such bodies are part and parcel of the ideal typical mass integration party.

In this sense, the legal regulations pertaining to parties in the Turkish context in some aspects both promote and work against the ideal typical mass integration party. In other aspects, they promote the ideal typical catch-all party, but they also work against it. By stipulating internal democratic processes, the legal regulations however work against total integration parties as well as clientelistic parties.

Table 4.6. Expectations on the basis of the party legal regulations in Turkey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party legal regulations</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
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<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the party legal regulations in Turkey, according to the institutional theoretical models. P: Present expectation.
Applying the Institutional Explanations to the Turkish Case: Electoral System and Party Legal Regulations

In linking together the electoral law and the legal regulations on parties in the Turkish context, it can be established that these institutional structures agree on presenting traits conducive to mass integration as well as catch-all parties. Interestingly, however, both these institutional structures in other aspects counteract mass integration and catch-all parties, respectively. No traits in the institutions are however conducive to the ideal typical total integration or clientelistic parties. Instead, these types are unanimously counteracted by the institutional arrangements on parties in Turkey.

Thus, it must be concluded that the institutional structures in Turkey present features promoting mass integration as well as catch-all parties. On the basis of the institutional structures, we thus expect the linkage of parties – including the Virtue Party – to present traits of mass integration as well as catch-all type. In the analysis, the institutional traits counteracting these types must however also be taken into account.

In conclusion, it can be stated that institutional arrangements in Turkey do not predict one dominating type of linkage in parties. Instead, mass integration traits and catch-all party traits are expected to be present in parties. It should be noted that the two institutional aspects here selected for analysis are in agreement on this mixed prediction. Thus, they do not point in different directions in this regard.

Table 4.7: Summarised expectations on the basis of the institutional structures in Turkey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional structures</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
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</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the institutional structures in Turkey, according to the institutional theoretical models. P: Present expectation.
Presented in a model, the expectations regarding the linkage in Turkish parties, on the basis of the institutional structures, would look accordingly:

*Figure 4.2. Institutional model in the case of Turkey.*

Comment: The figure presents the expectations of linkage objective and linkage outcome in the Virtue Party on the basis of the institutional structures, in line with the institutional model.

Having established the expectations of party linkage on the basis of party-centred as well as institutional explanations, the stage is now set for examining the linkage of the Virtue Party, in order to find out whether any of the models can explain the linkage of the party. The linkage objective and the linkage outcome of the Virtue Party will determine which model seems best suited to explain the way in which the linkage of the Virtue Party is organised.

**The Linkage of the Virtue Party**

As put forth in Chapter 2, I start the empirical study by outlining the linkage objective and the motivation of the Virtue Party. What linkage objective(s) and motivation(s) are cited is crucial for determining what factors can be regarded as causing the linkage outcome at hand. Only after these two have been outlined, we may go on to examine the way in which the Virtue Party works to establish and maintain external and internal linkage.

**Linkage Objective**

Representatives of the Virtue Party assert that the main goal for the party’s linkage activities towards the citizens of Turkey is to become an electorally big party. According to Gündogan, “we want to win elections, (this is our) main goal”. Thus, the Virtue Party embraces an electoral objective in

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practice. Party documents, outlining the ideal and strategy of the party, substantiate this view. In the party organisational guide, for example, the importance of general elections is time and again repeated. Indeed, the party has a standing committee for elections on every level, just to be prepared for elections at all times.

Outside analysts agree that the Virtue Party’s linkage objective in practice is to maximise votes. Sakallioglu underlines that the Virtue Party is a political party that operates according to the same logic as the other parties in Turkey. Indeed, Sakallioglu asserts that the Virtue Party, as well as its predecessors, is “extremely pragmatist. It is a political party. So completely the whole thing (is) geared to vote-catching. No doubt about that”.

We might thus draw the conclusion that the Virtue Party is primarily an electoral party, ideally, strategically and in practice. The party wants to come to power by maximising votes in elections. But, how does it try to maximise its votes? Like the catch-all party, by appealing to the whole population, or as the clientelistic party, by promising services for supporters in return for electoral support?

There are certainly elements of both these approaches in the party. Party representatives as well as party documents constantly emphasise the importance of “reaching all”, in a manner consistent with the ideal typical catch-all party type. In the party organisational guide, it is even stated that “all activities (are aimed at) ... the realisation of the ultimate goal, which is that each voter in each constituency will become a supporter of the Virtue Party”. That it is a very important goal on ideal and strategic level to reach out to the public at large is clear. Ideal typical catch-all traits are thus emphasised by the party as important on ideal and strategic level.

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1 Party organisational guide, 1998: 136, cp. also 148, 94, 158, 166, 171. The importance of elections – and voters – is also marked in the Presentation guide, cp. e.g. 1999: 9-10, 33.

2 To be noted in this context is that most outside observers speak from their experience and knowledge on the Welfare Party, i.e. the predecessor of the Virtue Party, as the Virtue Party was relatively new at the time. However, they generally claim that what goes for the Welfare Party for most parts also applies to the Virtue Party.

3 Sakallioglu, 11 May, 1999. Göle states the same thing (Göle, 10 May, 1999). Toprak agrees that the Virtue Party addresses the mass and that they “like to get as many votes as possible” (Toprak, 25 September, 1998). However, Toprak does not regard the Virtue Party as a pragmatist party. According to her is a “sectarian party, with a special electorate”, with an “ideological party image” (Toprak, 25 September, 1998).


5 This emphasis on reaching the masses is repeated on several occasions in the organisational guide (cp. e.g. Party organisational guide, 1998: 37, 39, 49, 50, 95, 96). That the party has not succeeded in doing so is however admitted, both by party representatives and in party
However, clientelistic practices are also emphasised by party people as well as by outside analysts as an important feature in the attempt at creating mass electoral support for the Virtue Party in practice.\footnote{Party representatives Gündogan, 17 May 1999, Gören, 3 May, 1999, Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999 and outside observer Günes-Ayata, 13 May 1999. That the Welfare Party (the party preceding the Virtue Party) acted on a clientelistic logic is suggested by many (e.g. H Demircan, 7 April, 1999, Gündogan, 8 April, 1999).} By offering service to the citizens, mainly through party-held municipalities but also through the party organisation itself, the party works for a further extension of its voter base.

That the Virtue Party operates on a clientelistic logic is substantiated by the fact that the party constantly emphasises how different groups would be materially favoured under a future Virtue Party-government (on local or national level).\footnote{Gündogan, 17 May 1999.} Thus, in practice, the party aims at drawing votes by stressing the material implications of a Virtue Party-government for different groups in society, making it resemble a clientelistic party.

Outside observers underline the importance of these clientelistic traits in the Virtue Party. Particularly the importance of the municipalities are emphasised in this context.\footnote{Özbudun, 28 April, 1999. For other examples of clientelistic services cp. also Toprak, 25 September 1998, Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999, Heper, 29 April, 1999. According to Günes-Ayata, who has published extensively on this matter, municipalities are especially suitable for patronage as “(i)f you are in power in municipalities, then you have direct access to resources. If you are in power in government, it is not that direct”; and she further contends that “(o)ne way of patronage is also getting indirect resources for the party itself” (Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999).} Sahin, who has studied the patronage of the Virtue Party, claims that the party “(m)obilises lots of people in urban areas by strict patronage”.\footnote{Sahin, 17 May, 1999.} Indeed, according to Sahin, “most party activities (are) related to patronage” in the Virtue Party.\footnote{Sahin, 17 May, 1999.} In practice, then, the Virtue Party seems to rely on a clientelistic logic to a large extent.\footnote{In this context, it must be noted that patronage is a multifaceted phenomenon with different motivations and consequences. Patronage does make life easier for lots of people in the patronage networks, while it at the same time furnishes the party in question with votes. For the party, the ambition to use patronage might thus be part of a double-sided strategy. On the documents. This shortcoming is often put down to the short life span of the party (cp. e.g. Presentation guide, 1999: 6).}
Ideally and strategically, catch-all party traits thus dominate in the linkage objective of the Virtue Party, whereas clientelistic traits dominate in practice. But are there no elements of the ideal typical integration parties in the linkage objective of the Virtue Party?

Traces that might be indicative of such a stance are indeed found in the party. Members are for instance regarded as fairly important in the Virtue Party, just as they are in the ideal typical parties of integration. That this is so is vouched for both by party representatives and party documents, as I will return to. However, basically it is not the members per se that are valued in the Virtue Party, but rather their effect on the electoral support. According to the head of organisation, Gündüz, “we have some special programme … (to) reach the people… If we have more and more members, we can manage to reach all (the) people (and) we will become very big”. Emphasis on members turns out to be more of a vote-catching strategy, and there is no interest in integrating members into the party to make them part of the political process. Again, the Virtue Party thus resembles the ideal typical clientelistic party, not the (mass) integration party.

Just like in the parties of integration, party organisation is further something highly valued in the Virtue Party. The party also views itself (as

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2 Gündüz, 1 May, 1999. Also according to Gündogan, members are used to “reach different structures of people” (Gündogan, 21 October, 1998). Gören states the same thing: “(V)voters are more important than members” (Gören, 21 October, 1998).
well as other parties) as a civil society organisation, and it refers to its duties as such. In the presentation guide of the party, it is stated that “political parties are at the same time civil society organisations (and) one of the tasks of civil society organisations is to educate people and make them aware”.\(^1\) These traits remind of the ideal typical parties of integration, which aim at the political education of their members. Again, as I will return to, organisation is however mainly valued as a means for (electoral) success. In the organisational guide of the party, it is stated on several occasions that the party should organise in a way that yields (electoral) results.\(^2\)

Thus, while there are traits in the Virtue Party that do suggest a resemblance with the ideal typical party of primarily mass integration, the linkage objective of the Virtue Party is not to draw the masses and to integrate them into the party (and thus into society), which is the linkage objective of the ideal typical mass integration party. Instead, the linkage objective of the Virtue Party is at all times electoral success.\(^3\)

However, integration of the masses into society does take place as a result of the Virtue Party’s work, according to outside analysts. Narli, for example, speaks about the “indirect, latent function of their effort”.\(^4\) According to her, the Islamists provide a path into society for marginalised people by providing various forms of patronage, such as jobs and scholarships. Indirectly, the receivers of the benefits then become part of the society. This is thus a “latent function of the (party’s) grass-root policy”.\(^5\) At

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\(^1\) Presentation guide, 1999: 24; “presentation” is defined as every activity aimed at creating positive response for the party in the public opinion (Presentation guide, 1999: 8). This is something substantiated by party representatives as well as outside analysts (Gündogan, 17 May, 1999, Gündüz, 1 May 1999 and Budak, 1 May 1999). Outside observer Ayata too refers to the party’s traditionally close connections with civil society (Ayata, 14 May, 1999).


\(^3\) When confronted with the issue directly, one party official pointed to the high electoral turnout in the 1999 elections, and on the basis of this contends that “we don’t see any alienated people in Turkey” in need of integration (Gündogan, 17 May, 1999).

\(^4\) Narli, 6 May, 1999. It should however be noted that it is primarily the Welfare Party that Narli refers to, even if she suggests that the same applies to the Virtue Party.

\(^5\) Narli, 6 May, 1999. Also according to outside observer Göle, the Virtue Party, its predecessors and the wider Islamist movement, have brought “new social classes, new social groups into the system”; this in turn has a “kind of elevator effect, it carries these new groups into the system, it gives legitimacy. So (the Islamists) tried to give legitimacy to Muslim identity… (The) Islamist movement … helped this (inclusion) of Islamist identity, Muslim identity into the system of modern politics” (Göle, 10 May, 1999). Sahin asserts the same thing: “The Welfare Party mobilised these people, (and) gave (them) access to resources, services”; indeed this inclusion is continued by the Virtue Party, “(these people) want to see
the same time, Narli underlines that this integration is nothing that is aimed for by the party: “No, no. The grass-root policy is to reach the grass-root people to meet their needs” in order to get their votes; “their aim is to be in power”. The Virtue Party thus seems to be motivated by electoral incentives by design, but to some extent end up integrating the masses by default. To integrate the masses form no part of the linkage objective of the Virtue Party. Even if the work of the party in some instances leads to the integration of people into the party – and thus into the society, it is not part of the party’s objective to accomplish that. To the extent that this is the result, it is a matter of an unintended consequence.

All in all, the main linkage objective of the Virtue Party is to mobilise as many votes as possible in elections. In this sense, it resembles an ideal typical electoral party. This seems to be the case on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. The party does not aim at integrating the members into the party. With regard to the linkage objective of the party, there are thus no traits of the ideal typical integration parties.

In the quest for winning as many votes as possible, different routes are taken by the Virtue Party. Direct appeals to the people at large are emphasised by the party ideally and strategically. In this sense, the Virtue Party thus resembles the ideal typical catch-all party. Such appeals are also found in practice, but there other traits dominate. In practice, the Virtue Party primarily embraces a linkage objective based on a clientelistic logic, just like an ideal typical clientelistic party.

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1 Narli, 6 May, 1999. Göle too contends that this is not directly intended for by the Islamists, indeed it is a matter of an “unintended consequence” (Göle, 10 May, 1999).

2 Not all observers agree with this analysis, however. Toprak asserts that “the Virtue Party and its predecessors have been trying to include marginalized sectors of society (in terms of social status, intellectual prestige, political and economic power) among the elites of Turkey… (It is basically a struggle to get a piece of the cake)” (Toprak, 21 May 1999). Further, Toprak does not does not regard the Virtue Party as a pragmatist party. According to her is a “sectarian party, with a special electorate”, with an “ideological party image” (Toprak, 25 September, 1998).

3 Not all agree with this conclusion. A common contention in Kemalist circles is that the Virtue Party and its predecessors only chose Islam as a foundation for its political programme, because it was an easy way to get to power. Apart from the difficulties of establishing anything about such hidden intentions, or indeed the desirability of doing so, what I here study is how the party describes and understands its aim. That this is the only honest route is emphasised by Göle, when speaking about the democratic mind of the Islamists: “I think it is a terribly sad story for political scientists, or sociologists, to try to
Chapter 4: Explaining the Linkage of the Turkish Virtue Party

Table 4:8. Traits in the linkage objective of the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage objective</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

Motivation behind the Linkage Objective

But why does the Virtue Party embrace a linkage objective of catch-all kind ideally and strategically and of clientelistic kind in practice? Is it because the party acts according to party-centred factors as is stated by the party-centred explanations or is it because it acts according to the institutions at hand, in accordance with the institutional explanations?

As the party-centred factors in the case of the Virtue Party not were joined neatly together in a model, the question on the motivation of the Virtue Party on the basis of party-centred factors has to be broken down further. Thus, is the motivation for the particular linkage objective of the Virtue Party based on its societal setting, its background and experiences or its orientation?

Party representatives and party documents emphasise that the party – ideally and strategically – organises the way it does, as it wants to come to power: “What we would like to … is to come in front, to power. To govern Turkey”.¹ The reason for this is that they want "(t)o apply our economic views, and apply social policies, economic policies and these sort of things … (to) serve (the) people".² The party is thus clearly motivated by its pragmatic orientation in its ideal and strategy – it wants to implement its policies within the present society, not reform society at its base.

The motivation underlying the linkage objective of electoral kind on ideal and strategic level in the Virtue Party thus rests on the basis of the pragmatic orientation of the party, in line with the party-centred

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explanations. Coming to power is what matters. Thus, ideally and strategically, the party aims at organising in the way that it regards as most efficient given the basic pragmatic orientation of the party, focused on coming to power.

But whereas the Virtue Party in its orientation focuses primarily on universal appeals, like an ideal typical catch-all party, this trait dominates only on the ideal and strategic level in its linkage objective. In practice, the linkage objective is moulded on a clientelistic logic. In this context, it is important to note that both party representatives and outside observers refer to the societal setting in Turkey in accounting for such clientelistic practices – indeed, they claim that such practices are “expected” in Turkey and that all parties are acting on the same logic.

On the basis of the party-centred explanations, it can therefore be suggested that the Virtue Party in practice primarily seems to be influenced by the societal setting in transforming its orientation into a linkage objective. On ideal and strategic level, the party seems to be influenced by its orientation in a more direct manner.

The background and experiences of the party does however not seem to influence the linkage objective of the Virtue Party to any greater extent. These – according to the party-centred explanations – predict a linkage objective of mass integration party kind in the Virtue Party, and such features are, as we have seen, absent.

However, is the Virtue Party at all influenced by the institutional structures in Turkey? References to such an influence are rare. But on some occasions, references to the importance of the legal regulations on parties, for the organisation of the Virtue Party, do occur.

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1 Throughout the organisational guide, the importance of winning elections in order to come to power is in focus. Cp. e.g. Party organisational guide, 1998: 23-26, 29, 50, 53, 158, 224-225. Cp. also Presentation guide, 1999: Introduction, 6, 15, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 36 and 38.


That the Welfare Party (the party preceding the Virtue Party) acted on a clientelistic logic is suggested by many (e.g. H Demircan, 7 April, 1999, Gündogan, 8 April, 1999).

3 Party statutes, § 2. Presentation guide, 1999: 16. Also in the party’s organisational guide, it is stated that the activities should be legal (Party organisational guide, 1998: introduction). The same thing is stated by party representatives, e.g. Gündüz, 1 May, 1999. This does not least apply to the internal organisation of the party, and particularly the holding of congresses et c. According to Akgönenc, the entire organisation in that respect is laid out according to the law (Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999). In this context, it should be noted that the Virtue Party probably is particularly interested in following legal regulations, as its three predecessors have been closed down for being illegal. During my fieldwork, I also got the impression that
The party professes its intention to remain within the limits of the different laws. These references to the impact of the institutional structures, more specifically the legal regulations, are however very general. In what way can it be argued that they influence the linkage objective of the Virtue Party?

There are reasons to believe that, for example, the objective to have an elaborate organisation is a result of the legal regulations, as these prescribe a developed organisation. To some extent the Virtue Party is thus probably influenced by this, as the party finds it important to follow legal regulations. However, that the objective to have an elaborate organisation primarily results from a willingness on the part of the Virtue Party to follow legal regulations is probably inaccurate, as the prime reason stated for such an elaborate organisation is that it is regarded as important in the vote-catching work. The objective of vote-maximisation, on the basis of the pragmatic orientation, thus is more likely to be the decisive factor behind the elaborate organisation, than an ambition to be law-abiding, even if that factor is not insignificant.

The linkage objective, on ideal and strategic level, to reach out to all, like an ideal typical catch-all party, could also be a result of the legal regulations at hand. Indeed, as we have seen, a Turkish party may not approach just particular groups, but has to have a cross-sectional approach. Thus, as party representatives and party documents claim that they find it important to abide by the law, it seems likely that the legal regulations have influenced the linkage objective of the Virtue Party on ideal and strategic level, according to which the party is to have a broad appeal.

However, neither the electoral system nor the legal regulations make for clientelistic parties. Indeed, the clientelistic traits in the Virtue Party in practice are counteracted by the institutional arrangements. When it comes to its clientelistic traits in practice, it cannot be argued that the Virtue Party is influenced by the institutional structures in Turkey.

To sum up, both the pragmatic orientation of the Virtue Party and the institutional framework of Turkey seem to motivate the linkage objective of catch-all kind, on ideal and strategic level. However, in practice, the party in 1998-1999 was under much more pressure that the predecessor Welfare Party had been in 1995; there seemed to be an increased watchfulness and caution on their part. Outside analysts make the same observation. Balci for example notes that while "the Welfare Party had (a dynamic organisation), the Virtue Party is not dynamic. They are afraid of being closed down" (Balci, 23 April, 1999). E.g. Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999; Gündogan, 28 April, 1999.
seems to be motivated primarily by its orientation as shaped by the societal setting in Turkey.

The relations between the motivation and the linkage objective on different levels in the Virtue Party are presented in the figure below.

*Figure 4:3. Relation between the motivation and the linkage objective in the Virtue Party, on the basis of the theoretical models.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivation based on orientation favouring party of primarily catch-all kind</th>
<th>Linkage objective of dominantly catch-all kind on ideal and strategic level and to some extent in practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivation based on societal setting favouring party of primarily clientelistic kind</td>
<td>Linkage objective of dominantly clientelistic kind in practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation based on origin, background, experiences favouring party of primarily mass integration kind</td>
<td>No influence on linkage objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation based on legal framework favouring party with catch-all as well as mass integration characteristics</td>
<td>Linkage objective of dominantly catch-all kind on ideal and strategic level and to some extent in practice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: Relation expressed in **bold** characters is in line with the theoretical expectations. Relation expressed in ordinary characters is not in line with the theoretical expectations.

Are there then any other motivations behind the linkage objective of the Virtue Party? That is, motivations other than those suggested by the party-centred and institutional models; motivations not foreseen by the theoretical framework? No such motivations can be found on the level here discussed, i.e. as motivating the linkage objective of the Virtue Party.

However, going deeper into the motivations of the party, one can detect traces of a motivation at a more profound level – a level not discussed by the theoretical models; the level of why people enter into politics in the
first place. At this level, there are traces of a religious motivation in the Virtue Party. Even if the suggestions of such a motivation are very vague (as they necessarily have to be in the Turkish context, for legal reasons), some indications of such a religious motivation can be unearthed. Party representative Gündogan, for example, emphasises the long-term aspect of the party work, “we are long runners in this”\(^1\). This long-term view implies that there are deep-lying motivations for continuing the work of the party. Gündogan adds to this image by referring to the other parties that have carried out the mission before the Virtue Party: “(I)n this ideology, not the political party, this ideology, there are lots of parties (that have) existed in the past and (that) have been closed”.\(^2\) By pointing to the successive parties in the Islamist tradition, Gündogan implicitly (which is as far as he can go) refers to the religious motivation, underlying the efforts of the party.

Outside observers are more open (as they can be) on the religious motivation for the party. According to Toprak, “they just thought that they were doing this for the sake of God”.\(^3\)

On a deeper level, the efforts of the Virtue Party thus seem – at least partly – inspired by religious motivations. On the level here discussed, no other motivations than those listed in the theoretical models however exist.

So far, I have thus established that the Virtue Party seems motivated by the societal setting of the party to formulate its orientation into a linkage objective of clientelistic kind in practice, and that it is motivated both by its pragmatic orientation (in a more direct way) and by the legal framework in Turkey, to formulate a linkage objective of catch-all kind on ideal and strategic level.

But how does the party conceptualise and carry out the different aspects of linkage? Does it act in line with its linkage objective in this regard, as it should according to the models, or does it conceptualise and carry out its linkage in other ways? This is what is studied next. I start with the efforts to establish external linkage.

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\(^{1}\) Gündogan, 17 May, 1999.

\(^{2}\) Gündogan, 28 April, 1999.

\(^{3}\) Toprak, 5 May, 1999.
Establishing External Linkage

Activities to Establish External Linkage

What activities does the Virtue Party conceptualise and carry out, in order to establish external linkage to the people? In this regard, the legacy from the earlier incarnations of the party lives on in the Virtue Party, and the linkage ideal of the party is to uphold the wide set of political, ideological and social activities that were developed especially by the earlier Welfare Party. However, party representatives point out that the Welfare Party had incomparably more financial resources than the Virtue Party, as a new party, has been able to muster. This fact (along with the feeling of a pressure from the state) is regarded by party officials as having severe effects on the party’s abilities to carry out the activities it would like to, in order to reach out to the people. The level and quality of the “presentation” has thus not yet reached “the required standards and quality”, in the eyes of the party. The ideal of the Virtue Party, when it comes to activities to establish external linkage, is however to have fairly all-encompassing activities of political/ideological and social character, much like the ideal typical mass integration party.

Leaving the ideal regarding activities to establish external linkage and proceeding to the strategy of the party in this regard, it can be established that the party according to its strategy tries to provide a wide variety of activities designed to reach out to the people and to make them aware of – and hopefully also voters of – the Virtue Party.

In this work to present the party to the people, it is primarily four areas that are regarded as important: (1) relations with media, (2) to inform, influence and guide the public opinion, (3) to form the public opinion, and (4) organisations.

1 Toprak refers to the activities of the Welfare Party: “(T)hey had a well-functioning organisation, … they were going door-to-door, especially in squatter-site areas, among the urban poor, delivering them goods and services, that kind of things … distributing … groceries, coal during the winter, helping them with their funerals, when they are sick, that kind of things. (Welfare Party) women, especially, they were very active, in terms of organising in these areas and so on” (Toprak, 5 May, 1999). Balci also refers to such activities: “(T)he Welfare Party went to the streets, went to the homes, went to the mosques and talked to … people, all people. Not only Islamist, not only nationalist, not only leftist, (but) all people” (Balci, 23 April, 1999).

2 Gören, 3 May 1999, Presentation guide, 1999: 6. Also outside observers refer to this point, e.g. Toprak, 5 May, 1999. The party uses the term “presentation” for denoting its outreach activities.

3 Presentation guide, 1999: 7. Important activities, outlined in the strategy of the Virtue Party, are conferences and seminars, where voters are informed on certain subjects and where an
The party’s presentation guide further lists the activities that the party activists on lower levels are supposed to carry out in their local districts; also the regularity with which activities should be carried out is stipulated.\(^1\)

Home meetings are regarded as most important of all activities in the Virtue Party, and such are to be carried out every week.\(^2\) The reason for this, as stated in the presentation guide of the party, is that “(b)oth the political conditions and the basic juridical construction do not give us the opportunity to talk about anything, anywhere”.\(^3\) It is only in the safe home-environment that every issue may be put forward and freely discussed.\(^4\)

Further, in a booklet from the Women’s commission of the party, the wide variety of activities to be undertaken by the women in the party are listed. These range from social activities, such as providing uniforms and stationary for needy students, to hosting lunches for the mass media and educational seminars for the members of the Women’s commission.\(^5\)

The fact that extensive, continuous activities are emphasised in the strategy of the Virtue Party does not mean that campaigning activities before elections are regarded as unimportant. Indeed, they are not. Instead,
activities of all categories are to be intensified and extra activities of campaigning character should be performed in times of election, according to the party strategy.\(^1\) It is further of utmost importance that these activities are well-planned, programmed and carried out with discipline.\(^2\)

In the strategy of the Virtue Party, also campaigning activities in times of election – not least the emphasis on grass-root contact with voters directly – are thus of ideal typical mass integration character.

These activities make up the linkage strategy of the Virtue Party when it comes to the work to establish external linkage. It can thus be concluded that the Virtue Party to a large extent resembles an ideal typical mass integration party, in this respect. Just like the mass integration party, the Virtue Party aims at carrying out campaigning activities as well as political/ideological, social and recreational activities. These activities are further to be carried out on a continuous basis.

Ideally and strategically, the Virtue Party thus outlines activities of largely mass integration party character, in its efforts to establish external linkage. Such comprehensive and regular activities are also carried out to a certain extent in practice. Not least the regularity of the activities is underlined by party representatives: “(We work) before election, after election. Election is not a special time for us”.\(^3\) This view is also substantiated by outside observers: “We have the impression that their organisation is active not only during the election time, but all year around”.\(^4\)

Especially the work carried out by the party women in practice is emphasised by the party, and not least the social aspects of this work. Party representative Akgönenc gives examples of such activities: “In the women’s group, we help the orphans, we help the children (and) things like that. We try to help the poor people”.\(^5\) Also the rest of the party carries out such work, work, as vouched for by party representatives.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Such campaigning activities in times of election include cards and letters to be addressed to people from all layers of society – each home and each person, setting up of election headquarters, candidate visits, reviewing the work of other parties and continuously every night evaluate the activities during that day and prepare the programme for the next (Party organisational guide, 1998: 224-225).


\(^3\) This statement was uttered by Muhammed Abdullah, a party member acting as interpreter during the interview with the head of party organisation, Gündüz. Gündüz confirmed the statement (Gündüz, 1 May, 1999).

\(^4\) Özbudun, 28 April, 1999.

\(^5\) Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999. Apart from these activities, Akgönenc gives examples of other activities carried out by women in practice, such as door-knocking, coffee-house and private
That the party indeed carries out some such activities of far-ranging, mass integration character is further vouched for also by outside observers. According to Göle, the party does “face-to-face activities (and) campaigns”.2 Also other observers underline the activities, “(in the) street, in (the) house and face-to-face…”.3

Göle also underlines that not least the women are important, in a way that she finds paradoxical: “(The) Islamist party used women in a way, women were active let’s say, in going into the houses (home meetings). It is paradoxical, because they give more importance to women’s votes, than the secular, modernist parties, who gave more importance in their discourse to women”.4 Also in practice, then, the Virtue Party carries out certain broad and multifaceted activities, in a way that presents similarities to the ideal typical mass integration party.

In this context, it can be noted that outside observers point to the religious character of these activities of the Virtue Party. Ayata refers to the wide activities of the Virtue Party, as “mosque-centred (and) part of everyday life”, something which he regards as “very important”.5 Erder too states that the Virtue Party uses religious activities to make contact to people: “(M)ales of each household go at least sometimes to the mosque. They (the Virtue Party) can (then) make contacts within Islamic networks...
during prayer time”. Interestingly, also party representative Gören suggests that certain activities are of religious character. Thus, he refers to activities undertaken “during Ramadan also. A lot of social activities, and prayers and social help for the poor people, as charity”.

Thus, diverse activities of largely social character are carried out by the Virtue Party also in practice, even if not to the same extent as was the case in the earlier Welfare Party – and not to the extent desired, especially in times of election. In some respects, these social activities are regarded as an offshoot of the policies of the party; the policies that the party wants to pursue in power are already enacted in the party work. In this way, activities take on an ideologically character in a manner that presents similarities to the ideal typical mass integration party, even if activities there primarily are intended to integrate members into the party.

However, the evidence suggests that such continuous activities of largely social character are not carried out primarily on a mass integration logic in the Virtue Party, but rather on a clientelistic logic. Thus, representatives of the Virtue Party primarily stress the importance of what can be construed as activities of service or patronage kind in practice, even if these activities take on an ideological tint in the party: Poor families are

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1 Erder, 6 May, 1999. In this context it can also be noted that in much of the party’s writings, not least in the party’s organisational guide, a particular style of language is used. According to the translator of these documents, Claire Kaustell, the language used is old-fashioned, almost anachronistic and “biblical” (Kaustell, 17 March, 2003). Also in other contexts, observers have pointed out that the party (and its predecessors) often use old, Arabic words instead of more modern Turkish words that denote the same things. The common analysis of this usage of language is that the party by using old-fashioned, Arabic words wants to invoke its religious legacy without stating it openly. The usage of language becomes a proxy for using an open religious appeal.

2 Gören, 3 May, 1999.

3 Again party representatives blamed the lack of funds (Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999, Gören, 3 May, 1999) or the fact that a lot of the people were new in the party and they “had no experience in election campaigning; they did not have the proper education, and they did not have the ‘drive’” (Gündogan, 28 April 1999). I too observed such a lack of enthusiasm among part of the party campaigners, most notably in Konya on 13 April, 1999. On other occasions, the party campaigners were very active, however (such as in Balikesir on 7-8 April, 1999 and in Ankara on 2-3 April, 1999. Outside observers claim that the reason for lack of enthusiasm is that “the Virtue Party is afraid to be closed” (Balci, 23 April, 1999). According to party representative Gündogan, the Virtue Party wanted to stay low in the 1999 election (Gündogan, 28 April, 1999). The party wanted to be left alone by the state to be able to build the organisation and structure properly. Indeed, the goal was to become strong in the next election, and then get around a 30 per cent of the votes and be able to form government by itself (Gündogan, 28 April, 1999). This is an interesting prediction, considering the victory of the Justice and Development party in 2002 (who got 34.3 per cent of the votes)!
helped with their basic needs: food, clothing, and medicine and the party helps people with funeral expenses, when they are ill, and so on.\(^1\)

As discussed previously, the motivations for such activities must be established to be able to determine whether they are of mass integration or clientelistic kind. Whereas such activities in an ideal typical mass integration party are aimed primarily at drawing the masses for integration into the party, such activities in a clientelistic party are aimed at making votes for the party.

In the Virtue Party, the objective is clear, as previously established. The linkage objective of the Virtue Party is to maximise votes, and not to make more members. Thus, these social activities primarily take on a clientelistic character in the Virtue Party. However, this does not mean that motivations of a “purer” mass integration character are totally absent in the Virtue Party. Indeed, activities may also be regarded as an offshoot of the policies of the party, as discussed previously, and in that sense they can be regarded as ideological. In the perspective of linkage, however, it is making votes that matters most in the Virtue Party. Activities of social-service kind thus primarily take on a clientelistic character in this party.

Also in other ways, activities of clientelistic character are extended to citizens by the Virtue Party, for example in dealing with the state bureaucracy. Thus, party representative Akgönenc states that “(i)f they (people) have some complaints, they have to go to the (public) offices … (T)hey can go there, find our party people … and they help them to do the right procedure or to find the right people to tell what the problem is etc”.\(^2\) This practice is typical of clientelistic parties.

The outside observers also refer to the activities of the Virtue Party, taking place between elections to establish external linkage in practice, as being of primarily clientelistic kind.\(^3\) Heper, for example, refers to the same kind of activities that Akgönenc speaks about: “(T)hey are trying to make life easier for many people, who have not had the means … (and) all sorts of support systems to deal with the impersonal institutions, the bureaucracy, the hospital and so on; they are helping these people out, personal service. And the best example is how they operate in those municipalities that they

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\(^2\) Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999.

control”.\(^1\) Also Özbudun refer to the importance of the municipalities in this regard as municipalities “is a source of patronage”.\(^2\) As we saw previously, Sahin, who has studied the patronage of the Virtue Party, claims that the party “(m)obilises lots of people in urban areas by strict patronage”. Indeed, according to Sahin, “most party activities (are) related to patronage” in the Virtue Party, and the municipalities is of utmost importance in this work.\(^3\) Günes-Ayata too points to the importance of party patronage, and especially patronage on the basis of municipalities: “If you are in power in municipalities, then you have direct access to resources”.\(^4\)

That municipalities indeed are of vital importance for the Virtue Party – and that the difference between activities carried out by the municipality and activities carried out by the party itself is not totally clear in the eyes of the party – is confirmed by party representative Akgönenc: “(If) people need help monetarily, for funeral expenses, we help them. Or someone is very sick we help (him). Now, this kind of help is done mostly through the help of the municipalities. That is why we try very hard to get as many municipalities as possible.”\(^5\) This indicates that the party makes use of the municipalities for its own benefit. Also other party representatives do not separate municipality activities from party activities in describing “what the party does”.\(^6\) Again, there are suggestions that the fault-line between those two kinds of activities is blurred, in a typically clientelistic way.

In election-campaigns too, clientelistic activities stand out in the Virtue Party. Thus, the party representatives, and analysts studying the party, point out that the party tailors its activities to the recipients in question, in order to be as efficient as possible in different environments and social contexts. Each activity should thus be carefully adjusted in relation to “what, how and to whom it is to be presented…”.\(^7\) This practice is described by one

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\(^1\) Heper, 29 April, 1999.
\(^3\) Sahin, 17 May, 1999.
\(^4\) Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999.
\(^5\) Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999.
\(^7\) Presentation guide, 1999: introduction. Time and again it is emphasised in the presentation guide that party members and representatives should address their audience so that “everyone understands” (Presentation guide, 1999: 13, cp. also 8-9). Important is also that the activities and their contents do not offend anyone; “(w)hile caressing the feelings of our own voters, we should desist from freezing out or attracting antipathy from … those who have not yet made a decision” (Presentation guide, 1999: 19. Cp. also 1999: 23, 25). It is also repeatedly underlined that the presentation should be adapted to the group or individual that receives it.
party official standing as a parliamentary candidate in the seaside province of Balikesir. He states that he during his election-campaign used different tactics in the three different areas of the province, in order to get as wide support as possible: “(W)ith respect to social structure, Balikesir can be broken up into three areas … (and) since there are three different social structures … in Balikesir, I broke up my strategy in three”.¹

In this sense, the party more than anything else acts to catch votes – and its activities in this regard largely resemble those of an ideal typical clientelistic party. Thus, the Virtue Party thus does not primarily emphasise general appeals carried out by party leadership, targeting all and everybody, like an ideal typical catch-all party. Nor does it carry out the same activities in all districts, based on the ideology of the party, in a (mass) integration manner. Instead, it subscribes to a clientelistic logic, employing local influentials where that is appropriate, appealing to primordial identities, where that is appropriate and referring to materialistic benefits where that is appropriate.

That diverse methods indeed are used in different locations can be vouched for by myself, as I joined the candidate Gündogan on his campaign in Balikesir. Also other outside analysts state that, “they follow different tactics in different regions. They modify their strategies according to the problems (at hand)”.²

¹ Güngör, 17 May, 1999. In the seaside towns, where the party was not known – nor well received – the party candidate engaged a local man, who was not a member of the party, to go with him in his campaign and to recommend him to the locals. This locally well-known man acted as an intermediary between the party representatives and the local population. In the small villages, where people are more religious, such an intermediary person was not necessary. Here, the party candidate thus went by himself and presented the programme of the party. Not least, the party in this context professed its ties to Islam; for example, the candidates and his friends attended the Friday prayer in the mosque. In the third area, which is rich but wholly dependent on its agricultural industry, the material benefits that would follow if the Virtue Party came to power were emphasised. Party candidate Güngör, who also works as a senior advisor in the party, asserts that using different approaches (depending on the characteristics of different areas) is a practice generally utilised by the party (Gündogan, 17 May, 1999).

² Narli, 6 May, 1999.
According to party representative Cetin, it is further essential to “visit important men (and) speak to (them) especially” during the election campaigns.\(^1\) Also this practice is typical of clientelistic parties.

Apart from these activities of largely clientelistic character, also other kinds of activities were used in the election campaign. Not least car convoys are regarded as important campaign activities – and they should be long, as “long convoy (equals) a big party”.\(^2\) Also media activities are important. According to Göle: “They (Islamists) were in the campaigns, they were ideologically speaking as well, publishing articles, they became spokespersons of the Islamist party... They have a television channel. Television is very important. Channel 7. Which is very competitive..., with modern, mainstream … good quality programmes. (Thus) they created their own Islamist intellectual spokespersons”.\(^3\)

Regarding the activities performed by the Virtue Party in order to establish external linkage, it must thus be concluded that on ideal and strategic level, activities of ideal typical mass integration kind dominate in the Virtue Party. Even if activities to establish external linkage in practice to some extent may be regarded as ideological, and thus of mass integration kind, the evidence suggests that these activities predominantly take on a clientelistic character in the Virtue Party in practice.

Table 4.9. Traits in the activities to establish external linkage of the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

**Target of Party Efforts to Establish External Linkage**

Then, towards whom does the party direct these outreach activities? Who is the target of the party activities to establish external linkage? Like in the ideal typical electoral party types, the ideal of the Virtue Party is to target a

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\(^1\) Cetin, 13 May, 1999.
\(^2\) Cetin, 13 May, 1999.
\(^3\) Göle, 10 May, 1999. Göle claims that it is primarily the youth that carry out such media activities.
wide variety of people. This ideal is established in the opening paragraph of the party’s organisational guide. There, it is stated that the party embraces “an all-embracing attitude that comprises our whole country … (and that it) is open to our entire people”. Indeed, “every place should be visited, every person should be approached”. In the ideal, the Virtue Party thus resembles an ideal typical catch-all party, attempting to approach everyone.

That this wide approach also is an important strategy of the party is expressed in the presentation guide. Here is emphasised that “one of our most important tasks today, is to present the party well to all categories”, so that it can ”embrace the broader mass”. It is further stated that the Virtue Party’s target is “the entire public opinion”. This strategy is also expressed by party representatives. According to the party’s head of organisation, Güdüüz, “we want to reach anywhere, all people … from city to village… All the people living in Turkey… Not specific groups… We want to make good (relations) with all people”. Outside observers substantiate this picture. Thus, Göle asserts that “they want to go to everybody… (T)hey are trying to target the majority… (They don’t have) an exclusionary discourse”. Also strategically, then, the Virtue Party to a large extent resembles the ideal typical catch-all party, when it comes to the target of their activities to establish external linkage.

This broad approach also seems to be carried out in practice to a large extent, not least in times of election. Party officials emphasise that the party does not target specific strata in society in its work, but all people. According to Güdüüz, the head of organisation, “(w)e approach all people”. The inclusive approach is emphasised by the head of elections, Gören.

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4 Presentation guide, 1999: 9, 13. Not least the youth is to be targeted in these efforts by the party (Party organisational guide, 1998: 52). However, in the presentation guide, this strategy of approaching all is somewhat diversified. It is here made clear that it is primarily those who are already voters of the Virtue Party and those who are not yet decidedly in favour of a certain idea or party, who thus are “neutral and accessible” and potential voters, that should be targeted (Presentation guide, 1999: 9-10). How the party should work towards a third group, those who are decidedly against the Virtue Party’s ideas, is not discussed, something which gives the impression that these are not regarded as worth-while in terms of targeting efforts.
5 Güdüüz, 1 May, 1999.
7 Güdüüz, 1 May 1999. Gören, 3 May 1999, states the same thing.
According to him, the party “talks also to non-Virtue party voters”.\(^1\) Party representative Akgönenç substantiates this view. When discussing who is invited to party activities, she contends that “(it) is open! (…) For example, if we give a concert, we say that it is open to all”.\(^2\)

Outside observers too refer to the wide approach of the Virtue Party is carried out in practice: “The Virtue Party tries to go to everybody”.\(^3\) Also my field-observations, supports this statement. During the 1999 election campaign, I observed the work of the Virtue Party Women’s commission in Ankara (Cankaya) and Konya. In their door-knocking and distribution of election material and carnations work, they aimed at covering every street in the district that they were in charge of.\(^4\) The head of the women commission, commission, Celik, also confirms that they did go to “every district (and that) … every place (is important)”.\(^5\) However, in a different context, Celik admitted that different areas were very different to work in, and for example Cankaya (city centre of Ankara) “is a most difficult one for us”.\(^6\) In the men’s campaign too, the aim was to target all, without exclusion. On the occasions that I observed, all (male) hands encountered were shaken and all shops and coffee-houses visited.

Thus, it seems like the Virtue Party to a large extent resembles a catch-all party in practice when it comes to the target of its efforts to establish external linkage. It approaches the population at large, anyway in the general election campaigning. However, as has been established previously, those activities do not dominate in the party’s efforts to establish

\(^1\) Gören, 21 October, 1998.
\(^2\) Akgönenç, 26 April, 1999, cp. also Akyürek, 12 April, 1999. That concerts and other activities arranged by the party indeed seem to be open to all also in practice was witnessed by myself during the election campaign, which largely took place during the “Sacrifice Feast” (Kurban Bayrami), in 1999. On a poster, I found an invitation to a party sponsored concert (30 March, 1999). When I (and the taxi driver) eventually found the location for the concert, I could observe a wide variety of people attending the concert, even if there was a majority of covered young women and their well-groomed male companions in the audience.
\(^3\) Özbudun, 28 April, 1999.
\(^4\) Whether they in practice prioritised certain areas over others in this work is difficult to establish; however on the occasions that I observed, both middle-class areas and shanty town (gecekondu)-areas were covered. However, openly hostile households seemed to be avoided in the campaign. The party women generally went to each and every door when distributing election material and flowers, but when they were informed by the neighbours that somebody upstairs or down the road was not sympathetic to the Virtue Party, these doors were carefully avoided.
\(^5\) Celik, 14 May, 1999.
\(^6\) Celik as cited in a Reuter report, 1 April 1999. The party women that I joined in Ankara agreed that middle class areas were more difficult to work in than the shanty towns.
external linkage in practice. In practice, clientelistic activities dominate. And regarding clientelistic services, the Virtue Party seems to be more particular in selecting its target. In distributing “simpler” clientelistic services, especially known voters and potential voters for the party are targeted. Regarding more far-reaching clientelistic activities, the party is however even more discriminatory. Outside observer Günes-Ayata states that, “there are different kinds of services that they would do... (W)hen Melih Gökçek (mayor of greater Ankara) is distributing bread, he cannot distinguish (between) voter and non-voter... They only distribute it to potential voters and the voters, that they think may vote for them... (But if) a poor child comes and says ‘I want to have a bread’, and they say ‘Kick him out because his father has not voted for us’, that would be the end of every vote. So in terms of distribution of bread … they go to the poor people (in general)... But if they are distributing jobs (credits and contracts), then they are very discriminatory”.¹

Thus, in a clientelistic manner, the Virtue Party in practice seems to direct the greatest part of their outreach activities at people that they know or expect to vote for the party. It does not, as an ideal typical catch-all party, direct themselves to the population at large. Nor does it, like the ideal typical (mass) integration party, primarily target an a priori well-defined social group in society.²

It can be noted that, obviously, religious people (of the Hanafi interpretation which dominates in Turkey) are likely to fall in either the “voter” or the “potential voter” categories, and as such be targets for party

¹ Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999. Cp. the presentation guide, 1999: 9-10, where it is underlined that it is voters and potential voters that are prioritised.
² Not all scholars agree with this analysis. As we have seen earlier, for example, Toprak asserts that “the Virtue Party and its predecessors have been trying to include marginalized sectors of society (in terms of social status, intellectual prestige, political and economic power) among the elites of Turkey... (I)t is basically a struggle to get a piece of the cake” (Toprak, 21 May 1999). Further, according to Toprak, the Virtue Party is a “sectarian party, with a special electorate”, with an “ideological party image” (Toprak, 25 September, 1998). This indicates a similarity with the ideal typical mass integration party. Özdalga states the same thing. According to her, the Virtue Party targets a particular status group, if not a particular social class. Özdalga claims that the Virtue Party particularly targets the “outsiders” or “underdogs”, those who are not part of the establishment. Further, the Islamists frame this targeting in an ideological manner, on the basis of a “looser-ideology” (Özdalga, 4 March, 2004). In my view, these conceptions not necessarily contradict my conclusions. It all has to do with “what came first”, the target on the basis of an ideological reasoning or the target on the basis of a pragmatic reasoning. I argue that the Islamists predominantly are pragmatic in targeting primarily groups where they expect to find support and that they then frame this targeting in an ideological manner.
efforts. However, the party officials and outside analysts emphasise that also people of other religious convictions, such as the generally staunchly secularist Alevis, at times are targeted by the party.\textsuperscript{1} This basic stand supports the idea that the Virtue Party indeed targets a wide variety of people, regardless of which group they belong to. Thus, they do not target a particular, well-defined group in society, even if their targeting often is phrased in an ideological way.

In summary, it can thus be established that the Virtue Party resembles primarily an electoral party, when it comes to the target of its activities to establish external linkage. On ideal and strategic level the party resembles the ideal typical catch-all party, in that it aims at reaching everybody in Turkey. In practice, however, this broad approach of catch-all kind is present only in some, more general, activities. In most activities, i.e. the clientelistic activities which dominate the efforts to establish external linkage in the Virtue Party, the target is more narrow. In such activities, it is primarily known voters and people who are expected to be voters of the party that are targeted, even if the targeting often is phrased ideologically. Thus, in practice the target of most efforts of the Virtue Party primarily resembles that of an ideal typical clientelistic party, even if there is a presence of mass integration traits.

Table 4:10. Traits in the target of the activities to establish external linkage of the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
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<td>Strategy:</td>
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<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

**Perform of Activities to Establish External Linkage**

What bodies in the party carry out these activities designed to establish external linkage? The Virtue Party has an elaborate organisation that should

\textsuperscript{1} Sahin, 17 May, 1999, speaking about a particular Alevi-settlement in Ankara targeted by the Virtue Party. Outside observer Erder too notes that “they (the Virtue Party) try to get … Alevis, for example” (Erder, 6 May, 1999). Ayata makes the same observation (Ayata, 14 May, 1999). Cp. also party representatives Gündogan, 17 May 1999, Gündüz, 1 May 1999, and Akyürek, 12 April, 1999.
“embrace the whole country”. Ideally and strategically, the Virtue Party should organise on six levels – from the general headquarters, via the province (il) organisations, the district (ilce) organisation, the town (belde) organisation, the village and neighbourhood (köy and mahalle) organisations to the ballot box (sandik) organisation. On each of these levels, the organisation is divided into different departments, in line with the pattern of the general headquarters (even if the number of departments is lesser on the lower levels). On each of these levels, the different departments of the party have specified tasks to carry out.

Apart from these departments, there is to be a women’s committee. This women’s committee is to be organised parallel to the party, as an affiliate organisation. The importance of the youth committees on different levels is emphasised in the organisational guide of the party as well. Particular “speakers” or “preachers” (hatipler) are further to be bestowed with great importance in the outreaching work of the Virtue Party, according to the party documents outlining the ideal and strategy in this regard.

Also other means are devised on ideal and strategic level by the Virtue Party to reach out to the people. Thus, on different levels, there are to be

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2 These different departments and their organisations are described in detail in the organisational guide of the party. Party organisational guide, 1998: passim.
3 Cp. Party organisational guide 1998: 52 (province), 98 (district), 137 (city). That women committees should be organised also on village/neighbourhood level is also stated (1998: 158). The women and men thus generally work in a parallel manner in the party. This is so also in the election campaign. According to Akgönenc: “The general campaign was led by the women and by the men, they were doing parallel work”; however, in some activities they cooperated as well: “(W)e combine men and women together and they work simultaneously together” (Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999).
4 The head of such youth committees “is responsible for all kinds of organisational activities aimed at making youths that are eligible to vote to participate actively in the organisation”; and for this task youth committees are thus to be established on different levels (Party organisational guide, 1998: 52 (province), 97 (district), 137 (city), 158 (neighbourhood/village)). Thus, such youth committees are to perform a plethora of different activities, not least of social kind (Party organisational guide, 1998: 87 (province), 129 (districts)). To be noted in this context is that it at the time of this study not was permitted for a party to have affiliate organisations. Mention of separate women and youth organisations is thus technically against the law.
5 Party organisational guide, 1998: 54 (province), 98 (district). In this context it is interesting to note that the word “hatip” is commonly used to refer to a preacher or someone who preaches a religious message. Again can be noted that a term with religious connotations is used, even if “hatip” in this context refers to “preachers” of the party message more than anything else.
different teams, which carry out activities weekly. Party officials are further to visit different villages and neighbourhoods on a regular basis. Moreover, in each village and neighbourhood, there should be one representative of the party who should participate in the ongoing activities taking place the villages and neighbourhoods.

Ideally and strategically, the Virtue Party has thus devised a multi-faceted organisation aimed at reaching out to people. Various bodies are outlined for performing the activities to establish external linkage. In this sense, the Virtue Party to a large extent resembles the ideal typical mass integration party.

That the performers outlined on ideal and strategic level in the Virtue Party are active on different levels also in practice is vouched for by party representatives. Especially, performers on the local level are emphasised by party representatives, even if activities by the party leadership are important as well. According to Gören, it is crucial for the party to know everything about the most local level. Therefore five people are active in each constituency to gather information about everybody that lives in that constituency. The head of election, Gören, however also emphasises the importance of the other levels: “I think (that) all the levels should work … (like a) chain… We can assume a chain… (F)rom the top to the foot… If any level is weak … the system is weak…” However, not all organisations

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1 Party organisational guide, 1998: 73-74 (province), 118-119 (district). Such teams consist of a head, a speaker, one person in charge of video, one in charge of sound, a driver and any accompanying persons.
3 Party organisational guide, 1998: 99-100. At the lowest levels (neighbourhoods/villages and constituency levels), there should further be representatives and observers to take care of the regular work, such as arranging weekly home meetings, “mapping persons who require particular observation … mapping the problems in the constituency, poor people, singles and those in need and report this to the neighbourhood representative so that necessary help can be distributed to them” (Party organisational guide, 1998: 157, 158-159, 161 (representatives), 166-168 (observers)). Indeed, such a person should “in a conscious way work for the realisation of the final goal, which is that every elector in that constituency should become a Virtue Party-supporter” (Party organisational guide, 1998: 167. One observer is heading this work. To his help he has four other observers, who should “try to reach all” in their particular area.
4 E.g. Gündüz, 1 May, 1999.
5 Gören, 21 October, 1998. Even if the Virtue Party thus is well-organised also in practice, party representatives are not satisfied. According to the party’s head for elections, Gören, the party organisation is not satisfactory in practice: “(W)e are a new party…less than one and a half years, so organisation (is) new, it is not established” (Gören, 3 May, 1999).
devised have been set up. The youth commission, which in the ideal and strategy is bestowed with great importance, had thus, for example, not yet been set up in 1999, even if there were plans to do so.\(^1\)

Outside observers confirm that the party indeed is well-organised down to neighbourhood level throughout the country and that the Virtue Party is more present on the “grass-root level than other (parties)”.\(^2\)

Apart from the organisational set-up, one pool of party workers which in practice seems to be very important on the local level is the young party women. Some such young women that I talked to state that they “work politically, in the party”.\(^3\) Party representative Celik as well as outside observer Atacan confirm that such young women or girls are assets to the party on the local level.\(^4\) According to Göle, the youth is very active as well.\(^5\) Indeed, also one outside observer refers to the fact that there is a “party man”, “in care of the street, (who) studies the families… And then later on (he) approaches a family with problems”.\(^6\) To a large extent, then, the Virtue Party thus seems to organise like an ideal typical mass integration party, also in practice; with nationally diffused local branches and affiliate organisations, which carry out the activities to establish external linkage.

As to connections with ancillary or interest organisations, such are prepared for in the organisational guide of the party and contacts with civil society are visualised in the party’s ideal and strategy.\(^7\) But because of the legal situation at hand, it is difficult to establish the extent to which such relations exist in practice.\(^8\)

However, outside analysts point to the importance of the Virtue Party’s connections with civil society. According to Ayata, there is a “network (of) supplementary organisations, Islamic communities. (These)

\(^1\) Gündogan, 17 May, 1999.
\(^2\) Erder, 6 May, 1999. Narli, 6 May, 1999 states the same thing.
\(^3\) Informal conversation with young party women in Konya, 13 April, 1999.
\(^5\) Göle, 10 May, 1999.
\(^6\) Narli, 6 May, 1999.
\(^7\) Party organisational guide, 1998: 39, 53 (province), 98 (district). That the party envisions close relations with civil society, and especially the wider Islamic movement, is suggested by the presentation guide, where it is stated that “we are a pious foundation (vakıf). Therefore we should not only content ourselves with that the main organisations offers us, but we should all the time mature and develop in all directions and from different sources” (Presentation guide; 1999: 14).
\(^8\) At the time of this study parties were not permitted to have affiliate or ancillary organisations, or indeed connections with interest organisations and the civil society. It is therefore difficult to find out more about such connections.
don’t act directly, but on behalf of the Virtue Party… (They have a) similar ideology… (These are) ‘total’ institutions, (and they are) very important in (the) political socialisation (as they) teach (the) basic values of Islam”.1

However, the suggestion that the Virtue Party supports a widespread, deeply entrenched social movement is rejected by party representative Güngörd: “Those movements require lots of money, you have to give them money. We don’t have enough money … to spare them”.2

Basically, when it comes to who performs the activities to establish external linkage, the Virtue Party thus to a large extent seems to resemble an ideal typical mass integration party, not least on ideal and strategic level. However, this is the fact also – if to lesser extent – in practice.

But not only the elaborate organisation, emphasised especially by party representatives, is important in this regard. As we have seen, also strong local men seem to be important actors in the work of the Virtue Party to establish external linkage in practice. That this is so is further underlined by the Virtue Party representative Cetin: “If important men belong to the party, (it is an) advantage for the party in that area”.3 The importance of informal networks, typical of clientelistic parties, is also brought forward by outside observer Sahin, who asserts that Virtue Party has a “complicated web (of contacts). (They) use every kind of influence”.4 In this way, the Virtue Party to some extent also resembles the ideal typical clientelistic party in practice, when it comes to the performer of outreach activities. However, the lion’s share of the activities to establish external linkage is carried out by the diversified party organisations on different levels, just like in the ideal typical mass integration party.

To sum up, it can then the established that the main part of the activities to establish external linkage in the Virtue Party is carried out by the

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1 Ayata, 14 May, 1999. Özbudun too speaks about the “network of various kinds of organisations, foundations, newspapers, TV networks (and) various kinds of Islamic associations… (These are) not formally connected to them (the party), but informally” (Özbudun, 28 April, 1999). Another example is the connections between the Virtue Party and the National Youth Organisation (Milli Gençlik Vakfı), a religious youth organisation, pointed to by many analysts, e.g. Sahin, 17 May, 1999. Party representative Güngörd however claims that the two are not related, even if he personally was a good friend of the leader of that organisation (Güngörd, 17 May 1999).

2 Güngörd, 17 May 1999. However, Güngörd does not reject that there is an informal relation between the Virtue Party and the civil society: “(I)n those different organisations … members of them can also be members of us. But we do not deliberately organise … those sorts of civil society (organisations) (Güngörd, 17 May 1999).

3 Cetin, 13 May, 1999. Güngörd states the same thing (Güngörd, 17 May 1999).

4 Sahin, 17 May, 1999.
local branches of the party, much as it is in the ideal typical mass integration party type. This emphasis on local branches and affiliate organisations is primarily evident in the ideal and strategy of the party. However, local branches are important also in practice, even if they are not as developed as desired. In practice, clientelistic networks and local notables are also emphasised to some extent. In this respect, similarities with the ideal typical clientelistic party are thus present. Still, it is the local branches – spread more or less all over the country – and not the local notables in strongholds that seem to carry out the bulk of the work to establish external linkage in the Virtue Party. Thus, mass integration traits clearly dominate regarding what bodies perform the outreach activities of the Virtue Party.

Table 4.11. Traits regarding the performer of the activities to establish external linkage of the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performer</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

Conclusions Regarding the Establishment of External Linkage

To conclude, it can be determined that according to its ideal and strategy, the Virtue Party to a large extent resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, regarding the way in which it works to establish external linkage. Like the ideal typical mass integration party, the Virtue Party ideally and strategically emphasises continuous and multi-faceted activities – with a largely ideological content – taking place also between elections on local levels. In the ideal and strategy, such activities are coupled with more intermittent activities of campaigning character in times of election.

However, when it comes to the target of the activities, the Virtue Party does not resemble an ideal typical mass integration party, ideally and strategically. Unlike the mass integration party, which targets an a priori well-defined social group in society, the Virtue Party works to reach everybody – on ideal and strategic level.

While activities of ideal typical mass integration character thus undoubtedly play a central role in the party’s ideal and strategy, the importance of these activities is less in practice. Indeed, the outreach
activities taking place in practice are marked by distinct clientelistic features, even if these often are framed in an ideological manner. Also the target of those activities is of primarily clientelistic kind in practice.

The Virtue Party thus presents an interesting mix of different traits in its efforts at establishing external activities. Ideally and strategically, mass integration kinds of activities, carried out by local branches in a mass integration way, are directed at everybody in a catch-all manner. In practice, the picture changes, however. Here, predominantly clientelistic activities (clientelistic ideal type) carried out by local branches (mass integration type) are primarily directed specifically at supporters (clientelistic ideal type).

A summary of these traits, which dominate in the Virtue Party’s efforts to establish external linkage, is presented in table 4:12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishing external linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>Performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Activities, target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the Virtue Party’s efforts to establish external linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

Ideally and strategically, the Virtue Party thus does not primarily work to establish external linkage in line with the theoretical expectations based on the linkage objective of the party. Instead of establishing external linkage in line with the catch-all and clientelistic models, which was expected on the basis of the linkage objective, the Virtue Party – on ideal and strategic level – organises primarily like a mass integration kind of party, except regarding the target of the activities. Regarding the target, the Virtue Party resembles the catch-all party (ideally and strategically), just as was expected on the basis of the linkage objective and in line with the theoretical expectations of both party-centred and institutional kind.

In practice, however, it can be concluded that the Virtue Party – just like is envisaged in the linkage objective – works to establish external linkage largely by way of clientelistic practices, even if primarily mass integration kind of performers are carrying the activities out, and even if clientelistic activities often are framed in an ideological manner.
I will return to a discussion of how we may account for this outcome in the conclusions of this chapter. First, I will however move on to studying the other aspects of the linkage of the Virtue Party.

Maintaining External Linkage

Activities to Maintain External Linkage

As we have seen, it is generally emphasised – by the party as well as by outside analysts – that one particular characteristic of the Virtue Party is that it pursues its activities all year round and not only in times of election. To be active at all times forms part of the ideal and strategy of the Virtue Party – but it is also something which is realised in practice.\(^1\) As they are carried out on a continuous basis, most of the activities designed to establish external linkage in the Virtue Party are thus also used to maintain the linkage with those parts of the electorate that the party has succeeded in establishing linkage to. In that sense, the external linkage activities are put to dual use.

Such activities of dual character, listed by the party in its presentation guide, are for example social and cultural programmes, home-meetings, conferences and seminars, coffee-shop meetings, courses, political discussions, cultural and athletic activities, festivities, open-air meetings and contacts through the mass communication media and telephone. Not least the activities of the women commission are of this “dual” character.\(^2\)

These ongoing activities make the people who already have some attachment to the party, but who are not members, even more involved in party life. According to the ideal and strategy of the Virtue Party, it is important to care for supporters at all times – not only in times of election. Indeed, in the presentation guide, the party emphasises that it does not regard the group of voters as simple “customers”.\(^3\)

In this regard, the Virtue Party to a large extent resembles an ideal typical party of mass integration, ideally and strategically, when it comes to activities to maintain external linkage. Just like an ideal typical mass integration party, the Virtue Party – ideally and strategically – aims at maintaining the contacts with its supporters through a wide range of multifaceted activities, of not least political/ideological character.

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\(^1\) Cp. statements referred to above by party representative Gündüz and outside observer Özbudun.


\(^3\) Presentation guide, 1999: 15.
Previously, we have seen that ongoing activities of ideological/political and social kind indeed seem to be carried out by the Virtue Party also in practice, but not to the extent intended. Instead, activities of clientelistic rather than mass integration character dominate the efforts to establish external linkage in practice.

Also when it comes to activities to maintain external linkage, the same situation seemingly applies. Even if some activities of mass integration character are carried out to this effect, it is emphasised by outside analysts and implied by party representatives that it probably is the clientelistic services and rewards in the Virtue Party that are most important for maintaining the external linkage in practice. Outside observer Narli explains how it works: “(The Virtue Party provides for) basic human needs. Young people need scholarships, networks, jobs and the … Virtue Party provides it… They developed a strong network, (they) ask people, companies to employ (people)...”\(^1\) By providing access to job opportunities and other necessities, the Virtue Party thus succeeds in maintaining the external linkage to different groups of people.\(^2\) In this sense, then, the Virtue Party primarily resembles an ideal typical clientelistic party in practice, when it comes to its activities to maintain external linkage, even if mass integration traits are present as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities to maintain external linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

**Target of Activities to Maintain External Linkage**

As to the target of the Virtue Party’s activities to maintain external linkage, it can be established that just like regarding the activities to establish external linkage, activities to maintain external linkage in the Virtue Party

\(^1\) Narli, 6 May, 1999. Outside analyst Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999 and party representative Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999 also refer to such practices in this context.

\(^2\) Again, the importance of power in municipalities is highlighted, as being of vital value for the Virtue Party. Only by holding power in municipalities, the Virtue Party can they realise patronage on a large and continuous scale (Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999).
are – ideally and strategically – meant to be directed to all, who are interested in the party. In this sense, the Virtue Party again resembles the ideal typical catch-all party, on ideal and strategic level.

General activities are also targeted at the public at large – at least to some extent – in practice. More specific, clientelistic activities, however, i.e. the bulk of the activities of the Virtue Party, are primarily directed at specific groups, in which the Virtue Party knows that it has voters or where it expects to find voters. According to outside observer Narli, “if you are from (the) periphery and come to Istanbul (and) if you don’t have (any) connections, if you don’t know anybody, then you will have difficulties. That is why they create their parallel society … on every level … to compete with the established, urban, secular bourgeoisie”. In many ways, the Virtue Party thus acts just like the “machine-workers” in the early 20th century United States. Just like those, the Virtue Party thus in practice primarily tries to stay in touch with people from marginal groups through providing clientelistic services. However, a mass integration logic – according to which supporters are to be more closely connected to the party organisationally – is not totally absent in the Virtue Party. Even if this line of action does not dominate, mass integration traits thus are present in the Virtue Party as well.

A pattern similar to that which evolved regarding the target of the efforts to establish external linkage, thus presents itself regarding the target of the efforts to maintain external linkage. Again, the Virtue Party in its ideal and strategy directs itself at all and everyone in its efforts at maintaining external linkage. In practice, however, the party primarily targets particular people, which are likely to support the party in elections, even if some general activities are targeted at all supporters, like in an ideal typical catch-all party; mass integration traits in this regard are also present.

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1 Narli, 6 May, 1999, Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999. Narli contends that the Virtue Party is well-particularly suited to take care of such people as “Islamists in the big cities mostly (are from) lower income and lower-middle (classes). But their origin is provincial (and) the provincial background is very important (Narli, 6 May, 1999). According to Sahin, the social “diversification is (wider) in the Virtue Party, (which means that they) can connect to everyone. Everyone can find someone in the party to connect to” (Sahin, 17 May, 1999).
Table 4.14. Traits in target of the activities to maintain external linkage of the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

**Performer of Activities to Maintain External Linkage**

Who carries out these activities to maintain external linkage in the Virtue Party? As was the case regarding the activities to establish external linkage, local party bodies are important in carrying out activities to maintain external linkage, ideally and strategically in the Virtue Party. In this sense, the party resembles the ideal typical mass integration party. Thus, when it comes to the conceptualised activities of social, political and ideological character, different party officials at the grass-root level are to be responsible.\(^1\) The party “speakers” or “preachers” are also to be active on a continuous basis, as are the different teams.\(^2\) Special importance is bestowed on the representatives and observers at the very lowest levels, in the ideal and strategy of the Virtue Party.\(^3\) According to the party’s organisational guide, these representatives and observers are to have the over-arching responsibility for the continuous work of the party at their respective level, such as the weekly home-meetings.\(^4\) Party officials on different levels moreover on a continuous basis should visit villages and neighbourhoods, as should the Women’s commission and the youth committees.\(^5\) All these kinds of activities should take to place on monthly or weekly basis according to the ideal and strategy of the party.\(^6\)

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\(^1\) The heads of public relations on different levels should, for example, be responsible for the contacts between the party and the public, and such contacts are maintained through repeated visits to different institutions, companies, work-places and “civil society organisations” (Party organisational guide, 1998: 50 (province)).


\(^3\) Representatives in the neighbourhood/village and observers in the constituency.


\(^6\) Party organisational guide, 1998: 63 (province), 107 (district), 144 (city).
Regarding the performers of activities to maintain external linkage in the Virtue Party, ideally and strategically, there are thus clear similarities to the ideal typical party of mass integration character.

As we have seen previously, party representatives claim that even if the organisation of the Virtue Party not is as elaborate as envisioned in the ideal and strategy of the party, a wide range of party bodies is in place, in practice. These bodies also perform activities to maintain external linkage, along with other activities of external and internal character. Not least when it comes to clientelistic activities, which are important to maintain external linkage, the local party organisation is important. It decides to whom the service activities should be distributed and it distributes them.\(^1\)

Even if the performers of the activities to maintain external linkage in the Virtue Party thus do not perform activities of mass integration character to any greater extent, the bodies themselves are dominantly of mass integration kind. Just like in the ideal typical mass integration party, diverse organisations at every level, down to the grass-roots, carry out these tasks in the Virtue Party in practice.

However, also party workers who are more loosely connected to the local party organisation play a role in the distribution of the important clientelistic services. Such party workers aim at having good contacts with the local politicians (if they are not from the party). In this sense, there are some similarities also with the ideal typical clientelistic party, when it comes to what performers carry out the activities to maintain the external linkage in the Virtue Party in practice.

Thus, performers of activities to maintain external linkage are primarily of mass integration kind in the Virtue Party on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice, even if there are party workers of clientelistic kind in practice, as well.

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\(^1\) Cp. Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999.
Table 4:15. Traits regarding the performer of the activities to maintain external linkage of the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performer</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

Conclusions Regarding Activities to Maintain External Linkage

Regarding the efforts aimed at maintaining the external linkage, the Virtue Party thus displays a mixture of different ideal types, just like it did regarding the efforts to establish external linkage.

In the ideal and strategy of the party, primarily ideal typical mass integration characteristics are prominent, at least regarding activities and performers. However, the activities are targeted at supporters at large, at least ideally and strategically, just like in an ideal typical catch-all party. In practice, primarily local party bodies of mass integration character carry out activities on a clientelistic logic; i.e. clientelistic activities are directed at known (or expected) voters.

Table 4:16. The full picture of the Virtue Party’s effort to maintain external linkage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintaining external linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>Performer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Activities, target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the Virtue Party’s efforts to maintain external linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

Again, the Virtue Party does not present a linkage outcome in line with the linkage objective on ideal and strategic level, except regarding its target. However, in practice the Virtue Party acts in line with its clientelistic linkage objective as expected, but the performers are primarily of mass integration kind, contrary to the theoretically based expectations.
I will return to a discussion of what might be the reason for this particular outcome in the conclusions of this chapter. Now I will turn to finding out how the Virtue Party works to establish internal linkage.

Establishing Internal Linkage

Member-Recruitment Policy of the Party

Members are, as I touched upon earlier, regarded as fairly important in the Virtue Party. Party documents as well as party officials emphasise the importance of members on ideal and strategic level. In the party organisational guide, it is underlined that the party aims at “visiting all persons recorded in the electoral register and try to make them become members or win them over to our party”. The head of the party organisation on every level is to make sure “through campaigns that more members can be recruited” and the local party representatives should to see to it that “the mobilisation for registering of members proceeds lively and continuously”.  

On ideal and strategic level, then, a large membership is presented as being of utmost importance to the Virtue Party. In this sense, the Virtue Party thus resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, when it comes to its member-recruitment efforts.

In one respect, however, the ideal and strategy on membership recruitment diverges from the ideal typical mass integration type; the Virtue Party ideally and strategically recruits members from the population at large, not only from a specific, well-defined group, which is the case in the ideal typical mass integration party.

That making many members is important also in practice is vouched for by party representatives. The party’s head of organisation, Gündüz, states that “(w)e work very hard and our members increase. It is very important”. Akgönenc too states that members are important, and she regrets that the party has not been able to focus on recruiting members because of the

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1 Party organisational guide, 1998: 172, cp. also 167, 170, 227. In the presentation guide as well, the importance of “making an approached person willing to become a member” is underlined (Presentation guide, 1999: 21). Indeed “at least one member a week (is to be) recruited in every constituency” (Party organisational guide, 1998: 29, 158, 167).
2 Party organisational guide, 1998: 30, 49 (province), 95 (district), 158 (village/neighbourhood), 166-168, 170 (constituency), 168.
3 Gündüz, 1 May, 1999.
elections, “but now we will have more systematic activity, registering members … a membership drive”.¹

Also in practice, then, the Virtue Party seems to resemble the ideal typical mass integration party. Indeed, unlike what is stated in the ideal and strategy, the party even seems to target particular persons in practice, just like an ideal typical mass integration party. However, as one looks more closely into this specific targeting, another picture emerges. Thus, party representative Gören asserts that, “we choose first our sympathising people, (as) it is easy to make them members”.² The Virtue Party thus seems to target primarily those who are sympathetic to the party in their membership recruitment.

Thus, while the Virtue Party looks for members in a particular group, it is not a group decided on a priori, on the basis of the ideology of the party, as is the case in the ideal typical mass integration party. Instead, it targets persons who already are sympathetic to the party, regardless of what “group” they belong to. In this sense, the Virtue Party thus more resembles the ideal typical clientelistic party in its membership recruitment, than it does the ideal typical mass integration party. Just like the ideal typical clientelistic party, the Virtue Party in practice connects known sympathisers to the party.

Also in other – more obvious – ways, the party presents clientelistic features in practice when it comes to its membership recruitment. Importantly, it is clear that it is primarily voters – and not members – that are sought by the party. According to the head of the election committee, Gören, members are important as they have a direct "psychological effect. If you are a member, you should give your vote to us".³ But even more important than this is the indirect effect of having many members on the number of voters. The head of organisation, Gündüz, emphasises that “if any political party (wants to) become … strong, (it) should collect more and more members”.⁴ He further claims, as we saw above, that “(i)f we have more and more members, we can manage to reach all (the) people (and) we will become very big”.⁵ Party representative Güngördar too refers to this line of reasoning. According to him, the Welfare Party used its many members "to reach different structures of people” and

¹ Akgün, 26 April, 1999.
² Gören, 3 May, 1999.
³ Gören, 3 May, 1999.
⁴ Gündüz, 1 May, 1999. Also the presentation guide underlines the propaganda results of membership (Presentation guide, 1999: 21).
⁵ Gündüz, 1 May, 1999.
the Virtue Party uses “the same method”.¹ In practice, it is thus not the members per se that are valued. Indeed, as I will return to soon, little emphasis is placed on, for example, the political education of members in the party in practice; something which is heavily emphasised in the ideal typical mass integration party. Instead, it is the effect of the members on the electoral support which is valued.²

Previously, we have seen that also outside observers generally regard the Virtue Party as a largely clientelistic party. This general observation supports the conclusion here.

In summary, it can thus be established that the importance of members is heavily emphasised primarily on ideal and strategic level in the Virtue Party, but also to some extent in practice. Ideally and strategically, the Virtue Party resembles an ideal typical mass integration party in this respect. In practice, however, it turns out that it is not mainly the members themselves that are valued, but rather their potential as vote-getters. Thus, regarding the membership-recruitment policy of the Virtue Party in practice, similarities with the ideal typical clientelistic party dominate, even if some mass integration traits are present.

Table 4:17. Traits in the member-recruitment policy of the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member-recruitment policy of the party</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

Restrictions to Enter the Party

According to the ideal and strategy in the Virtue Party, quite formal requirements have to be met for a member to be admitted to the party: The

¹ Gündogan, 21 October, 1998.
² The numbers of members are also relatively modest in the party. Slightly different membership numbers are cited by different party representatives. According to Gündüz, there are 500 000 members, while Gündogan claims that the party has 354 000 members (Gündüz, 1 May, 1999, Gündogan, 17 May, 1999). Other party representatives are not aware of the number (e.g. Celik, 14 May, 1999). These numbers should be compared to those in the preceding Welfare Party, which had 3 million members according to party representatives (Jonasson, 1996: 85).
prospective member should be a Turkish citizen, should be over 18 years of age, should not be forbidden to enter into a party on legal grounds, should hold a driver’s licence (to be able to fulfil civil and political rights) and should accept to pay an entry fee and an annual fee to the party.1 Anyone who fulfils these criteria and declares in writing to the party that he or she accepts the party programme and statutes and is willing to be active is admitted as a member.2 Those who want to become members then fill in a form. This form should be signed by two members of the party, who thereby recommend the person in question to membership.3

No probationary period is prescribed for the member-to-be, but the situation of a prospective member is to be examined by the district board and if they regard the prospective member as suitable for membership, they make a decision in favour of membership. Persons who are not regarded as suitable for membership due to their behaviour are however not accepted as members.4

On ideal and strategic level, the membership criteria and the procedure to become a member in the Virtue Party are thus rather formal, and the requirements on the members are rather high. In this sense, the Virtue Party thus to a large extent resembles an ideal typical mass integration party on ideal and strategic level, when it comes to the restrictions to enter the party.

In practice, however, party officials at first claim that these criteria and procedures generally are just pure formalities; in general, anyone is welcome as a member. According to the head of organisational matters, Gündüz, “(there are) no rules. Everybody can be (a) member in our party, there is no rule… If anybody chooses our idea and he says ‘I am … with you’, there is no (further) rule … (and) there is no checking”.5 This stance would suggest a similarity with the ideal typical electoral party (of catch-all

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1 The requirements regarding citizenship, age and legality are such outlined in the legal regulations on political parties.
2 Party statutes, §§ 2-3. Anyone that stands for the Virtue Party in municipal or general elections is also registered as a member of the party.
3 Party statutes, § 4.
or clientelistic kind), in which no formal requirements are posed on members-to-be.

Later, however, Gündüz modifies his statements and declares that if somebody wants to become a member, he should indeed “take (a) reference, and then come to us… (He needs) some reference”.\(^1\) Furthermore, Gündüz states that “if he comes with a reference, “we are going to check ‘Who is this?’, (and) after that (we will tell him) ‘You are most welcome!’”.\(^2\) According to this statement, the requirements to become a member in the Virtue Party thus seem to be rather formal after all, just like they are in an ideal typical mass integration party, even if it seems to be fairly easy to fulfil the criteria.

As this was the version emphasised by the party representatives on membership matters, there is reason to believe that this is the course followed in practice, typical of that in the ideal typical mass integration party. However, it cannot be ignored that tendencies of a slacker attitude (resembling that in an ideal typical electoral party) also seem to be present in the Virtue Party.

The linkage ideal and strategy in the Virtue Party regarding admittance of members thus resemble that of the ideal typical mass integration party, with formal restrictions to enter the party. In practice, the membership admittance policy seems somewhat more relaxed. Still, however, the resemblance to the ideal typical mass integration party dominates in this regard.

### Table 4:18. Traits in the restrictions to enter the party in the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictions to enter the party</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

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\(^1\) Gündüz, 1 May, 1999. That the decision on who will become a member is taken in quite a formal way is confirmed by party representative Celik (Celik, 14 May, 1999).

\(^2\) Gündüz, 1 May, 1999.
Conclusions Regarding Activities to Establish Internal Linkage

Regarding activities to establish internal linkage, the Virtue Party thus presents rather clear-cut similarities to the ideal typical mass integration party on ideal and strategic level. Just like this ideal type, the party values members highly, aims at recruiting many members and poses formal, but not strict, requirements to be met in order to become a member in the party.

In practice, the picture changes somewhat. Whereas members and membership-recruitment still are regarded as important, it turns out that members are regarded as important for a specific reason. The Virtue Party primarily values members not *per se*, but as vote-getters. In this sense, the Virtue Party thus primarily resembles the ideal typical clientelistic party in practice, when it comes to its recruitment policy. However, quite formal restrictions are placed on prospective members in the Virtue Party, both ideally, strategically and – if to slightly lesser extent – in practice. Regarding membership restrictions, the Virtue Party thus primarily resembles the ideal typical mass integration party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishing internal linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>Recruitment, restrictions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>Recruitment, restrictions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>Restrictions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recruitment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the Virtue Party’s efforts to establish internal linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

Regarding the efforts to establish internal linkage, it must thus be noted that the linkage outcome in the Virtue Party in this respect does not generally follow from the linkage objective as stipulated by the party-centred models, except regarding the clientelistic trait in practice.

There are however reasons to believe that the party, also in practice, is influenced by the institutions in the form of the party legal regulations, which stipulate formal requirements for membership. These influences are not in line with the electoral linkage objective of the party, and thus contrary to the expectations as outlined here. This indicates that the institutional influence can “by-pass” the linkage objective, and influence the linkage outcome directly. I will return to a discussion on how we are to account for
this outcome in the conclusions of the chapter. Now, it is time to take on the last aspect of linkage, i.e. how the party works to maintain the internal linkage.

**Maintaining Internal Linkage**

**Activities to Maintain Internal Linkage**

In party documents, not much is stated on particular activities for members, designed to maintain the internal linkage. However, some activities of this kind are referred to. One such activity is education. Thus, position holders in the party on different levels are to be educated on different subjects and “different seminars, information meetings, conferences and discussions (should take place with) parliamentarians and head of municipalities”.¹ Particular position holders on different levels, responsible for the presentation of the party, are also educated in presentation techniques.²

Indeed, education of party members in general is emphasised by party documents. In this context, it must however be noted that it is not a case of general education so as to make members more politically competent. Instead, it is the importance of education on effective political propaganda that is emphasised by the party.³ Thus, the main objective of the education of members in the Virtue Party seems to be to breed informed members who are well acquainted with, and thus effective potential propagators of, the party message. The objective is not to make members able to take part in the political process per se. In this sense, electoral rather than integration objectives motivate the education of members on ideal and strategic level in the Virtue Party: “(O)ur success depends upon well educated organisational workers on all levels”.⁴

Another activity intended to engage members, ideally and strategically, is the letters that are to be sent out from the party to the members on special occasions. Such letters are meant to result in a “warmer relationship … if addressed directly to members”, according to the presentation guide of the party.⁵

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¹ Presentation guide, 1999: 18. There is further a committee for education that should see to it that “members of the organisation are educated” (Party organisational guide, 1998: 40).
² Presentation guide, 1999: 34.
³ Cp. e.g. Presentation guide, 1999: 36.
⁵ Presentation guide, 1999: 21. A monthly bulletin for members is also to be prepared, containing information on party activities and other important announcements from the party.
Ideally and strategically, social activities should also take place to enable the maintenance of internal linkage. In the words of party representative Akgönenc, “(t)he ideal is to provide them (the members) a form, where similar thinking families or people can come together and share some things”.

On ideal and strategic level, then, diverse activities are designed for maintaining internal linkage. In this sense, the Virtue Party resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, even if fewer activities are envisioned for members in the Virtue Party than is usually the case in mass integration parties.

In this context, it should also be noted that members, ideally and strategically, seem to be expected to participate in the activities carried out by the party to establish and maintain external linkage. In the Virtue Party, the same activities thus to a large extent seem to be meant to reach and maintain voters and members. As noted previously, such activities are generally to be continuous, multifaceted and far-ranging, and of political/ideological and social character, ideally and strategically. Thus, members in the Virtue Party are expected to take part in various diverse activities, not least of political/ideological and social character. Again, the Virtue Party therefore resembles the ideal typical mass integration party ideally and strategically.

In practice, however, only few activities are directed only to members. Indeed, “there is no special programme and no special project for our members”, according to the head of organisation, Gündüz. Indeed, he claims that “(i)f we say ‘unfortunately this is special for our members’, this is not democracy”.

However, the education of members drawn up on ideal and strategic level seems to be carried out to some extent in practice. According to the head of organisation, Gündüz, “(t)he party (does) not (have) any special school, but there are some special programmes…” But, as I will return to

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1 Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999.
2 This is to be the case not least in times of election, when everybody in the party (from the head of the party to each and every member) is expected to be at service, without exceptions and conditions (Party organisational guide, 1998: 224).
3 Gündüz, 1 May, 1999.
4 Gündüz, 1 May, 1999. Akgönenc too speaks about that “(we will try to) educate our people … (the) members” (Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999).
shortly, these programmes are less of educational character and more a means to communicate the stands of the party headquarters to the levels below. As we have seen, what is outlined is further not a case of general political education, but more of propaganda training.

That some sort of education takes place in the Virtue Party is however vouched for by outside observer Özbudun, who refers to the “political education” of the Virtue Party, and claims that this education sets the Virtue Party apart from other parties (except the National Movement Party).\(^1\)

There are also some other activities for members in the Virtue Party. Thus, the head of the women’s committee, Celik, states – for the women’s committee – that there are particular meetings for members.\(^2\)

The Virtue Party women also seem rather active in practice regarding different activities, not least through the important house visits. In this sense, there are certain similarities with the ideal typical mass integration party also in practice, when it comes to activities to maintain internal linkage.

However, in practice other traits dominate regarding the activities pursued to maintain internal linkage. Indeed, to be able to have a career in the party, a member needs to show a willingness to take part in the party work: “(W)e like to give more chances to active members. For instance, (in) every election, we choose the people from them, between them … (and) they can receive a salary”.\(^3\) In this sense, there is a clientelistic logic to the internal working of the party in practice; active members are rendered a special status in the party, through different kinds of party-internal patronage.

The party’s head for elections, Gören, himself substantiates this view. He states that “(generally) we can’t pay them. They make it as a hobby, for their idea. (However) sometimes this is a symbiosis, they work for us and if we have a chance, if we have something to give them, or some business or some work for their relatives…”.\(^4\) According to Gören, members are thus sometimes rewarded for their work in the party, also when it is not in power: “Sometimes we are paying them, not salary, but donation”.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Özbudun, 28 April, 1999.
\(^2\) Celik, 14 May, 1999. The women committee seems not least to deal with different education seminars (Virtue Party, Central Headquarters Women Commission, undated: 12).
\(^3\) Gören, 3 May, 1999.
\(^4\) Gören, 3 May, 1999. When asked a direct question on whether they help their members to get jobs and money etc., Gören answers “yes, yes, yes” (Gören, 3 May, 1999). Gündogan states the same thing (Gündogan, 17 May, 1999).
Gören claims that this is part of a wider political logic in Turkey: "(P)eople … expect something from the government. If the party is in power … members expect work etc".¹ This logic is also referred to by party representative Akgönenc. Akgönenc states that clientelistic practices are very much a part of the whole political system in Turkey; she asserts that "every party will try to place as many people as possible".² She contends that these practices are utilised by the Virtue Party as well, and she exemplifies: "(T)he idea is that mayor Melih Gökçek (Virtue Party mayor of Ankara greater municipality), will pay as many as possible".³ Thus, while it is emphasised that the Virtue Party works for the well-being of all people, not only party-members, in practice party internal patronage indeed is important.⁴

Outside analysts as well emphasise that party internal patronage is important in the Virtue Party in practice, as it is in many parties in Turkey. As Günes-Ayata states that "(w)e have a culture that legitimises patronage".⁵ Observers thus assert that in Virtue Party-held municipalities, public constructions, for example, are often handed out to party members. According to Erder, "they (the Virtue Party) give work (like) sub-construction: ‘You can do a school and we will give you money’. (They use) public expenditure".⁶

Also in other ways, the Virtue Party provides for its members, according to the outside observers: "They are distributing jobs … credits … contracts … petty trade", according to Günes-Ayata, and she continues "the Virtue Party … (is) into patronage, because … they have mouths to feed within the party".⁷

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¹ Gören, 21 October, 1998.
² Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999.
³ Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999.
⁴ Celik however claims that there is no internal clientelism in the party. According to her "we will give … some opportunity for all people (when in power), actually not our members … (but) to all people… (A)fter the election, there is no member, there is no difference between… our members and other people, they are citizens of Turkey, we should be (a) Turkish government and municipality … (and) give opportunity to all citizens" (Celik, 14 May, 1999).
⁵ Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999.
⁷ Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999. Günes-Ayata notes that patronage is not without problems for the party. According to her "it is a double-edged sword. On the one hand it secures power within the organisation, on the other hand, it is very risky in terms of voting", as people will not vote for a party they regard as corrupt (Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999). Thus the situation is paradoxical; on the one hand people expect patronage, but on the other they don’t like it when
This patronage results in a rather wealthy, “Islamist” class according to the analysts. One analyst even jokingly characterises the Virtue Party member as “bearded, fat, with a new, big car and influence”, as a result of different kinds of remuneration by the party. The same logic is referred to by Ayata. According to him, “(p)arty membership (is a) channel for access to resources”.2

Thus, whereas there are some attempts at providing activities of mass integration kind to members in the Virtue Party, clientelistic activities dominate in practice. It is mainly through clientelistic activities that the Virtue Party works to maintain its internal linkage to its members in practice. On ideal and strategic level, mass integration kinds of activities however dominate.

Table 4:20. Traits in the activities to maintain internal linkage of the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities to maintain internal linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

Performers of Activities to Maintain Internal Linkage

When it comes to what bodies perform these activities to maintain internal linkage, it can be remembered that, ideally and strategically, the Virtue Party’s organisation branches off until it reaches the lowest level, comprising a few streets. As we saw above, the party thus organises on six levels – from the central headquarters, via the province (il) organisation, the district (ilce) organisation, the town (belde) organisation, the village and neighbourhood (köy and mahalle) organisations, to the ballot box (constituency, sandik) organisation.3
Much emphasis is thus placed on the homogeneity of the party; the same organisational structure should prevail in all parts of Turkey. As we have seen previously, this elaborate organisation is, ideally and strategically, regarded as very important by the party, not least for efficiency reasons.\(^1\) Thus, the party should take great care to “without exception, form all organisations that we need to form, … to provide education for the workers in the organisation on all levels … (and) organise our work in a way that yields results”, according to the organisational guide.\(^2\)

On different levels, different officials should take care of different tasks. Thus, there are, for example, particular “provincial teachers” that are “responsible for the education of the members of the organisation”.\(^3\) The same pattern should be replicated regarding most bodies and on all levels, according to the ideal and the strategy of the Virtue Party.

As we have seen, the activities on the different levels in the organisation are to be continuous. It is for example stipulated that the boards on every level should meet every week.\(^4\) Most activities are to take place on the local levels. It is particularly emphasised that the party representatives on village and neighbourhood level should be constantly active.\(^5\) The importance of an affiliate organisation – the women’s committee – is also emphasised on ideal and strategic level: “(C)onsidering that about half of the

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\(^1\) Cp. also the Party organisational guide, 1998: preface, introduction.


\(^3\) Party organisational guide, 1998: 54 (province), 98 (district). Party speakers/preachers are also to be educated by the party (Party organisational guide, 1998: 54 (province)). Such speakers/preachers are not only to be men; also women should be educated to become speakers/preachers (Party organisational guide, 1998: 90 (province)). The party’s head for election, Gören states that “For every box, there (should be) five people: one head of (the) team (and) four others. (There are) 200-300 people in a box (and the party should make) a list of people for every box (and collect) information about all, (like if the are) for or against the Virtue party” (Gören, 21 October, 1998). Gündüz also underlines the importance of the “ballot box” level (Gündüz, 1 May, 1999). To be noted in this context is that it, as previously discussed, not is a matter of general political education aimed at improving the political competence of members. Instead, education primarily aims at making members better propagators of the Virtue Party.

\(^4\) Party organisational guide, 1998: 29; this requirement does not apply on the central level, however. It is further stipulated that party representatives that are not active are to be replaced.

\(^5\) Party organisational guide, 1998: 29. Constant and a very high level of activity is to be expected from the observers active at constituency level (Party organisational guide, 1998: 166-167). Indeed, members who are not active, are “sought out in their homes” (Party organisational guide, 1998: 171).
population of Turkey consists of women, one understands how important the activities of the women committees are”.  

In this sense, the Virtue Party thus largely resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, ideally and strategically, when it comes to what bodies are to perform activities to maintain internal linkage on ideal and strategic level. Just like in this ideal type, primarily local branches but also affiliate organisations are to perform activities at all times, ideally and strategically.

Also in practice, the party is well-organised, according to party representatives. According to Gören, the party’s head of elections, the organisation is like a pyramid and he states that the “ballot box” level is “the most important organisational unit”. The party officials thus generally claim that “(o)ur organisational structure is a very strong structure”. This goes not only for the main organisation, but also for the women’s committee. The organisation of the women committee is structured in a “top-down design model”, starting at the headquarters, and going down through province, district, street and apartment levels. According to the committee itself, this organisation has been established in all of Turkey’s 80 provinces.

That the Virtue Party indeed is well-organised is vouched for by outside analysts as well. As we saw earlier, Narli vouches for the presence of an elaborate organisation, down to street level and she asserts that “they are very well organised”. According to Özbudun, “the Virtue Party (and the National Movement Party) are the only true mass parties in Turkey. They have a strong organisation, highly motivated groups of militants and they emphasise party organisational virtues … much more than the other parties.

1 Party organisational guide, 1998: 52. The women committee organises in a parallel manner to the main organisation. Thus, “those units that are prescribed according to the organisational model of the party, should also be…formed within the women committees and their activities should be carried out along this model (Party organisational guide, 1998: 52, Virtue Party, Central Headquarters Women Commission, undated).  
3 Gündogan, 17 May, 1999. However, the party officials are not always satisfied with the way in which the different bodies carry out their tasks and complain about the lack of their efficiency. Thus, “even though the Virtue Party is organised on all levels, it couldn’t work as well as it should” (Gündogan, 17 May, 1999). Party representative Gören agrees to this analysis (Gören, 3 May, 1999).  
4 Virtue Party, Central Headquarters Women Commission, undated: 5.  
6 Narli, 6 May, 1999.
The other parties do not give very much emphasis to organisation and organisational activity”.¹

The activities to maintain internal linkage in the Virtue Party thus take place mainly at the lower levels in the party organisation. Here, the different activities are carried out, and here members are furnished with the diverse goods of service character. However, unlike case in the clientelistic party, members are not primarily paid workers. According to Gören, “we can’t pay them (...). This is a hobby ... (and they work) not every day, (but) some day, some time”.² The important party internal patronage is this not distributed directly, via the party organisation. Instead, it is mainly an indirect consequence of party membership.

Party internal patronage is thus a result of party membership in the Virtue Party, but it is not primarily carried out by the party, as is the case in the ideal typical clientelistic party, even if some such traits of clearly clientelistic character are present as well.³ As a party, the Virtue Party thus predominantly resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, also when it comes to activities to maintain internal linkage in practice. Just like in a mass integration party, the Virtue Party is active on different levels, and not least on the lower levels, to maintain members in the party.

The resemblance to the ideal typical mass integration party grows even stronger as the main party organisation co-operates closely with an affiliate organisation – the women’s committee – in the work to maintain internal linkage, ideally, strategically – and in practice.⁴ Ideally, strategically and in practice, the Virtue Party thus primarily resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, when it comes to what bodies perform the activities to maintain internal linkage. In practice, there are however also some clientelistic traits in this regard.

¹ Özbudun, 28 April, 1999.
³ In this context, it can be noted that things are different regarding the party external patronage, which indeed is carried out directly by the party organisation.
⁴ In the Virtue Party, the general principle is to have a gender-separatred organisation. The men are organised in the party, while the women are organised in the women’s committee. Also the activities are generally gender-segregated, even if men and women sometimes come together in common activities.
Chapter 4: Explaining the Linkage of the Turkish Virtue Party

Table 4:21. Traits regarding the performer of the activities to maintain internal linkage of the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performer</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

Mode of Intra-Party Communication: Intra-party Elections and Other Internal Communication

In the party statutes, it is established that the highest decision-making body in the Virtue Party is the national congress, which is to be held at regular intervals. At this congress, intra-party elections are to be held for the positions of the party leader, the Party Advisory Council and the General Management Council, among other positions. The Party Advisory Council meets every three months, and is the most important advisory body after the congress. The General Management Council (Genel İdare Kurulu) is to be entrusted with the general and ongoing decision-making in the party. This body is to convene once a month, it is to take decisions on all aspects of party work and it should keep in constant touch with the rest of the party organisation.

Delegates to the general congress are to be of two kinds. On the one hand, there are “natural” delegates, such as the party leader, ministers, members of the central board, parliamentarians and founding members of the

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1 Party congresses are to be held not less than 2 years and not more than 3 years apart (Party statutes, § 7, 10. Party organisational guide, 1998: 36). Extraordinary congresses may also be called. According to the party statutes and organisational guide, the party is to be headed by an elected head and an elected board on the different levels. The heads and boards are to be elected on district, provincial and central level (Party organisational guide, 1998: 179 (district), 194 (provincial), 35 (central)). Apart from this board, there is also a chairman council and an advisory council (Party organisational guide, 1998: 49, 64-65 (province), 95-98, 108 (district), 135-136, 145 (town), 162 (village/neighbourhood level)).

2 Party statutes, §§ 14, 15, 17. Other positions to be filled through elections are those of the central board and the disciplinary council. Regarding the party’s advisory council, the majority of the members (60) are elected by the congress, whereas 20 are appointed by the party leader (Party organisational guide, 1998: 42).

3 Party statutes, § 15, 16.

4 Party statutes, § 17. To its help in the daily work, the General Management Council should have a board, consisting of the deputy party leaders and the secretary general for the party.
party. On the other hand, there are delegates who are to be elected at the provincial congresses.\(^1\)

The congress at each level is to be elected from the level below.\(^2\) Representatives to the district (ilçe) congress are thus to be elected by and from representatives on the village (köy) and neighbourhood levels (mahalle).\(^3\) The same procedure applies to representatives that are to attend congresses on province (il) and (as we have seen) national level. Representatives to the provincial congress are to be elected by and from representatives at the district congress, and representatives to the national level are to be elected by and from representatives at the provincial congress.\(^4\) These provincial and district congress elections are to be held with regular intervals, just like the general congress. Further, they are to be agreed on by and reported to the level above.\(^5\) Thus, the elections on the different levels must be approved by the level above.\(^6\) This situation thus prevails in the Virtue Party ideally and strategically: Elections are to be carried out to each level, from the very lowest level. In this sense, the Virtue Party to a large extent resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, when it comes to intra-party elections. Just as this ideal type, the Virtue Party – on ideal and strategic level – provides for elections from the lowest levels, and up.

That the prescribed elections indeed take place also in practice in the Virtue Party is vouched for by the party’s head of organisation, Gündüz, as “(t)his is (the) Turkish law and rule for political parties”.\(^7\) To the extent that the party indeed carries out internal elections, the Virtue Party thus also in practice seems to resemble the ideal typical mass integration party in this respect. However, it must be noted that the elections on the lower levels are, at least to some extent, supervised by the level above. Such supervision is

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3. Party statutes, § 28, cp. also Party organisational guide, 1998: 93, 177. Apart from elected delegates, there are also “natural” delegates in the district congress, such as the head and the members of the district board and the head of the municipality (if he is from the party) (Party organisational guide, 1998: 179, 191).
4. Party statutes, §§ 8, 24. Apart from delegated elected to the provincial congress from the district level, there are also “natural” delegates in the provincial congress, such as parliamentarians and city mayors in the province (§ 25).
5. Party statutes, § 22.
not in line with the mass integration ideal type, but rather the ideal typical total integration party type. Some further observations can also be made regarding the party internal elections of the Virtue Party.¹

First, it must be noted that the first general congress of the Virtue Party was not held until 14 May, 2000. Until then, the founders of the party were “bestowed with the competence of the general congress”, in accordance with the party rules.² Thus, all the representatives of the party were appointed and not elected from December 1997 until May 2000 and not much internal democracy in that sense were at hand during this period.³ This fact was lamented by party representative Gören, as he thought that the situation bred heterogeneity: “(I)t would be very nice (with internal elections), because the people (at) … district … and province (level)…will choose their best person. (---) (They will be) more suitable than the first… They will choose the able, capable people for management of the region”.⁴

Second, it must also be noted that before the first – and, in fact, the only – general, national congress was held, there were accusations in the media that the party-internal elections on lower levels had been orchestrated from the top in order to produce a congress that would vote in favour of the more traditional faction.⁵

On the one hand, for the first time in the history of the ”Erbakan parties”, i.e. the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party, a serious challenger – Abdullah Gül – stood against the candidate favoured by Erbakan to the party leader post in the party-internal elections, Recai Kutan.⁶ The results of the voting for the post of party leader in the congress (633 votes for Erbakan’s candidate, Recai Kutan and his list for the General Management Council, and 521 votes for the challenger, Gül, and his list), shows that if there were previous orchestrations to make for a “traditionally” minded congress, these had not led to the desired result. Indeed, according a Virtue Party parliamentarian, ¹

¹ In this context, it should also be noted that the women’s committee keep in touch with the main organisation regularly. Further, three members of the women committee, among them the head of the Women’s Commission, are also appointed to the General Management Council (Virtue Party, Central Headquarters Women Commission, undated: 7).
³ Indeed, according to Taniyici, former party leader “Erbakan … carefully orchestrated the creation of the new party’s programme and the selection of its leader” (Taniyici, 2003: 475).
⁴ Gören, 3 May, 1999.
⁶ Indeed, “Erbakan never had to compete against strong … challengers for the top leadership position” (Özdalga, 2002: 137).
Remzi Cetin, the results of the vote were "a very big shock" for the traditional faction.\textsuperscript{1} Drawing from this evidence, there thus seems to be at least some degree of intra-party democracy in the Virtue Party.\textsuperscript{2}

On the other hand, Gül ran on a ticket for change in the party, change in a more open and democratic direction. In his speech to the congress, he stated that "(w)e want democracy in Turkey, (then) if you cannot speak in the party (we are) hypocrites. If we complain at the centralisation in Turkey, (we must see that centralisation is there) also in (the) party. (It is a) very centralised party. (Further) (t)he opinion of the organisation has not been taken into account. (---) We must discuss".\textsuperscript{3} Gül was met with massive protests and many also criticised Gül’s own behaviour, and implied that he was not so democratic himself and only was interested in furthering his own interests. The representatives of this view claimed that "(w)e are tied to democracy, we could give democracy courses".\textsuperscript{4}

Gül’s accusations imply that the internal democracy in the Virtue Party leaves at least some things to be wanted. There are also indications that many of the delegates and other party members who supported Gül on the lower levels of the party organisation, were expelled from the party after the congress.\textsuperscript{5} But, again, the fact that Gül was allowed to stand up at the general congress and complain about the lack of party internal democracy

\textsuperscript{1} Cetin, 14 May, 2000. According to Cetin, the Kutan faction expected the Gül faction to get 200-250 votes.

\textsuperscript{2} I had the opportunity to observe the congress as an invited guest and I witnessed a very dramatic congress. Two very visible groups were present – those for Gül and those for Kutan, and many speakers clearly took sides with either. Especially the youngsters that supported Kutan were conspicuous, shouting their slogans in front of the stage and demanding respect for "elders"; not least when Gül referred to his relative youth. In speaking about elders, these youngsters obviously referred to Erbakan, the erstwhile leader of the parties preceding the Virtue Party. That Erbakan is very important in the Virtue Party is clear. The longest, standing applause (coming from the 10 000 people inside as well as the 15 000 people outside of the congress hall for around 20 minutes) took place when the well-wish from Erbakan was presented; a lot of "Erbakan" chanting also took place. Despite the tough debates, the congress ended on a “unity” note; both party leader candidates entered the stage and held each other hands up in the air as a sign for unity. As to formal procedure, the congress seemed to take place in the prescribed way (Field notes, 14 May, 2000).

\textsuperscript{3} Gül, 14 May, 2000, field notes. Gül also talked about the lack of influence of the members: “It is a most sacrificing organisation, filled with giving people who spend all their time for the Virtue Party. Every week, there are always meetings. The members are encouraged to give what they can, but never their opinions and ideas” (Gül, 14 May, 2000, field notes). The speeches at the congress were interpreted for most of the congress. In the end, the situation became quite chaotic and the interpretation failed due to technical problems.

\textsuperscript{4} A mayor from Konya (name missing) (Field notes, 14 May, 2000).

\textsuperscript{5} Özdalga, 24 May, 2000.
paradoxically is an indication of the presence of internal democracy in the Virtue Party. Furthermore, the debate at the congress was very open indeed and people spoke freely.\footnote{In the words of Gül: “There is nothing we cannot talk about” (Gül, 14 May, 2000, field notes).}

Even if there thus seems to be a certain degree of party internal democracy in the Virtue Party, the importance of the party leadership, especially of the General Management Council, should not be underestimated. According to one party worker, this is the “most powerful body in the party”.\footnote{H Demircan, 7 April, 1999.}

According to outside observers, party internal democracy does not generally characterise Turkish parties. Özbudun states that “(i)n none of them, there is perfect internal democracy…”\footnote{Özbudun, 28 April, 1999.} Balci however claims that the elections in the Virtue Party has taken place according to the party statutes, and when asked his opinion on how democratic these elections are, he claims that “(i)t differs, because if the leader is a very strong man, (it is) not much of (an) election. This time (however), there is no strong leader”, and hence the elections have been more democratic.\footnote{Balci, 23 April, 1999.}

Regarding the internal elections in the Virtue Party then, both democratic (participatory) practices, with elections to every level, characteristic mainly of the ideal typical mass integration party \textit{and} not-so-democratic traits, with controlled elections, characteristic of the ideal typical total integration party \textit{but also} of the ideal typical clientelistic party, thus seem to prevail in the Virtue Party.

While the Virtue Party to a large extent resembles the ideal typical mass integration party on ideal and strategic level, when it comes to party internal democracy, these procedures are marked by traits of not only the ideal typical mass integration party, but also of the ideal typical total integration party and the ideal typical clientelistic party in practice. Judging from the actual performance of the party congress and the remarks by outside observers, mass integration party traits however seem to dominate in the internal election proceedings of the Virtue Party.

When it comes to other kinds of intra-party communications, such as the mode in which different levels communicate on policy matters and other issues, party documents provide for continuous such communications, on
ideal and strategic level. The bodies on the different levels should thus be in constant contact with each other; the higher levels give orders to and supervise the lower levels and the lower levels report back up to the higher levels.¹ The organisation should also be characterised by “unity, community and discipline … (and) each and every one in the party organisation should be aware of his authority and responsibility and … do his duty”.²

On ideal and strategic level, the organisation of the Virtue Party is thus very centralised in this regard. For example, the different levels of the organisation are not free in deciding what activities to carry out. In the presentation guide, it is stated that “(t)he work, the methods, the politics and the agenda is established … via central guidance”.³ More specifically, the leadership on provincial level should prepare and carry out the programme on the provincial level, but it should also prepare the presentation material for the districts and so on. Each level should prepare its own programme, but also receive information from, and prepare a programme for, the level under it.⁴ In this way, the levels are to be tightly knit together.

In this sense, the continuous intra-party communications of the Virtue Party, as envisioned on ideal and strategic level, primarily seem to be of one-way character (top–down). In this regard, the Virtue Party to a large extent resembles the ideal typical total integration party, with its directive linkage. Even if there are stipulations for the centre to listen to the lower levels, these are not emphasised. Instead, a vast measure of control of lower levels by higher organs is stipulated. On ideal and strategic level, total integration party traits thus largely dominate other party internal communications than intra-party elections.

That this ideal and strategy to some extent is carried out in practice is vouched for the party’s head of organisation, Gündüz. Gündüz points out that instructions as to what activities are to be carried out are forwarded from

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¹ Party organisational guide, 1998: 29. Thus the head of the central political committee for example “inform the provincial organisations… (and) hold meetings with the heads of the provincial political committees to educate and activate them” (Party organisational guide, 1998: 37).

² Party organisational guide, 1998: 25. To realise this well functioning organisation, a certain amount of control is required according to the party organisational guide. With control is meant “inspection of whether the planned activities are in accordance with the reached goals”; inspection thus makes it possible to reach the goals envisioned (Party organisational guide, 1998: 25).

³ Presentation guide, 1999: 18. However, these guidelines are to be discussed as different seminars, conferences and meetings between different levels.

higher to lower levels of party organisation: “(W)e send some documents (etc) … from the centre… Our members, they will take our documents and our programme and go to the village people and say ‘our programme is this and this’”.¹ Thus the party centre is in contact with all levels, not least the lowest ones: “(Ballot) boxes are consulted (and) the deputy heads tell them what to do… Top–down”.²

The meetings on lower levels stipulated in the ideal and strategy, led by representatives from higher levels, thus not only consist of “teaching” as was ideally intended; “they (also) give time for … questions and they discuss with them”, even if the lower levels do not seem to have much opportunity to forward their ideas to the top in this process.³

Even if this is so, the different levels of the party organisation seem rather independent in deciding on what kinds of activities are to be undertaken in practice. Indeed, the main party organisation encourages the members on local levels to be active, and the headquarters do not decide what the local levels should do: “It is up to them…. We ask them to come together, in whatever means they would like to have…. We do not decide these activities from the headquarters. They decide themselves”.⁴ That the lower levels are independent also in times of elections is vouched for by party representative Akgönenc. According to her “(b)oth men and women each day (were) given a programme (during the election campaign). Those programmes (were) prepared by the district units” and they get no instructions from the central headquarters in this regard.⁵

Also the head of the women’s committee, Celik, points out that the lower levels do communicate their knowledge to the centre, instead of only doing what they are told. The reason or this is that the provincial level has “more information than the general centre”; i.e. the provincial levels are

¹ Gündüz, 1 May, 1999. Gündüz also describes how the process works: “First we are choosing ten people from the province and we are teaching these ten people. After that, these ten people are going to their province and they are … choose five people that lives in a (district), and … teach them, and these five people will go to their village…. and they are also choosing five people in the village and they are teaching (them) … and they will teach the people. (It) is all linked” (Gündüz, 1 May, 1999). Party representative Budak states the same thing (Budak, 1 May, 1999).
³ Gündüz, 1 May, 1999. Gören also claims that “(t)hey make discussions (at those meetings). They educate each other and they make some decisions” (Gören, 3 May, 1999). Cp. also Celik, 14 May, 1999.
⁴ Gündogan, 17 May, 1999.
⁵ Akgönenc, 26 April, 1999.
more in tune with the local context and what works there, than the central level is. At the same time, the “(g)eneral centre has information for all of Turkey”. Thus, the different levels seem to cooperate in practice – the centre has strategic information about the whole country, while local levels have more information on local matters.

In this sense, the internal communication in the Virtue Party in practice primarily seems to resemble that of an ideal typical mass integration party, rather than an ideal typical total integration party. However, to the extent that the lower levels are “ordered” from the top also in practice, there is a resemblance with the ideal typical total integration party as well.

Regarding the internal communication of the party, the Virtue Party thus presents different traits depending on whether one focuses the intra-party elections or other party internal communications. Whereas the Virtue Party resembles primarily the ideal typical mass integration party regarding its ideal, strategy and practice in relation to its intra-party elections, it also presents some similarities with the total integration party regarding its intra-party elections and clear similarities with this ideal type in its ideal and strategy, on other party internal communications than party elections.

On balance, however, as the two aspects of intra-party communication here are considered together, mass integration party traits dominate ideally, strategically and in practice, whereas total integration traits are present on all these levels, when it comes to the internal communication in the Virtue Party.

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1 Celik, 14 May, 1999.
3 My observations during the 1999 election campaign supports this view of basic coordination from the top, but at least some degree of independent activities at lower levels. For example, the campaign slogans were the same in the different areas that I visited (Ankara, Balikesir and Konya) and in all these places, the party women distributed carnations. However, on the local level, different districts seemed to have little idea of what the other districts were doing more exactly. Actual practices also differed, like how much emphasis was place on political rhetoric in the encounter with voters.
4 Also other party representatives confirm that the different levels in the party organisation are in contact with each other. Çp. Gündogan, 28 April, 1999, Gören, 21 October, 1998, Gündüz, 1 May, 1999, Celik, 14 May, 1999, Çetin, 13 May, 1999. Communication also takes place with the Women Commission on a continuous basis, according to party representative Celik, 14 May, 1999.
Table 4.22: Traits in the mode of intra-party communication in the Virtue Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of intra-party communication</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Virtue Party. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

**Conclusions Regarding Activities to Maintain Internal Linkage**

Regarding its efforts at maintaining internal linkage, the Virtue Party thus primarily resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, on ideal and strategic level. Just like the mass integration party, the Virtue Party envisions the use of far-ranging political, ideological and social activities, carried out by local branches, and continuous intra-party communications and internal elections. While some total integration party traits are present, on ideal and strategic level, in the internal party communications other than elections, these traits do not – on balance – dominate in this regard.

Whereas the intra-party communications in practice, both regarding party internal elections and other communications, indeed are marked by mass integration characteristics, if with some total integration influence, activities in the Virtue Party to maintain internal linkage in practice are primarily of clientelistic kind. These activities are however not primarily carried out by a fragmented party organisation tapping into local clientelistic networks, as is the case in the ideal typical clientelistic party. Instead, party internal patronage is more an indirect consequence of party membership, while members are organised in highly structured branches, in a mass integration manner.
Table 4.23. The full picture of the Virtue Party’s effort to maintain internal linkage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintaining internal linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal:</strong></td>
<td>Activities, performer, intra-party communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy:</strong></td>
<td>Activities, performer, intra-party communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In practice:</strong></td>
<td>Performer, intra-party communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the Virtue Party’s efforts to maintain internal linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

A now familiar pattern thus reveals itself again. To generalise, the Virtue Party again seems to be a party that ideally and strategically aims at being a mass integration party, but which in practice is marked by clientelistic traits, even if mass integration traits are present in practice as well. Whereas the clientelistic traits can be derived from the linkage objective, as based on the societal setting of the party according to the party-centred models, the emphasis on mass integration traits cannot be accounted for in this manner. Again, institutions in the form of legal regulations however seem to have a direct impact on linkage outcome, unmediated via the linkage objective.

After having summarised the findings on the linkage of the Virtue Party, I will conclude this chapter by discussing, at some length, how these results may be accounted for theoretically.

**Summarising the Linkage Outcome of the Virtue Party**

To summarise, the Virtue Party is a party that in its linkage objective on ideal and strategic level aims at catching as many votes as possible by universal appeals, just like an ideal typical catch-all party. In practice, the party however expresses more of a clientelistic stance in this regard.

On the basis of the theoretical expectations, this linkage objective on ideal and strategic level would be derived from the pragmatic orientation of the party and the legal framework, whereas the clientelistic linkage objective in practice would be derived from the societal setting of the party. As party representatives claim to be motivated by and act in line with the orientation...
of the party as well as the legal and societal setting in Turkey, the theoretical contentions so far are supported in this regard.

On the basis of the stated linkage objective and its motivations, the Virtue Party should thus present a linkage outcome marked by catch-all characteristics on ideal and strategic level, but clientelistic characteristics in practice, if it is to follow the theoretical models, as outlined here.

Starting with its effort to establish external linkage, the analysis shows that the Virtue Party primarily presents ideal typical mass integration traits regarding its activities and the performer of the activities on ideal and strategic level. Also in practice, the Virtue Party resembles an ideal typical mass integration party when it comes to what body performs the activities. This outcome thus does not follow the theoretical predictions. Indeed, the theoretical expectations as outlined here do not foresee any mass integration traits in the Virtue Party. However, regarding the target of the activities, this is in line with the prediction, at least on ideal and strategic level. Just as was expected, the Virtue Party according to its ideal and strategy targets everybody as an ideal typical catch-all party. Also the clientelistic activities in practice and the target of clientelistic kind in practice follow from the theoretical expectations based on the linkage objective.

When it comes to efforts to maintain external linkage, exactly the same picture emerges as regarding the efforts to establish external linkage.

The efforts to establish internal linkage are primarily marked by their ideal typical mass integration party traits on all levels and in most aspects, quite contrary to the theoretical expectations. Only regarding the recruitment policy in practice, the Virtue Party presents primarily clientelistic traits and thus acts in accordance with the theoretical expectations.

Finally, regarding the efforts to maintain internal linkage, mass integration traits again dominate in all aspects and on all levels (with one exception), thwarting the theoretical expectations. Again, however, the exception – the activities of the Virtue Party in practice to maintain internal linkage – follow the theoretical predictions in presenting clientelistic characteristics.

Taken together, the Virtue Party on ideal and strategic level thus presents a linkage outcome resembling primarily the mass integration party type, quite contrary to the theoretical expectations, as here outlined. In practice, traits of the ideal typical clientelistic party type dominate, even if traits of the mass integration party type too are present. This clientelistic outcome in practice is in line with the theoretical expectations, whereas the
traits of mass integration kind are not. I will end this chapter by discussing what may explain this linkage outcome of the Virtue Party.

**Applying the Party-Centred and Institutional Explanations**

How can we explain the linkage outcome of the Virtue Party? According to both theoretical models – the party-centred and the institutional – the linkage outcome should follow from the linkage objective, based on party-centred factors (according to the party-centred model) or institutional factors (according to the institutional model).

In the Virtue Party, the linkage objective is of catch-all kind on ideal and strategic level and of primarily clientelistic kind in practice. On ideal and strategic level the linkage outcome should thus be of catch-all kind, whereas the outcome should be of clientelistic kind in practice, if the theoretical expectations are to be met.

In practice, the efforts of the Virtue Party to a large extent (but not exclusively) are of clientelistic kind. On the basis of the specified party-centred model, which predicts such a clientelistic outcome, we can thus establish that the clientelistic efforts of the Virtue Party in practice can be explained by the societal setting in Turkey (or, as suggested previously, by the orientation of the party as influenced by the specific societal setting). According to this explanation, it is the societal setting that has shaped the linkage objective and the linkage outcome of the Virtue Party in practice, to the extent that these are of clientelistic kind. Thus, this outcome is in line with the specified party-centred explanation in this regard. Institutional factors form no part of this explanation.

However, on ideal and strategic level, the linkage of the Virtue Party far from presents the catch-all characteristics expected. Instead, it presents ideal typical mass integration party traits in these respects, with some exceptions. One such exception is the target of the efforts to establish external linkage. This target is of catch-all kind in the ideal and strategy, just as it would be according to both the orientation of the party and the legal regulations. As both the orientation and the legal regulations were referred to by party representatives, it is difficult to argue that one of these motivations is more important that the other in this regard. In this context, both the orientation and the legal regulations may thus be considered as important for the outcome regarding the target of the activities to establish external linkage, in line with the theoretical expectations in each case.
But how are we to account for the presence of mass integration traits that does not follow the theoretical expectations, i.e. those on ideal and strategic level?

One explanation to this would be to point to the legal framework of Turkey. This framework as least partly favours ideal typical mass integration traits in political parties. Thus, there might be an institutional explanation for the fact that the Virtue Party envisions an organisation in line with the mass integration party type, on ideal and strategic level. This explanation is substantiated by the fact that party representatives claim that the party is organised according to the laws, but also by the fact that the Virtue Party at the time was decisively afraid of being closed down (on good grounds as it turned out) and that the party therefore had good reasons for following the legal regulations, at least on ideal and strategic level. Probably, legal regulations are one factor in explaining the mass integration traits in the Virtue Party on ideal and strategic level.

In some cases, mass integration party traits are present also in practice in the Virtue Party, notably when it comes to the internal organisation of the party. In such cases, for instance regarding the formal requirements to enter the party as a member and the traits of party internal democracy in practice, the party representatives explicitly refer to the legal regulations in accounting for these traits. Here, it thus seems as the institutions (i.e. the legal regulations) affect the linkage outcome directly, unmediated by the linkage objective. Thus, it seems as the Virtue Party is influenced by the legal regulations to organise as a mass integration party, but this outcome is not mediated via the linkage objective of the party, as there are no mass integration traits in the linkage objective of the Virtue Party. The legal framework thus influences the linkage outcome directly, in a way that is contrary to the theoretical expectations as outlined here.

To some extent, then, institutional factors, not mediated via the linkage objective, seem to influence the ideal and strategy, and in certain aspects also the practice, of the Virtue Party in making for mass integration traits in certain respects. Particularly, institutions seem to influence the party organisation (i.e. what is here referred to as “performer”), which indeed is what is primarily regulated in the laws. The ideal typical mass integration

\[ \text{1} \] However, the contention that the mass integration traits follow from the background and origin of the party, which indeed foresee an organisation as a mass integration party, must be regarded as doubtful: On no account do party representatives refer to these factors in explaining why the party is organised the way it is.
traits in the activities of the Virtue Party are more difficult to explain by referring to legal regulations, since little legal regulations apply to the activities of Turkish parties.

The mass integration traits on ideal and strategic level, when it comes to the activities of the Virtue Party, are then largely unaccounted for by the theoretical explanations here utilised. Might there be another explanation for this outcome? May this outcome be put down to efficiency concerns, as we know that the Virtue Party is largely motivated by its electoral orientation? That is, may mass integration traits be regarded as electorally effective by the Virtue Party? This is indeed not improbable. Or may other factors, like the religious orientation of the party, account for this outcome? I will return to this discussion in Chapter 8.

Lastly, it can be established that the origin, background and experiences of the Virtue Party do not account for the linkage outcome of the party, contrary to the theoretical expectations on the basis of the party-centred models.

The findings of this chapter can be summarised in the following figure.

*Figure 4.4. Relation between explanatory factors, linkage objective and motivation and linkage outcome in the Virtue Party.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal setting favouring party of primarily clientelistic kind</th>
<th>Linkage objective and motivation of clientelistic kind in practice</th>
<th>Linkage outcome of clientelistic kind in practice, especially regarding activities and target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orientation favouring party of primarily catch-all kind</td>
<td>Linkage objective and motivation of catch-all kind on ideal and strategic level</td>
<td>Linkage outcome of catch-all kind on ideal and strategic level regarding target of outreach activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation favouring party of primarily catch-all kind</td>
<td>Linkage objective and motivation of catch-all kind on ideal and strategic level</td>
<td>Linkage outcome of mass integration kind on ideal and strategic level regarding outreach activities and performer and regarding performer in practice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comment: Relation expressed in **bold** characters is in line with the theoretical expectations. Relation expressed in ordinary characters is not in line with the theoretical expectations. Relation expressed in *ordinary italics* is a suggested relation, not in line with the theoretical expectations.

In this context, it can be noted that the Virtue Party thus in practice does not organise as it sets out to do according to its ideal and strategy. In the Virtue Party, different factors explain on the one hand, the linkage ideal and strategy, and, on the other hand, the linkage outcome in practice.
CHAPTER 5

EXPLAINING THE LINKAGE OF THE JORDANIAN
ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT (Jabhat al-‘Amal al-Islami)

Jordan – and the Islamic Action Front – is the next case to take on. Like in the previous chapter I will start by outlining the societal setting, the origin, background and experiences of the party and its orientation, followed by the institutional arrangements in Jordan, in the form of the electoral system and the legal regulations pertaining to parties. On the basis of this outline, it can be determined what kind of linkage is expected in the Islamic Action Front according to the theoretical models. Then, the empirical analysis of the linkage of the Islamic Action Front is embarked upon. After that, conclusions may be drawn as to how well the models are able to explain the linkage outcome in the Islamic Action Front.

The Jordanian Political Context

Societal Setting in the Jordanian Context

Jordan is a small country, and a country with a difficult economic situation. Contrary to many other Arab countries, Jordan does not have any oil, and the country is also bestowed with few other natural resources. Traditionally Jordan has to a large extent relied on foreign aid, something which has made the country very vulnerable to the political instability in the region.1 Even if the economic situation thus is far from good, Jordan has succeeded in reaching a better economic status than many other countries in the region.2 Due to its lack of natural resources, heavy industry is largely absent in Jordan and the country has not undergone any rapid industrialisation in this

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1 The economy in Jordan has also been negatively affected by the many wars in the region, especially by the wars with Israel in 1948-49 and 1967 and the Second Gulf War, not least as these crises led to an influx of refugees and ex-patriots into Jordan.

2 This is to not least due to the foreign economic aid received. According to OECD-statistics, published in the journal OmVärlden (2003:1:21), Jordan received 4 per cent of the United States’ total official bilateral aid (ODA) in 1999-2000. Only Egypt received more, with 17 per cent. However, the relatively favourable economic situation also depends on the fact that many Jordanians work abroad, mostly in other Arabic countries, and send home money; these revenues of ex-patriots are very important for the Jordanian economy.
field.\textsuperscript{1} Instead, it is business, commerce, transport and – above all – tourism that dominate the domestic economy in Jordan.

Few people live on the countryside in Jordan; it is an urbanised country.\textsuperscript{2} This was not always the case, however. When Jordan was founded in 1946, many of the people living in the country were nomadic Bedouins.

In many ways, Jordan is thus a modernising country; in some aspects there has been a marked socio-economic change and the conditions for the citizens have improved. However, traditions are still very strong in Jordan. This applies not least to the tribal structures, which are very influential in all areas of public life in Jordan, not least political life. Traditionally, all native Jordanians belonged to a tribe, and it was the task of the tribe to take care of its members. Today, this tradition breeds clientelism in the administration of the state as tribal leaders seek public posts.\textsuperscript{3} De-ideologisation of the public debate, interest-based politics, spread of secular and mass consumer-goods orientation are all relatively absent in Jordan, even if there are tendencies in these directions in the upper and middle classes.

Mass media, private, party-based and government-owned, are relatively developed in Jordan and parties can publish material in private and party-owned papers. However, there are rather substantial legal and self-imposed restrictions on the public political debate in the media.\textsuperscript{4} Further, the broadcasting media (radio and television) are state-owned and are basically a channel for presenting government policies. The views of political parties are covered at the discretion of the government (except in times of elections, when candidates are allowed limited broadcasts).\textsuperscript{5}

The government in Jordan has traditionally tried to provide for its citizens. Education for all has been regarded as an important goal. Therefore

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\textsuperscript{1} In other fields, there is however an ongoing industrialisation. Examples are production of fertilisers and garments.

\textsuperscript{2} The General Census of Population and Housing of Jordan, carried out in 1994, 78.2 per cent of the population of just above 4 million people lived in cities (www.dos.gov.jo, General census). In 1998, almost 79 per cent of the 4.8 million people lived in cities (www.dos.gov.jo, Key National Indicators).

\textsuperscript{3} Members of a tribe for example often vote for the tribal leader in elections, and expect protection and care in return (\textit{al-Wastah}). This behaviour is typical of a particularistic logic. Moreover, social classes are not of particular political importance in Jordan. What is important is family and tribe.

\textsuperscript{4} Especially the Press and Publications Law with different amendments, and governmental acts against free expression have been thoroughly criticised, e.g. at different conferences (cp. the conference-reports, Hawatmeh 1994 and Lucas, 1998).

Jordan has a rather well-educated population, especially compared to other countries in the region. The public medical care is also relatively well developed in Jordan, and the care is free in the public hospitals; everybody is offered a minimum health insurance through the National Assistance Fund. On the top of this, there are also private alternatives. In all, the Jordanian citizens are rather well provided for by the government, not least in comparison with other countries in the region. Still, there are substantial differences between the poor and the rich, and public welfare is far from satisfactory for everybody. Instead, traditional family and tribal ties are the social safety net for many Jordanians.

Ethnically, the population of Jordan is made up of a range of different nationalities. The two major groups are the Jordanians, or East-bankers, and the Palestinians, or West-bankers. Apart from these groups, there are some relatively small minority groups in Jordan. The tensions between the groups, especially between the native Jordanians and the Palestinians, have sometimes run high; especially during the civil war in 1970-71. Since then, there have been substantial efforts to reduce tensions between the groups and unity instead of fragmentation is emphasised by the government.

Taken together, Jordan presents a picture of a society which used to be traditional, but that is presently undergoing a process of modernisation. Even if the country presents a multi-faceted picture, it is the characteristics that according to the models lead to clientelistic parties that stand out most clearly in the case of Jordan. In Jordan, modernisation and urbanisation takes place, but traits typical of rural, pre-modern societies also prevail. Both these characteristics are conducive to clientelistic parties. Even if Jordan is better than most of its neighbours at providing welfare for its people and even if the state administration is well entrenched, welfare in different aspects is still generally not satisfactory for large parts of the population. In Jordan, the traditional tribal ties further play a pivotal role and the society is generally marked by a particularistic outlook. The usage of mass media for political

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1 In 1998, 11.5 per cent of the population above the age of 15 was illiterate (devdata.worldbank.org, Jordan Data Profile).
2 In 1998, 51.8 per cent of the physicians in Jordan were private, while 48.2 per cent were public (www.dos.gov.jo, Key National Indicators).
3 The Palestinians now make up more than half of the inhabitants of Jordan.
4 These include for example Chechens, Circassians and Christian groups, consisting such as Armenians.
5 Even if this is so, there are reserved seats for minorities in elections, something that we will return to shortly.
purposes is also restricted. Like the ideal typical society which breeds clientelistic parties, Jordan is further marked by a certain degree of ethnic heterogeneity, even if there is a policy drive from the state to “Jordanise” the inhabitants. Thus, taken as a whole, traits regarded as typical for a society that breeds clientelistic parties dominate in Jordan.

**Table 5.1. Expectations on the basis of the societal setting of Jordan.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic context</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the societal setting in Jordan, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation.

**The Origin, Background and Experiences of Islamic Action Front**

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which is a branch of the central Brotherhood in Egypt, was founded at the same time as the state of Jordan, in 1946. However, it was the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood that was established at that time and it had branches in Jordan. The Jordanian Brotherhood was not founded until 1953, but it is generally considered that the two units – the state of Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood – were born and bred together; it is further generally considered that they have been mutually beneficial to each other, even if the relation between the two not always has been unproblematic.

In the beginning of his reign, King Hussein (inaugurated in 1952) introduced limited democratic reforms. For example, the founding of certain political parties was allowed and the first free multi-party elections were held in 1956. The Muslim Brothers participated in those elections, but as independent candidates, since they had not been allowed to form a political party. This prohibition later turned out to be beneficial for the Brothers, as they were not banned along with the other parties in 1957, when Hussein for the first time encountered a forceful political challenge to his reign. The state of emergency lasted until 1984, when by-elections to the parliament were conducted in a relatively free manner, on the basis of independent candidates. The first general elections after those held in 1956 were held in 1989, after Jordan had severed relations with the West Bank. Political

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1 Later, in 1961, the parliament was dissolved.
2 The direct reason for holding these elections were the protests from the people triggered by
parties were however not allowed until the introduction of the Party Law in 1992.

During the period when the parties and the parliament were closed, the Muslim Brothers thus had a special status in Jordan. Throughout these years the Brothers were continuously active; they carried out social activities, provided education and gave out publications. The goal of these activities was, in the long run, to prepare the ground for the introduction of Islamic Law, *Sharia* and, thus, an Islamic way of life. However, the Muslim Brotherhood was always loyal to the King, and they were therefore rewarded with several posts in governments from the 1950s on.1

At the return of electoral politics, the Muslim Brothers benefited from their continuous social activities, which had made the Muslim Brotherhood the biggest and broadest political force in Jordan, with deep roots in society. To King Hussein’s big surprise and dismay, the candidates from the Muslim Brothers received most votes in the 1989 elections.2 Together with independent Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood subsequently made up almost half of the parliament that was formed after the elections and the important post of Speaker of the parliament went to a Muslim Brother, Abdel-Latif Arabiyyat.3

In 1992, the new Party Law was enacted and political parties could once again be formed. For different reasons, the Muslim Brotherhood did not apply to become a political party. Instead, the Islamic Action Front was established and was granted party status in 1992.4

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1 This loyalty of the Muslim Brothers to the King was particularly important in the crisis of 1956 and in the Civil War that broke out in September 1970 (“Black September”), when the Palestinians of the West Bank (which was lost to Israel during the Six Days war in 1967) on their own initiative waged war against Israel from Jordanian soil, and in that way challenged the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Jordan over its own territory. The Jordanian army however subdued the Palestinian guerrilla groups, and even if the Muslim Brothers always supported the Palestinians wholeheartedly, they during this crisis took sides with the Jordanian regime. (Ghadbian, 1997: 119, 124, 127).


3 Muslim Brothers also participated in the government and in the Commission that was formed to draft a National Charter, which would form the basis of the political development in Jordan; the National Charter was passed in 1991.

4 The relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front are not easy to
King Hussein was not at all pleased with the development of a strong Muslim Brotherhood. In 1993, elections were to be held again, however under a new electoral law.\(^1\) The Islamists protested against this new electoral law, which they regarded as an attempt at weakening their chances in the elections. The Islamic Action Front also considered boycotting the elections. However, the party decided to participate and even if they lost some votes compared to the 1989 elections, the Islamists still came out as an important force in the parliament.\(^2\)

In 1995, the first local elections were held in the country. In these, the Islamic Action Front participated, but did not do particularly well.\(^3\) Instead, independents and government loyalists were most successful in those elections.

In 1997, new parliamentary elections were held in Jordan. As the electoral law was not revised, as demanded by the Islamists and others who regarded the new law as directed against them, the Islamic Action Front boycotted the elections.\(^4\) The result of the elections was a parliament that was very loyal to the King, dominated by independents and, to a lesser extent, the National Constitutional Party (comprising nine centrist parties).

In 1999, local elections were held again. This time the Islamic Action Front participated in the elections and did well; it came to power in many municipalities.\(^5\) Thus, the Islamists are, after all, very interested in participating in the political life in Jordan, even if they protest when they regard themselves as being counteracted by the state.\(^6\)

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\(^1\) These were very important elections since the new parliament was to ratify the peace agreement that had been negotiated with Israel. King Hussein was of course aware that it would not be easy to convince the Islamists to support the peace agreement. This is one of the reasons that is often cited as to why the electoral system was changed prior to the elections. The new electoral law is discussed later in this chapter.

\(^2\) After the 1993 elections, the Islamists still made up the biggest organised opposition in parliament with 16-17 seats, and around 16-17 percent of the votes. Independent pro-monarchists and non-party deputies made up the majority in the parliament (Reynolds & Elklit (undated), Farhan, 1997: 13, Post-Election Seminar. A Discussion of Jordan’s 1993 Parliamentary Election, 1995: 31, 55).


\(^4\) Several other parties, of pan-Arab and leftist leanings, as well as a number of independents also took part in the boycott. Also professional associations, persons from the political elite and a number of organisations boycotted the elections (Hourani & Yassin, 1998: 28).

\(^5\) Among these were the major cities of Zarqa, Irbid and Ruseifa. The Islamic Action Front also did well in Tafileh and Madaba. The party further claimed 5 (out of 20 elected) seats in the Greater Amman city council (20 seats are appointed) (www.jordanembassyus.org).

\(^6\) The Islamic Action Front also participated in the 2003 general elections, which ended the
In 1999, King Hussein died and was succeeded by his son, Abdullah. The question was whether King Abdullah (II) would continue the inclusive policies towards the Islamists, or if the traditionally close relations between the regime and the Islamists would be broken. So far, the same pattern as under King Hussein has prevailed. Thus, the King generally is anxious to include the Islamists in the political process. At the same time, he is wary of the political challenge they pose. Thus, so far, the Islamists are not stronger than the King permits them to be, but the two are not opposed to each other in any fundamental way. And, so far, the Islamists have accepted this situation (if not without protests).¹

The Islamic Action Front thus has its origins outside of parliament and it was by and large created by an extra-parliamentary movement with deep roots in society and a well established organisation – the Muslim Brotherhood. In this sense, then, characteristics that according to the models are conducive to organisation as an integration party of mass kind stand out in the case of the Islamic Action Front.

On the other hand, the Islamic Action Front basically accepts the regime and does not challenge the establishment at its core, even if it sometimes protests against it. The regime also basically accepts the Islamic Action Front, even if it sometimes acts against it. The Islamists (the Islamic Action Front and, before it, the Muslim Brotherhood) have also a history of being in power – nationally and locally. In these senses, then, traits are present in the Islamic Action Front that according to the models would lead to an electoral party of either catch-all or clientelistic kind. However, even if traits conducive to electoral parties thus are present in the Islamic Action Front, it is the traits that according to the models breed mass integration parties – like the deep roots in civil society – that stand out and thus dominate in the Islamic Action Front.

¹ This question was actualised in the autumn of 1999 (at the time of the field-work for this study) when the “Hamas crisis” erupted.
Table 5.2. Expectations on the basis of the origin, background and experiences of the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin/Background/Experiences</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of origin, background and experiences of the Islamic Action Front, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation, P: Present expectation.

The Ideological Orientation of the Islamic Action Front

As was underlined above, the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front, on the one hand, and the King and his government, on the other, have mostly been cordial, even if the two sometimes have been at odds. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front have thus been awarded a special position in the politics of the country, and as a movement it is moderate and relatively flexible. The Islamic Action Front is thus not in opposition to the state itself. Instead, the ultimate aim of the Islamists is to work within the political framework to reform society. In this way, the Islamic Action Front must be regarded as reformist, working to create an Islamic state "from below", instead of overthrowing the current system with force in a revolutionary manner. Basically, then, the Islamic Action Front has an ideological orientation of reformist character.

But is the ideology restricted (i.e. limited and flexible) as it usually is among reformists, or is it totalitarian (i.e. all-encompassing and inflexible)? The first objective of the Islamic Action Front is “the resumption of Islamic life and the application of Islamic Sharia in all fields”.¹ According to the Islamic Action Front, the Islamic law should thus be all-encompassing, and cover all areas of life. In this sense, the ideology of the Islamic Action Front is totalitarian.

But how is this “resumption of Islamic life” to be carried out? According to the objectives of the party, the Islamic Action Front wants to “establish a system based on democracy and Shura (and) the defence of human dignity, liberty and freedoms in general”, it wants to act in favour of “political pluralism”, and it will undertake “efforts to achieve the best for all citizens” and for “protecting freedom of opinion and expression for all

¹ Hourani et al, 1993: 30.
citizens”; further it works for “ensuring religious freedom for all, and achieving co-operation and harmony among all citizens in the interests of the country and the nation”.¹ From these objectives, we may draw the conclusion that the ideology of the Islamic Action Front is restricted, in the sense that it does allow for flexibility in the interpretation of the ideology.²

In these senses, then, characteristics of an ideal typical mass integration party thus dominate in the Islamic Action Front, even if totalitarian traits are present as well. However, unlike the case of the mass integration party, the Islamic Action Front does not emphasise common action on the basis of a class. Instead, unity is emphasised. The party aims at “reinforcing unity among citizens” and at “combating ethnic, regional, tribal and sectorial conflicts that threaten this unity”.³ The Islamic Action Front thus looks for unity across all cleavages.

The ideological predisposition of the Islamic Action Front does not mean that pragmatic traits are absent, however. The Islamic Action Front is well aware that it needs to get into parliament to realise its policies.⁴ Unlike the mass integration party and the clientelistic party, the Islamic Action Front does not appeal to particular groups in this effort, though. As we saw above, it is unity that is emphasised. In order to get into parliament, the Islamic Action Front focuses on universal appeals. In this sense then, some traits characteristic of the ideal typical catch-all party are present in the orientation of Islamic Action Front.

Taken together, the Islamic Action Front thus is a party where a reformist and restricted ideological orientation dominates, just like in the ideal typical mass integration party. Despite this, a totalitarian trait is present in the Islamic Action Front, in that Islam is regarded as all-encompassing by the party and regarded as influencing “all fields”. However, traits of electoral character are not absent in the Islamic Action Front. More specifically, traits reminiscent of those in an ideal typical catch-all party are present in the Islamic Action Front in this regard.

¹ Hourani et al, 1993: 30-32.
² Note that the objectives of the Islamic Action Front here are taken at their face value in line with the ambition to analyse the picture that the party itself presents. Like before, no discussion on “hidden intentions” take place here.
⁴ Indeed, outside analysts contend that the pragmatism increases in the party, partly due to the demands of common people: “The last 10 years, they have changed their tactics and their slogans… (T)hey are under the pressure of giving more pragmatic answers and solutions” (Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999). Thus, in Shteiwi’s view, the Islamic Action Front is “an ideological party with a pragmatist approach” (Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999).
Table 5:3. Expectations on the basis of the orientation of the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the orientation of the Islamic Action Front, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation, P: Present expectation.

Applying the Party-Centred Explanations to the Islamic Action Front and the Jordanian case

Like in the Turkish case, the different characteristics of the party and its societal environment in the Jordanian context do not go together as neatly as suggested by the theoretical models. However, the indicators do not point in quite as many directions in the case of the Islamic Action Front in Jordan as they did regarding the Virtue Party in Turkey.

Thus, according to the models, the societal setting in Jordan suggests, in a quite unambiguous way, that Jordanian parties should organise in a clientelistic manner, something that would also apply to the Islamic Action Front. To some extent, the experiences of the Islamic Action Front support this conclusion, or at least organisation as an electoral party. However, the background of the Islamic Action Front primarily suggests that the party should organise as a mass integration party, according to the model. This expectation is also essentially supported by the orientation of the party, even if some traits that ideal typically would lead to characteristics of total integration and catch-all party kind are present in the orientation of the Islamic Action Front as well.

Table 5:4. Summarised expectations on the basis of the societal setting, origin/background/experiences and orientation of the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicability of Party-Centred Explanations</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal setting</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin/Background/Experiences</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the societal setting, origin/background/experiences and orientation of the Islamic Action Front, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation, P: Present expectation.
To be applicable in this case, the theoretical party-centred model outlined in Chapter 2 must thus be broken down in two clusters of explanations in this context. Thus, if the societal setting is emphasised in this case, the Islamic Action Front should organise as a clientelistic party, according to the model. If, on the other hand, the orientation, background and origin are emphasised, the party should organise primarily as a mass integration party, if with some electoral and total integration party traits.

In analysing the linkage objective and linkage outcome of the Islamic Action Front, we will find out whether any of those explanations indeed seems to be able to explain why the Islamic Action Front organises its linkage the way it does.

Figure 5.1. Specified party-centred models in the case of the Islamic Action Front.

Comment: The figure presents the expectations of linkage objective and linkage outcome in the Islamic Action Front on the basis of societal setting, origin/background/experiences and origin respectively, in line with the specified party-centred models.

Institutional Environment: Electoral System and Laws Regulating Party Organisation

Electoral System and Electoral Laws

Jordan has had two different types of electoral systems since the reintroduction of electoral politics in 1989. In 1989, the majoritarian block

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1 These electoral systems apply in the elections to the House of Deputies. The members of the senate are appointed by the King.
vote system was employed. For different reasons, this system was replaced by the semi-proportional Single Non-Transferable Vote, or what in the Jordanian context is called the “one man-one vote”, system in 1993. The Single Non-Transferable vote system was also employed in 1997 elections. As I will return to, these different systems favour different types of parties.

The Islamic Action Front, which was formed in 1992, has operated only under the Single Non-Transferable Vote system. However, the Muslim Brotherhood was very successful under the block system employed in 1989. Thus, the introduction of the Single Non-Transferable Vote system is seen as an attempt to curb their success by the Islamists. Because they perceive the new electoral system as being directed against them, the Islamists campaigned heavily against the introduction of the Single Non-Transferable Vote system in 1993. In spite of this, the party participated in the 1993 elections, and it was slightly less successful than the Muslim Brotherhood had been in 1989. In 1997, the Islamic Action Front boycotted the elections. One of the reasons for this boycott was that the party felt maltreated by the regime. The party has all along lobbied hard for the reintroduction of the Block Vote system. Because of this, I find it motivated to discuss both systems, and what effects they have on the linkage of political parties.

In the majoritarian Block Vote system, which was employed in the 1989 elections, the voter has as many votes as there are mandates in the constituency. The candidates who win most votes fill the seats, regardless of how many votes they get. The Single Non-Transferable Vote system is, on the other hand, a semi-proportional system. Here, the voter only has one vote, but there are multiple seats to be filled in the constituency. The candidates who win most votes in the constituency, also win the seats in the constituency.

These systems are very different as to their implications for the parties. While the Block Vote system favours big, broadly based parties, it is also traditionally regarded as having a tendency to encourage parties that are based on particularistic sentiments and identities such as clan, ethnicity, religion or regionalism, much like ideal typical clientelistic parties.

In the Jordanian context, observers have noted that the Block Vote system was also utilised in the 2003 elections.

According to Reynolds and Reilly, “(t)he Block Vote is simply the use of the First Past the Post voting in multi-member districts. Each elector is given as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and they are usually free to vote for individual candidates regardless of party affiliation. In most Block Vote systems they may use as many, or as few, votes as they wish…” (Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 36).
system seems generally to have led the voters to cast one or two votes for one or two candidate(s) to whom they were related through family or kinship ties, while the rest of the votes were “religious” and cast for Muslim Brothers.\footnote{Reynolds & Elklit, undated.} In this case, it thus seems as the Block Vote system promoted voting according to different allegiances. According to Reynolds and Reilly, “(s)ystems which give the voter more than one vote … provide the space for electors to cut across pre-conceived social boundaries. Under the 1989 Jordanian electoral system…, a Muslim voter could cast two out of their three votes for Islamic candidates while giving an independent Christian their last vote”.\footnote{Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 11.} The Block Vote system further seems to encourage parties and candidates to be more inclusive in their appeals and to appeal to voters also outside their traditional support base, in a manner reminding of the ideal typical electoral party of catch-all character.\footnote{Reynolds & Elklit, 1997: 5, 25.} In addition, according to Reynolds and Reilly, “(t)he Block Vote is often applauded for retaining the voter’s ability to vote for individual candidates and allowing for reasonably-sized geographical districts, while at the same time stressing the role of parties and strengthening those parties which demonstrate most coherence and organizational ability”.\footnote{Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 36.}

The Single Non-Transferable Vote system, on the other hand, is generally regarded as favouring smaller parties and minority parties, especially if they have a concentrated basis of voters. The Single Non-Transferable Vote system is also said to favour highly organised parties. Thus, generally it favours ideal typical integration parties.\footnote{According to Reynolds and Reilly, "(t)he most important difference between SNTV and the plurality-majority systems … is that SNTV is better able to facilitate minority party representation… But at the same time the system encourages parties to become highly organized and to instruct their voters to allocate their votes to candidates in a way which maximizes a party’s likely seat-winning potential’” (Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 51).}

In the Jordanian context, observers have noted that the introduction of the Single Non-Transferable Vote system seems to have led the Jordanians to cast their one and only vote on what is most important for them, and this most often turns out to be a candidate to whom they have tribal ties. Ideology, or religion, come in second and lose out under this system.\footnote{Reynolds & Elklit, undated.} Hourani et al mean that “it is clear that … amendments introduced to the Electoral Law, particularly the ‘one–person, one–vote’ amendment, have
improved the chances of candidates who depend on local or tribal influence, or wealth, prestige and public office, at the expense of candidates who depend on political programs and ideological affiliations”.¹ That this can be the result of the Single Non-Transferable Vote system is also emphasised by Reynolds and Reilly; “(a)s SNTV gives voters only one vote, the system contains few incentives for political parties to appeal to a broad spectrum of voters in an accommodatory manner. As long as they have a reasonable core vote, they can win seats without needing to appeal to ‘outsiders’. Furthermore, the fact that multiple candidates of the same party are competing for the same voters means that internal party fragmentation and discord can be accentuated, and that ‘clientelistic’ politics, where politicians offer subtle electoral bribes to groups of defined voters, is exaggerated”.²

In this case, the Single Non-Transferable Vote thus seems to have promoted voting on the basis of clan, ethnicity, religion or regionalism. In the same vein, the Single Non-Transferable Vote seems to have encouraged parties and candidates to be more exclusive in their appeals, i.e. targeting only voters with in their own core support base and rely on “clientelistic politics” in a manner that resembles that of the ideal typical clientelistic party.³

Another feature of the electoral systems in Jordan (in both the Block Vote and the Single Non-Transferable Vote systems) is that there are seats reserved for minorities.⁴ Any voter can vote for the candidates running for these seats. The voter does not have to be a Christian to vote for the Christian seat, and the Christians can vote for the Muslim seats.⁵ Further, the voters may register in any district they like.

Under the Block Vote system, the minority seats did thus not have a disintegrating effect on the relations between the different ethnic and religious groups in Jordan. On the contrary, the voters were – at least in some districts – encouraged to vote for candidates also from a different ethnic or religious group than their own. With the Single Non-Transferable system, the voter can vote for any seat in the Single Non-Transferable Vote system, whereas all voters can vote for all seats in the Block Vote system.

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² Reynolds & Reilly, 1997: 52.
⁴ In all, nine seats are reserved for Christians (in seven districts), while three seats are reserved for Circassians or Chechens (in three districts) (Hourani & Yassin, 1998: 23). In 1989, there were seven Christian deputies in six districts, and three Circassian or Chechen deputies from three districts (Provisional Law no 23 for the year 1989).
⁵ I.e. all voters can vote for any seat in the Single Non-Transferable Vote system, whereas all voters can vote for all seats in the Block Vote system.
Vote system, this situation has changed. With only one vote, there is little encouragement to vote in a cross-sectional manner. For the parties this means that the Block Vote system encourages parties to appeal to voters from different minorities in an inclusive way in a way typical of ideal typical electoral parties, while the Single Non-Transferable Vote does not encourage such broadness in appeal. Here, it becomes important to secure core votes.

Other features in the electoral system of Jordan is that Jordanian citizens can vote in the elections from the age of 19 if he or she is registered in a final electoral list and is the holder of a personal election card.1 To be able to run in the Jordanian elections, candidates have to fulfil certain criteria.2 Voting to elect the deputies is general, secret and on one level.3 Independents as well as parties can stand in the elections, but the act of voting itself is conducted through writing the name of the candidate (or candidates in the Block Vote system) that one wishes to vote for on a certified ballot paper, which is then placed in the ballot box.4 No provisions or regulations regarding political parties are thus included in the electoral law.

The requirement of writing the name of the favoured candidate on the ballot paper however necessitates some regulations for illiterates. These regulations have changed somewhat over time.5 However, the practice adopted has typically included that the name of the candidate voted for has to be read out aloud. This practice has made for clientelistic practices.6

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1 The registration is a rather complicated procedure, and the low turnout in Jordan has partly been blamed on this (Hourani & Yassin, 1998: 21, 23). Restrictions in the right to vote are listed in articles 3 and 5 of the Electoral Law.
2 These criteria are regulated in the Law of Election to the House of Deputies, articles 18-20, 22.
3 Article 32 of the Law of Election to the House of Deputies.
4 Article 46 b of the Law of Election to the House of Deputies.
5 In the law of 1986, it is stipulated that illiterate voters may ask the Chairman of the balloting panel to write the names of the candidates the elector wishes to elect on the ballot paper. After having written down the names, the Chairman is to read the names out within earshot of the balloting panel (article 46 b). In the Elections Regulations for 1986, it is however stipulated that after the Chairman of the ballot panel has written the names of the candidates that the voter wishes to elect, he is to read the names to the elector (Art 8). The requirement for reading the names aloud to the balloting panel is thus deleted. This requirement of reading the name aloud to the balloting panel is however reintroduced in the amendment to the electoral law in 1993, with the amendment that only the name of one candidate is to be written down (Provisional Law number (15) for the year 1993). In 1997, the mechanism used by illiterate voters to cast their ballots was changed once again (Hourani & Yassin, 1998: 20).
6 Shteiwi reports that voters sometimes are known to sell their votes. In order to collect the
Further, the electoral law in a rather precise manner regulates the way in which election campaigning may be carried out. For example, the organisation and convening of electoral meetings and the delivery of electoral speeches are prohibited in places of worship, institutions of learning and buildings occupied by government ministries and departments and official public institutions. As to the content, it is stated that speeches, publications and advertisements by the candidate may not include any insinuation or slander of any candidate, or agitate sectarian, tribal or regional bias among the various groups of citizens. In their campaigns, the candidates are further prohibited from presenting gifts or contributions, monetary or in-kind assistance, or any other benefits (or the promise thereof) to any natural or judicial person, with the purpose of influencing the voting; and nobody is allowed to soliciting such benefits from any candidate.

General elections are to be carried out every 4 years, and the same goes for municipal elections. In the municipal elections, the mayors and the municipal councils are elected through the Block Vote system. The capital, Amman, is however an exception. Here, the municipal council is party elected, partly appointed by the government; the mayor is also appointed.

In summary, it can thus be established that the electoral law in Jordan does not promote the establishment of strong parties. Instead, the candidates form the focus of interest in Jordanian elections. Thus, parties are not at all regarded as being of special importance in this context.

Regarding the impact of the Jordanian electoral law on political parties, it can be established that the different electoral systems favour very different kinds of parties. The block system is generally regarded as favouring big, inclusive parties that traditionally are based on particularistic

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1. Article 60b of the Political Parties Law.
2. Article 63 of the Political Parties Law.
3. Article 65 of the Political Parties Law.
4. Al-Omari, 17 November, 1999, Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999. The municipal elections are regulated by a law from 1955, as amended in 1995. Here, it is further stipulated that election campaigning for municipal elections start one week before the elections. The voting age is 19 years and the family book is used as identification at the polling stations. Contrary to the situations applying to general elections, citizens must vote in the municipality where they live. The number of seats in each municipal council ranges from 6 to 12, according to the size of the population (Jordan Times, 18 March, 1999, published on www.jordanembassy.org).
sentiments, like the ideal typical clientelistic parties. However, in the Jordanian context, the Block Vote is – quite to the contrary – regarded as favouring parties that promote voting across such primordial boundaries, much like the ideal typical catch-all party.

The Single Non-Transferable Vote system, on the other hand, is generally regarded as being conducive to ideological, more exclusionary parties of integration kind. However, again the Jordanian context contests this general understanding. In Jordan, the Single Non-Transferable Vote rather is regarded as promoting parties and candidates “who depend on local and tribal influence, or wealth, prestige and public office”. Thus, in the Jordanian case, the Single Non-Transferable Vote seems to have made for ideal typical clientelistic parties. On the other hand, the regulations on party campaigning are designed to counteract clientelistic practices on the part of the political candidates and parties.

In this context, it must be noted that the change in electoral systems has made things difficult for the parties in Jordan, not least because the systems have very different consequences. While the Block Vote system encourages a certain behaviour on the part of the parties, a next to opposite behaviour is encouraged by the Single Non-Transferable Vote system. What electoral strategies are optimal under the different systems have thus not yet been made clear to the parties and candidates. It must also be noted that there is an on-going debate about the electoral system in Jordan, and the final word is not yet said regarding what will be the final solution. When the electoral system becomes more institutionalised, it will be clearer to the candidates and the parties what electoral strategies are best suited to that system. Because of this uncertainty, it might be difficult to attribute features of the political parties to the electoral system in this early stage.

In this context, I will therefore include both electoral systems – the

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1 Hourani et al, 1995: 29.
2 Cp. Reynolds & Elklit, 1997: 19. Cp. also Gallagher who discusses the introduction of a new electoral system in a different setting – Japan. Gallagher claims that it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the impact of a new electoral system after just one election as the “political system is still adjusting” and because “parties and politicians will modify their behaviour at future elections” (Gallagher, 1998: 221). Indeed, Gallagher cites a suggestion that “once an electoral system has been adopted … it should be kept for at least three elections before it can be properly judged” (Gallagher, 1998: 221).
3 Here, it should be remembered that the field-study was carried out in 1999. In 2003, a new election was held in Jordan, yet again under the Single Non-Transferable Vote system. By now, the Jordanian parties should thus have adapted to the election system, according to Gallagher.
Block Vote, favouring catch-all parties in the Jordanian context, which is heavily favoured by the Islamic Action Front, and the Single Non-Transferable Vote, favouring clientelistic parties in the Jordanian case, which is currently in place.

Table 5.5. Expectations on the basis of the electoral system and electoral laws in Jordan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Block vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Non-Transferable Vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the electoral system and laws in Jordan, according to the institutional theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation.

The Jordanian Party Regulations according to the Constitution, the Political Parties Law and Other Relevant Laws

The Jordanian Constitution is not very specific when it comes to regulations on political parties. Indeed, it only stipulates that Jordanians are entitled to establish political parties, provided that the objects of such parties are lawful, their methods peaceful and their by-laws not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and that political parties and the control of their resources should be regulated by law.\(^1\)

The National Charter is more specific, however. Here, it is for example stated that political and party work in Jordan is based on the principle of pluralism of thought, opinion and organisation and on securing the requisites of democratic competition and its legitimate means.\(^2\)

More specifically, the National Charter further states that a party, in their internal workings as well as in their programmes, approaches, actions and public and party activities, must adhere to the following principles:\(^3\)

- Parties must employ democratic methods in their internal workings, choice of leadership and in the exercise of their activities within a framework of democratic dialogue and free competition among the political parties.

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\(^1\) General information for this section was provided by El-Hassan (Head of Research and Translation, the Parliament), 6 October, 1999.

\(^2\) Articles 16 ii and 16 iii of the Constitution.

\(^3\) 2:4:2 of the National Charter.

\(^4\) 2:4:5 of the National Charter.
There shall be no structural or financial affiliation by the leadership or members of any party with any non-Jordanian. Also, no activities by any party or grouping shall be conducted upon instructions or directions from any foreign state or body.¹

Any party in government or participating therein shall adhere to the principles of equality and equal opportunities for all citizens and must regard ability and qualifications as basic criteria for any appointment to public office.

In the matter of financial revenues, all parties shall rely on local, recognised, declared and specified Jordanian resources. These shall be subject to financial audit and legal review in the manner prescribed by law.²

In matters of organisation, activities and orientation, all parties shall refrain from organising or recruiting for party purposes within the ranks of the Jordanian Armed Forces and security departments or establishing military or paramilitary (militia) groups of any description whatsoever.

All parties, whatever their form of organisation, shall maintain premises with known and declared addresses. Parties shall not use state, public, charitable or religious institutions or bodies for the benefit of any party or grouping. Nor shall they involve any such institutions in any political or factional conflicts.

Many of these more specific regulations are reiterated in the Political Parties Law of 1992. However, here it is primarily the establishment of parties that is regulated, even if some provisions are included regarding the ideology, organisation and funding of parties.

Regarding the establishment of parties it is stipulated, among other things, that Jordanian citizens have the right to form parties and to voluntarily join them.³ To be a member of a party, a person must be 18 years

¹ In this context, it is however added that if any licensed Jordanian party serving Palestine, Arab unity or Islamic solidarity it shall be regarded as a national Jordanian undertaking.
² Further, it is declared that the party may accept gifts and donations from Jordanian citizens, but only to an amount of five thousand Dinars per person and year. The money may be invested inside Jordan, but only in a way that does not benefit any of the party members (Article 19 of the Political Parties Law).
³ Article 4 of the Political Parties Law. It is further stated that the number of the founding members of any party has to be not less than fifty persons fulfilling the stipulated criteria (article 5). These criteria are: to have completed 25 years of age, to have been a Jordanian for at least ten years, not to have been finally convicted by a court of proper jurisdiction of a
of age and must also meet the same conditions as the founding members. There are also rather extensive regulations on forming a party.¹

It is again underlined in article 14 of the Political Parties Law that the use of the premises, instrumentalities and assets of (professional) associations, charitable organisations and clubs, for the benefit of any partisan organisations, shall be prohibited. Thus, a strict separation between political parties and e.g. charity societies is upheld in the legal regulations.

When it comes to ideology and organisation, the Law sets forth the principles to be followed by the party. These include:

- adherence to the principle of political pluralism in thought, opinion and organisation,
- adherence to the preservation of the independence and security of the Homeland, protection of national unity, renunciation all forms of violence and non-discrimination among citizens, and
- avoiding the utilisation of the state’s institutions, public organisations and all educational institutions for partisan organisation, and striving to preserve the neutrality of these institutions towards everyone in performing their duties.
- abstention from establishing military or para-military organisations of any form whatsoever.²

Political activities of the parties are allowed within the law. If parties want to act in public areas, they have to notify the public authorities, in accordance with the law of general meetings which applies to all, not only parties. Thus, seminars, lectures and speeches are allowed, as is personal activities to promote the party, banners and propaganda, as long as it is within the law.³

The laws regulating the life of parties are thus rather specific in the crime (except political crimes) unless he has been rehabilitated, to enjoy full civil and legal competence, to reside in the Kingdom permanently, not to claim the nationality of another country or foreign protection, not to be a member in any other Party, or any other non-Jordanian political partisan organisation, not to be a member of the Jordanian Armed Forces, Security Instrumentalities or the Civil Defence, and not to be a judge.

¹To be established, the party must present a Memorandum of Association, containing, among other things: the principles for which the party exists and the goals it seeks, the membership conditions and the procedures for joining the party, the procedures for forming the party’s echelons, specification of the financial resources and the rules for managing its financial affairs (Article 6 of the Political Parties Law).

²Article 21 of the Political Parties Law.

³Official at the Ministry of Interior, Department of Parties and Elections, name withheld, 23 November, 1999.
Jordanian context. Some of these regulations promote particular kinds of parties. Thus, the regulations stipulating intra-party democracy favour primarily parties of mass integration character, which provides for intra-democratic procedures, not least as it is underlined in the law that also the “exercise of their activities” must be carried out in a democratic manner, something is typical of the ideal typical mass integration party.

However, there are also regulations that run counter to the mass integration party. It is repeatedly stated in the legal regulations that parties may have no relations to civil society organisations; parties are not allowed to use such organisations or their assets in a way that benefits them, they may not share locations with them and they may not involve such institutions in political conflicts. Thus, the traditionally close relation between the ideal typical mass integration party and the civil society is prohibited in the Jordanian context.

Further, there are regulations that work specifically against ideal typical total integration parties in the Jordanian setting. It is stated that parties may not establish military or paramilitary militia groups of any kind. Such groups are found in ideal typical total integration parties, especially of fascist kind. It is also stated that parties must renounce all forms of violence, something which is not always done in ideal typical total integration parties, working for a revolution.

Also regulations that can be interpreted as working against ideal typical clientelistic parties can be found in the legal regulations on political parties. This goes especially for the regulation that says that party money may be invested in Jordan, but only in a way that does not benefit any of the party members.

All in all, the laws regulating political parties are not unanimous in promoting a particular kind of party in the Jordanian context. Indeed, different regulations counteract different party types. In some ways, however, the regulations can be said to promote particular types. Thus, in emphasising the importance of intra-party democratic procedures, the legal regulations make primarily for parties of mass integration, even if also catch-all parties, which regularly present a certain degree of internal democracy, also may be said to be favoured in this regard. However, in prohibiting relations between parties and the civil society, the legal regulations counteract mass integration parties. Together, it can be argued that traits favouring mass integration and catch-all parties are present in the Jordanian case, but that none of these dominate.
Table 5.6. Expectations on the basis of the party legal regulations in Jordan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party legal regulations</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the party legal regulations in Jordan, according to the institutional theoretical models. P: Present expectation.

Applying the Institutional Explanations to the Jordanian Case: Electoral System and Party Legal Regulations

In determining what kind(s) of parties the institutional context in Jordan provides for, it must be noted that the two different electoral systems and the legal regulations point in different directions as to what kind of party they promote. Therefore, the theoretical expectations have to be broken down into three parts.

If one considers the Block Vote system, the conclusion must be that features promoting ideal typical catch-all parties are dominating. If influenced by this, the Islamic Action Front should therefore present primarily catch-all party traits.

If the Single Non-Transferable Vote system is considered, the conclusion must be that primarily clientelistic parties are favoured. If influenced by this, the Islamic Action Front would then present primarily ideal typical clientelistic party traits.

If the legal regulations are emphasised, it is more difficult to pinpoint one particular party type that is favoured. One can however note that catch-all party traits and mass integration party traits can be said to be favoured, even if mass integration party traits are counteracted as well. Total integration party traits and clientelistic party traits are however counteracted by the legal regulations.
Table 5.7. Summarised expectations on the basis of the institutional structures in Jordan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional structures</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Block Vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Non-Transferable Vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal regulations</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the institutional structures in Jordan, according to the institutional theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation, P: Present expectation.

Below, the expectations of linkage in Jordanian parties on the basis of the institutional structures in Jordan are presented in three models.

Figure 5.2. Specified institutional models in the case of Jordan.

After having determined what linkage outcome is to be expected in the Islamic Action Party on the basis of party-centred as well as institutional factors, it is now time to turn to the party itself. How does the Islamic Action Front organise its political linkage?
The Linkage of the Islamic Action Front

The Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood

When analysing the efforts to establish and maintain external linkage by the Islamic Action Front, one very important issue has to be addressed – namely the relationship between the Islamic Action Front itself and the Muslim Brotherhood, from which it has sprung. The true nature of this relationship is very difficult to ascertain, not least since there are so many different opinions about it, pointing in different directions.

On the one hand, there are those within the party who contend that there are no organisational connections whatsoever between the party and the Brotherhood, even if the two organisations share ideological values. According to the party leader, Arabiyat, “(w)e are one stream in general, but we are (an) independent party … established in 1992 according to the laws of parties… We … find ourselves … working together on the Islamic issues. But formally and practically, we are (a) different organisation”\(^1\). The head of the membership organisation, Aweida, states the same thing and claims that while there is cooperation between the two bodies on different levels “(w)e do not have this direct obedient attitude (in) the Islamic Action Front to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is (a case of) indirect co-operation”\(^2\).

Outside observers also refer to this separation. Hourani et al state that “(t)he party’s leadership insists that the Islamic Action Front is not an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and should not be considered as the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm”\(^3\). In this view, the separation of the two organisations is to the benefit of both in different ways.

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\(^1\) Arabiyat, 18 October, 1999.
\(^2\) Aweida, 27 November, 1999. Aweida seems to refer to legal regulations when explaining this relationship: “(The Muslim Brotherhood has) no right to indicate any sort of (support) to the Front” (Aweida, 27 November, 1999). Al-Omari also emphasises that “organisationally-wise they are completely different” (Al-Omari, 17 November, 1999). Also Muslim Brother Abu-Ghanimeh states that “organisationally … there is no connection” (Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999).

\(^3\) Hourani et al, 1993: 26, 17-18. Further, it is stated that “(i)n it statements and declarations, the Islamic Action Front claims that it has no administrative or financial links with the Muslim Brotherhood, maintaining that the only binding feature between the two organisations is the fact that many of the Islamic Action Front’s current members are also Muslim Brotherhood members. The Islamic Action Front maintains that major differences exist between the two groups, pointing out that while the Brotherhood’s role is confined to spreading the Islamic call, the Front assumes responsibility for political activity” (Hourani et al, 1993: 26, 17-18).
Chapter 5: Explaining the Linkage of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front

That the Islamic Action Front is a construction by the Muslim Brotherhood is however clear. According to Hourani et al, “it was the strenuous efforts and initiative of some Muslim Brotherhood members that led to the party’s establishment”.¹

On the other hand, there are those – within and outside the party – who assert that the Islamic Action Front completely relies on the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, not least to establish (and maintain) external linkage. According to these party representatives and outside observers, the Islamic Action Front carries out activities of political character, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood has a broader approach, including social work.² Party representatives and outside observers claim that the two are “two faces of the same coin” and the Islamic Action Front is the “political arm” of the Muslim Brotherhood.³ Indeed, one party representative states that “(t)he relationship is clear, because the party itself cannot continue without the Muslim Brotherhood”.⁴

According to this view, it is thus the Brotherhood that is at the helm; it is the Muslim Brotherhood that decides everything of importance, also in the party. Former party member Al-Omoush states that “decisions taken by the

¹ According to Hourani et al, “(t)his newly created division of responsibilities (between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood) constitutes, in actuality, a progressive step the Muslim Brotherhood chose to take: firstly, in order to maintain its former members; secondly, to distinguish itself from the new, more moderate approach of the Islamic Action Front; and, thirdly, to enable the Islamic Action Front to attract new followers, by calling on all other Islamic movements and independent Islamists to join it” (Hourani et al, 1993: 26, 17-18). Muslim Brother and former party member Abu-Ghanimeh states the same reasons for the organisational independence, and in addition, he contends that the party was considered as a protection from closure, should the government decide to act against political Islam. The party would then be closed and not the Brotherhood (Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999). Also outside observer El-Sherif contends that the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood are “overlapping, but it is not the same structure, (indeed it is) a totally different structure” (El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999).
³ According to some, not least Abu-Ghanimeh (10 September, 1999), the Muslim Brotherhood is also still very active in politics (cp. below).
⁴ Party members Al-Kofahi and Al-Omari uses the “coin” metaphor (Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999, Al-Omari, 17 November, 1999). According to Hourani, the Muslim Brothers sees the Islamic Action Front as its political arm, while the party sees itself as more independent (Hourani, 5 October, 1999). Outside observers El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999, and Shteiwi also uses the “political arm” metaphor. Analysts also assert that “the Muslim Brotherhood … perform in the name of the Islamic Action Front” (former party member Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999) and “the Islamic Action Front is an off-shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood… In reality, there is no separation” (Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999).
Islamic Action Front are in accordance with the Muslim Brotherhood… (T)he real decision-makers … are the Muslim Brotherhood… (O)fficially they are independent, legally they have nothing to do with the Brotherhood. But in reality, there is this interaction”.¹

A fact is that many – probably the majority – of the members of the Islamic Action Front also are members of the Muslim Brotherhood.² According to many analysts, this fact has organisational consequences. For example, Hourani et al state in a booklet on the Islamic Action Front that “Muslim Brotherhood members form the majority of both the Islamic Action Front’s Founding Committee and (the highest organ, the) Shura Council. (Therefore) these bodies (can) be considered a continuation of the

¹ Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999. Also outside observer and Islamist Nofal claims that the Brotherhood has more influence on the party than vice versa, even if he regrets it (Nofal, 18 October, 1999). Analyst Abu-Rumman too claim that the Muslim Brotherhood has the upper hand (Abu-Rumman, 5 October, 1999, 5 October, 1999). That the Brotherhood has had a wider political role throughout the history of Jordan is referred to by different sources (cp. e.g. Hourani et al, 1993: 10-11). Muslim Brother Abu-Ghanimeh for example states that “(t)he main field of activities of the … Brotherhood since its establishment, until the establishment of the party, …is … the political field” (Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999). Outside observers Nofal, 18 October, 1999, and Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999, too state the same thing, as does Hourani et al (1993). Former minister of interior Hammad supports this view, and claims that the Brotherhood has a special status in the Jordanian context. According to him, the Muslim Brotherhood was registered as a charity society in the Ministry of the Interior in the 1940s (at the time there were no special ministries, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs). In this registration, the Brotherhood did not refer to its activities and it has not changed this registration. Therefore, they are – and can be – politically active. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood is registered – along with political parties – at the Ministry of Interior and not as other charity organisations at the Ministry of Social Affairs (Hammad, 20 October, 1999). Most other observers claim that the Muslim Brotherhood is registered at the Ministry of Social Affairs (e.g. Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999 and El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999). However, according to an official at the Ministry of Interior, the Muslim Brotherhood is registered at the Prime Ministry, as a society, not as a charity (Official at the Ministry of Interior, Department of Parties and Elections, 23 November, 1999). According to this official, the Muslim Brotherhood is allowed to carry out some activity, but it is not very clear. In reality, this official points out, the Muslim Brotherhood carries out political activities, and the government accepts it. There is a silent understanding between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood, as a practice, but not a law (Official at the Ministry of Interior, Department of Parties and Elections, name withheld, 23 November, 1999).

² According to Muslim Brother Abu-Ghanimeh, 90 per cent of the members belong to both organisations (Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999, former party member Al-Omoush also refers to the fact that most Islamic Action Front members are Muslim Brothers). The fact that most of the members of the party also are members of the Brotherhood is something that most party representatives refer to when explaining the relationship between the two bodies (cp. e.g. Aweida, 27 November, 1999, Said, 16 October, 1999 and Al-Omari, 17 November, 1999). Also outside analysts comment on this fact (cp. e.g. Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999 and Al-Khazandar, 12 October, 1999).
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Brotherhood”. However, there are also independents, without relations to the Muslim Brotherhood, in the party. Independent Islamist Nofal describes the relationship in a manner that catches the complexity of the situation: “Jordan’s government issued a law that parties must be licensed. The Muslim Brotherhood (then) … introduced the party. But the Islamic Action Front … is not only for the Brotherhood. It is open for everybody… Like, if I have a son. He might become completely independent, but he is still my son”.

Before analysing the way in which the Islamic Action Front organises its linkage, I thus have to look into the nature of the relationship between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood. Even if I hereby forestall the analysis somewhat, a clarification of the relationship between the two entities is of great importance for a general understanding of the linkage. In this context the analytical division into the ideal, strategy and actual behaviour of a party in practice, employed in this study, further comes in handy, and may help us to penetrate this complex issue.

Using this approach, it can thus be established that on the ideal and strategic level, as visualised by the party leadership in the Islamic Action Front, there are – as we saw earlier – no organisational relations between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood. This stance also has a foundation in the party law, as we have seen. Consequently, any close organisational relationship between the two entities would be illegal.

When it comes to activities in practice, however, there seems to be a co-ordination of the work of the party (the Islamic Action Front) and the social movement organisation (the Muslim Brotherhood). Indeed, a lot of work – which in the eyes of the electorate is connected to the party – is carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood in practice, while the Islamic Action Front is devoted to work of more occasional character.

As to the relations between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood it thus seems to be a case of different relations on different levels. On the ideal and strategic level, there are no relations, but in practice there are very close relations.

That the relations between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim

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2 Adding to the confusion are the reports that the Islamic Action Front in August 1994 declared itself independent from the Muslim Brotherhood (Hourani et al, 1997: 25). This suggests that there were formal cooperation between the two to start with.
3 Nofal, 18 October, 1999.
Brotherhood differ depending on what level of analysis is investigated has consequences for what will be regarded as the linkage outcome of the party in this study. What will here be focused, is the linkage as visualised (ideal), planned (strategy) and carried out in practice by the party. This is what is emphasised by party representatives, for obvious reasons (not least because any relations to a social movement organisation is prohibited by law). The Islamic Action Front will then for most parts be seen as organisationally independent of the Muslim Brotherhood.

However, it would be to exclude a crucial part of the total linkage effort connected to the Islamic Action Front if reference were made only to the activities of the party. Therefore, I will in the analysis refer both to the linkage outcome attributed to the party itself and to the linkage outcome attributed to the joint efforts of the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood, when it comes to the linkage effort in practice. Regarding the ideal and strategic level, I will however only refer to the ideal and strategy of the Islamic Action Front. In this way, I present a fuller picture of the linkage effort of the party under study. In drawing this picture, I start with the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front.

**Linkage Objective**

The Islamic Action Front is a party that wants to win votes in elections – indeed votes are of central importance to the party, ideally, strategically and in practice. This point is emphasised by party representative Said, who, when asked whether the voters are more important than the members, eagerly answers “yes, yes, yes!”. Also Kilani, the head of the party’s women’s wing, emphasises that the party is “working to spread”, i.e. to gain more voters. In this sense, the Islamic Action Front is primarily an electoral party, and its linkage objective is more focused on catching votes than on making members.

That members (let alone their integration into the party) are not especially important for the party is also suggested by the party leader Arabiyat, who seems to feel that once the party is formed, members are not

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1 It must here be remembered that I have not studied the linkage work of the Muslim Brotherhood directly, as it was the linkage work of the Islamic Action Front that was the focus of my interest. As a result thereof, my first-hand information regarding the Muslim Brotherhood itself is limited.

2 Said, 16 October, 1999. Former party member Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999, also emphasises the role of the voters.

3 Kilani, 15 November, 1999.
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of particular value: “(W)e don’t really give this thing (membership recruitment) much from our work”.

To the extent that they are referred to, members are primarily regarded as a means to reach more voters. When evaluating the importance of voters as against the importance of members, the party’s head of organisation, Aweida, contends that “(t)here is a relation between them. Because the more members we have, the more voters we have... The more members we have, the more we can reach to the voters”.

To the extent that there are members in the Islamic Action Front, they are thus valued primarily as vote-getters, in an ideal typical clientelistic way.

On ideal and strategic level, as well as in practice, the evidence then suggests that like in the ideal typical electoral parties, maximising votes is the dominating linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front, not integration of members into the party.

The Islamic Action Front thus principally resembles an electoral party, and an electoral party of catch-all character. On ideal and strategic levels, it is clear that clientelistic practices, i.e. buying votes through different kinds of favours (or promises thereof) – in a way that is recurrent in the Jordanian context – is something that the party does not want to be involved in. Party representatives, on central as well as local levels, emphasise that clientelistic practices are unacceptable: “We don’t intend to buy their votes”.

Votes can only be won by proclaiming the message to as wide an audience as possible. On ideal and strategic level, the Islamic Action Front thus embraces a linkage objective in line with the ideal typical catch-all type, i.e. maximising of votes through reaching out to all. For most parts this ideal

1 Arabiyat, 18 October, 1999.
2 Aweida, 27 November, 1999. Al-Omari also discusses the value of the membership: “(A)n effective woman, she can have an impact on thousands of women” (Al-Omari, 17 November, 1999).
3 The Islamic Action Front does not participate in elections at all costs, though. Indeed, as we have seen, the Islamic Action Front together with other parties boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections in protest against the state. Subsequently, the party has however re-evaluated its stand and has shown that it wants to take part in elections, even if the factors motivating the boycott not have been removed.
4 Many outside observers (e.g. Khoury, 24 November, 1999 and Fakhuri, 25 September, 1999) refer to the general usage of clientelistic practices in Jordanian parties and politics (not seldom coupled with tribalist concerns, as I will return to).
and strategy also seems to be reflected in the actual behaviour of the party in practice: “They are targeting everybody”.¹

The linkage of the Islamic Action Front is thus dominantly of catch-all kind. However, as already mentioned, there are some indications that a clientelistic logic is at play in the party, in practice. We previously saw that members, to the extent that they are valued at all, are seen primarily as vote-getters, in a way characteristic of an ideal typical clientelistic party.

The head of the organisation, Aweida, further refers to a difference between the ideal situation and the actual one, when it comes to linkage objective: “The Muslim Brotherhood don’t ask anything from the people, or to vote for them. Because as Muslims, charity to be accepted by God cannot be pre-conditioned. But (it is part of) the nature or the people (to think): ‘Be good to the people who have been good to you’”.² This statement suggests that there are promises of help by the Islamists, with the silent agreement that such help would result in support of the party.

Also outside observers refer to the presence of a clientelistic logic in the actual work of the Islamists. According to Hammad, “(t)he Muslim Brotherhood uses charity to give the people (what they need). It will of course have an effect on the elections… It is the same people who do the charity and who are in the party. But it is the Muslim Brotherhood organisation and not the Islamic Action Front party organisation that carries out the charity”.³

Outside observer Abu-Rumman contends that the Islamists indeed have a mixed view of clientelism. On the one hand, “(t)hey have a discourse against the al-Wastah”.⁴ On the other hand, Islamists are not totally free from al-Wastah concerns, according to Abu-Rumman. On the whole, however, Abu-Rumman contends that the Islamists rely less on clientelism than other parties in the Jordanian context.⁵

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¹ Outside analyst Al-Khazandar, 12 October, 1999.
² Aweida, 27 November, 1999. Note that Aweida here places the Muslim Brotherhood on equal footing with the Islamic Action Front.
³ Hammad, 20 October, 1999. However, Hammad claims that the party does not rely on a clientelistic logic: “They do not extend services”, this is done by the Brotherhood (Hammad, 20 October, 1999). Outside observer Shteiwi does not agree, he contends that “there are … many cases … where they actually make their support conditioned… Sometimes it is indirect…, sometimes it is blatant” (Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999).
⁴ Al-Wastah refers to the general practice of treating family and tribal members preferentially, i.e. clientelism in the Jordanian variety.
⁵ Al-Khazandar contends that as the Islamists make use of clientelistic practices “they will do it with their own explanation… (They see it as) part of Dawah (preaching)… (The reasoning
In evaluating the degree to which the Islamic Action Front, as a party, embraces a linkage objective of clientelistic kind, it is important to isolate the objectives of the Islamic Action Front from those of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is rarely done by party representatives themselves. However, from the examples cited here, it can be noted that the clientelistic logic most often is attributed to the Muslim Brotherhood (as Aweida and Hammad do) or to the wider category of Islamists (as Abu-Rumman and Al-Khazandar do). Thus, it seems as whether a clientelistic logic not is absent from the workings of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is not primarily attributed to the Islamic Action Front. Indeed, the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front is regarded as being rather of catch-all kind, even if some clientelistic traits may be present.

Further, most political parties and independent candidates in Jordan rely on a tribalist logic in practice, in a clientelistic way. However, according to party representatives, the extent of tribalism is limited in the Islamic Action Front.\(^1\) According to outside observers, tribalism is totally not absent from the Islamic Action Front, however. Indeed, “(t)hey pick up a representative in a certain district (that) has all the important elements; being from the district, from a large family, so he plays on that card as well, the tribal card”\(^2\). However, unlike many other parties and independents, the Islamic Action Front does not exclusively rely on tribalism. Of most importance are the wide appeals of catch-all character, intent on maximising votes.

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\(^1\) E.g. Irbid mayor Al-Kofahi states that “I didn’t have tribal support, because my family is not big” (Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999).

\(^2\) El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999. Indeed, Shteiwi claims that “(t)he Islamic Action Front works very finely with the Jordanian tribal context. This is part of their strength… (M)ost of the time they file candidates who are tribally known… Everywhere, they play on their tribal denomination as well” (Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999). Also outside observer Fakhuri notes that the Islamic Action Front acts on a tribalist logic, but that it couples is with a religious, ideological stance: “Sometimes they choose a person who is strong in his tribe, and he will have his tribe’s votes and he will have the Muslim Brothers votes” (Fakhuri, 25 September, 1999). Former as well as present party representatives confirm that tribal connections are not unimportant (Al-Onmoush, 11 October, 1999, Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999, Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999).
Thus, the Islamic Action Front does not primarily act on a clientelistic logic, even if such is present in practice. Instead, it is catch-all traits that dominate the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front, ideally, strategically and in practice.

Table 5.8. Traits in the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage objective</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

Motivation behind the Linkage Objective

So far, I have thus concluded that the Islamic Action Front by its linkage effort primarily wants to secure votes at elections, mainly by appealing to all in a catch-all fashion. But why does the Islamic Action Front embrace this linkage objective? Is it because they want to implement some policy-changes, or do they have broader ambitions?

The representatives of the Islamic Action Front emphasise that their ultimate aim is to introduce an Islamic system in Jordan, and – as they believe in the parliamentary way of doing politics – the party needs to come into power in order to do that. A party representative puts it accordingly: “(W)e (want to) have a central position, where we can carry out our programme…”¹ That the party wants to come to power is further clarified by party representative Al-Masalha: “We should reach this point of peacefully exchanging the ... government… I think that this is the target in the future; we are trying to reach this... You cannot put your ideals and ideology into effect, because you need this authority”.²

The Islamic Action Front thus wants to come to power. But, when looking deeper into the issue, it becomes clear that the party wants to come to power not only to implement some policy-changes, like an electoral party. Indeed, it wants to reform society at its base in line with its ideology, just like an ideal typical mass integration party. That the Islamic Action Front has a far-ranging view of politics and aims at changing politics slowly is

¹ Aweida, 27 November, 1999.
suggested by party representatives as well as outside observers: “(They) don’t want only ... (to come to) power quickly, but (they) have to change the society slowly, slowly”. ¹

Also in other ways, there are resemblances with the mass integration kind of party in the motivation of the Islamic Action Front. According to party representative Said, for example, “(activities) should be a result (of) our ideology, our principles, in conformity...”. ² In the Islamic Action Front, electoral objectives thus have an ideological motivation: “The Islamic Action Front aims at getting votes to have Islamic Action Front candidates reach the parliament and create Islamic awareness and culture. (This) approach is adopted...without abandoning the principles and ideology”. ³ Hence, the electoral objective of catch-all kind, which dominates on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice, is based on a mass integration type of motivation in the Islamic Action Front.

Quite contrary to the theoretical expectations, a mass integration type of motivation thus leads to the dominating catch-all linkage objective in the case of the Islamic Action Front. In order to act in line with the ideological orientation and to realise the ideological goal of reform of society, a linkage objective of catch-all kind is regarded as most efficient by the Islamic Action Front.

Also in another way, the ideological motivation makes for catch-all traits in the Islamic Action Front: as the ability to “catch masses” in an ideal typically catch-all way follows from the ideology of the party in the eyes of the Islamic Action Front. This is evidenced by party representative Al-Masalha, who asserts that “we have examples of our ex-leaders in the party... (W)hen they lost the clear point of the ideology, they lost their masses”. ⁴ Other representatives too underline that there is a relation between

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¹ Abu-Rumman, 5 October, 1999). Outside observer El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999, states the same thing, as does party representative Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999 .
² Said, 16 October, 1999. Also party representative Al-Kofahi refers to the value of realising the party goals: “To help others, alleviate the suffering of the people ... is (the) best (way) to have the sense of success and achievement” (Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999).
³ Abu Baker, 8 June, 2003.
⁴ Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999. Indeed, it does not seem easy to walk the tightrope between being too pragmatic and too ideological in the Islamic Action Front. In the fieldwork for this study, I interviewed both an ex-leader that had been excluded from the party because he was too pragmatic (Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999), and another because he was too ideological (Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999). That this balance between being ideological and being pragmatic is not an easy one in the Islamic Action Front is also suggested by journalist El-Sherif, according to whom the party nearly split in 1997, on whether to boycott the elections or not: “There is definitely a tug of war between the
the religious ideology of the party and the support of the masses. Thus, party leader Arabiyyat contends that “(f)irst of all, we are going to follow the Islamic principle. It is acceptable to the people…”¹ By subscribing to ideological (religious) principles, in a mass integration manner, the party thus meets the linkage objective of maximising votes, in a catch-all way.

However, there is evidence that also another motivation, apart from the ideological motivation of mass integration kind, is present in the Islamic Action Front – a motivation that would be more in line with the societal setting of the party – and that is that the party wants to come to power for the sake of power itself, not least by drawing on particularistic appeals.

Especially, prominent party members who used to be part of the party leadership refer to these pragmatic motivations of the party. According to Faori, who used to be the only woman in the Shura council but later withdrew, “their main priority is the elections, to get to power…”.² Faori states that this is a stance taken by the party, not by the Muslim Brotherhood: “(I)n 1993, they suffered regression in a way. It developed into a very clear and personal, individual competition… The party has just become a medium, (a) method to reach power-centres, to reach decision-making points”.³

Also outside observers support the view that the Islamists to some extent aim at coming to power for the sake of power itself, and that they tap into the clientelistic logic present in Jordan society in doing so.⁴ Hamarneh puts it bluntly: “(T)hey are power-hungry … they want power”.⁵ There thus

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¹ Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999. Cp. also Said, 16 October, 1999. Al-Masalha as well contends that “any activity should begin with the ideology … which is religion-ideology … (because) … people understand when you are talking about religion…That is acceptable to people” (Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999). Also some outside observers refer to this logic of clientelistic kind.
² Faori, 29 November, 1999. Faori claims that the Islamic Action Front operates on a clientelistic logic in this respect. Also Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999, Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999 and Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999 refer to this logic of clientelistic kind.
³ El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999. As we say previously, Shteiwi claims that “most of the time they file candidates who are tribally known… Everywhere, they play on their tribal denomination as well” (Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999).
seem to be motivations similar to those in primarily an ideal typical clientelistic party in the Islamic Action Front, at least in practice. These motivations however do not dominate.

Thus, the linkage objective of catch-all kind in the Islamic Action Front to a large extent seems to be the result of a mass integration type of motivation: The Islamic Action Front wants to maximise votes (linkage objective) in order to come to power to reform society in line with its orientation (motivation). This is the dominating motivation on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice.

In practice, a more pragmatic motivation is however present (but far from dominating) as well. To some extent, the Islamic Action Front wants to come to power just for the sake of power and is influenced by the societal setting in this regard, in a way that resembles the ideal typical clientelistic party.

But to what extent is the Islamic Action Front influenced by the institutions in conceptualising its linkage objective? Are institutions at all important in this regard? It can be established that institutional arrangements and laws indeed are important for the party. Party representatives refer to the restrictions set forth by legal regulations.\(^1\) In general, the Islamic Action Front thus pledges that it does “abide by the party regulations”.\(^2\) These regulations, according to the party representatives, however largely counteract a linkage objective of catch-all kind, as they prevent activities with a broad appeal, such as mass meetings, television and official media, which are regarded as “the most effective activities”.\(^3\) More generally, legal regulations are felt to counteract political activities at large. In this sense, then, the linkage objective of catch-all kind does not seem to be influenced by the legal regulations.

The electoral system is however said to affect the linkage objective of the party to a certain extent. According to party representative Al-Masalha, the new one man–one vote system has had the effect that the party is “not


\(^2\) Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999.

\(^3\) Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999. Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999, states the same thing. Indeed, Al-Masalha claims that such restraints “effect our (contact) with the masses”, making these contacts take specific shapes, such as “direct contact, personal contact” (Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999).
interested in the Christians” anymore, as these are less likely to vote for the party when they only have one vote.\(^1\) Al-Masalha continues to say that this “does give a bad effect on the society, (as it leads to a) division of the religious and ethnic groups”.\(^2\) Thus, it seems as the Single Non-Transferable Vote electoral system has had the predicted effect in making for the presence of particularistic, clientelistic traits in the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front – at least in practice. The remark also suggests that even if the Islamic Action Front lobbies hard for the reintroduction of the Block Vote, it has adjusted to the electoral system in place. Thus, the old electoral system does not seem to affect the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front.\(^3\)

In sum, institutions thus seem to have some effect on how the Islamic Action Front conceptualises its organisation in its linkage objective. However, while certain aspects of linkage therefore may be induced by the institutions in place, the Islamic Action Front does not outline its organisation the way it does in order to follow institutions, in general. For most parts, the Islamic Action Front representatives themselves emphasise party-centred factors – primarily the orientation of the party – in making for the particular linkage objective of the party.

Thus, the analysis shows that the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front primarily is to maximise the number of votes for the party by reaching out to the masses, as an ideal typical catch-all party, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. The reason why the party wants to do this (motivation) is primarily that it wants to reform the society on the basis of its ideology, as an ideal typical mass integration party. In practice, there are also evidence suggesting that the Islamic Action Front to some extent acts on a clientelistic logic as a result of both the societal setting and the institutions (the electoral system) in place.

Going back to the theoretical expectations, we may thus conclude that these largely fail to predict the relation between the motivation and the linkage objective in the Islamic Action Front. Instead of producing a linkage objective of primarily mass integration kind – which would be in line with the party-centred explanation – a linkage objective of predominantly catch-all kind is found in the Islamic Action Front, resulting from its ideological

\(^1\) Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999.


\(^3\) In this context, it can be noted that in the case of the Islamic Action Front, it only took 2 elections to adapt to the change of the electoral system, not 3 as suggested by Gallagher (1998).
orientation on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice.

It can further be noted that the origin, background and experiences of the party are not referred to at all in this context. These do thus not seem to influence the linkage objective of the party at all, at least not directly. The expectation on the basis of the societal setting in Jordan is however met to some extent – in practice, some clientelistic traits are present in the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front.

As to the institutions, traits in the legal regulations and electoral system work against a linkage objective of catch-all kind in the view of the Islamic Action Front. Thus, these institutions do not seem to influence the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front to any greater extent. However, the present electoral system is (in the Jordanian context) regarded as furthering clientelistic parties, and the evidence suggests that the presence of clientelistic traits in the Islamic Action Front in practice may at least partly be a result of this electoral system.

The relation between the motivation and the linkage objective on different levels is presented in the figure below.

Figure 5:3. Relation between the motivation and the linkage objective in the Islamic Action Front, on the basis of the theoretical models.
Apart from these motivations for aiming to organise in a particular way, there further seems to be another motivation, at a more profound level, for the Islamic Action Front to be in politics. This is a motivation at a deeper level, that is not taken into account by the theoretical ideal typical models used for reference in this context; namely the reason why people want to become politically active in the first place. In the Islamic Action Front, this motivation suggests that the party does not – in the first place – work to reform society or to gain power *per se*. Instead, the Islamic Action Front is politically active in a certain way to please God – and be awarded by Him. Thus, a religious motivation is present in the Islamic Action Front.

Many party representatives return to this kind of motivation, even if it is not cited by all. For example, party representative Al-Masalha states that “(w)e think (that when) we are doing our (activities), we are not working for (people) to tell us ‘thank you’… We think that God will award you if you are doing this”. Party representative Al-Omari states the same thing. According to him “all (in the organisation) have something in common, they all work for God (and) people work without waiting for something in return. Because they work to be paid by God”.

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1 Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999.
2 Al-Omari, 17 November, 1999. Other party representatives refer to this motivation as well. Cp. e.g. Yousef states that “We don’t receive credit, reward… (this comes) from God only” (Yousef, 18 October, 1999), Aweida, 27 November, 1999, also refers to “the reward we get from God” and Al-Kofahi states that the party works as it does “(t)o be awarded by God in the other world”. Al-Kofahi continues: “(E)ven if we are not rewarded (for) our giving, our effort doesn’t stop, because we do it for the other life” (Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999). Also Kilani, head of the Women’s Wing, refers to this kind of motivation in a brochure directed to the members in the wing: “What is better work to do, than to start with your religious obligations … that is to call for God. To do what is permitted by God and refrain from doing what is forbidden. (---) There is the necessity and obligation to work in this party, to pursue towards developing its performance…To implement the wish of God and then to … realise our goal”. Party mayor Al-Kofahi refers to the long-term perspective on the work of the party
This basic religious motivation is there at all times: “It is our belief..., it does not depend on (whether) you have election or not”. But this motivation is indeed cited as a reason also for working for success in elections. As party representative Al-Omari asserts, “(o)ur ultimate aim … (is that) we work for God. We want to work as instructed by God. (---) (But) of course, issues … impose themselves. For instance, … at the time we have elections, the motive is … to work towards the elections”. In this sense, it seems as the religious motivation and the ambition to do well in elections are not at odds in the Islamic Action Front. Instead, working for electoral gain is viewed as a way to follow the religious commandments.

Outside observers as well assert that the Islamic Action Front is inspired by a religious motivation at a basic level. Al-Khazandar for example states that “they believe in dawah (preaching), which led them close to the people... Dawah, it is a means for them, it is a duty you have to do. Either you succeed or you fail, it doesn’t matter”. Hourani agrees to this analysis: “(T)hey believe that this is their duty; religious and political duty to the people, to tell them and to try to ask them to follow them”.

Thus, there are indications of another motivation underlying the linkage objective, and thus the linkage, of the Islamic Action Front – the religious motivation. In this chapter, I will however focus on the theoretical explanations for party linkage outlined in Chapter 2 of the study. The religious motivation for party linkage is dealt with in Chapter 8.

**The Legal Regulations and the Relation between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood**

After having established that the linkage objective of primarily catch-all kind in the Islamic Action Front follows mainly from its orientation of mass integration kind, in a way quite contrary to the theoretical expectations, the time has come to analyse the linkage outcome of the Islamic Action Front. However, before moving on to discussing whether the linkage outcome and connects this to the religious motivation: “(T)here is continuity, it doesn’t end... You might do a lot of effort, but you are not rewarded on earth, while you are alive. It doesn’t mean that your efforts are wasted... This is our relief; even if we are not rewarded (for) our giving, our effort doesn’t stop, because we do it for the other life” (Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999).

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1 Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999.
3 Al-Khazandar, 12 October, 1999. The idea on the part of the Islamists is that “We do it for God!”, according to Al-Khazandar, 30 November, 1999.
4 Hourani, 5 October, 1999.
follows from the linkage objective in the Islamic Action Front, as it should according to the models or whether the theoretical expectations yet again are thwarted, one important issue has yet again to be raised in this regard – the relationship between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood.

In discussing legal regulations above, only the party was taken into account. If the Muslim Brotherhood is included in the equation, quite a different scenario emerges regarding impact of the legal regulations. Even if the influence of the legal regulations on the party are limited in the present situation, the legal regulations are indeed important in making for the particular division of work of the Islamist movement in Jordan, i.e. into one political party and a broader social movement.

We saw above, that legal regulations are regarded as counteracting effective political activities. However, these legal regulations do not seem to make the Islamic movement in Jordan any less active. On the contrary, they seem to make the movement look for other ways to pursue the activities it wants to carry out. Indeed, party representative Abu Baker states that “political work is one of various means to promote the ideology”.\(^1\) Thus, the close cooperation between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood is regarded, at least partly, as a result of the legal restrictions. The legal regulations limit the party. Therefore, other ways have to be devised to pursue the activities desired.

According to party representative Al-Kofahi, the Brotherhood carries out many activities, “because the party, according to the law, (has) limits (in) its abilities to work”.\(^2\) Activities by a social organisation like the Muslim Brotherhood are not supervised in the same manner as the activities by a political party. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood carries out many activities on behalf of the Islamic Action Front.

Had there been no (or other) legal regulations limiting party work, the situation would probably have looked very different in Jordan. In such a situation, there are reasons to believe that the Muslim Brotherhood itself, which today carries out very different activities than the Islamic Action Front, would have organised as a political party.

Given the current legal regulations, the Islamist movement in Jordan has opted for the present arrangement. In this context, it must however be

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\(^1\) Abu Baker, 8 June, 2003, emphasis added.

\(^2\) Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999. Party-member Faori also states that “the government doesn’t give the opportunity to carry out (activities) the way they like” (Faori, 29 November, 1999).
noted that this close cooperation between a party and a social movement is forbidden according to the legal regulations.

Legal regulations thus do seem to influence the Islamic movement in Jordan as a whole, but not in the way expected. The legal regulations make the Islamic movement circumvent and actually break the laws by establishing a close cooperation between a political party and a social movement, in clear defiance of the laws. This can be done as there is a silent agreement on the matter between the state, on the one hand, and the Islamic Action Front and Muslim Brotherhood, on the other. According to an official at the Ministry of Interior, “(t)here is no evidence (of a connection between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood). (There is) nothing tangible to present to the court”.\(^1\) The official continues to state that the presence of such a cooperation indeed “is known in general, but it is not the official view”.\(^2\)

Thus, on a basic level, the legal regulations seem to make the party, the Islamic Action Front, to concentrate on particular activities, while other activities are left to the social movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, on this basic level, legal regulations must be said to influence the way in which the over-all Islamist movement in Jordan conceptualises its work. As a result, the party embraces a linkage objective of electoral (catch-all) kind.\(^3\) Had there been no or different legal regulations, the division of work between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood probably would have looked very different.

In this study, I will mainly regard the efforts of the party per se, even if reference will be made to the work of the Muslim Brotherhood as well. As we saw earlier, the Islamic Action Front is, in the present situation, not much influenced by the institutions here studied, i.e. the party legal regulations and the electoral system, as a party. As a whole, the Islamic movement is however influenced by the legal regulations. This is something to keep in mind and I will return to this particular issue in the conclusion of this chapter. Now I will turn to the linkage outcome of the Islamic Action Front.

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\(^1\) Official, Ministry of Interior, name withheld, 23 November, 1999.
\(^3\) Even if the matter has not been studied particularly here, there are reasons to believe that the linkage objective of the Muslim Brotherhood is of mass integration kind, aiming at integration members in the organisation in order to eventually reform the society.
Establishing External Linkage

Activities to Establish External Linkage

What activities does the Islamic Action Front carry out to establish external political linkage, to reach new presumptive voters? The main activity of the Islamic Action Front in this regard is to keep in constant touch with the Jordanian people. The Islamic Action Front sees itself as having a “message (it has to) diffuse in the society: That Islam is the solution”.¹ This is mainly done by debating hot political issues from time to time, i.e. not only in times of elections, and by staging different kinds of campaigns. The party leader Arabiyyat contends that what the party wants is “(j)ust to express ourselves, who we are, what we want, and what is our plan for the future”.² Activities that form part of this work include “meetings … information …, … gatherings for special (political) issues”.³ These activities are thus carried out in practice in order to establish external linkage. Also on ideal and strategic level, such activities are emphasised. Activities mentioned in the party programme are thus mobilisation of the public through speeches, seminars, conferences, public meetings and festivals.⁴ The idea is “to issue on behalf of the party our understanding, our opinion in different (fields) … if it is political, if it is educational, or economic issues”.⁵

On ideal and strategic level as well as in practice, awareness-raising, nationwide campaigns thus are of major importance in the Islamic Action Front’s effort to establish external linkage. That the Islamic Action Front focuses on debating political issues in practice is emphasised by outside analysts as well. According to Al-Khazandar, “they are working all the year in different issues; human right issues, political issues, academic issues”.⁶ That such campaigns are important for the Islamic Action Front was also witnessed by myself. At the time of the fieldwork of this study, in the autumn of 1999, the overshadowing political issue for the Islamic Action Front was the “Hamas issue”.⁷ As a part of the campaign to free the Hamas-

¹ Aweida, 27 November, 1999.
² Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999.
³ Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999. Also press conferences are to be utilised to this effect. In the 2003 election campaign, party representative Abu Baker states that the party used written publications, banners, slogans, media, visits to people including big families, meetings and the internet (Abu Baker, 8 June, 2003).
⁶ Al-Khazandar, 12 October, 1999.
⁷ In September 1999, the King decided, in consultation with the government, that the office of
leaders, different meetings, speeches and demonstrations arranged by the Islamic Action Front took place, which were attended by many people.1

Other outreach activities that are conceived at the ideal and strategic level in the party are contacts with the people through media; newspapers and television. Such activities are carried out in practice too. The party does not have an own party newspaper, but “we have a colleague newspaper, al-Sabil… It is independent … but it is close to us”.2 Through this paper, and other media-activities (such as press conferences), the Islamic Action Front works to reach out to the population at large in Jordan in practice.

Activities of campaigning character – holding meetings and demonstrations – are also the main activity of the women sector of the Islamic Action Front.3

In general, the activities carried out by the Islamic Action Front to establish external linkage then in many ways remind of the activities undertaken by an ideal typical catch-all party, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice.

However, unlike the ideal typical catch-all party, the activities of the Islamic Action Front are not restricted to election campaigns. At least ideally

of Hamas in Amman would be closed down (probably as a step in the process of normalisation with Israel). The Islamists, mainly Muslim Brothers, reacted in a violently way against this decision. Even if the Muslim Brothers do not have any organisational links with Hamas, it is obvious when speaking with them that they see Hamas as a part of the bigger Islamic movement, striving for the same goals. In every way, the Muslim Brothers thus tried to use their good connections with the political leadership in Jordan to end the story in a way beneficial to them. However, they did not succeed. Instead, several Hamas members were arrested and four leaders of Hamas was flown to Qatar, where they were given sanctuary and the Muslim Brotherhood must be regarded as having lost an important battle with the regime. In his handling of the Hamas issue, King Abdullah showed that it was very important for him to have continuous contacts with the Islamists, and to include the Islamists in the political process. On the other hand, he also showed that it, at the end of the day, is his agenda that prevails.

1 Another example of a political campaign is that of the Anti-Normalisation Committee, which is headed by the Islamic Action Front. The Anti-Normalisation Committee, which consists of 13 different opposition parties (including communist parties, nationalist parties, socialist parties; “from the extreme Leftist to extreme Rightist”, Arabiyat, 18 October, 1999), works to raise public opinion against the process of normalisation with Israel, and to influence the government and the King to retract this process. Party representatives like Arabiyat, 18 October, 1999, and Said, 16 October, 1999, repeatedly emphasise the importance of this campaign.


3 Kilani, 15 November, 1999. Examples of campaigning activities during 1999 was the show of support in favour of Merve Kavakci, the Turkish parliamentarian elected on a Virtue Party ticket, who was not allowed to enter the parliament because she was wearing a head-scarf and activities in support of Hamas (Kilani, 15 November, 1999).
and strategically, the Islamic Action Front is to carry out its campaigns on a continuous basis. According to the party leader such meetings are to take place “any day”.

Campaigns of these kinds thus are to be the main activity of the party in order to reach out to people, on ideal and strategic level.

However, the party leadership is not always satisfied with the extent to which the campaigns are carried out in practice. Not least Kilani, the head of the Women’s section, think that the party could do a lot more of this kind of work. The problem, according to Kilani, is that the Islamic Action Front is a relatively new party and that the people are afraid of harassments by the government if they participate in party political activities: “(T)hey will find that it is dangerous to go to the party”. However, Kilani sees signs of a brighter future: “(We are) really just in the beginning”.

That the party not is very active in practice is pointed out by outside analysts as well, even if they have some continuous presence. According to Hourani, “most of their activities is through the elections… Ordinary days, I believe that they are not active… (T)hey are doing from time to time certain activities, but you cannot see it, you cannot feel it”.

In times of election, the campaign activities are however intensified. On ideal and strategic level, but also in practice, such electoral activities – carried out by party candidates – include visit to houses, personal contacts, mass meetings, distribution of flyers and posters, and setting up of election offices, where people can come and visit the candidates.

Not least the activities of the party women are important in the

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1 Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999.
2 It can also be noted that even though I repeatedly asked to be informed about such meetings and even though party representatives promised to inform me, I was never invited to any activity during my field-work.
3 Kilani, 15 November, 1999. Outside observers also note this situation: “Most of the people are convinced that the political party is not the place they want to attend…They believe that it is not active, it is not doing a good job, so they hesitate to attend political parties. Partly maybe because they believe that the government in general and directly, they are not encouraging, and they are not happy to see serious political party system in Jordan. So they are aware of the government, they don’t want to make the government … punish them” (Hourani, 5 October, 1999). Also other factors impede the extent of the activities in practice, according to party representatives, such as the publication laws of the country and the limited financial resources of the party (Said, 16 October, 1999). Thus, as noted previously, legal regulations are seen as hindering (all kinds of) political activity in Jordan.
5 Hourani, 5 October, 1999. Hourani also comments of the low degree of activity in the women’s section: “They are not very active” (Hourani, 5 October, 1999).
election campaigns. Referring to the latest election campaign, party leader Arabiyat states that “(t)hey had their own gatherings, they had their own means to reach the people in different areas, and at the day of the election, they were very, very active”. Kilani agrees and asserts that the “women section is very active in elections... Muslim women ... they believe that election... It is from their understanding of Islam that they should be ... active”.

Party representative Said further asserts that the party representatives, in times of election, “visit people in their ... tribal groupings” and “deal with the papers”. Social activities do however not take place during election campaigns as a rule, even if it happens occasionally, according to party representatives and outside observers.

Also in times of election, activities of ideal typical catch-all character thus dominate in the Islamic Action Front. However, references to meetings with tribal groupings suggest the presence of some clientelistic activities in practice.

However, the party not only focuses on campaigning activities of catch-all party kind (between or in times of election), even if these activities dominate on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. In the party programme, it is also stated that the party should work to strengthen Islam by spreading Islamic education and to consolidate the Islamic awareness in the nation, with all legitimate means. The party is further to support the religious institutions and to spread the message of the mosque, in order to strengthen its role as an active and efficient institution and to upgrade the level of dawah (preaching) and religious guidance. To this end, the party programme calls for the publishing of books, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines and establishment of institutions as well as specialised scientific research centres for the purpose of preparing studies necessary for the implementation of the Front’s objectives. The party also assures that it is to pay particular consideration to youth clubs, cultural and sport centres and

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1 Arabiyat, 18 October, 1999. Former party member Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999, states the same thing.
2 Kilani, 15 November, 1999. Note here also the reference to the motivation of religious kind.
3 Said, 16 October, 1999.
5 Party programme of Islamic Action Front and Hourani et al, 1993: 32.
scouts, as all these institutions educate and prepare the youth.\textsuperscript{1} Professional associations, unions and popular organisations are also to be given attention.\textsuperscript{2} Indeed, it is stated that “the party should be involved in all fields of general, public work on local and national level, and to work to provide the … institutions with the Islamic spirit”.\textsuperscript{3} Thus, the party ideally and strategically is to focus on educational and ideological activities, in a manner resembling an ideal typical mass integration party.

However, party representatives, like Aweida, concede that such activities are not carried out in practice to any greater extent, even if “we arrange lectures in the branches”.\textsuperscript{4} Also outside analyst Hourani claims that the party sometimes organise meetings and lectures, “but they are not very active”.\textsuperscript{5} Regarding the activities of the women section, Kilani states that educational lectures “to spread awareness”, should be a main activity, but she claims that such are not carried out to any greater extent.\textsuperscript{6} In this sense, some similarities with the ideal typical mass integration party are present when it comes to the outreach activities of the Islamic Action Front, but these far from dominate.

Activities of more social and recreational kind are moreover regarded as important to carry out on a continuous basis (if not in times of elections). According to party representative Aweida, the party tries “to carry out the policies, the programme of the party into reality”.\textsuperscript{7} Party representative Al-Kofahi also refers to the value of realising the party goals, even if the party is not in power: “To help others, alleviate the suffering of the people … is (the) best (way) to have the sense of success and achievement”.\textsuperscript{8} In this sense, such help is a projection of the party’s policies and social help is ideologically motivated. Former party member Al-Omoush further states that “it is natural (to have such social activities), because it is a continuous process (and) not only in the elections. Because … it is a ‘relations society’, (where it is important) always to relate to people”.\textsuperscript{9} The same thing is stated

\textsuperscript{1} Party programme of Islamic Action Front and Hourani et al, 1993: 33.
\textsuperscript{2} Party programme of Islamic Action Front. The party will also participate in municipal, parliamentary and trade union elections (Hourani et al, 1993: 33).
\textsuperscript{3} Party programme of Islamic Action Front.
\textsuperscript{4} Aweida, 27 November, 1999.
\textsuperscript{5} Hourani, 5 October, 1999. Abu-Rumman, 5 October, 1999 states the same thing.
\textsuperscript{6} Kilani, 15 November, 1999.
\textsuperscript{7} Aweida, 27 November, 1999.
\textsuperscript{8} Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999.
\textsuperscript{9} Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999.
by party representative Al-Masalha. According to him, personal contacts are sought by the party to circumvent government restrictions: “For example if you have a party, for example a wedding party or … mourning… (I)n these places nobody can tell you not to talk, not to go there. We are very active in these places”.

This practice is also mentioned by outside observer Hourani: “They are very active in celebrations … wedding celebrations”. Such ideologically motivated activities resemble those of the ideal typical mass integration party, even if one cannot discard the clientelistic aspect of these activities.

However, when it comes to the outreach activities with such a social content, the division of work in the Islamic movement in Jordan is employed. Thus, even if these activities are referred to as party activities, the activities are – formally – not activities of the Islamic Action Front per se, but of organisations connected to it; not least the Muslim Brotherhood. Party representative Al-Kofahi contends that the Muslim Brothers have “continuous activities … related to social work”. Further, compared to the activities of the party, “(t)he type of activity in the Islamic Brotherhood is more hot. Maybe some daily activities… We have to spread awareness… It is weekly, in the Brotherhood, for men and women”.

Thus, when it comes to the joint efforts of the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood to establish external linkage, activities of mass integration kind dominate. While the Islamic Action Front “doesn’t operate more than in the field of politics”, other activities – of for example of social kind – are carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood.

This coordination of the activities of the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood is also referred to by outside observer Hammad: “The committees in the party do not have any direct (charity) activities, but the party committee may encourage people as a policy to participate in charity

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1 Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999.
2 Hourani, 5 October, 1999.
3 Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999.
4 Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999. As to the work in general by the Muslim Brotherhood, Muslim Brother Abu-Ghanimeh states that “they have activities where they reach directly the people in general” (Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999). Such work includes continuous social work like running of schools for general education (elementary schools, secondary schools, colleges) and providing for the poor, for widows, for orphans, for sick, for handicapped; they work in the refugee camps and they build mosques (cp. Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999, Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999, Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999, Nofal, 18 October, 1999).
5 Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999.
committees”. The Islamic Action Front thus does not carry out charity activities itself, but it encourages participation in such activities by related bodies, primarily the Muslim Brotherhood.

Indeed, the argument of Kilani, the head of the Women’s Section, in discussing the activities of the Islamic Action Front is that “here in Jordan, we have so many (societies). So why … repeat? (…) We don’t have anything political (in the Islamist field) … (therefore we in the party) have to concentrate on the political issues. Because no-one will take care of that, if you don’t do it… (But) you will find that … Muslim Sisters, they are doing these things (like social work)”.

Party representatives thus contend that specialisation is better – the Islamic Action Front specialises in political work, of catch-all character, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood carries out activities of broader, social (mass integration) character. There is no need for the party to duplicate the activities of the Brotherhood – the field of the party is political campaigning, because none of the other societies take care of that.

In this context, it should be noted that the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood not only take on a mass integration character, even if that primarily is the case. As indicated earlier, one cannot overlook the clientelistic aspect of those activities in practice. According to outside analysts, the Muslim Brotherhood provides help, assistance and employment in return for support of the party.

1 Hammad, 20 October, 1999.
2 Kilani, 15 November, 1999. Party representatives Aweida, 27 November, 1999, and Said, 16 October, 1999, as well as former party member Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999 state the same thing. One example of work carried out by ‘societies’ cooperating with the Islamic Action Front is “meetings in their home for women, only to study the Quran” (Kilani, 15 November, 1999).
3 Outside analyst El-Sherif also refers to this division of labour: “(While) the Muslim Brotherhood is more involved in (social work), the Islamic Action Front (deals with)…political issues, social issues, economic issues” (El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999). Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999, states the same thing. Muslim Brother Abu-Ghanimeh however disagrees to this some extent. He states that the activities of the two bodies are independent from each other, but “they are in conformity … there is a convergence between their activities … the political activities of the Muslim Brotherhood are in conformity with the political activities of the Islamic Action Front … there is co-operation”; i.e. while the Islamic Action Front only carries out political activities, the Muslim Brotherhood carries out social as well as political activities and in these political activities, the two bodies work together. Abu-Ghanimeh continues: “The introduction of the party does not cancel the political role of the Muslim Brotherhood” (Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999). Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999 also contends that the Muslim Brothers carry out political work.
That clientelistic practices are shunned by the party – not least in times of election – is however emphasised by party representatives; and outside analysts agree to this.\(^1\) However, there are assertions that the party engages in some activities related to tribalism.\(^2\) Thus, clientelistic traits seem to be present to some extent in the Islamic Action Front in practice.\(^3\)

In summary, it can thus be concluded that the Islamic Action Front predominantly resembles an ideal typical electoral party of catch-all character, when it comes to activities to establish external linkage. It focuses on activities of campaigning kind, not least in times of election, even if such activities are to be carried out also between elections, in a way not stipulated by the catch-all ideal type. This situation applies particularly on ideal and strategic level, but also in practice, even if activities in practice are less extensive than intended.

Activities of ideological, social or clientelistic character do not seem to form part of the party’s repertoire, ideally, strategically level nor in practice to any greater extent, even if some traits of ideological character are present ideally, strategically and in practice and clientelistic activities to some extent take place in practice. Activities in practice of the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood together, however, are of primarily mass integration kind, if with certain clientelistic elements. A summary of these findings is presented in the table below.

\(^1\) Abu-Ghanimeh states that clientelistic practices were avoided in the 1989 elections: “We do not intend to buy their votes” (Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999). Abu-Ghanimeh claims that the same is true of the Islamic Action Front. Regarding the social activities, Al-Kofahi emphasises that this is a matter of material help only to those who need it, and that the help is in no way conditioned. Clientelistic concerns are thus not part of this work (Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999). Muslim Brother Abu-Ghanimeh states the same thing (Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999). Not least party mayors are very clear in rejecting clientelistic practices. This is interesting as there on municipality level would be ample opportunities for a party in power to provide supporters with certain benefits. However, Al-Omari, mayor of Zarqa, asserts that “(w)hoever elects us or didn’t elect us, he has the right to approach us and we are responsible to serve everybody, regardless whether they elected us or not” (Al-Omari, 17 November, 1999). The mayor of Irbid, Al-Kofahi, 20 October, 1999 states the same thing. Among the outside analysts, particularly Hammad, 20 October, 1999 and Abu-Rumman, 5 October, 1999 underline that clientelistic activities are carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood, and not the party.


\(^3\) Hourani gives examples of such clientelistic tactics (Hourani, 5 October, 1999).
Table 5.9: Traits in the activities to establish external linkage of the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
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<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front (and the Muslim Brotherhood). D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait, -: not analysed.

**Target of Party Efforts to Establish External Linkage**

The Islamic Action Front viewed on its own thus primarily carries out activities of campaigning character, like a catch-all party. But who is the target of these activities?

As mentioned previously, the ideal and strategy in this regard, as expressed by the party representatives, is that the party directs the activities to establish external linkage at everybody, like an electoral party of catch-all kind. According to the party representatives, the party aims at addressing Muslims as well as Christians, poor as well as rich, well-educated as well as non-educated, urban as well as rural people, i.e. the population at large. Party representative Al-Masalha states that the party should target “all the people in the country… (P)eople understand when you are talking about religion … there is no difference if he is a Christian or Muslim or any other religion”.

That this aim of targeting all also is carried out in practice is evidenced by outside observers and vouched for by party representatives. Thus, anybody can attend the demonstrations et c that the party organises: “Our meetings, most of them, are open for the people … it is open for anybody to attend these meetings”. Further, all and everybody can share the views of the party by reading their frequent statements in the press.

Outside representative Al-Khazandar also refers to this fact, which according to him is religiously inspired: “They are targeting everybody, because they believe (that) it is a part of dawah. The message of Islam should be sent (to) everybody”.

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2 Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999.
3 Al-Khazandar, 12 October, 1999. Al-Khazandar further claims that “everybody” here
to establish external linkage, the Islamic Action Front thus predominantly resembles a party of ideal typical catch-all kind, ideally and strategically as well as in practice.

This broad approach of catch-all kind is the predominant ideal, strategy and practice also in times of elections, as pointed out by party representatives and vouched for by outside observers. According to party representative Abu Baker, the Islamic Action Front “approaches all different sectors” in the election campaign.\textsuperscript{1} Mezagopian, who is a Christian Armenian, vouches for the fact that the Islamic Action Front indeed goes to all in times of election. Indeed, she states that “as a family, we were approached only by the Islamists” during the 1999 local election campaign.\textsuperscript{2} Former party member Al-Omoush, who stood for the party in the 1993 elections, also contends that “you approach everybody, regardless of the origin, regardless of religion, wherever they are residing in (the) constituency”.\textsuperscript{3} Also in times of elections, then, the Islamic Action Front resembles primarily the ideal typical catch-all party in that it targets all, ideally, strategically and in practice.

However, both party representatives and outside observers indicate that the party not always uses such a broad approach, particularly in times of elections. Indeed, people both within and outside of the party note that the Islamic Action Front to some extent does tend to concentrate its efforts on certain areas and certain groups, not least in times of elections. Even if the basic stance is that election activities are “open for everybody (and that) … we do not differentiate” between people, “(i)n the last elections for municipalities … we focus(ed) on the big cities”.\textsuperscript{4} Thus, the party did not present candidates everywhere in the elections, but only in specific areas, where they feel that they have a fair chance to win.\textsuperscript{5} Thus, in times of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Abu Baker, 8 June, 2003.
\item Mezagopian, 22 September, 1999.
\item Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999.
\item Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999. Party representative Said expresses the same thing: “(We go to) everybody … (but we are) more present in the cities” (Said, 16 October, 1999), as does Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999. According to Al-Masalha, the reason for this is that “political awareness in the cities is more clear” (Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999).
\item Al-Masalha claims that the party does not put up candidates in “boiling areas (with a) tribal and not political base” (Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999). Aweida also gives an example of this practice of not fielding candidates if “there is no … strong percent(age) in a certain area” (Aweida, 27 November, 1999). Usually, areas where candidates are not put up are “rural areas and small towns” (Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999). Abu Baker states the same thing (Abu Baker, 8 June, 2003).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
elections the Islamic Action Front tends to focus on urban areas where they expect support, while rural areas – where tribal sentiments are strong – are not targeted to the same extent.

Also between elections, some particular groups are targeted more often than others, even if the basic stance – which is also carried out in practice – is to approach all. Thus, the party exerts more efforts in the Palestinian refugee camps and in relation to the educated, middle classes. Another group that is given extra attention is students. That these groups are of particular importance for the Islamic Action Front is confirmed by outside analyst Hourani: “My impression is that they are going to … the young people, students in universities, among the poor people, people of the camps, the people who are angry (as a result of) their economic conditions or … the political solutions in the area, they are against peace with Israel”.

In this sense, it might thus be said that the Islamic Action Front indeed – at least occasionally – focuses particular groups in society, at least in practice. But does the Islamic Action Front resemble a party of integration or a clientelistic party in this regard?

As we have discussed earlier, a party of integration focuses a group that is defined a priori, on the basis of the ideology of the party. When discussing why the Islamic Action Front focuses on certain groups, both party representatives and outside analysts, as we have seen, emphasise that the party focuses groups and areas where they have been successful. Outside observer Abu-Rumman contends that they “prepare meetings for their candidates in the areas … where they think it is good for them”. This indicates that the Islamic Action Front to a certain extent acts on a clientelistic logic in their targeting.

However, also other reasons for such particular targeting are cited. Thus, there are indications that the Islamic Action Front fields candidates according to agreements with the executive authorities. As we saw earlier, party representatives also claim that the present electoral system make the

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2 The party is always very active in elections to student unions where they generally are very successful; the same is true for different professional associations (Party representative Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999). Cp. also Said, 16 October, 1999.
3 Hourani, 5 October, 1999.
5 Faori, 29 November, 1999.
party focus on some districts more than others, in a clientelistic manner.\footnote{Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999.}

The singling out of particular target groups and areas, that takes place to some extent in electoral activities of the Islamic Action Front in practice, thus seems to be a result of electoral concerns and institutional influences, rather than being the result of an ideological stance. To the extent that particular groups are selected for focused attention, the Islamic Action Front thus primarily acts on a clientelistic (and institutional) logic, not on a mass integration logic.

In this context, it must however be noted that the specialised targeting does not make up the main practice of the Islamic Action Front. In most cases and in most activities, particularly those taking place between elections, the Islamic Action Front targets all and everyone – ideally, strategically and in practice.

When including the Muslim Brotherhood in the equation, this picture changes somewhat. The Muslim Brotherhood seemingly tries to reach everybody, but the social activities – which are the most important activities of the Muslim Brotherhood – are only provided to those who cannot afford the goods provided themselves. According to Muslim Brother Abu-Ghanimeh, “(t)here is no house, there is no family, where we haven’t rendered out services… (We go) to everybody… Even we extend services to Christians; if they have enough evidence that they are poor, they are also included in our services”\footnote{Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999. Independent Islamist Nofal, 18 October, 1999, states the same thing.}

The Muslim Brotherhood thus concentrates its work of predominantly social character on poor areas which are found not least in the urban centres and in the refugee camps.\footnote{Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood focuses its activities on such areas to a much greater extent that does the Islamic Action Front: “You will see more of us (in) the middle (class) areas than the Muslim Brotherhood” (Aweida, 27 November, 1999).} Contrary to the Islamic Action Front, which focuses the main part of their activities on the population at large, the Muslim Brotherhood is more selective when it comes to their main activities and targets particularly the least well off. Further, it seems as they target those areas for ideological reasons, as a result of religious commands. The target of the external efforts by the Muslim Brotherhood thus primarily resembles the target of the ideal typical party of integration of mass kind, in that the target is decided on \textit{a priori}, on ideological grounds.

To summarise, the Islamic Action Front ideally and strategically

\begin{itemize}
\item[ootnote{Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999.}]\item[ootnote{Abu-Ghanimeh, 10 September, 1999. Independent Islamist Nofal, 18 October, 1999, states the same thing.}]\item[ootnote{Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood focuses its activities on such areas to a much greater extent that does the Islamic Action Front: “You will see more of us (in) the middle (class) areas than the Muslim Brotherhood” (Aweida, 27 November, 1999).}]
\end{itemize}
targets all Jordanians in their efforts at establishing external linkage. Also in practice, the party predominantly targets all, like an ideal typical catch-all party. However, in practice other traits are present as well. Thus, not least in times of elections, the Islamic Action Front seems to target particularly groups where they expect to be successful (and which they have agreed with the executive authorities to target) – such as the middle classes and the poor in the cities, Palestinian refugees and students. In this respect, there are some similarities with the ideal typical clientelistic party.

The Muslim Brotherhood also tries to reach all on a general level. The most important activities, however, i.e. the activities of social kind, are directed at the poor, found in the city centres and in refugee camps. To some extent, the target of the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood thus overlap in practice, particularly regarding the poor in the cities and the refugee camps. However, for most parts the targets of the two organisations are different; while the Islamic Action Front generally targets all, the Muslim Brotherhood particularly targets specific groups.

Table 5:10. Traits in the target of the activities to establish external linkage of the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
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Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front (and the Muslim Brotherhood). D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait, -: not analysed.

**Performer of Activities to Establish External Linkage**

Which part of the Islamic Action Front then performs the activities of predominantly campaigning character, directed primarily at the population at large, in order to establish external linkage? According to the party representatives, the ideal in this regard – which also forms the strategy of the party – is that the political activities should be carried out partly by the central headquarters, and partly by the local branches. The central headquarters are supposed to draw up the general guidelines for the activities and to head countrywide campaigns, while the local branches are supposed
to adapt the activities to the conditions on the local level and to carry out different kinds of local campaigns in all of the 23 branches in Jordan.¹

This division of work is also to take place in times of election, ideally and strategically: “(W)e have a central statement for all branches … the main guidelines. And the branches … add what they think is proper locally for their locations… (E)very branch has their choice … because it is different places”.² What election activities are to be carried out in the branch is thus decided by the temporary local election committee in the branches.³

In the party headquarters then, different permanent and temporary committees – each of which has its own plan – are set up to take care of different matters. These committees change as issues change.⁴ These committees work to influence the government and to raise public opinion on a nationwide level, and they have their own plan, but they work in line with the general guidelines issued by the central party leadership.⁵

An affiliate organisation to the party, the women’s section, is also regarded as an important performer of activities, ideally and strategically, as are organisations ancillary to the party. Such ancillary bodies include bodies

¹ Party representative Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999. Party representative Al-Omari, 17 November, 1999 states the same thing. The same is true for the women’s section, according to Kilani, 15 November, 1999.
³ Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999. Abu Baker states the same thing (Abu Baker, 8 June, 2003). The actual plan of conduct however depends on what kind of election it is, according to the party leader: “For the municipality (elections), really we here give the national plan and ask the branches to have their own plan and to decide on their (own) ground… (W)e have a central committee here…and they have their own local committees” (Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999). That things are a bit different regarding general elections is suggested by Al-Omoush, who stood for the Islamic Action Front in the 1993 elections. According to Al-Omoush, the election campaign was then to a rather great extent planned by the central party, and as a candidate “he (could) not make arrangements… Th(e Islamic Action Front (was) … arranging for his campaign (through) the central committee and sub-committees” (Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999).
⁴ Examples of such committees are the committee of anti-normalisation, the elections committee, the political committee, the social committee, the educational committee, the economic committee, the information committee, the youth committee, the student committee, the fatwa committee (for ideological issues), the committee for relations with other parties (opposition committee), the committee for foreign affairs, the media committee, the professional association committee. In all there are about 20-23 central committees for different issues, according to the party leader (Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999, Said, 16 October, 1999, Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999.
for students and for the youth.\footnote{Said, 16 October, 1999.} Further, ideally and strategically, “(e)ach sector has their specific duties, specific activities; maybe some activities for students, some for women…”\footnote{Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999.} According to the ideal and strategy, then “(t)he women, they have their duties in the women centre, the students in the student section, labourers with the labourers, the tradesmen with the tradesmen”.\footnote{Al-Omari, 17 November, 1999.}

But the local branches of the party are also important, ideally and strategically.\footnote{In the local branches, different committees are to be active, such as the cultural committee, the organisational committee, the elections committee, the committee for relations with other parties and the committee for social activities (Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999).} Not least, the local branches are to be active in elections to different local bodies. According to party representative Al-Masalha, “there are always elections in the branches, because they have societies … all the time, clubs”, like the important professional associations, in which the party is to be represented.\footnote{Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999. Local elections are not only important ideally and strategically. Also in practice, the Islamic Action Front is often a very important force in the professional associations, such as the medical association, the bar association, the dentist’s association and the engineer association. Persons related to the party are often elected to head these powerful bodies (Said, 16 October, 1999).} Elections to such bodies are to be dealt with by a sub-committee in the branch, and not by the central level.

Also when it comes to activities of more ideological, cultural and social character, “the branch itself (should) deal with this. They (are to) have programmes through the cultural committees, or the committee for party activities”.\footnote{Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999. Aweida, 27 November, 1999, states the same thing.} The branches are also to be responsible for mobilising participation in demonstrations and meetings, together with advertisements in the press.\footnote{Said, 16 October, 1999.} Especially the work of the members in the local branches are regarded as important, ideally and strategically: “(W)e depend in our work on our activists. If the member is active, he can influence”.\footnote{Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999. Aweida, 27 November, 1999, states the same thing.}

On ideal and strategic level, then, different bodies are to take care of different activities in the Islamic Action Front. Some activities are to be taken care of by the central level, while other activities are regarded as being best performed by the nationally diffused local branches. Some activities are to be carried out by the affiliate women’s section, whereas other activities
are to be performed by bodies ancillary to the party. In this way, there are thus clear resemblances to the diversified organisation of the ideal typical mass integration party. Especially the division of activities between the central level, the local level and the affiliate and ancillary organisations points in this direction.

To some extent, the Islamic Action Front also in practice performs its activities to establish external linkage in a way similar to the ideal typical mass integration party. Not least outside observers refer to the fact that the party is well-organised and has branches all over Jordan.¹

That the party also utilises the services of other organisations (not formally connected to the party), especially in times of election, is referred to by outside observer Hourani: “(I)n the election, they are very active, they have a very strong and active network, a lot of organisations, a lot of facilities... They are using organisations, social organisations … schools, hospitals. They have a lot of facilities… (T)hey have a very good network and when they want to make a campaign, they can mobilise a lot of people in this (way)”.² The utilisation of a broad range of bodies in the Islamic Action Front, with varying degrees of attachment to the party – typical of the mass integration party – is thus emphasised by outside analysts.³ Note, however, that outside observers not always are careful to distinguish between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood. It is thus difficult to establish whether they refer to the party or to the social organisation in this context.

² Hourani, 5 October, 1999. Also outside observer Hammad claims that the party cooperates with committees that are separate from the party, not least in matters related to charity (Hammad, 20 October, 1999).
³ Other examples of cooperation with different organisations which are not formally linked to the party in practice can be cited. Thus, high party representatives are for example often involved in other organisations, not least organisations carrying out activities of social character. The party leader Arabiyat is also the head of charity organisation that organises mass-weddings (al-Afaj), and a former party leader, Ishaq Farhan, is the head of a regional, all-Arab “Committee for Defending Jerusalem” (Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999. The same goes for ex-Shura member Nawal Faori, she too is active in many different societies (Faori, 29 November, 1999)). Even if these organisations have no formal organisational connections to the party, the fact that the same person heads both suggests that the two are connected in the public eye. Such organisations are further generally very active. Another example of an organisation with close connections with the party is, as we have seen, the anti-normalisation committee. Al-Omari also states that many of the activities in the branches are carried out in conjunction with other societies, and he cites examples of different activities: Support of orphans and poor people, voluntary work like collecting olives and helping out in times of water shortage (Al-Omari, 17 November, 1999).
Party representatives, on the other hand, are generally less happy with the way in which activities are performed in practice by the party. Especially the local levels are largely inactive, even if some activities are carried out.\(^1\) In most branches, and most of the time – even in times of election – the level of activity is very low, according to party representatives: “(T)hey are not so enthusiastic, the people (in the local branches)”.\(^2\) Indeed, only part of the members are activists: “A very small percentage, a very small minority (of the members), … carries out this effort”\(^3\).

This lack of activity is also found in the women’s section, according to its head. As we have seen, the women’s section is lauded for its work in times of election. The women’s section also carries out some activities on its own, some together with the men.\(^4\) But its head, Kilani, asserts that the section is far from fulfilling its potential and most activities are carried out in the centre, not in the branches.\(^5\) Also outside analyst Hourani claims that even if the party sometimes organise meetings and lectures, “they are not very active”.\(^6\)

It is thus primarily the central level that is active in efforts to establish external linkage in practice in the Islamic Action Front. In this sense, there are thus clear resemblances to the ideal typical catch-all party in practice, regarding what bodies perform the activities to establish external linkage, even if some traits of the ideal typical mass integration party are present as well.

In accordance with previous observations, the picture changes when the Muslim Brotherhood is introduced into it. As we saw earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood carries out social activities on the local level, activities that to a large extent is associated with the Islamic Action Front.\(^7\)

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\(^1\) Aweida, 27 November, 1999.  
\(^2\) Aweida, 27 November, 1999.  
\(^3\) Aweida, 27 November, 1999. Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999, states the same thing. The reason why members are active to such a limited extent is attributed to institutional factors: “(T)he party is not … (free) in its movement. Many members of the party, they are afraid to act (as they risk being) … harassed by security” (Aweida, 27 November, 1999). Kilani states the same thing (Kilani, 15 November, 1999).  
\(^4\) Thus, even if “women … are more involved with women … we have some (meetings) with the men” (Kilani, 15 November, 1999). Arabiyyat states the same thing: “They have their own programme and we have our programme. But we can share their programme and they can share our programme” (Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999).  
\(^5\) Kilani, 15 November, 1999.  
\(^6\) Hourani, 5 October, 1999. Abu-Rumman, 5 October, 1999 states the same thing.  
\(^7\) Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999. Cp. also the observations by outside observers made previously.
The Muslim Brotherhood further has connections (if not organisational) with for example the Islamic Charity Society, which carries out social and welfare work through its 41 branches spread over Jordan. Moreover, party representative Al-Kofahi contends that the Muslim Brothers have “continuous activities … related to social work”. This is so not least in times of election: “In elections, the name of the Islamic Action Front (is used) …, but truly, the Islamic Brothers have the main (activities) in the election”. According to party representative Al-Masalha, the Muslim Brotherhood thus prepares the ground for the party: “Because they preach, they go, they talk, they speak to people, they are active… They prepare a lot for the party … through this”. In fact, Al-Kofahi states that “(a)ll these activities of the party is under the supervision of the Brotherhood”, even if the party also carries out some work (of political kind) at the local level. This is the view also of outside analyst Hamarneh, who claims that “on the lower levels it is the Brotherhood” who does the work.

Thus, while the Islamic Action Front is primarily active on central level with different campaigning activities, the grass-root work of social character is carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood in practice. Interestingly, however, there also seems to be a more formalised cooperation between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood in practice. Even if this is denied by the party leader, party representative Al-Masalha asserts that there indeed is an organisational connection between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front: “Actually, we have in every branch what they call a ‘trans-committee’ (containing) … a number from the Muslim Brotherhood,

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1 Abu-Ghanim, 10 September, 1999. Also outside analyst Shteiwi refers to this fact (Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999).
2 Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999.
3 Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999.
4 Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999. These activities contribute to the fact that “the Muslim Brotherhood more spread than the party” (Said, 16 October, 1999).
5 Hamarneh, Mustafa, 11 November, 1999. Also party representatives Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999, Aweida and Kilani refer to the fact that continuous activities are primarily carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood, not the party (Al-Masalha, 22 November, 1999, Aweida, 27 November, 1999, Kilani, 15 November, 1999). According to Kilani, these contacts are however “not formal … (as) in the law it is not allowed to have formal (contacts)” (Kilani, 15 November, 1999). As we have seen earlier, also outside analysts such as Hammad refers to this symbiotic relationship. According to Hammad, the Muslim Brothers “have two identities. Towards the people they work as a charity organisation, not as a party. But it is the same people who do the charity and who are in the party…But it is the Muslim Brotherhood organisation and not the Islamic Action Front party organisation that carries out the charity” (Hammad, 20 October, 1999).
and part … half from here (the Islamic Action Front)… They (the Muslim Brothers) have more experience and all these things. That is, we (are in) full co-ordination with the Muslim Brotherhood.¹

There thus is a general agreement among party representatives and outside observers on the fact that while the Islamic Action Front is active on national level with policy issues (like an ideal typical catch-all party), the Muslim Brotherhood primarily deals with social activities on the local levels in practice. Thus, when the Muslim Brotherhood is regarded in conjunction with the Islamic Action Front, they largely resemble an ideal typical party of mass integration, when it comes to what bodies perform the activities to establish external linkage. Just like in the ideal typical mass integration party, the party here relies on the social movement from which it springs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performer</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front (and the Muslim Brotherhood). D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait, -: not analysed.

Conclusions Regarding the Establishment of External Linkage

In sum, it can thus be concluded that the Islamic Action Front on its own predominantly resembles the ideal typical catch-all party type, when it comes to how it works in order to establish external linkage, both on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice.

Like the ideal typical catch-all party, the Islamic Action Front primarily devotes itself to campaigning activities directed at all, even if some other traits (of mass integration and clientelistic kind) are present in these regards as well. Regarding what bodies are to perform these activities, the Islamic Action Front however differs for the ideal typical catch-all party type, at least on ideal and strategic level. On these levels, the party

underlines the importance of a wide variety of bodies to carry out the activities. In practice, the activities are primarily carried out by the central level, however, just like in an ideal typical catch-all party.

If the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood are regarded in conjunction, this picture changes radically. When looking at the combined efforts of the Islamic Action Front and Muslim Brotherhood to establish external linkage in practice, the image of an organisation that predominantly resembles an ideal typical mass integration type of party emerges; i.e. an organisation that performs a wide range of not least social activities, targeted at an *a priori* defined group, carried out by diverse organisations on the local level.

**Table 5:12 The full picture of the Islamic Action Front’s effort to establish external linkage.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities to Establish External Linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal:</strong></td>
<td>Performer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy:</strong></td>
<td>Performer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Activities, target</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In practice:</strong></td>
<td>Activities, target, performer</td>
<td>Activities, target, performer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the Islamic Action Front’s efforts to establish external linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

Returning to the theoretical expectations on the basis of the linkage objective of the party, we may thus conclude that the Islamic Action Front largely acts as theoretically expected, i.e. in line with the linkage objective of dominantly catch-all kind. Slight traits of clientelistic practices, theoretically expected to be the result of the societal setting as well as institutions are also at hand. The traits of mass integration kind in the Islamic Action Front can however not be attributed to the linkage objective of the party.

However, if one includes the Muslim Brotherhood in the equation, a next to ideal typical mass integration outcome follows. As theoretical expectations have not been outlined for the joint work of the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood, no conclusions can be drawn in this
At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties

regard here. However, I will return to this outcome in the concluding section of this chapter. Next, I will study the efforts to maintain the external linkage in the case of Islamic Action Front.

Maintaining External Linkage

Activities to Maintain External Linkage

The Islamic Action Front to a large extent uses the same kind of activities to maintain external political linkage, as it does to establish external linkage. Not least the different meetings, campaigns and demonstrations play an important role in this regard, at least ideally and strategically. However, activities to maintain linkage do not abound in practice. Indeed, party member Faori asserts that there are activities “only during elections (even if) occasionally, they might have these lectures”.¹ According to former party member Al-Omoush, there was a more continuous relation between the party and the people before the 1997 elections boycott. According to him, the boycott “somehow interrupted the relations … between the Action Front and the people”; before that, the party had “continuous relations with the people, they used to receive them in their office, and they used to visit them in their house and they used to visit prisoners in the prisons”.² Ideally, strategically and in practice, activities to maintain external linkage thus are of catch-all character in the Islamic Action Front.

Al-Omoush further suggests that also clientelistic activities are part of the continuous contacts in practice. Speaking about the fact that the party works to release prisoners, he reflects that “when (they) are successful in releasing the persons from prison, (the) relations … with the families will be even stronger. And if we consider tribalism in Jordan, so if (they) are able to make a favour to a member of (a) tribe, (they) have approached the whole tribe”.³ This indicates that there is a clientelistic logic underlying at least some activities of the Islamic Action Front in practice, making for more long-term relations with supporters. As we have seen previously, there are also some other claims that the Islamic Action Front makes use of clientelistic practices.⁴ However, such activities far from dominate.

In its activities to maintain external linkage, the Islamic Action Front

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¹ Faori, 29 November, 1999.
² Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999.
³ Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999.
⁴ Cp. e.g. outside observer Hourani, 5 October, 1999.
Chapter 5: Explaining the Linkage of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front

Thus to primarily seems to resemble a vote-maximising party of catch-all character in relying on activities of campaigning character, ideally, strategically and in practice, even if some clientelistic activities in practice are noted.

Apart from these largely catch-all tactics for maintaining external linkage, some attempts at providing education for the supporters are noted as well in the Islamic Action Front. In this sense, there thus are attempts – at least on ideal and strategic level – at carrying out activities typical of parties of (mass) integration, in order to maintain external linkage. However, these activities do not seem to be very extensive in practice.

In all, the activities of the Islamic Action Front itself to maintain external linkage thus largely resemble the activities of the ideal typical catch-all party, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. On ideal and strategic level, there are further some traits of (mass) integration kind; such traits are also present in practice, if not to any greater extent. In practice there are moreover indications of the presence of some clientelistic traits.

If we add the Muslim Brotherhood in this context as well, it can be established that the efforts of this organisation to a large extent are focused on maintaining contacts with the people. Like in the Islamic Action Front, the methods for maintaining linkage to a large extent coincide with the methods meant to establish linkage to the people in the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood to a large extent carries out activities of social character, like provision of welfare and education. According to a former party member, “the nature of (this work is) continuous, because the Islamists have continuous relations with the people”.

The Muslim Brotherhood also in other ways work to maintain external linkage. According to outside analyst Hourani: “(The Muslim Brotherhood) has people supporting them, listening to them, following them. For example, they are listening to them at the mosques… So they are active … in the mosques, during the Friday-prayer and they are active on certain … religious occasions… So socially they are very active … (not least) on the local level”.

When regarding the efforts to maintain external linkage carried out by the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood in conjunction, it must

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1 Kilani, 15 November, 1999.
3 Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999.
4 Hourani, 5 October, 1999.
therefore be established that this work in many ways resembles that of an ideal typical mass integration party, in practice.

**Table 5:13. Traits in the activities to maintain external linkage of the Islamic Action Front.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal:</strong></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy:</strong></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In practice:</strong></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comment:** The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front (and the Muslim Brotherhood). D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait, -: not analysed.

**Target of Activities to Maintain External Linkage**

The occasional campaigns, demonstrations and meetings, carried out by the Islamic Action Front, are largely directed at the core of supporters, ideally, strategically and in practice. Even if these occasions are “open for everybody”, as we saw earlier, most of those who actually participate in these activities are people who are already convinced. Indeed, the head of the women section, Kilani, states: “(I)t is easy for us to bring … women to work in our activities (such as demonstrations); very big number (come)”, as long as they are not registered as members. Gatherings and activities thus to a large extent have the character of being get-togethers by those who support the party.

In this sense, it can be argued that supporters are important for the party, not least since there seem to be little efforts by the party to make party members, something that I will return to soon. The supporters seem to make up the link between the party leadership and the society at large. What is termed “friends of the party” is regarded as a big group; indeed “most of the people are still like friends, not members”.

Ideally, strategically and in practice, activities to maintain external

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1 Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999.
3 Outside observer Abu-Rumman, 5 October, 1999 states the same thing. This view is substantiated by party member Faori, 29 November, 1999.
linkage – like the activities to establish external linkage – are thus directed at those who support the Islamic Action Front, just like they are in an ideal typical catch-all party. However, no particular targeting takes place in this regard in the Islamic Action Front, as is the case in the ideal typical clientelistic party. Instead, the party primarily relies on supporters to stay connected to the party.

As noted previously, the Muslim Brotherhood on the contrary targets particular groups in its activities to establish external linkage. As the same activities are utilised to maintain this linkage, there are reasons to believe that also the target of the activities to maintain external linkage is of mass integration kind, when the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front are considered in conjunction.

Table 5.14. Traits in target of the activities to maintain external linkage of the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front (and the Muslim Brotherhood). D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait, -: not analysed.

**Performer of Activities to Maintain External Linkage**

What bodies then perform the activities that the Islamic Action Front carries out to maintain external linkage? Again, the same situation prevails as regarding what bodies perform the activities to establish external linkage in the Islamic Action Front. While there according to the ideal and the strategy of the party is a division of labour between the central level and the local branches in the party, like in an ideal typical mass integration party, it is mainly the central level that carries out the activities in practice in the Islamic Action Front, like in the ideal typical catch-all party. The branches do not seem to carry out continuous activities to maintain external linkage to any larger extent, even if they are present in many districts. Indeed, as party representative Aweida points out, the local branches are mostly active in
times of election, and sometimes not even then.1

In practice, the activities to maintain external linkage are instead largely carried out by the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood in conjunction. As we have seen, the Muslim Brothers perform diverse, not least social, activities to maintain external linkage, especially at the local levels; and unlike the case in the Islamic Action Front on its own, the Muslim Brotherhood is very active on a continuous basis.2

When regarding the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood in conjunction, the work to maintain external linkage in practice is carried out by, on the one hand, the leadership of the Islamic Action Front (and the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood), and on the other hand, by the local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this sense, there are clear similarities with the ideal typical mass integration party type regarding the performer of activities to maintain external linkage, if the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood are regarded as one.

When the Islamic Action Front is regarded on its own, it however resembles primarily the ideal typical catch-all party in practice, even if some ideal typical mass integration traits are present as well. On ideal and strategic level, the Islamic Action Front however primarily resembles the ideal typical mass integration party regarding what bodies are to perform the activities to maintain external linkage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performer</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front (and the Muslim Brotherhood). D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait, -: not analysed.

1 Aweida, 27 November, 1999.
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Conclusions Regarding Activities to Maintain External Linkage

Taken together, the efforts to maintain external linkage to a large extent resembles the efforts to establish external linkage in the Islamic Action Front. Regarding the activities to maintain external linkage, the Islamic Action Front thus to a large extent resembles an ideal typical electoral party of catch-all character, both on ideal and strategic level and in practice. Even if traits of the ideal typical party of mass integration are present on ideal and strategic level and traits of both the ideal typical mass integration party type and the ideal typical clientelistic party type are present in practice, these far from dominate.

The same situation largely applies regarding the target of the activities. Efforts to maintain external linkage are carried out in an ideal typically catch-all manner, ideally, strategically and in practice.

When it comes to the performer of the activities to maintain external linkage, the pattern found regarding the efforts to establish external linkage again is duplicated; ideally and strategically activities to maintain external linkage should be carried out by the different bodies in the Islamic Action Front, in a way resembling the ideal typical mass integration party. In practice, however, the activities are the responsibility of primarily the central level in the Islamic Action Front, as it is in a catch-all party, even if branches are present.

Just like the case regarding efforts to establish external linkage, this picture changes dramatically when the Muslim Brotherhood is included. When regarding the work of the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood in conjunction, again the resemblance with the ideal typical mass integration party is striking. Viewing the two in conjunction, the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood on different levels carry out diverse, continuous activities. Some of these activities are intended for supporters in general, but most are carried out towards a particular, pre-defined group. In this sense, the resemblances with the ideal typical mass integration party dominate when the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood are regarded together.
Table 5:16. The full picture of the Islamic Action Front’s effort to maintain external linkage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities to Maintain External Linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>Performer</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>target</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>Performer</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
<td>target</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Activities</td>
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<td>IAF-MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>target, performer</td>
<td>target, performer</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF-MB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the Islamic Action Front’s efforts to maintain external linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

Again, the Islamic Action Front thus largely organises in line with its catch-all linkage objective, as expected, on the basis of the linkage objective.

More conspicuous is – again – the striking resemblance to the ideal typical mass integration party, when the Muslim Brotherhood is regarded in conjunction with the Islamic Action Front. Before discussing how these outcomes may be accounted for, I will take on the organisation of the internal linkage in the Islamic Action Front.

Establishing Internal Linkage

In this section and the next, I analyse how the Islamic Action Front works to establish and maintain internal linkage. As previously, we therefore look more specifically at the internal activities of the Islamic Action Front per se. However, as it in this section is the internal activities of the party that are under investigation, the references to the Muslim Brotherhood are more limited and made only in footnotes, as long as the doings of the Muslim Brotherhood are of no direct consequence for the internal activities of the Islamic Action Front.

Member-Recruitment Policy of the Party

The interest of the Islamic Action Front in recruiting new members is modest at best, both on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. Party leader Arabiyyat contends that “we don’t really give this thing (membership
recruitment) much from our work”.  

Indeed, members are primarily valued because “(t)he more members we have, the more we can reach to the voters”. The members are thus not the main focus of interest in the party; neither the quality nor the quantity of members seem to be particularly important. Even if making members is his main job in the party, the head of the membership committee, Aweida, points out that the members are primarily regarded as a means to connect to new supporters and not valued in themselves. Occasionally there may be drives to make more members, directed from the central level: “We used to have a plan of expansion”. But not a lot of effort is put into these drives. According to party representative Said, “(t)he members have increased, but slowly. We are not opening doors for members”.

Why is the Islamic Action Front not interested in making members? One reason might be the reluctance on the part of the citizens of Jordan to become involved in parties. When asked how they recruit members, the head of the women section, Kilani, states that: “It depends on our relationship… Everyone has her relationships; sometimes relatives, sometimes other societies, sometimes cultural societies, schools maybe… But it is not easy at all to come, to bring someone and to put his name and register and be a member… It is a big step for them”.

That this reluctance is spread in Jordan is witnessed also by outside observers: “(O)ver all, Jordanians are not very much interested in becoming active members of any political party”.

Regarding membership recruitment, then, the Islamic Action Front primarily resembles the ideal typical electoral party of clientelistic kind; on ideal as well as strategic level and in practice. Like in an ideal typical clientelistic party, limited efforts take place to recruit members and members are valued primarily as vote-getters. Indeed, the number of members is not

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1 Arabiyat, 18 October, 1999.
3 Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999.
4 Said, 16 October, 1999.
5 Kilani, 15 November, 1999. As we saw above, Kilani asserts that “it is easier for us to bring people, women … to work in our activities (without) … registering” (Kilani, 15 November, 1999).
6 El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999. Hourani states the same thing, and he blames the government: “(People) hesitate to attend political parties. Partly maybe because they believe that the government … (is) not encouraging” (Hourani, 5 October, 1999).
7 Membership in the Muslim Brotherhood seems to be an entirely different matter. Even if it is difficult to establish the membership-recruitment policy of the Brotherhood, as I have no direct information in this regard, it seems as members are very important for the Muslim Brotherhood, contrary to the situation in the Islamic Action Front. The recruitment-policy of
kept track of in the Islamic Action Front; this too suggests the limited importance of members.  

Table 5: Traits in the member-recruitment policy of the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member-Recruitment Policy of the Party</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ideal:

Strategy:

In practice:

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front. D: Dominating trait.

**Restrictions to Enter the Party**

When it comes to the restrictions to enter the Islamic Action Front as a member, these are very different from what is usually the case in electoral parties of ideal typical clientelistic character. In such parties there are generally no restrictions on becoming a member. In the Islamic Action Front, on the other hand, there are rather formal restrictions to enter the party as a member, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice.

In the party programme, it is stated that “(the) party comprises people

the Brothers seems to be a case of selective – and thus limited – recruitment of highly qualified members, in a way that reminds of the recruitment-policy of a total integration party. While membership in the Islamic Action Front is of little consequence, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood is all-encompassing and for life.

1 It is difficult to verify the number of members in the Islamic Action Front. Party representatives are evasive when the membership figures are asked for. Indeed, when asked about these matters, the head of the membership committee, Aweida, seems to be taken aback: “Exactly, I don’t know… Once we started, we started with 3000… (I) never got this question… (I) cannot say… Because the financial situation cannot help us to introduce cards for each member” (Aweida, 27 November, 1999). Membership figures do not seem to be important for the party leader either: “We have 23 branches in Jordan, with several thousand members… 4-5000 members…(But) our power is not in…this number. Our power is in the whole society” (Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999). Said claims that there are about 3000 members (Said, 16 October, 1999). Outside analysts El-Sherif states that “it is the largest party in Jordan today…(regarding) registered members”; however “if you want to say, how many registered and active users the Islamists have…, it is very few…(it is) mostly sympathisers” (El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999). Thus, even if there are relatively many members in the Islamic Action Front compared to other parties in the Jordanian context, they are rather few in absolute numbers. This interpretation is substantiated by outside observers Hourani, 5 October, 1999, and Abu-Rumman, 5 October, 1999.
who are committed to Islam. Those who (fulfil) … the conditions … become members”.¹ Further, the formal requirements to become a member are stated in the party programme: “Every Jordanian citizen, male or female, is accepted in the party according to the following conditions. He should be over 18 years of age, have good behaviour and morals, introduce a written application to become a member in the party through the branch where he lives or works, be recommended by two members of the Shura or administrative committees, pay the decided membership fee, or any financial fees decided, and promise to abide by the founding system of the party”.² Further it is stated that “(t)he administrative committee of the branch should recommend his acceptance (and the decision) should be accredited by the executive office. Then he makes the vow of membership in front of the administrative committee”.³ Ideally and strategically, then, the restrictions on membership are quite formal in the Islamic Action Front, resembling those in an ideal typical mass integration party.

That these formal procedures also are acted out in practice by the party is vouched for by party representatives. The head of membership organisation, Aweida, explains the actual process: “There is a central committee, and … they investigate the membership … (in) all the branches. (It) applies the laws pertaining to membership, (it) has to make sure that the persons are eligible to become a member in the party. Then the committee asks the approval of the executive bureau… And if they don’t approve, the application will be rejected. There is no discrimination when they consider a certain application. First (the prospective member) should be recommended by those who have the right to recommend … (i.e.) the members of the Shura council and the administrative committee… Even if you are moving from one branch to another, it should be all through this committee, and also resignation. To a certain extent, they can recommend to the executive bureau

¹ Party Programme of the Islamic Action Front.  
² Party Programme of the Islamic Action Front.  
³ Party Programme of the Islamic Action Front. Termination of party membership is also regulated in the party programme. In a brochure from the women’s section, its head Kilani further puts forth a number of desirable – and rather demanding – qualities in the women to be involved in the party work. They should have self-confidence and self-discipline, they should have proved themselves through previous voluntary work, they should have administrative qualifications, patience, negotiating skills and the ability to convince others, they should be knowledgeable on the political system in Jordan and the laws and legal rights for women, they should have determination and a strong will based on the faith in the work and they should have communication skills and the ability to work hard (Kilani, “Women section, Islamic Action Front”).
to accept or reject. But the final approval or rejection is from the executive bureau.

Moreover, a further requirement has to be fulfilled for a member to be involved in the party’s internal processes: It is only a “person who has carried out all his financial commitments, and who has been a member for one year (that) becomes a member in the (general) committee”. As I will return to soon, the general committee is the basic decision-making body in the party. Thus, some kind of two-tier membership seems to be present in the Islamic Action Front, even if the demands on qualification to the higher tier are not particularly difficult to meet, and indeed “(m)ost of the members are members of the general committee”.

Party membership is however not exclusive, as it is in an ideal typical total integration party. Party leader Arabiyyat contends that party membership is open for anybody: “Our membership is open for Muslim Brotherhood or any other person … even the Christians. (…). Anybody … can be a member. Muslim or non-Muslim”. Indeed, Arabiyyat states that “(w)e have Christian (members)”. Regarding restrictions to enter the party, the Islamic Action Front thus resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, which places formal – not strict – requirements on prospective members, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice.

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1 Aweida, 27 November, 1999. Said, 16 October, 1999, also explains this process.
2 This conclusion is substantiated by party leader Arabiyyat, who underlines the importance of the party branches in this process and he verifies the presence of membership dues: “(W)e have membership fees … (collected) annually” (Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999). Aweida, 27 November, 1999, states the same thing.
3 Aweida, 27 November, 1999. This requirement is not stated in the party programme.
4 Aweida, 27 November, 1999. Aweida states that the reason for these requirements is that if not a some kind of demand on long-term commitment is made “political people (will), once they hear that there is a (general) election, … become members in order to be nominated” (Aweida, 27 November, 1999).
5 Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999. Ex-Shura member Faori, 29 November, 1999, states the same thing, as does Said, 16 October, 1999.
6 Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999. Ex-Shura member Faori however disputes this fact, “no we haven’t, but (it is possible to have)” (Faori, 29 November, 1999). Interestingly, the party members must swear allegiance to Islam to become members (Party Programme of the Islamic Action Front). This requirement seems difficult to reconcile with the presence of Christian members in the party.
7 Things are different in the Muslim Brotherhood. Here, there restrictions to enter the organisation seem to be stricter than they are in the party. According to Al-Masalha “the criteria there, in the Muslim Brotherhood, (are) more severe” (Al-Masalha, 22 November,
Table 5.18. Traits in the restrictions to enter the party in the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictions to Enter the Party</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front. D: Dominating trait.

Conclusions Regarding Activities to Establish Internal Linkage

Taken together, the efforts to establish internal linkage in the Islamic Action Front present a peculiar mix of ideal typical clientelistic traits, regarding the membership recruitment policy, and ideal typical mass integration traits, regarding the restrictions to enter the party. Members are thus not particularly sought by the party, but when they are to enter the party, rather formal restrictions are placed upon them.¹

¹ The Muslim Brotherhood seems to be more unanimous regarding activities to establish internal linkage. If this organisation were a political party in its own right, it would have resembled a party of total integration when it comes to activities to establish internal linkage. In this regard, the Muslim Brotherhood however must be seen as completely separate from the Islamic Action Front, even if there are indications that most of the members of the Islamic Action Front are members of the Muslim Brotherhood as well.
Table 5:19. The full picture of the Islamic Action Front’s effort to establish internal linkage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities to Establish Internal Linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ideal: Restrictions
Strategy: Restrictions
In practice: Restrictions
Recruitment

Comment: The table presents the Islamic Action Front’s efforts to establish internal linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

None of these outcomes are wholly in line with the theoretical expectations, which predict a linkage outcome of primarily catch-all kind, following the linkage objective of predominantly catch-all kind.

However, in the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front a slight clientelistic trait is present in practice. Maybe this can account for the outcome regarding recruitment policy? The restrictions of mass integration kind in the Islamic Action Front can however not be accounted for by the linkage objective of the party. I will return to a discussion on this and the other outcomes in the concluding section of this chapter. First I will dwell on the last aspect of linkage – the efforts to maintain internal linkage.

Maintaining Internal Linkage

Activities to Maintain Internal Linkage

What activities has the Islamic Action Front designed to keep the members once they have joined the party? According to the head of the membership committee, Aweida, the activities to this effect are quite elaborate in the party – at least ideally and strategically: “(Members should) meet every other week. We have a programme, education programme, which we do. We have publications and statements of the party. And of course as Islamists, we should read the Quran. (And there) is education pertaining to the party and its literature, and Islam in general”.¹ Members are also to be active in the different campaigns of the party, “we depend (on the) work (of) our activists”.² In this sense, there thus are quite substantial similarities between

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¹ Aweida, 27 November, 1999.
the Islamic Action Front and the ideal typical mass integration party, when it comes to activities to maintain internal linkage, at least on ideal and strategic level. As in an ideal typical mass integration party, the Islamic Action Front is to provide long-term activities of not least ideological and educational character for its members.

However, this ideal and strategy is not always acted out in practice in the Islamic Action Front, as attested to by party representative Aweida: “This is the way it should be, (and) we have some branches … (which) … apply everything as it should be, and some (do so) to lesser extent, it depends… Big branches like Amman and Irbid, they have this type of organisation. Others are … they are small… The way they work, it is not the way (we) anticipate it to be. Because of their size”.1 In most branches, the activities provided for members are thus more limited.

Indeed, there is evidence pointing to the fact that the activities to maintain internal linkage in the Islamic Action Front are restricted to the more occasional campaigns, carried out primarily by the central leadership. According to party representative Said, “(w)e have many activities in the branches. Maybe financial activities, maybe information activity, we have many activities … political activities”.2 However at the same time he points out that the party is fairly new and that “(w)e are (still) building”.3 When asked if they have any ideological activities, Said states that “(u)ntil now, I think that we haven’t some of these activities”.4 Instead, he claims, the party focuses on political activities, but these mainly take place “(i)n the centre”.5 Aweida points to the same thing: “In general, the response (from the members) is weak … on daily basis. But they become active during elections”.6 Aweida regrets that the general level of engagement is low: “Unfortunately this is the reality. (We) hope in the future that there will be more response”.7 Generally, then, the members are not active on a continuous basis, even if they are more active during campaigns and in some branches.

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1 Aweida, 27 November, 1999.
3 Said, 16 October, 1999.
4 Said, 16 October, 1999.
7 Aweida, 27 November, 1999. Party member Faori, 29 November, 1999 also complains about this lack of activity. The head of the women committee, Kilani, too states the same thing regarding the women’s section (Kilani, 15 November, 1999).
Outside observers are at odds regarding the character of the activities to maintain internal linkage in the Islamic Action Front. While some outside observers note that social activities do not take place within the party, others assert that the party does provide broad activities, like education.\(^1\) It is thus difficult to draw any conclusions on the basis of these statements.

In practice, then, the activities of political and ideological character, visualised in the ideal and strategy of the party, are not acted out in practice to any greater extent in the Islamic Action Front, even if some activities of these kinds do take place. In practice, the Islamic Action Front thus predominantly resembles the ideal typical catch-all party, which is active primarily in time of elections, with activities of campaigning character.\(^2\)

### Table 5: Traits in the activities to maintain internal linkage of the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| In practice: | P | D |

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

**Performers of Activities to Maintain Internal Linkage**

As is the case regarding the activities to establish and maintain external linkage in the Islamic Action Front, it is the joint responsibility of the party’s central headquarters and its branches to perform also activities to maintain...
internal linkage, according to the ideal and strategy of the Islamic Action Front. As we saw earlier, the headquarters are to draw up the main guidelines and these are to be implemented according to local conditions by the branches. The branches are further subdivided into cells, which comprise about 15 members. In these cells, a lot of the work to maintain internal linkage is supposed to take place, not least through the weekly meetings.\(^1\) Affiliate committees, such as the women’s section, are also supposed to carry out activities to maintain internal linkage.\(^2\)

On ideal and strategic level, the Islamic Action Front is thus to present a diversified organisation, stretching nation-wide. In this organisation, branches are important, as are the even smaller cells. The presence of cells in this regard seems to indicate similarities with the ideal typical total integration party. However, in the Islamic Action Front such cells are not organised on occupational but on geographical basis, like the branches in the ideal typical mass integration party. Thus, on ideal and strategic level, the Islamic Action Front to a large extent resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, when it comes to what bodies perform the activities to maintain internal linkage.

Party representatives however dispute the actual existence of such an elaborate organisation in practice: “We had names, names, only names. In the beginning we had also ... for example the youth committee... But ... (they) not truly work”.\(^3\) Indeed, “all work is coming from the executive office. They are the people who are really working”.\(^4\) Thus, even if “all levels ... should be (equally important) ... mostly, it is the central ... committee (that is)”.\(^5\) In practice, the political activities are then carried out primarily by the party leadership in the headquarters, even if some activities are carried out in some branches, cells and committees. However, the women’s section (and presumably the other affiliate committees as well) largely fail to carry out its activities.

In this sense, the Islamic Action Front must again be characterised as largely resembling the ideal typical mass integration party, when it comes to the ideal and strategy on what bodies are to perform the activities to maintain internal linkage. In practice, however, activities are primarily carried out by

\(^1\) Aweida, 27 November, 1999.
\(^2\) Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999.
\(^3\) Kilani, 15 November, 1999.
\(^4\) Kilani, 15 November, 1999.
\(^5\) Aweida, 27 November, 1999.
the central headquarters, like in an ideal typical catch-all party, even if also other bodies are present and active to some extent, like in an ideal typical mass integration party.1

Table 5.21. Traits regarding the performer of the activities to maintain internal linkage of the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performer</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td></td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

Mode of Intra-Party Communication

How does the intra-party communication work in the Islamic Action Front, i.e. how are elections carried out within the party and how does other intra-party communications take place? This is what I will discuss here, in the concluding section on the linkage outcome of the Islamic Action Front.

The party programme is very elaborate when it comes to outlining the way in which the party internal communication is to take place in the Islamic Action Front, not least regarding the party internal elections.2 For most parts, the ideal and strategy, as outlined in the party programme, is also carried out in practice, according to party representatives.3

In the party programme, it is stated that the party-internal elections start from the lowest level of the party – the members. The totality of the members forms the general council or committee of the party. In practice, it is however not enough to be a member to participate in these elections. The member must also have fulfilled his/her financial requirements and must

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1 In the Muslim Brotherhood, the encompassing activities that serve to maintain the internal linkage are carried out mostly by the local branches, but also by the central leadership. It is the branches that organise large parts of the members’ lives (Al-Kofahi, 18 November, 1999). In this sense, the Muslim Brotherhood is similar to the ideal typical mass integration party.

2 Party programme of the Islamic Action Front. These procedures are also presented in Hourani, 1993: 34-54.

have been a member for more than one year.¹

The basic idea is that the general council or committee (which only meets in the form of the general committees in the branches, and once a year if there are no exceptional meetings) is the highest decision-making body in the party *de jure*, i.e. ideally and strategically. The general committee elects the *Shura* (advisory, consultative) council. In practice, *de facto*, it is the *Shura* which is the highest decision-making body in the party, as the general council as a rule endorses the general policies recommended by the *Shura* council.

The *Shura* council consists of 120 members and is elected by proportional representation from the branches every 4 years; it meets every 6 months if there are no exceptional meetings.

If the members are more than 1000 (which they are), the members elect a general assembly which carries out the role of the general committee or council, i.e. the general assembly elects the *Shura* council. The general assembly (which meets once a year) not only consists of members elected from the branches, but of other representatives as well. More specifically, the general assembly consists of members of the *Shura* council, the members of parliament from the party, members of the administrative committees representing the branches and elected representatives from the branches.

The *Shura* council, elected from the general assembly, takes all the important decisions in the party. This is the case in practice, even if the decisions are to be formally approved by the general assembly or general committee. The *Shura* council further elects the president of the *Shura* and the secretary general of the party (every 2 years).

The daily matters of the party are taken care of by the executive office, which consists of the secretary general (who is the president of the office) and 12 members who (like the secretary general) are elected every other year from the *Shura* council; the executive office meets once a week (minimum).²

The general committee of the branch, i.e. the totality of members in

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¹ Aweida, 27 November, 1999.
² The executive office further elects the deputy for the secretary general and the secretary general for administrative affairs, who takes care of the secretariat; it also appoints the temporary and permanent committees and the different heads of the different committees in the party, and it decides on the establishment of new branches (Aweida, 27 November, 1999). According to Aweida, the head of the committee then appoints the members of the committee, who are then to be approved by the executive office (Aweida, 27 November, 1999). Kilani however disputes this view. According to her, in the women committee, “all the women, they elect this executive (head)”, the head is thus not appointed (Kilani, 15 November, 1999).
the branches (including women), not only (indirectly) elects the leadership at the central level; it also elects the administrative committees for the branches, which take care of the daily affairs of the branch.\footnote{The administrative committee for the branch consists of 7 members, and is elected every other year; within itself the administrative committee selects the leadership of the branch. The general committee of the branch (meeting once a year) also issues decisions that are abiding, once they are approved by the executive office.}

The branch is then further subdivided into geographically based cells, and each cell “has someone in charge…; the party organisation committee in the branch, they select him”.\footnote{Aweida, 27 November, 1999.} At this level, it is thus not a case of election.

Thus, ideally, strategically and in practice, there are two main levels of organisation in the Islamic Action Front – the branches and the central level, and the members in the branches elect the positions on the central level.

As stated above, party representatives claim that these procedures also are carried out in practice.\footnote{Arabiyyat, 18 October, 1999, Said, 16 October, 1999, Aweida, 27 November, 1999, and Kilani, 15 November, 1999.} On a general level, outside observers agree that the internally democratic ideal and strategy is carried out in practice in the Islamic Action Front. According to Shteiwi, “it is a strong, large party… They cannot run things without democratic procedures. There are democratic procedures… (T)hey elect people … (even if) the party does not abide by this all the time… And sometimes they go to the roots and have them elect people in their area so they can run for their positions”.\footnote{Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999.} Shteiwi however asserts that this practice is common also in other contexts in Jordan: “Tribes do that as well” (Shteiwi, 17 November, 1999). Outside observer Fakhuri too contends that “(t)hey have their inside elections (in which) their members (participate). In a democratic way … (I)f you are strong, you can be democratic… Because they are strong, and they want to look … democratic in front of (the) media, in front of (the) government. It is not the decision of the leaders only, it is the decision of the grass-roots, the members” (Fakhuri, 25 September, 1999). El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999, states the same thing.

However, some peculiarities are reported as well. Not least an influence from the Muslim Brotherhood on the internal workings of the Islamic Action Front is suggested by Hourani et al.\footnote{Hourani et al make some interesting notes about the very first elections to the Shura council of the Islamic Action Front (which was to be elected by the founding members): “The Shura council elections, which were initially enthusiastically entered into by all, eventually resulted in a clash between Muslim Brotherhood members and independents. The independents subsequently resigned from the party in strong protest against the final election results. (---) The results of the Shura council elections dealt a serious blow to independents. They considered the landslide victory of the Muslim Brotherhood to be a breach of their pre-
Nofal too claims that decisions in the Islamic Action Front are largely orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Outside observers Shteiwi and El-Sherif suggest the same thing, but underline that democratic procedures dominate in the Islamic Action Front. There are also others (like ex-Shura member Faori) who claim that there are serious deficiencies in the way the party internal elections in the Islamic Action Front are carried out. When asked about the degree of internal democracy in the party, Faori laughs and says: “It is a male democracy… It looks (good) … theoretically … (According to law, there should be democracy) but they don’t abide by it and there is no monitoring (of) the system … (instead) it is very personal”.

Thus, there are indications of less democratic traits in the internal elections of the Islamic Action Front in practice. For most parts, however, internally democratic procedures dominate.

When it comes to internal elections in the Islamic Action Front, it is thus evident that there generally are good and recurrent opportunities for the members in the branches to, through elections, have a say in who will be their representatives on branch as well as on central level. Regarding procedures for intra-party elections, the Islamic Action Front thus to a great extent resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, at least ideally and strategically. Just like this type of party, the Islamic Action Front has elections to different levels, starting at the lowest level. Such elections take place in practice too, according to party representatives and outside observers, even if non-democratic traits also are reported.

As to other party-internal communications, these seem also to be well provided for in the Islamic Action Front, at least ideally and strategically. The Shura council and the leadership of the party are supposed to be in constant touch with the branches on different matters, according to the ideal and the strategy. These contacts also take place in practice, according to party representatives. According to Said, for example, “(t)he relations between the centre and the branches is very strong, so we collect members of electoral agreement and a breach of the Islamic Action Front’s commitment to pluralism… Dr Ishaq Farhan, … secretary general, refuted the accusations of the resigned independents and said that “the elections were executed in a democratic and civilised manner and according to the party’s regulations”’ (Hourani et al, 1993: 42-50).

1 Nofal, 18 October, 1999.
3 Faori, 29 November, 1999.
4 Still, the number of women, for example, is low in elected bodies at the central level; at the time of the investigation there were but 3 women in the Shura council, “and we need more” (Arabiyat, 18 October, 1999).
At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties

the committees in the branches every month and we (give) them … (the) decisions issued by the centre”.¹

Even if this communication seems rather one–way, or top–down, Aweida claims that this not necessarily is the case: “It is an exchange of visits … between them (at the central level) and … the branches and its leaders. Either they go there or they come here to the centre to exchange … (ideas). (T)hey discuss the issues and how to (deal with them)”² Indeed, the centre relies on information from the branches to make correct decisions.³ It is emphasised that “(i)f the decisions involve the local status … it is independent… (I)f there are decisions related to the general status of the country, naturally it will be a united attitude… We have a master plan for all (workers) and we have a sub-plan for each … city”.⁴ Then, “each (branch) according to their capabilities (and) resources … introduce their own plan… (They will) decide the means that will suit … (the) branch”⁵

It is also emphasised by party representatives that a member at any time can contact any member of the Shura council, if he has an issue to raise. Further, the committees at the central level sometimes have a corresponding committee at the branch level and the two exchange opinions.⁶ Each committee is to have “its own plan (based on the central) guidelines … and they (are to) … follow the plan and give reports (on) … their activities”.⁷

The committees on branch level are however often temporary and they are, as we have seen, largely inactive. Primarily two committees seem to be established and have some continuous activities at branch level, even if the level of activity leaves a lot to be wanted in the eyes of the party; the membership committee and the women’s committee.⁸ According to the head

¹ Said, 16 October, 1999.
⁵ Aweida, 27 November, 1999.
⁶ Arabiyat, 18 October, 1999.
⁷ Arabiyat, 18 October, 1999.
⁸ Aweida, 27 November, 1999, Kilani, 15 November, 1999. There are different opinions on how the women are organised in the party. Whereas party member Faori claims that women are organised “only in the women’s committee”, and thus separately from the men, former party member Al-Omoush claims that membership "is collective, they gather together... because in the party law in general in Jordan, there is no distinction between women and men and the Islamic Action Front abide by the party regulations” (Faori, 29 November, 1999, Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999). Also other party representatives as well as party documents refer to a joint membership (Aweida, 27 November, 1999, Said, 16 October, 1999, Party Programme, Kilani, 15 November, 1999). However, women only seem to be active through
of the women’s committee, Kilani, the central level however has “direct connections” with the committees in the branches.\(^1\) While the committees in branches are responsible for their activities, still the main activities are carried out at the central level: “We decide in the centre and in our area and in the branch they decide in the branch”.\(^2\)

There are also contacts between the different committees at the different levels. Regarding at least the women’s committee at the central level, this has “much connection with the executive office” at the central level.\(^3\) According to the head of the women’s committee, Kilani, “(we) listen to each other… Sometimes they encourage (our activities), sometimes they say ‘better not to do it’. We discuss if we do not agree, and every activity that we … do, it should be … approved by the executive office”.\(^4\) However, Kilani, vouches for the basic freedom of the committees, claiming that committees “they have free decisions, to make free activities … (since) (e)very committee has its own situations”.\(^5\) The work of the committees is therefore not entirely directed from the central leadership, even if the party headquarters issue general guidelines.

Regarding the regular internal communication in the Islamic Action Front, this is thus of continuous and reciprocal character between lower and higher party levels and between different organs at the same level, just as in an ideal typical party of mass integration, at least ideally and strategically. In practice too there are continuous communications of the foreseen kind, if not to the degree desired.

Ideally, strategically and in practice, the Islamic Action Front then primarily resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, when it comes to its internal communication. However, there are also indications of less democratic traits. Interestingly, these are of a kind not included in the ideal

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\(^1\) Kilani, 15 November, 1999.
\(^2\) Kilani, 15 November, 1999.
\(^3\) Kilani, 15 November, 1999.
\(^4\) Kilani, 15 November, 1999.
\(^5\) Kilani, 15 November, 1999.
types here utilised for comparison, as there in the Islamic Action Front are indications of domination of an external body (the Muslim Brotherhood). Thus, this trait – which is present but not dominating – in the Islamic Action Front, cannot be fit into the table.

Table 5.22. Traits in the mode of intra-party communication in the Islamic Action Front.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Intra-Party Communication</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Islamic Action Front. D: Dominating trait.

Conclusions Regarding Activities to Maintain Internal Linkage

In summary, the Islamic Action Front seems to present similarities primarily to the ideal typical mass integration party type, when it comes to its efforts to maintain internal linkage, especially on ideal and strategic level. Ideally and strategically, the Islamic Action Front aims at providing a wide range of activities for its members, performed by different kinds of bodies; ideally and strategically the party should also be internally democratic, with constant two-way communication between higher and lower levels.

In practice, another picture prevails. While there are some indications that certain activities to maintain internal linkage of mass integration kind in fact are carried out – at least by some parts of the organisation, the dominating picture is that the level of activity aimed at maintaining internal linkage is rather low in the Islamic Action Front in practice, at least on lower levels. No (or next to no) other activities than campaigning activities in times of election and irregular contacts with the central party leadership are carried out by many branches of the party. The central leadership is however quite active.

Regarding activities to maintain internal linkage and the bodies performing these, the Islamic Action Front thus dominantly resembles the ideal typical catch-all party in practice, even if some traits of mass integration kind are present. Regarding intra-party communication, mass integration traits dominate, even if there are suggestions of other, less
Chapter 5: Explaining the Linkage of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front

Table 5.23. The full picture of the Islamic Action Front’s effort to maintain internal linkage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities to Maintain Internal Linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>IAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>Activities, performer, intra-party communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>Intra-party communication</td>
<td>Activities, performer, intra-party communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the Islamic Action Front’s efforts to maintain internal linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

Returning to the theoretical expectations, we may thus conclude that regarding the efforts to maintain internal linkage, these expectations are largely thwarted – especially on ideal and strategic level – in the Islamic Action Front. Quite contrary to the theoretical expectations, which on the basis of the linkage objective predict catch-all traits, mass integration traits dominate when it comes to the efforts to maintain internal linkage on ideal and strategic level, and regarding the internal communication in practice. We will soon discuss this outcome.

Regarding activities in practice, and what bodies perform these, outcomes are however in line with the theoretical expectations on the basis of the linkage objective. Just as expected, the Islamic Action Front presents catch-all traits in these regards.

Summarising the Linkage Outcome of the Islamic Action Front

The time has now come to summarise the way in which the Islamic Action Front organises its political linkage – from its linkage objective and its motivation, to its linkage outcome in different aspects, regarding the efforts to establish and maintain the external and internal linkage.

According to its linkage objective, the Islamic Action Front is a party primarily aiming at catching as many votes as possible, just like an ideal
typical catch-all party, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice – even if there are traits also of an ideal typical clientelistic kind in practice.

On the basis of the theoretical expectations, such a linkage objective would follow primarily from the old electoral system. However, as we have seen, party representatives do not claim to be influenced by the old electoral system. Instead, they more than anything claim to be influenced by the orientation of the party (of mass integration kind; motivation), not by institutions. Thus, in the Islamic Action Front, an orientation of mass integration kind leads to a linkage objective of catch-all kind, in a way that is not expected by the models.

Institutional arrangements in Jordan are thus not particularly important for promoting the linkage objective of catch-all kind in the Islamic Action Front. However, the new Single Non Transferable Vote system seems (at least so some extent) influential in making for clientelistic traits in the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front.

The theoretical models in the form they are outlined in this context thus largely fail to explain the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front. However, if the theoretical models were modified so that an orientation of mass integration kind is regarded as leading to a linkage objective of primarily catch-all kind, it would be applicable in this case. But what does the linkage outcome of the Islamic Action Front look like? Does it support such a modified model?

Moving on to the linkage outcome of the Islamic Action Front, it has been established that the party it its efforts to establish external linkage primarily resembles an ideal typical catch-all party regarding the activities and the target of those activities – on ideal and strategic level, as well as in practice. However, regarding the performer of those activities, a different situation is at hand – in this respect, the Islamic Action Front resembles the ideal typical mass integration party on ideal and strategic level, while it is similar to the ideal typical catch-all party in practice.

For most parts, the modified theoretical model thus applies when it comes to the efforts to establish external linkage; the orientation of mass integration kind results in a linkage objective of catch-all kind, which in turn results in a catch-all linkage outcome in many (but not all) aspects.

If the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood is added to the outreaching

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\[1\] Indeed, there might be some basis of such a modification in the theoretical model itself. After all, the historical mass integration party wanted to win elections, even if this objective – ideal typically – is subordinate to the objective of integration of members into the party.
efforts of the Islamic Action Front, a totally different picture emerges, however. The linkage efforts to establish external linkage of the Islamic Action Front in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood to a large extent resemble those of an ideal typical mass integration party. Even if the matter is not studied explicitly here (as it is the Islamic Action Front that is the main focus of study, not the Muslim Brotherhood) such an outcome probably is in line with a linkage objective of mass integration kind, stemming in a mass integration orientation on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this sense, the outcomes would be in line with the theoretical model.

The Islamic Action Front presents largely the same linkage outcome regarding its efforts to maintain external linkage as it does regarding efforts to establish it. Thus, it resembles the ideal typical catch-all party when it comes to the activities to maintain external linkage and the target of those activities, ideally, strategically and in practice. It resembles the mass integration party regarding what bodies perform these activities on ideal and strategic level. In practice, however, performers are of catch-all kind.

Again, the modified theoretical model suggested thus applies; the orientation of mass integration kind results in a linkage objective of catch-all kind, which in turn results in an outcome of largely catch-all kind.

Again, the picture changes as the Muslim Brotherhood is introduced into it. The efforts of the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood in conjunction to maintain external linkage to a large extent resembles those of an ideal typical mass integration party, something which then also probably is in line with the theoretical expectations in this case.

The linkage outcome in the Islamic Action Front changes dramatically as we move onto the internal linkage of the party. Regarding the efforts to establish internal linkage, a mixed picture is presented; both mass integration traits and clientelistic traits appear, on ideal and strategic level and in practice. Obviously, this outcome is not in line with the theoretical expectations. I will return to a discussion on what can account for this outcome in the last section of this chapter.

Regarding the efforts to maintain internal linkage, the pattern again changes; here traits of mass integration type dominate on ideal and strategic level, when it comes to what activities are carried out and who performs them. Regarding the mode of the internal communication, mass integration traits not only dominate on ideal and strategic level, but also in practice. However, regarding the activities to maintain internal linkage and the performer of those activities, these are of catch-all kind in practice in the
Islamic Action Front.

Theoretically, this is a difficult outcome to account for. In some parts, the modified theoretical model – according to which a mass integration orientation leads to a catch-all objective and catch-all linkage outcome – applies; regarding activities and performer of the activities to maintain internal linkage in practice. These activities and performers are of catch-all kind and are thus accounted for by the linkage objective of catch-all kind. However, regarding the rest of the outcome in this respect, the catch-all linkage objective either seems to matter little, or to lead in an unexpected, mass integration direction. I will discuss how we are to account for this – and other – outcomes in the concluding section of this chapter.

Taken together, the Islamic Action Front considered by itself then primarily resembles the ideal typical catch-all party type regarding its external linkage, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice, even if some mass integration traits are present (particularly regarding the performers on ideal and strategic level). In many aspects, the mass integration traits thus co-exist with the catch-all party traits, even if it is the latter ones that dominate. However, when it comes to outlining the internal linkage of the Islamic Action Front, the picture becomes more complex; here, primarily mass integration traits dominate, along with certain clientelistic and catch-all traits – ideally, strategically and in practice.

Whereas the external linkage outcome of the Islamic Action Front may be accounted for by a modified theoretical model, according to which a mass integration kind of orientation leads to a catch-all linkage objective, which in turn results in a catch-all linkage outcome, this is more difficult regarding the internal linkage outcome of the party. I will end this chapter by discussing how these outcomes may be explained.

**Applying the Party-Centred and Institutional Explanations**

In the case of the Islamic Action Front, theoretical expectations based on party-centred factors predict a linkage objective and linkage outcome of mass integration kind (if the orientation and the origin, background and experiences of the party are focused) and a linkage objective and linkage outcome of clientelistic kind (if the societal setting of the party is focused). Theoretical expectations based on institutional arrangements predict a catch-all kind of linkage objective and linkage outcome if the old (Block Vote)
election system is focused, whereas they predict a clientelistic linkage objective and outcome if the present (Single Non Transferable Vote) electoral system is focused, and a mixed linkage objective and linkage outcome of mass integration and catch-all kind if the legal regulations are focused. In this context, it must however be noted that legal regulations primarily are regarded as counteracting the work of political parties.

However, presence of “explanatory factors” and corresponding “linkage objectives” is not enough here. To be able to claim that the explanatory factors indeed influence the linkage objective in place, this influence has to take place “in the right way”. Party representatives must thus refer to the explanatory factors in their motivations.

In the Islamic Action Front, party representatives claim to be primarily motivated by their orientation, which is of mass integration kind. Just like in a mass integration party, the Islamic Action Front wants to reform society at its base by using parliamentary methods. An orientation of mass integration kind thus results in a linkage objective of primarily catch-all kind in the Islamic Action Front, which in turn results in an outcome of largely catch-all kind. This is quite contrary to the theoretical expectations.

As has been discussed earlier, the party-centred theoretical model might however be modified. Thus, an orientation of mass integration kind could be construed to result in a linkage objective of dominantly catch-all kind, which in turn leads to a linkage outcome of largely catch-all kind.

Such a model would explain certain features in the linkage outcome of the Islamic Action Front. But it would not apply in all aspects of the linkage outcome. As we have seen, the Islamic Action Front primarily present catch-all linkage in the activities to establish and maintain external linkage, and the target of those activities (on ideal and strategic level, and in practice).

When it comes to the more organisational side of linkage – regarding what part of the organisation is to perform activities, regarding who is admitted to the organisation as members and how the party internal communication takes place – the Islamic Action Front presents traits of mass integration kind, especially on ideal and strategic level. In some instances, these mass integration traits are also realised in practice, such as regarding membership requirements and intra-party communication.

These features do not follow from the linkage objective of the party, at least not in the way expected. In some respects, particularly regarding the mass integration traits in the party-internal communication, there are however reasons to suspect influences from the legal regulations. Party
representatives of the Islamic Action Front claim to follow the legal regulations on parties in general. These regulations thus seem to influence the linkage outcome directly, without being channelled via the linkage objective. Like in the Virtue Party, there are thus reasons to believe that the legal regulations on political parties in Jordan to some extent affect at least aspects of the internal organisation of the Islamic Action Front directly, without being mediated via the linkage objective.\(^1\)

However, it cannot be excluded that these mass integration traits in the organisational aspects of the linkage should be attributed also to other factors. Maybe they are seen as promoting electoral success, as electoral success is something that is aimed for by the party? In that case, a linkage objective of catch-all kind would lead to a linkage outcome of mass integration kind in certain, especially organisational, respects (cp. the Virtue Party). Maybe the mass integration traits in the Islamic Action Front should be attributed to the orientation of the party, or maybe to the religious factor? In that case, the orientation would affect the linkage outcome of the party in these aspects, without being mediated via the linkage objective. I will return to this discussion in the concluding chapter of the study (Chapter 8).

In other aspects, organisational features do take on traits of catch-all kind in practice in the Islamic Action Front, in line with the (modified) theoretical model, regarding performer of activities to establish and maintain external linkage. In these cases, these features can be derived from the linkage objective of primarily catch-all kind.

In some respects, institutional influences also do take place in the expected manner in the Islamic Action Front. The presence of clientelistic traits regarding the target of the external linkage efforts are to some extent attributed to institutional factors by party representatives, who feel that the present electoral system makes for specialisation and not broad approaches.\(^2\) Also the societal setting is regarded as making for certain clientelistic traits in the Islamic Action Front. Thus, the societal setting seems to work in conjunction with the electoral system in making for at least some clientelistic

\(^1\) The ambiguity on the position of women in the party may also be a result of legal regulations. Legal regulations assume a joint membership of men and women in parties. In the Islamic Action Front such a joint membership seem to be formally in place (and the legal regulations are referred to as causing it), even if the women carry out most of their activities in the women committee (Al-Omoush, 11 October, 1999). The formal organisation in this regard thus seems to be a direct consequence of the legal regulations, not mediated via the linkage objective.

\(^2\) Abu Baker, 8 June, 2003. Also the need to emphasise tribal factors is due to the electoral system, according to Abu Baker.
traits in the Islamic Action Front.

In this context, an interesting ambivalence with it comes to members in the Islamic Action Front can further be noted. On the one hand, members are not recruited actively and regarded primarily as vote-getters, as in an ideal typical clientelistic party. On the other hand, quite formal restrictions are placed on members and they are allowed a substantial influence in the party internal elections, like in an ideal typical mass integration party. This indeed seems to be a paradox.

In solving this paradox, the close relation between the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood have probably to be taken into account. Arguably, it is new members that are not actively sought and that are regarded as vote-getters. Old members, who are likely to be members of the Muslim Brotherhood as well, are more highly regarded and given an influential role in the party organisation. Again, the linkage of the Islamic Action Front cannot be fully understood if not its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood are taken into account, something that I will return to shortly.

In treating new members in a clientelistic way, the Islamic Action Front may thus be influenced by the societal as well as the institutional setting, in line with the theoretical models.

On the basis of these findings, we may thus attempt an explanation of the linkage outcome of the Islamic Action Front: In the Islamic Action Front, an orientation of mass integration kind results in a linkage objective of largely catch-all kind – the party primarily wants to win many votes in elections – even if clientelistic traits are present in the linkage objective as well. This linkage objective in turn results in linkage activities and target of largely catch-all kind on ideal as well as strategic level and in practice. At the same time, the linkage organisation in the Islamic Action Front is of largely mass integration kind on ideal and strategic level and to some extent in practice, even if traits of electoral kind dominate in practice.

In other words, the Islamic Action Front is motivated by its ambition to reform society at its base. To achieve this, the party primarily aims at gaining as many votes as possible in elections. To be successful in elections, primarily the party leadership plans and carries out campaigning activities.

However, the organisational set-up of the Islamic Action Front cannot be explained on the basis of this reasoning if the basic theoretical model is to be followed. Instead, the organisational features (particularly the party internal organisation) seem at least partly to be explained by institutional factors in a direct, unmediated way. Efficiency concerns and the orientation
of the party cannot be discarded in this context, either. As the bodies performing activities in the Islamic Action Front in practice primarily are of catch-all kind, there are however reasons to believe that this is a result of the electoral linkage objective, and thus in line with the modified party-centred model.

But do not the other party-centred explanatory factors matter in this context, i.e. the origin, background and experiences of the party? Indeed, these factors do not seem to be important in explaining the linkage outcome of the Islamic Action Front. Even if there are, as we have seen, elements of linkage of mass integration kind in the Islamic Action Front, as there would be according to the model on the basis of the origin, background and experiences of the party, party representatives do not refer to these factors in relation to the linkage outcome of the Islamic Action Front. Therefore, these factors do not seem do influence this linkage outcome directly to any greater extent, even if some influence from them cannot be excluded.\(^1\)

The explanation of linkage in the Islamic Action Front can thus be summarised in the following figure.

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**Figure 5.4. Relation between explanatory factors, linkage objective and motivation and linkage outcome in the Islamic Action Front.**

1 In this context, it should be noted that the performers of mass integration kind on ideal and strategic level in the outreach activities, the membership restrictions of mass integration kind, and the activities and performer of mass integration kind in the efforts to maintain internal linkage have been largely unaccounted for by the preconceived and the modified models. I have however discussed how these traits may be explained.
Comment: Relation expressed in **bold** characters is in line with the theoretical expectations. Relation expressed in ordinary characters is not in line with the theoretical expectations. Relation expressed in *bold italics* is a suggested relation, (largely) in line with the theoretical expectations. Relation expressed in *ordinary italics* is a suggested relation, not in line with the theoretical expectations.
All along in this chapter, we have witnessed how the image of the linkage efforts of the Islamic Action Front changes when the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood are included. If the Islamic Action Front is viewed in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood – and there are good reasons to do so – a next to ideal typical mass integration type of pattern emerges: A party and a social organisation in close collaboration provide political as well as ideological and social activities, not least for their members. One difference from the ideal typical mass integration type would be that at least the Islamic Action Front generally pursues a broad approach – it reaches out the population at large, in a way that the mass integration party does not.

The efforts of the Islamic movement (i.e. the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood in conjunction) further seem to be largely in line with the theoretical expectations. Even if the linkage objective and motivation of the Muslim Brotherhood have not been studied directly in this context, as these were not the object of study, there are reasons to believe that they are of mass integration kind, i.e. that the Muslim Brotherhood aims at drawing the masses in order to reform society (in line with its orientation). In the Islamic movement as a whole, an orientation of mass integration kind thus presumably leads to a linkage objective of mass integration kind, which in turn results in a linkage outcome of largely mass integration kind. Thus, the original party-theoretical model – focusing the orientation of the party – would largely apply if the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood are viewed in conjunction.

However, at a basic level, the division of work in the Islamic movement in Jordan is also to a certain extent the result of institutional factors, such as the legal regulations in place. To be able to carry out the activities desired, the Islamic movement has felt a need to divide into two: One political branch: the Islamic Action Front, and one social movement: the Muslim Brotherhood (even if the close collaboration between a party and a social movement is against the law). Had the institutions looked in a different way, the Islamic movement in Jordan perhaps would also have looked differently; perhaps it would have acted in one unified body, which would then probably have organised largely as an ideal typical mass integration party, even if it probably had directed itself to all. In this manner, then, institutional factors in a particular way can be said to have made for the specific linkage outcome in the Islamic Action Front. More precisely, they have made the Islamic Action Front focus on campaigning activities of catch-all kind (leaving other, more social tasks, to the Muslim Brotherhood).
Still, the basic reason for the Islamic Action Front (and probably the Muslim Brotherhood) to organise the way they do is that they want to reform society in line with their orientation, not to act in line with the institutions.

Looking at the Islamic movement as a whole, its particular organisation is thus influenced both by its orientation and by the institutions in place – the particular linkage outcome is in all likelihood a result of the linkage objective, which in turn is a result of the orientation, whereas the division into one political and one social branch to a certain extent is a result of the institutions at hand.
CHAPTER 6

EXPLAINING THE LINKAGE OF THE PAKISTANI PARTY OF ISLAM (Jamaat-i Islami)

The turn has now come to the last case in this study: Pakistan and the Party of Islam. As before, the chapter starts by outlining the Pakistani societal setting in general and the origin, background, experiences and the orientation of the Party of Islam, followed by the Pakistani institutional setting regarding electoral system and legal regulations for parties. On the basis of this information, it can be determined what theoretical models may be applied in this context. The chapter then proceeds to examine in detail the political linkage of the Party of Islam and it ends by drawing the theoretical conclusions.

The Pakistani Political Context

Societal Setting in the Pakistani Context

Pakistan is a country with a difficult societal situation. It is a country with a large, generally very poor population, living on very low levels of subsistence. Even if Pakistan at times has enjoyed a high level of economic development, there are only few, rich people that have been able to reap the rewards of this development. The cleavages between the rich and the poor in Pakistan are enormous and the income-distribution is heavily skewed.

Pakistan is further a country where the state has not been able to provide its population with satisfying levels of education, security and

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1 I here regard the situation in Pakistan as it was until the military take-over on 12 October, 1999. At that time, the parliament was dismissed and the Constitution was suspended. Despite the military take-over, both representatives of the Party of Islam and political analysts claim that the political parties were allowed to work in much the same way as they had been before the take-over (even if that was not formally the case), at the time of the main fieldwork for this study, which took place in the spring of 2000 (a shorter spell of fieldwork took place in 1999). In anticipation of the October 2002 elections, new regulations on the organisation and activities of political parties were issued (www.ecp.gov.pk); these are however of no consequence here, as it is the (de facto) situation at the time of the fieldwork that is under study.

2 In 1998, the country had a population of around 132 million people, in 2003 it was exceeding 149 million (www.statpak.gov.pk, devdata.worldbank.org, Pakistan Data Profile).
welfare schemes. Even if there are private alternatives, especially in urban areas, the main locus of security and welfare in Pakistan remains the extended family and a particularistic outlook prevails in society. Education is, for example, a constitutional right for all citizens, but it is not compulsory and many children (also among those registered) do not go to school. One result of this is a very high rate of illiteracy.¹

Most Pakistanis, about two thirds of the population, live on the countryside and agriculture is the economic foundation on which the Pakistani society rests. The agricultural industry is largely organised in a feudal manner – a big landowner has many peasants working for him. This system makes the peasants wholly dependent on the landowner for their livelihood. It is further not unusual for the landowner to be a politician, or to have close connections with one. In accordance with the feudal logic that reigns, the landowner thus relies on the votes of his peasants, while they are under his patronage. Such clientelistic practices are very common in the Pakistani political context, even if they are prohibited by law. Interest-based politics is therefore largely absent and politics is something that is carried out by an elite of very powerful and rich people, while the great mass has little political influence.

However, not all Pakistanis live on the countryside. About one third of the population lives in the cities and “(m)illions … are migrating from the countryside to the major cities in search of jobs”; a rapid urbanisation thus takes place, especially to the big cities of Karachi and Lahore.² In the cities, the industry – which is primarily focused on textile-production – is largely located. This industry is for the most part concentrated in the hands of a few, very rich and powerful, industrialists, who – like the big landowners – often go into politics.³ The big industrialists often have a similar hold over their workers, as landowners have over their peasants. The workers depend upon

¹ According to governmental statistics based on the 1998 census, 42.7 per cent of people 15 years or older are literate in Pakistan (55.3 per cent of the men and 29 per cent of the women) (www.finance.gov.pk, 1999). According to the World Bank, 58.4 per cent of the Pakistani population aged 15 and over was illiterate in 1998 (devdata.worldbank.org, Pakistan Data Profile). However, according to local analysts, there are reasons to believe that these figures are overstated. There are figures speaking about such low rates of literacy as 25 per cent – and even 15 per cent (cp. e.g. Ziauddin, 20 February, 1999, (claiming that 26-27 per cent are literate) and Waseem, 7 April, 2000, (contending that only 17 per cent of the Pakistani are literate)).


³ Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister at the time of the military take-over in 1999, is the prime example of an industrialist turned politician.
the industrialist, and therefore support him in elections.

At the time of the fieldwork for this study, the media – particularly the press – played an important role in the political life of Pakistan. Despite the self-censorship, the press was regarded as considerably freer than the television, and party politics were abundantly discussed in papers.\(^1\) There are many newspapers in Pakistan, most of them are in Urdu while a few – politically influential papers – are in English. However, as the general public is largely illiterate papers only reach a limited audience. While the press is a useful means for parties to reach the intellectuals and middle classes, it is less useful in the poor and illiterate areas.

Ethnically, Pakistan is a very heterogeneous country and the ethnic identity is often stronger than the national identity among the Pakistanis. There are several different ethnic groups, which speak different languages, making up the population of Pakistan.\(^2\) Also religiously, there are substantial cleavages. While there are small groups of Hindus, Christians, Buddhists and Zoroastrians in Pakistan, 95-97 per cent of the Pakistani population are Muslims.\(^3\) There is however a deep cleavage between Sunni and Shia Muslims in Pakistan.\(^4\)

On the basis of this outline, it can be established that Pakistan presents a next to ideal typical model of a societal setting that breeds clientelistic parties, according to the model. Pakistan presents a case of feudal, pre-modern practices in rural areas as well as rapid modernisation, urbanisation and industrialisation in cities. In Pakistan, the society is further severely heterogeneous, the state-administered welfare is limited at best and a particularistic outlook prevails. Despite the fact that mass media – in particular the press – is used for party political discussion, traits that make

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\(^{1}\) This has however not always been the case. During the periods of military rule, the freedom of the media has often been curbed and during periods of parliamentary rule legal fights between the government and the press have been common (cp. e.g. Abbas, 4 April, 2000, Ziauddin, 20 February, 1999). The television market in Pakistan is dominated by the Pakistan Television Corporation, which is state run and largely coloured by the government in power. However, there are also private channels, like the Shalimar Television Network.

\(^{2}\) Punjabis (about 60 per cent), Sindhis (about 10 per cent), Pashtuns/Pathans (about 10 per cent), Mohajirs (about 7 per cent), Baluchis (about 5 per cent) and other minorities (about 8 per cent). While Urdu is the national language of Pakistan, together with English, it is the mother tongue for only about 7 per cent of the population (not least Mohajirs) (www.landguiden.se).


\(^{4}\) The figures on how many belong to the different religious groups vary, but figures often cited are that about 80 per cent of the Muslims are Sunni and about 20 per cent of the Muslims are Shia (www.landguiden.se).
Table 6.1. Expectations on the basis of the societal setting of Pakistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic context</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
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</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the societal setting in Pakistan, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation.

The Origin, Background and Experiences of the Party of Islam

The Party of Islam was founded in 1941 by (Maulana) Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi. The main objective of this organisation was then to create a body of devoted, believing Muslims, who were ready to work for a revival of Islam. During its first years, the organisation was active in Pathankot, India. When partition took place, in 1947, Maududi moved to Lahore in Pakistan, where he re-established the party. The Party of Islam was the first Islamist party in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and as an Islamist party it is favoured by the Constitution.¹

The political history of the Party of Islam, as that of Pakistan itself, is chequered. The political history of Pakistan is a history of (failed) attempts at democratic and parliamentary rule, frequently interrupted by military coups and wars with India.²

At independence, Pakistan was under parliamentary rule, but in 1958, the military took over and all political parties were banned. In 1962, a new Constitution was drawn up, the parties were restored, and presidential elections took place in 1965. Martial law was however again introduced in 1969, but in December 1970, the first free, general parliamentary elections were held. In 1971, civil war broke out as Bangladesh, or East-Pakistan,

¹ The Islamic character of Pakistan is established in the first paragraph of the preamble of the 1973 Constitution. Part 9 of the Constitution further deals with Islamic Provisions. There it is for example stated that “(a)ll existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam” (article 227). A general note in this context is that no party in Pakistan thus is or indeed can be against Islam. It is stated in the Political Parties Act of 1962, that a political party is prohibited to form if its object is to propagate any opinion or acting in any manner prejudicial to the Islamic ideology. However, these regulations do not make all Pakistani parties Islamist, as defined here. A party may not be against Islam, but it does not need to work for the introduction of an Islamic system, and hence be Islamist.

² Wars with India have been waged on the issue of Kashmir in 1947-48 and 1965, and on the issue of Bangladesh in 1971.
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wanted – and won – independence. The Pakistan Peoples’ Party and its leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto won the 1970 elections in (West) Pakistan and with increasingly authoritarian style, Bhutto ruled Pakistan during the 1970s. In 1977, elections were held again and the Pakistan Peoples’ Party won a great victory, but was charged with fraud. Military took over again and stalled the civilian political process. In 1978, the leader of the coup, General Zia ul Haq, became president. Zia ruled Pakistan until 1988 in a dictatorial manner; he introduced a harsh Islamic system and prohibited party political activity. In 1985, elections to the parliament took place, but these were far from free and fair. Only independents could stand in these elections, as Zia wanted to create a party-less political system. In 1988, Zia died in a plane crash and elections were held again. The Pakistan Peoples’ Party won, but soon the situation went out of hand and early elections were held in 1990.

In 1990, conservative and religious parties (among them the Muslim League and the Party of Islam), which had formed an alliance (the Islamic Democratic Alliance, Islami Jamhuri Ittehad, IJI), won the elections, formed government and, the leader of the Muslim League, Nawaz Sharif, became prime minister. Early elections were however held again in 1993, after the president had dismissed the government. In these elections, the Pakistan Peoples’ Party under Benazir Bhutto won. Again, the tenure of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party was marked by violence in the country and the government was charged with corruption. In 1996, Benazir Bhutto was dismissed as prime minister and in the 1997 elections, Nawaz Sharif and his Muslim League won a landslide victory, securing two thirds of the seats in the parliament.

Nawaz Sharif used his strong position in parliament to strengthen his power base in different ways. However, when he took on the Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, he went too far. The result was yet another military take-over in October 1999.1

Through these different phases, the Party of Islam has been part of the political game, even if it occasionally has been forbidden to work (e.g. during 1957-1962 and 1964). Even if the Pakistani state and society is

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1 The military held power until the October elections in 2002. In those elections, the party that supported and was supported by the military regime – the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam, PML–Q) – won a slight victory, with 77 seats out of 342. 63 seats went to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), whereas 45 seats went to the a alliance of Islamist parties, among them the Party of Islam, called the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). PML-Q eventually formed government. However, in Baluchistan and North Western Frontier Province, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal came to dominate the provincial governments (www.landguiden.se).
thoroughly penetrated by Islam and thus would seem to be a favourable setting for an Islamist party, the Party of Islam has thus lived through more as well as less glorious days – sometimes being posed against and sometimes favouring the government in place. The Party of Islam has however never been very successful at the polls. Despite this fact, the party has occupied seats in the parliament from time to time since the first free elections in 1970.\textsuperscript{1} During the dictatorial Zia period, the party even took place in government for a short time (in 1978-79).\textsuperscript{2} Most successful, the Party of Islam has been in cooperation with the Muslim League, in the Islamic Democratic Alliance in the 1988 and 1990 elections; through this alliance, it even formed part of the basis of government after the 1990 elections.\textsuperscript{3} However, the Party of Islam was largely inactive in parliament and government during this time, and they later withdrew from the alliance. In the 1993 elections, the Party of Islam formed a new party – the Pakistan Islamic Front, which won 3 seats and in 1997, the Party of Islam boycotted the elections. Thus, it must be regarded to have limited experience of being in power.\textsuperscript{4}

The Party of Islam is thus a party that was created outside of parliament, and for reasons other than winning elections, like a social movement organisation. Only later, the party chose the electoral way. In this way, the party is primarily marked by the characteristics typical of the ideal typical mass integration party in this sense. However, the Party of Islam has not generally been opposed by the state like in the ideal typical mass integration party; rather the Islamic Constitution of Pakistan favours the party. Even if it has at times opposed the state (for example by boycotting elections), the Party of Islam has generally shown a core acceptance of the state and has not challenged the establishment. In these senses, the Party of Islam thus does not share the traits of an ideal typical mass integration party, but rather of the ideal typical electoral parties, of catch-all or clientelistic kind.


\textsuperscript{2} Rahman, 17 February, 1999. At the beginning the Party of Islam was favourable inclined towards Zia, later they turned against him (cp. e.g. Kiessling & Husain, 29 March, 2000 ).

\textsuperscript{3} In 1988, the Islamic Democratic Alliance won 54 of the 207 seats in the National Assembly and in 1990, the alliance won 106 seats. In the 2002 elections not covered here, the Party of Islam participated in the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal alliance which, fuelled by massive anti-American propaganda in the wake of the US war on the Talibans, won 45 of the seats in parliament and the majority in Baluchistan.

\textsuperscript{4} Until 2002, the Party of Islam also had no experience of having local power.
Looking at the big picture, however, it is the origin of the Party of Islam outside of parliament and its roots in civil society that stand out most clearly. Even if traits, that according to the models would be conducive to parties of electoral character, thus are present in the Party of Islam, it is the traits which breed organisation of mass integration kind that dominate in the Party of Islam, when it comes to the origin, background and experiences of the party.

Table 6.2. Expectations on the basis of the origin, background and experiences of the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin, background and experiences</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of origin, background and experiences of the Party of Islam, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation, P: Present expectation.

The Orientation of the Party of Islam

At a very general level, Islam can be conceptualised as containing a comprehensive set of moral guidelines for life – political life as well as private life. Such a conception forms the backbone of the ideology of the Party of Islam. The ultimate goal of the Party of Islam is the creation of a truly Islamic state. On the way there, the Party of Islam maintains a strong commitment to the welfare of the people (not least those worst off), justice and honesty. These commitments form the necessary foundations of the Islamic state, which the party works to establish. In this sense, the Party of Islam is an ideological party at the core.

As I will return to soon, there has however always been a discussion in the Party of Islam regarding how these ideals should be realised. More precisely, it is discussed whether the party should stay out of politics and try to influence the political leadership in other ways (as a social movement) or whether the party should participate in political elections and try to influence in that way. The founder of the party, Maududi, favoured the electoral way,
something that led to certain defections from the party.\footnote{This stand is also declared on the party homepage: “For change in political leadership, general election is the best possible mean. (---) The party believes in (the) democratic order which can provide the framework for the Islamic movement to flourish, gather strength and bring about aimed transformation. For these reasons, the party favours prevalence of a truly democratic order in Pakistan” (www.jamaat.org, “Overview: Jamaat-e-Islami; Strategy for Change”).} That underground and violent activities are not favoured by the party is emphasised by different party representatives as such are not allowed in the teachings of Islam.\footnote{Cp. e.g. Munir, 22 February, 1999.} Even if it has not been very successful in elections, the Party of Islam thus works to reform society, and not for a revolution as it is understood in this context.\footnote{The ultimate aim of the Party of Islam is to reform all areas of life; “(i)t stands, not for partial reform, but for total change” in its quest to create a genuinely Islamic state (www.jamaat.org, “Overview: Jamaat-e-Islami; Strategy for Change”). In this reform work, the party claims to be “revolutionary in the sense that the objectives it cherishes, the ideology it upholds and the program it sponsors, is fundamentally different from, and comparably more dynamic, than those of other parties in the world” (www.jamaat.org, “Objectives, Goals and Approach”). However, the party is against violence and forced change, and it claims that there can be no change if it does not come voluntarily from the people: “The Party of Islam firmly holds that lasting change in the lives of individuals and in social pattern must necessarily stem from a change in the opinion, attitudes and outlook of people at large. It rejects a forced change because a forced change never touches the innermost being of man and it seldom reaches the grass-roots of society” (www.jamaat.org, “Objectives, Goals and Approach”). In this sense, the party must be regarded as being reformist rather than revolutionary in this context, even if the party itself uses the term “revolutionary”. It is also clarified that the “Party of Islam shall use democratic and constitutional means for the reform and revolution envisioned by it, i.e. minds and character of the people shall be reformed through preaching, counselling and projection of thoughts, and public opinion shall be prepared to accept the changes aimed at by the party” (Constitution of the Party of Islam, article 5). Thus, the objective is to establish the Islamic state and society, through a peaceful “revolution”. www.jamaat.org, “Objectives, Goals and Approach”.}  

Thus, the Party of Islam aims at change through reform, not revolution. But is its ideology restricted, in the sense that it is not all-encompassing and flexible? In the view of the Party of Islam, the ideology of the party is applicable to all areas of life, it “embraces life in its totality. It has no fragmentary approach in respect of time and space. Its \textit{locus standi} stretches from the dim dawn of history to distant future”.\footnote{Indeed, the Party of Islam turns against sectarian interpretations of Islam which claim to have the final and exclusively true interpretation of the teaching. According to party} In this sense, the ideology of the party is totalitarian: No aspect of life exists outside the ideology. 

However, the interpretation of the ideology of the Party of Islam is flexible, at least to some extent – there is no monopoly of interpretation.\footnote{www.jamaat.org. “Objectives, Goals and Approach”} On
a more general level, party representative Rahman asserts that the *ideal* of the party is “a pluralist society; the world is a collection of so many things and so many people coming from different backgrounds, so it should be a society accommodating pluralism”. Different interpretations of Islam indeed seem to be allowed by the party, and the party does not seem to subscribe to only one interpretation of Islam. Indeed, it is stated on the website of the party that “(a)uthentic dissent and genuine difference of opinion and interpretations should be respected and looked upon as the area of flexibility within the Islamic framework”. In this sense then, the party is not totalitarian, but flexible, even if the range of interpretation obviously has limits – “as a Muslim you cannot challenge … Quran and Sunnah.”

The orientation of the Party of Islam is thus distinctively ideological. Further, it is reformist and allows for flexibility in the interpretations, just like the ideal typical mass integration party. Unlike the mass integration party, the ideology of the Party of Islam is however totalitarian, in the sense that it is all-encompassing, covering all areas of life.

On the other hand, the ideology of the Party of Islam does not emphasise the common action of a group, such as a class. Indeed, the party shuns sectarianism and particularism in this respect. Instead, the ideology of the party is envisioned to reach out to all and everybody, the entire humanity. The ideological orientation of the Party of Islam is thus not representative Rahman, “the Party of Islam has never claimed to be a sect, and therefore it has peoples from all sects of religion… (W)hen it comes to the teachings of Islam, if you are a follower of a particular sect, … that particular sect will always be having difference of opinion with other sects on various issues. So the whole process becomes sectarian. In principle, the Party of Islam is not in agreement with this sectarian politics” (Rahman, 17 February, 1999).

Rahman, 10 April, 2000. Party representative Firdaus agrees, claiming that “(t)here is place for difference of opinion” (Firdaus, 29 March, 2000) as does party representative Ahmed: “Authentic dissent and genuine difference of opinion and interpretations should be respected and looked upon as the areas of flexibility within the Islamic framework. Instead of fighting each other for our differences, we should learn to live with our differences and to work for building upon the large area of our agreement” (Ahmed, undated: 12). Indeed, it is stated on the party website that “(o)ne has every right to differ from his (Maududi’s) approach” (www.jamaat.org. “Fifty Years of Pakistan and Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan Movement and the Jamaat-e-Islami”). That there is a flexibility of interpretation in the Party of Islam is also supported by outside observer Haider, who claims that “you can be anything and still be part of the party … (because) they don’t believe in sects” (Haider, 3 April, 2000).

2 **www.jamaat.org.** “Strategy for change”.

3 T Kahn, 28 March, 2000. Several analysts also emphasise that the ideology of the Party of Islam is not Deobandi (like that of the totalitarian Talibans); cp. e.g. Rafi, 14 April, 2000, interview and Hussein, 29 March, 2000.
interested in groups, it aims at embracing all: “Its appeal is indeed global”.¹ In this sense, there is a resemblance, if slight, with the ideal typical catch-all party.

In all, the orientation of the Party of Islam is basically ideological. It is restricted in that it does not demand total submission to one interpretation of the ideology only, but it allows for some interpretation in this regard. It is reformist in that it wants to reform society through gradual change and by being included in the political system – it does not want to overthrow it. In these respects, then, traits resembling the ideal typical mass integration party dominate in the Party of Islam. However, the party is totalitarian in that its ideology is all-encompassing, no sphere of life exists outside the party’s interpretation of Islam. Thus, traits of the ideal typical totalitarian integration party are present in the Party of Islam. However, unlike the integration parties, the Party of Islam does not emphasise the common action of one particular group (or class) in society, but directs itself to all. In this sense, traits of the ideal typical catch-all party are present in the Party of Islam.

Table 6.3: Expectations on the basis of the orientation of the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the orientation of the Party of Islam, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation, P: Present expectation.

Applying the Party-Centred Explanations to the Party of Islam and the Pakistani Case

Again, it must be established that the different characteristics pointed out by the party-centred models do not go neatly together in this empirical setting. As in the Jordanian case, there however seem to be two basic clusters of characteristics that point in different directions regarding what organisation of linkage we are to expect in the Islamist party at hand. Thus, the societal setting in Pakistan is conducive to the development of clientelistic parties, according to the model. The origin and background of the Party of Islam would be conducive to an organisation in line with a mass integration party, while the experiences rather suggest organisation in line with an electoral

party of clientelistic or catch-all kind. The orientation of the party also primarily suggests that the party should organise as a mass integration party, even if there are traits in the orientation of the Party of Islam that would suggest organisation in line with the total integration and the catch-all party, respectively.

Table 6.4: Summarised expectations on the basis of the societal setting, origin/background/experiences and orientation of the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicability of Actor-Centred models</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal setting</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin, background, experiences</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the societal setting, origin/background/experiences and orientation of the Party of Islam, according to the party-centred theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation, P: Present expectation.

As in the case of the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, two dominant clusters of party-centred explanations thus seem to apply in the case of the Party of Islam. Thus, just like on previous occasions, we have to modify the single party-centred theoretical model somewhat, in order to make it applicable in this context. More specifically, we have to specify the model into two clusters of explanations, the first being based on the expectations on the basis of the societal setting of the country, and the second being based on the expectations on the basis of a combination of the origin, background and experiences, on the one hand, and the party’s orientation, on the other.

Thus, emphasis on the societal setting suggests that the Party of Islam should organise its linkage as a clientelistic party, whereas emphasis on the origin, background, experiences and orientation of the Party of Islam suggests an organisation of linkage primarily in line with the mass integration party.

In the empirical analysis, we will find out whether any of those explanations seems to be able to explain why the Party of Islam organises its linkage the way it does.
Comment: The figure presents the expectations of linkage objective and linkage outcome in the Party of Islam on the basis of societal setting, origin/background/experiences and origin respectively, in line with the specified party-centred models.

**Institutional Framework: Electoral System and Laws Regulating Party Organisation**

**Electoral System and Electoral Laws**

In Pakistan, the parliament (the National Assembly) is directly elected by the people. For elections to the National Assembly, the majoritarian “First Past the Post” electoral system, in single-member territorial constituencies is employed. In this system, only one candidate can win a constituency. The 

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3 Again a reminder that what will be considered here is the institutional framework as it was until the military take-over on October 12, 1999. Today, other regulations are in place. These are referred to in footnotes.

4 Major laws regulating the conduct of elections to the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies are found in the 1973 Constitution, the Representation of the People Act from 1976, the Representation of the People (Conduct of Election) Rules from 1977, the Electoral Rolls Act and Electoral Rolls Rules from 1974, the Delimitation of Constituencies Act from 1974 and the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order from 1977. This section is primarily based on information from the Constitution, part 3, chapter 2 (Electoral Laws and Conduct of Elections) of the Constitution.
candidate that receives the highest number of votes is the winner of the constituency.

The National Assembly comprises 217 directly elected parliamentary seats and election takes place every 5 years. 207 of these seats are reserved for Muslims, while the remaining 10 are reserved for non-Muslim minorities ("separate electorates").¹ Until 1988, there were also reserved seats for women (indirectly elected), but this provision has been withdrawn.²

There are, moreover, elections to the four provincial assemblies every fifth year, held simultaneously with the National Assembly elections, since 1997.³ Also in this context there are reserved seats for Muslims and non-Muslims.

Every Pakistani citizen who is at least 21 years of age, who is registered in the electoral roll and who is not declared to be of unsound mind by court, can vote in elections to the national as well as the provincial assemblies.⁴ All elections are to be held by secret ballot.⁵ To be elected to the national or the provincial assemblies, candidates have to fulfil certain, rather strict, criteria, according to the Constitution.⁶

Further, there are regulations regarding election expenses. All election expenses are to be met by the candidates and there is a limit on the amount a candidate can spend, the candidate shall also vouch for every payment made in relation to election expenses.⁷

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¹ The separate electorates were introduced in 1978. For the non-Muslim seats, the whole country forms one multi-member constituency, with as many seats as are reserved for a minority (Alam et al, 1997: 11). The candidate with the highest number of votes wins the constituency. Muslims can thus vote only for Muslims and non-Muslims cannot vote for Muslims. The 10 reserved seats for minorities are allocated in the following manner: Christians - 4 seats, Hindus and scheduled castes – 4 seats, Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsis and other non-Muslims – 1 seat and Ahmadis/Qadianis – 1 seat (Alam et al, 1997: 10). The separate electorates made minorities feel degraded to second-class citizens, therefore the reserved seats were taken away in the 2002 rearrangements.

² The quota for women was however reinstated 2002.

³ The workings of the provinces are regulated in the Constitution, part 4. Administratively, there are many levels in Pakistan, e.g. divisions, districts, sub-divisions, tehsils and lower levels.

⁴ Articles 51 and 106 of the Constitution. Right of adult franchise was granted to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas as late as 1997, before that only "Maliks", i.e. government pensioners, were entitled to vote (Alam et al, 1997 and Pakistan Election Rules and Laws, 1993: 4).

⁵ Article 226 of the Constitution.

⁶ Articles 62, 63 and 223 of the Constitution, the 1976 Representation of People Act, and the Political Parties Act.

Elections to the National Assembly are highly regulated. Not least, there are regulations against corrupt practices in relation to the elections. These regulations prohibit violation of the law on election expenses, bribery, personation and undue influence.

In addition, there is a Code of Conduct to be followed by the political parties, in times of elections. In 1993, these regulations included for example prohibitions on what the parties could propagate, making parties refrain from pitting different groups against each other. Moreover, there are prohibitions on obstructing meetings and other political activities by rival parties, prohibitions on using violence during meetings and on using “corrupt practices”, such as bribing or offering gifts. In 1997, the Code of Conduct was extended and regulated, particularly regarding how advertisements for parties could be carried out.

In determining what effects the electoral system may have on the way in which political parties organise in the Pakistani context, it can be noted that traditionally, the First Past the Post-system is considered to favour big, inclusive parties of electoral character, appealing to different categories of voters, across different divisions in society, just like the ideal typical catch-all party. According to the same logic, this kind of electoral system is considered to work against smaller, ideological parties, appealing to more narrow segments of society. Therefore, according to this reasoning, the

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1 These and other offences which induce fixed penalties are listed in the Representation of the People Act, as published in Pakistan election laws and rules, 1993: 18-20.

2 Bribery is defined as giving or receiving gratification for voting in a particular way or not voting, for being a candidate or not, or for withdrawing. Gratification includes deal in money, entertainment or employment. Where gratification consists of “food, drink, entertainment or provisions” the punishment is lower (the Pakistan Penal Code, as published in Pakistan election laws and rules, 1993: 29). Personation is defined as “voting in the name of another person”. Undue influence includes inducing a person to vote for one or another, or not to vote, by use of threat or force, violence or restraints, invocation of divine displeasure or religious sanction, use of a place of worship for canvassing, or any act prejudicial to the glory of Islam or the security of Pakistan. Also boycotting an election or referendum and inciting others to do so is punishable.

3 Thus, parties cannot propagate any opinion prejudicial to the ideology, sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan and they shall refrain from speeches calculated to arouse parochial and sectarian feelings and controversy between sexes, sects, communities and linguistic groups.

4 The 1993 Code of Conduct is published in Zafar & Hussain, 1993. A code of Conduct was first employed in the 1990 elections, but it was not until the 1997 elections that observance was made an obligatory legal requirement (Alam et al, 1997: 125-126).


electoral system and regulations in Pakistan favour catch-all parties. That it is electoral parties of catch-all type, and not of clientelistic kind, that is favoured in the Pakistani case, is substantiated by the recurrent prohibitions on clientelistic practices in the electoral regulations.

The additional character in the electoral system of reserved seats for Muslims and non-Muslims respectively, however to some extent works against the inclusive appeal favoured by the First Past the Post-system. It is of no use for non-Muslim parties to appeal to Muslims in the electoral system here outlined, as Muslims cannot vote for those non-Muslim parties anyway. The same goes for Muslim parties; it is of no use for these parties to appeal to non-Muslims, as non-Muslims are not allowed to vote for Muslim parties. In this sense, the system with reserved seats for different minorities might result in exclusive appeals rather than inclusive on the part of the parties. However, as about 95 per cent of the Pakistani population is Muslim, this tendency of exclusiveness is not so strong, anyway regarding Muslims.

Despite this feature, the Pakistani electoral system can be considered as favouring Muslim parties with an inclusive appeal, just like the electoral party of ideal typical catch-all character.1

Table 6.5. Expectations on the basis of the electoral system and electoral laws in Pakistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the electoral system and laws in Pakistan, according to the institutional theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation.

The Pakistani Party Regulations According to the Constitution, the Political Parties Law and Other Relevant Laws

If elections are rather highly regulated in the Pakistani legal regulations, the organisation of political parties is less so. In the Political Parties Act of 1962 and amendments, certain regulations are however laid down to regulate the formation and activity of political parties.2 Here it is stated that

1 Things might be different regarding the non-Muslim parties. Here the electoral system might result in parties of more exclusive character.

2 Legal regulations concerning political parties are found in the Constitution (article 17), the Political Parties Act from 1962 and as amended in Political Parties (Amendment) Act of 1975, 1977 and 1985, the Political Parties (Amendment) Ordinance of 1963, 1978, 1979 and
• no political party shall be formed with the object of propagating any opinion or acting in any manner prejudicial to the Islamic ideology, or the sovereignty, integrity of Pakistan, or morality, or the maintenance of public order. No person is allowed to form a foreign-aided party or to be associated with any such party;
• every political party shall account for the source of its funds and submit its finances and accounts to audit by an officer or authority authorised by the Election Commission;
• it shall be lawful for any body of individuals or association of persons (not being in the service of Pakistan) to form a political party or for any person to be a member or office-bearer of a political party, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan.

In these regulations, not much is stated on how the parties can or cannot organise and work, however. The same is true for the Political Parties Rules from 1986, which mainly deal with the formation, name and financial audit of political parties.\(^1\) Regarding legal regulations on political parties in Pakistan, outside analyst Waseem thus states that “(s)ome legal provisions might be there, but there is complete freedom”.\(^2\)

The party legal regulations in Pakistan do not say much at all regarding how a party can organise and what activities it can pursue. In this

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1. Regulations on the formation of a political party: (a) A party is deemed to have been formed on the day its constitution is adopted by its general body or on the day the Election Commission determines, if the party carries out political activities but has not adopted a constitution; (b) Every party shall maintain proper accounts of all its income and expenditure, assets and liabilities and shall submit statement of its finances and accounts to audit. A party shall also submit a statement of its finances to audit, when formed; (c) Every party seeking registration shall have a distinctive name, which is neither identical with, nor closely similar to, the name of a registered party, and where there is identity, or such a similarity as may be calculated to deceive or confuse the average voter, the Election Commission may direct the political party make the application to make such changes in its name as it may deem appropriate (Pasha, 1995). It may be noted that no stipulations on party internal elections are made in the laws.

2. Waseem, 7 April, 2000. Waseem however continues to state that this is the case “(a)s long as they are not against the government. And if they are against the government, then they are … sent … notices of … over-due taxes” (Waseem, 7 April, 2000).
sense, it is difficult to claim that the party law in Pakistan favours any of the ideal typical party types; indeed, it seems to favour neither parties of integration nor electoral parties especially.

Table 6:6. Expectations on the basis of the party legal regulations in Pakistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party regulations</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the party legal regulations in Pakistan, according to the institutional theoretical models. --: No expectation.

Applying the Institutional Explanations to the Pakistani Case: Electoral System and Party Legal Regulations

The institutional framework of the (Muslim) political parties in Pakistan thus primarily seems to favour electoral parties of catch-all variety. This conclusion is based on the impact of the electoral system only, as the laws pertaining to parties do not seem to influence the way in which parties organise in any particular manner. Taken together then, the institutional factors suggest that the Party of Islam (as the other Muslim parties in Pakistan) would organise its linkage as an ideal typical electoral party of catch-all kind.

Table 6:7. Summarised expectations on the basis of the institutional structures in Pakistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicability of Institutional factors</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party of Islam</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents what type of party/parties that would be expected on the basis of the institutional structures in Pakistan, according to the institutional theoretical models. D: Dominant expectation.

The expectations regarding how Pakistani parties should organise their linkage, on the basis of the institutional structures, are expressed in the following model.
The Linkage of the Party of Islam

Linkage Objective

From the beginning, the Party of Islam has oscillated between the objective to be a holy community, to educate the vanguard of the Islamic Revolution in a manner reminding of a total integration party, and the objective to be a political party which works to draw and reform the masses, like a party of mass integration.\(^1\) For a long time, the contention between the two approaches roared in the party and there are still repercussions of this disagreement today.\(^2\)

The original aim of the Party of Islam was to prepare an elitist vanguard, which was supreme in moral regards and stood apart from society. As noted, this ambition to a large extent reminds of the approach of an ideal typical total integration party. However, unlike the ideal typical total integration party, which aims at overthrowing the ruling elite, the paramount objective of the Party of Islam was to attain the Islamic revolution through the education of the elite, the political leaders, and in that way make them inclined to change the society in a peaceful way. But there are also claims

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that the party used violence to get their way.\(^1\) Either way, the Party of Islam in its early years had no intention of “currying favour with the masses” as a political party; it rather worked to “augment its influence in the inner sanctum of power”:\(^2\)

However, from the 1950s on, the party entered upon the course of participatory politics and started to take part in the political process. The party also grew more interested in extending its reach into society in order to draw (and reform) the masses, in a way resembling that of the ideal typical mass integration party.\(^3\) Thus, according to outside observer Ansari, “the overriding focus (of the Party of Islam) has changed from elite to common Pakistanis”.\(^4\) While this development alienated some of the original members of the party, it attracted others.\(^5\) This course has been further solidified (not altogether without resistance) under the present leadership of Qazi Hussein Ahmad.\(^6\)

Thus, in recent years the Party of Islam has made efforts to expand its following, not least in order to do better at elections. Today, the Party of Islam aims at communicating its message to the masses, at educating the masses spiritually (\textit{dawah}, mission or preaching), at providing for needy people materially – and at getting people to vote for the party in elections.\(^7\)

In this work, it is of central importance to tie members more closely to the

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\(^1\) Outside observer Mahmood, 6 April, 2000, speaking particularly about the Islamic Student Organisation \textit{(Islami Jamiat-e Talaba, IJT)}.  
\(^5\) Many original members defected from the party as a result of this change of direction. Outside observer Zaidi contends that “in expanding their role … they lost that puritan culture of theirs … and when they started loosing their puritan culture, some of the leading figures, who had been with the party right from the beginning … felt disgruntled and later on they dissociated themselves from the party” (Zaidi, 21 March, 2000).  
\(^6\) Indeed, in himself Qazi Hussein Ahmad is a symbol of this shift. Contrary to the founder Maududi, Qazi Hussein Ahmad has not focused on writing books. He is a political worker who focuses on speaking the language of the people (Nasr, 1994, Rafi, 14 April, 2000, Mahmood, 6 April, 2000, Haider, 3 April, 2000). This approach is frowned upon by some party members. According to outside observer Hussein, “(t)he old guard in Party of Islam do not like Qazi Hussein Ahmad, because they see him using religion as means to acquire a political base. And in the process, striking the kind of compromises that they think dilute the pristine ideology of the Party of Islam” (Hussain, 28 March, 2000). Outside observer Haider, 3 April, 2000, states the same thing.  

party. In this sense, the linkage objective of the Party of Islam to a large extent resembles that of the ideal typical mass integration party – ideally, strategically and in practice. Like the ideal typical party of mass integration, the Party of Islam primarily wants to draw the masses to the party. Votes in elections are also important, but votes are not the prime objective of the party.

Even if the Party of Islam works at broadening its membership-base, it still cherishes its virtuous inner core and it “tries to emphasize the necessity of maintaining an inner core of highly dedicated and upright men and women as the foundation of Islamic revival”. Thus, ideally and strategically but also in practice, traits of the ideal typical total integration party are still present in the linkage objective of the Party of Islam.

Indeed, the Party of Islam tries hard to balance the different traits in its linkage objective – its objective to draw the masses and its objective to create a vanguard. Outside observer Mahmood refers to this tension: “(O)n one hand, (they are) trying to maintain the ideological purity of the (party), and (on) the other hand, creating mass organisation in order to enclose people”. 3

However, more exclusively electoral concerns are also present in the Party of Islam, and certain populist traits have made their way into the party. Outside observer Nasr for example states that the present president (Amir) of the party is “an assertive and populist Amir. His appeal has … been more clearly directed toward the Pakistani electorate than towards the rank and file of the Party of Islam”. 4 Outside analyst Al-Ghazali states the same thing: “Now they are more and more popular, or demagogic… (They are) appealing to whatever (they) see pleases the people, the popular sentiment”. 5

1 The importance of members is emphasised on the website of the party (www.jamaat.org, “The Membership Drive of the Jamaat-e-Islami”, “Objectives, goals and approach”, as well as by party representatives (e.g. Rahman, 17 February, 1999).
2 Ahmad, undated: 8.
3 Mahmood, 6 April, 2000.
4 Nasr, 1994: 55, see also 93, 94. That the Party of Islam throughout its history has formed and been part of different alliances (the Islamic Democratic Alliance, the Pakistan Islamic Front and, lately, the Mutahidha Majlis-e-Amal), points to the fact that they are not entirely disinterested in electoral success, as these alliances often are formed in order to garner more votes. However, the fact that the Party of Islam ended the cooperation with the Muslim League in the Islamic Democratic Alliance, despite its success and coming to power, suggests that the party is not interested in compromising its ideological objective for a place in the corridors of power.
sentiment”. In this sense, also some catch-all traits are present in the linkage objective of the party in practice. This is vouched for by party representatives as well. Party representative Munir contends that the party “wants to reach to the people … (it) needs voters, … (it) needs supporters. (...) A closed party cannot play that significant role”. Thus, voters have become more important to the party and many party representatives assert that members as well as voters are valued by the party: “(B)oth are important. We cannot neglect anyone”, not least because the one helps the other, “(they) work together”.

Also in another way, catch-all traits stand out in the Party of Islam. Thus, unlike the ideal typical mass integration party, the Party of Islam does not focus its efforts at a particular mass group in society. Instead, it targets all, as I will return to, ideally, strategically and in practice: “(O)ur invitation is for all people…” Indeed, the “target is to reach every person, every person”. Also in this sense, the Party of Islam resembles the ideal typical catch-all party.

Some outside analysts moreover suggest the presence of certain clientelistic traits in the linkage objective of the Party of Islam, at least in practice. According to outside observer Zaidi, the members of the Party of Islam initially tried “to help and support the community at their own level in a humble way. The concept of institutional social service came later, when they tried to use it as a means of expanding the party’s influence”. Outside observer Bashir too suggests the presence of a clientelistic logic underlying the activities of the party: “They may think that this (providing health care, schools for children et c) probably will help them in the voting”. A clientelistic logic is also suggested by party representatives. According to Iqbal, “(i)t is our … way to contact the people. (...) Through welfare”. When asked if they expect anything in return for the help, Iqbal states,

3 Malik, 3 April, 2000. Qazi, 4 April, 2000, Iqbal, 3 April, 2000, Firdaus, 29 March, 2000, state the same thing.
4 Munir, 3 April, 2000.
8 Bashir, 6 April, 2000.
9 Iqbal, 3 April, 2000.
“(a)ctually we expect, we expect. But, you know, the Muslims only want to see praise of Allah… If he becomes happy, then it is OK. But secondly … our target (is) to get their support, they come with us”.

In this sense, there are traces of a clientelistic logic in the Party of Islam at least in practice.

Not all agree that provision of services is carried out for electoral reasons in a clientelistic manner in the Party of Islam, however, at least not to any greater extent. Instead, analysts observe that this work to relieve sufferings “is ideological … (but maybe) … political … as well”. Party representatives also generally provide this interpretation of the social work. Party representative Rahman states that “it is part of the (party’s) social service and welfare programme to help people in need. Its workers are therefore asked to extend every possible help with regard to the problems people face from government agencies”.

As noted in previous chapters, the particular motivation for social-service activities must be established in order to decide whether they are provided according to a basically clientelistic or mass integration logic. In the case of the Party of Islam, it must be established that social-service activities primarily are provided according to a mass integration party logic, and not on a clientelistic logic – the Party of Islam primarily wants to reform society, not come to power.

This view is substantiated by party representative Rahman, as he contends that “sometimes it may be disappointing that you do not get mass support in the elections, and coming to power … some people definitely are disappointed. But at the same time, they feel inspiration from the activities they are doing at the grass root level. (…) (They have) contributed something”.

In this way, the Party of Islam tries to build its ideal society on the grass root level through social services before it has come into power. In this sense, it resembles an ideal typical mass integration party, not the ideal typical clientelistic party.

Most analysts also agree that the Party of Islam does not act primarily on a clientelistic logic. According to outside observer Hussein, the Party of Islam does not provide patronage “to that extent. Because they don’t have much money to throw around. It does exist, but I think as compared to the scale of patronage indulged by the Pakistan Muslim League, it is nothing. If people are disappointed, it is not because of lack of money, but because the party in power is the Pakistan Muslim League”.

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1 Iqbal, 3 April, 2000.
3 Rahman, 27 April, 2000.
4 Rahman, 10 April, 2000.
Zero”.

Ideological objectives and electoral objectives thus compete in the Party of Islam: “There is a tension. Because sometimes the leader of the Party of Islam is talking in populist terms, (and sometimes), it is elitist”. Outside observer Haider argues that the Party of Islam never can be outright populist, however, as ”it subscribes to a certain ideology, (and) that ideology automatically puts certain limitations on who is going to be a part of it. In a populist party, that is not a problem. Everybody can come”. According to Haider, the Party of Islam has tried to overcome this obstacle, without succeeding: “Now they have tried, unsuccessfull I would add, to broaden the base of the party. (...) (In doing so they have) actually resorted to all the various tactics that the populist parties use”. But the ideology of the Party of Islam “puts inherent limits on how much it can expand its vote bank”.

Even if there are electoral traits in the linkage objective of the Party of Islam in practice, these can thus never dominate. Even if the Party of Islam today aims at broadening its base and catch more votes in various ways, emphasis will always be ideological.

Thus, the linkage objective of the Party of Islam has always been dominated by integration traits, of either mass or total kind. Today, the mass integration traits have the upper hand in this regard – ideally, strategically and in practice, even if total integration traits are present in the linkage objective as well, ideally, strategically and in practice. Also catch-all traits are present ideally, strategically and in practice in the Party of Islam. In practice, some clientelistic traits are present as well.

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1 Hussain, 28 March, 2000. Outside observers Waseem, 7 April, 2000 and Shah, 22 March, 2000, state the same thing. Indeed, according to Hussain: “They speak a lot against feudalism, and they attack it most vociferously…. They have moved away from being an extension of an establishment party, to that of a party that has a particular liberal and liberated outlook on social life” (Hussain, 28 March, 2000).

2 Bashir, 6 April, 2000.

3 Haider, 3 April, 2000.

4 Haider, 3 April, 2000.

5 Haider, 3 April, 2000.
Motivation behind the Linkage Objective

The Party of Islam thus primarily embraces a linkage objective of mass integration kind, even if traits of the other ideal types are present as well. But to what factor can this linkage objective of predominantly mass integration kind be attributed? Is it due to the societal setting, the origins, background and experiences of the party or its orientation, or is it due to institutional factors?

As we saw previously, theoretically two (sets of) party-centred factors predict a linkage objective of mass integration kind in the Party of Islam; the origin, background and experiences of the party and its orientation. The societal setting and the institutional factors point in entirely different directions. Are there then reasons to believe that the linkage objective of Party of Islam is motivated by either its origin, background and experiences or by its orientation, or by both?

The motivations to why the Party of Islam embraces the linkage objective that it does, cited by the party representatives as well as by outside observers, point in one direction: The Party of Islam is motivated by its orientation. The party wants to reform society in line with its ideology, just like an ideal typical party of mass integration.\(^1\) According to party representative Ahmad, “this movement aims to reform society, to cultivate men for struggle and, as a result of this collective effort, to bring forward a new leadership and to change the entire system – including the system of governance”.\(^2\) Here, both the motivation and the linkage objective of the Party of Islam thus are made clear: The Party of Islam aims at the reform of society through the collective effort by the party.

More specifically, the Party of Islam aims at attaining the Islamic revolution. However, as noted previously, it is pointed out by the party that it is not a case of a revolt by the people, as in an ideal typical total integration party, but by a reform of the people so that they will work for the Islamic revolution, in a peaceful way. In this work, the support of the masses is important, not only the struggle of the party. According to party


\(^2\) Ahmad, 1999.
representative Rahman, “change cannot come unless the support of masses is in favour of that change. Therefore the main task is to get support as much as possible… If change comes without the support of the masses … it will not be durable”.  

Support for the party, not least in the form of votes, is therefore important for the Party of Islam, but it is not the main goal of the party. Thus, according to party representative Firdaus: “We need the voters. Not in the sense voter, but also when we want to change our society… (We want to) tell them the preachings of Islam”. Reform of society rather than coming to power is what the Party of Islam aims at. Party representative Matin states the same thing: ”We are for a system, and a system cannot be established until we go to power. And you cannot go to power until people vote for you. So … of course you want … people (to) understand your viewpoint and vote for you”. Votes are thus important, but reforming the system is more important for the party. Thus “(i)f some other party, they implement what we want, then it is not necessary that we go to power ourselves… If there is some other party, who does the same thing, we will welcome him”. 

Therefore, the traits of electoral kind in the linkage objective of the party in practice are not primarily a result of an ambition on the part of the party to come to power for the sake of power itself. In its writings, the party also emphasises that it does not “seek control of government machinery”; nor does it have the “sole purpose of reaching power-corridors at all costs, by whatever means, by hook or by crook”. It is the creation of the Islamic state that is the ultimate goal of the party. If this goal can be achieved in another way than through government by the Party of Islam, this is fine with the party: “We are after the principle, not the power”. 

Outside observers substantiate the view that the Party of Islam does

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3 Matin, 27 March, 2000. Party representatives Firdaus, 29 March, 2000 and Qazi, 4 April, 2000, state the same thing. Also party representative Rahman states this point with some emphasis: “The political system currently in practice in the country has certain limitations both from theoretical and practical point of view, still it is to be participated (in) with a view to reform it and the society” (27 April, 2000). Also party representatives Iqbal, 3 April, 2000 and T Khan, 28 March, 2000 states the same thing as does a booklet from the party’s women’s wing (Women’s Wing, Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan, undated: 11).
not primarily seek power. Indeed, it is pointed out that the Party of Islam left the government alliance in the Islamic Democratic Alliance because “(t)heir own identity was lost … (and Nawaz Sharif) pursued his own agenda”.\footnote{Waseem, 7 April, 2000. Outside observer Shah, 22 March, 2000, states the same thing. Also party representatives Rahman, 10 April, 2000 and T Khan, 28 March, 2000, refer to this incident. On the other hand, there are outside observers that suggest that the Party of Islam parted with the alliance due to electoral reasons (www.ijtimaa.org “What they say”).} Thus, the party is clearly not motivated by power itself, like the ideal typical electoral parties.

In other ways, the catch-all trait in the linkage objective of the Party of Islam can, however, be attributed to the orientation of the party. As we saw earlier, one element in the orientation of the Party of Islam is that it wants to embrace all. The trait of catch-all kind, found in the linkage objective of the party in practice, follow from this particular element in the orientation. That the party makes a broad appeal in order to act in line with its ideological orientation is substantiated by the party.\footnote{Haider, 3 April, 2000.}

Outside observer Haider points to a certain duality in the Party of Islam, when it comes to its objectives and their motivations. On the one hand, the main aim of the Party of Islam “is basically to get to the level of power. But there is also a conflicting aim, because there is – was and still is – a lot of debate about whether this can be done through being part of the political system or whether this can be done more effectively by working in and through the social structures”, i.e. outside the parliamentary process.\footnote{As we have seen, the party also continually refers to the “Islamic revolution”, and even this revolution for most parts is construed to take place in a reformist way, more truly revolutionary elements cannot be ruled out.} Thus, even if the party claims to subscribe to the parliamentary way of doing politics, there are indications of a total integration logic, according to which a party acts the way it does in order to revolutionise society.\footnote{On the party’s website, it is stated that “(i)n contemporary complex social system, cast, color, tribe, country or class considerations are essential ingredients of a political organization. Because of this, the parties either lose sight of their founding aims or continue working dogmatically. The other more horrifying aspect of such a trend is that parties structured on sectional, sectarian, regional and radical ideologies promote conflict which ends up in bloodshed. (…) National parties are unavoidably formed once territorial, national or regional considerations and promotion of such interests become part of faith. The characteristics given above are precisely the reasons why a party with faith in Unity can never be nationalistic in character. In juxtaposition, this party is supra-national in aim and outlook; its endeavors embrace humanity, and; its interests transcend time and territory” (www.jamaat.org “Objectives, goals and approach”). This broad approach is referred to also by party representatives Munir, 3 April, 2000, Iqbal, 3 April, 2000, Matin, 27 March, 2000 and Rahman, 10 April, 2000, Ahmed, 22 February, 1999 and T Khan, 28 March, 2000.} Thus, even if...
they are far from dominating, there seem to be traits of a total integration kind of motivation in the Party of Islam. There are thus indications suggesting that the Party of Islam conceives of its linkage the way it does in order to revolutionise society, in line with (parts of) its orientation.

Also in other ways, the traces of total integration kind in the linkage objective of the Party of Islam may be attributed to the orientation of the party. On its website, the party for example emphasises the importance of “complete allegiance to God Almighty as a supreme Creator” and asserts that “its qualitative stress inexorably makes it restrictive in its organisational scope”. Here, the exclusionary trait of total integration kind in the linkage objective of the Party of Islam is put down to its all-embracing orientation. However, at the same time, the party states that “(e)verybody is most welcome to join it”, but not as full members. This indicates that dual motivations are at play in the Party of Islam; motivations attributed to different aspects of the orientation of the party.

Efficiency concerns are not either absent from the motivations of the Party of Islam and there are even indications of the presence of a clientelistic logic, which by outside observers is put down to the general societal setting of the country. Also party representatives refer, if indirectly, to this situation.

Even if different motivations thus are at play in the Party of Islam, the party is primarily motivated by its main orientation, i.e. to reform society at its base in a peaceful way. In this sense, the Party of Islam primarily reminds of the ideal typical mass integration party.

Interestingly, no party representatives or outside observers refer to the origin, background or experiences of the Party of Islam in accounting for its linkage objective, even if these too suggest a linkage objective of mass integration kind. Thus, these factors do not seem important in this regard, at least not in a direct manner. It is however not improbable that these factors, at least partly, have influenced the orientation of the party and thus are important in an indirect manner.

Motivations influenced by the institutional context also seem largely

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1. [www.jamaat.org](http://www.jamaat.org) “Objectives, goals and approach”.
2. [www.jamaat.org](http://www.jamaat.org) “Objectives, goals and approach”. We will return to the different categories of members later.
3. We will return to the issue of membership in the Party of Islam later.
5. Cp. e.g. Iqbal, 3 April, 2000.
absent in the case of the Party of Islam. Institutions are not referred to when the objectives of the party are discussed. On a general note, the party emphasises that it is important to follow the laws. The party founder Maududi is quoted to have said to his followers: “(T)he Constitution of (the Party of Islam) has bound you to follow only legal and constitutional ways for the reformation and the revolution”. Also according to outside analyst Ansari, the party view has been that “we are a law-abiding party”. There are however no suggestions that such general statements directly influence the linkage objective of the party.

For most parts, the Party of Islam is thus motivated by its orientation, resulting in a linkage objective of primarily mass integration kind, ideally, strategically, and in practice, if with certain total integration and some catch-all party features (ideally, strategically and in practice as well). This is in line with the theoretical expectations.

To some extent, the societal setting in Pakistan also makes for a slight clientelistic trait in the linkage objective of the Party of Islam in practice. Also this is in line with the theoretical expectation.

However, the Party of Islam does not seem to be motivated by its origin, background and experiences, at least not directly, or by the institutional setting in Pakistan. The relation between the motivations and the linkage objective in the Party of Islam is expressed in the model below.

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1 As quoted on the party [www.jamaat.org](http://www.jamaat.org). “Fifty Years of Pakistan and Jamaat-e-Islami; Revolution: Through Bullet or Ballot”.

2 Ansari, 20 February, 1999. Ansari however claims that the party today protests and defies what they find to be unjust laws to a greater extent than it did in the beginning.

3 Two comments on the institutional arrangements are however recurrent. One is that the legal arrangements in Pakistan favour an Islamist party like the Party of Islam. Party representative Munir states that: “The Constitution of Pakistan supports us” (Munir, 22 February, 1999. Rahman, 17 February, 1999, states the same thing). There is however no recognition that these legal regulations in any way influence the organisation of the party. The other comment is that the electoral system in Pakistan is unfair and misrepresents the actual opinions of people. Therefore, the Party of Islam heavily propagates the introduction of the proportional representation system, which they argue are fairer – and under which they think that they would get more support (Munir, 22 February, 1999. Rahman, 17 February, 1999, too expresses the opinion that the current electoral system is unfair. That this is not a new issue is evidenced by the booklet “Proportional Representation and the Revival of the Democratic Process in Pakistan” (Ahmad, 1983), where a case for proportional representation is made). Indeed, the party boycotted the 1997 elections with reference to the unfair electoral system: “We boycotted because the system was not fair … the election process is not very fair in Pakistan” (Munir, 22 February, 1999). When it comes to electoral system, the Party of Islam thus opposes rather than is influenced by it.
Even if the orientation of primarily mass integration kind in the Party of Islam thus makes for its linkage objective of primarily mass integration kind, a religious motivation – motivating why the Party of Islam is in politics at all – is also found at a deeper level: The Party of Islam is in politics at the command of God. According to the Constitution of the party, “(t)he mission of the Party of Islam and the objective of all its efforts and struggle shall in practical terms be to establish the Din (i.e. the Divine order or the Islamic way of life) (…) It is incumbent upon a believer to strive for establishing Islam in its entirety without dissection and division”.¹

Whereas reforming society in line with the orientation of the party is the ultimate linkage objective of the ideal typical mass integration party, this is thus not so in the Party of Islam. Instead, reforming society is but a way to

¹ Constitution of the party, article 4.
please God – and to secure success in the Hereafter: “While the believer’s real objective is to attain Allah’s pleasure and success in the Hereafter, this cannot be realised without trying to establish Allah’s Din in this world. Therefore, a believer’s mission in practical terms is the establishment of Din while in essence it is the attainment of Allah’s pleasure that comes as a result of the effort for establishing Din”.¹

Party representatives state the same thing. According to Rahman, the general motivation behind the work of the party is that “the world should be better, for everyone”.² To accomplish this, the party has to “gain political support”.³ But he also states the additional motivation: “(T)he additional motivation … is that the Muslims believe that once they pass over this life, there is another life, where they will have to respond about their activities in this world…We should do something so that we can find a better place in the Hereafter”.⁴

The basic motivation of individual believers in the Party of Islam is thus to please God and ensure well-being in life after death. To reach this goal, believers have to work for a reform of the society in line with Islam. The motivation of mass integration kind is thus in turn – at a very basic level – motivated by religious concerns.⁵

Different kinds of motivations thus are at play in the Party of Islam, but they are integrated. The Party of Islam is at least to some extent motivated by electoral concerns; it wants to win support to come to power (an electoral motivation). However, the prime reason why it wants to come to power is to be able to reform the society (a mass integration motivation) – but also to please God (a religious motivation).

After having outlined the theoretical expectations regarding the linkage outcome of the Party of Islam, it is now time to turn to this outcome itself.

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¹ Constitution of the party, article 4.
² Rahman, 10 April, 2000.
³ Rahman, 10 April, 2000.
⁴ Rahman, 10 April, 2000. Qazi, 4 April, 2000, states the same thing. It is also emphasised that time is no issue in this regard: “We are not worried about time. (…) If the ideology of my party is not successful in my life, I don’t care. What I understand is that I keep on going, and I die this way” (Matin, 27 March, 2000).
⁵ The same can be said for the catch-all motivation, discussed earlier. To approach all with the message from God, pleases God. This is the motivation underlying dawah, mission or preaching. I will return to the religious motivation in Chapter 8.
Establishing External Linkage

Activities to Establish External Linkage

The activities to establish external linkage in the Party of Islam are of many different varieties. Among the outreach activities, religious education and especially *Quranic* teachings, with the aim to develop a moral sentiment in the masses, so called *dawah* (mission, preaching), is much emphasised by party representatives: “(T)he right way is to preach, to tell the people that ‘this is the right way’”.¹ Not least the abundant party literature “on different departments of life” is an important tool in this work.²

That *dawah* is a task both for the party organisation *per se* and for the individual members is clear. According to the constitution of the party, “(i)t is obligatory for every member of the party to present, generally the creed and mission of the party … to his circle of acquaintance and, as far as he can reach, to the people … and invite those who are ready to struggle to join the discipline of the Party of Islam”.³ This emphasis on the preaching of the party message is present on the ideal and strategic level, as well as in practice. However, there are indications that the actual behaviour in this regard does not meet the high standards set by the party: “(In preaching) we have not performed very well”, even if such activities take place.⁴

Also general educational activities (not only focused on religion) are important, ideally, strategically and in practice. The value of general education is emphasised in party documents: “Education is an important corner-stone of the Islamic system. Pursuit of knowledge is obligatory for all Muslims, including knowledge of skills, crafts and vocations”.⁵ Also in practice, the importance of general education is emphasised and the party “arrange(s) schools (with religious as well as general education) in the village(s) … for the poor people”.⁶ According to party representative Malik, Malik, there are“(a)bout 2000 centres of education working all over the country”.⁷ Especially the primary schools (“one class–one teacher schools”) are considered important. These are “(n)o religious schools, (but) the same

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¹ Munir, 22 February, 1999.
³ Article 9 of the constitution.
⁶ Iqbal, 3 April, 2000.
⁷ Malik, 3 April, 2000.
At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties

schools. The curriculum we teach is the national curriculum. But with some more emphasis on moral aspects.¹ Even if there are no universities run by the party yet, such are planned for.²

Through these schools the party thus hopes to reach out to people and establish external linkage, something which would help them further their objectives. By placing such an emphasis on education in its outreach activities, the Party of Islam to a large extent resembles the ideal typical mass integration party – on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice.

Apart from educational activities, various social and welfare activities are very important in the Party of Islam, ideally, strategically and in practice. Also in this regard, there are clear resemblances with the ideal typical mass integration party. The party (or bodies ancillary to it) extends help to the poor and needy and offers social service and medical aid.³ That such welfare activities are not only planned for but actually carried out in practice is vouched for by party representatives.⁴

Different kinds of support are provided: “(T)hose people who have no home … we build (a) home for them; (…) if their home is very small, so we enlarge that; (…) we arrange marriages (weddings) for (those) who are deserving; (…) we try our best to establish business for them, so that they can stand on their feet … we try our best to arrange jobs for them in different private organisations; (…) those people who have to pay loans … we arrange that loan … we give them money to pay their loan … (without further requirements); (…) we arrange monthly scholarships for the needy people – widows, orphans, injured people, or different patients, old men and women and children who cannot do any job and … need support and government is not supporting them; (…) and finally we support in this way

¹ Matin, 27 March, 2000. The party moreover trains “teachers who are teaching in private schools … and also … school principals” and it “open(s) … different vocational institutions … for girls” (Iqbal, 3 April, 2000). There is further a school at the party headquarters in Mansura, Lahore (Markaz Ulum-al-Islamia, Center for Islamic Education), which according to the website offers an eight-year programme and has presently 200 students on its roll (www.jamaat.org, “Institutions”).
³ According to party representative Iqbal, either the needy people contact the party, or the party contacts the needy people to receive such help. In either case, there is a specific procedure for people to be considered for welfare measures. “If anybody comes to us … first we judge if his case is a problem and then we support him according to the situation. (…) (S)econdly, we also visit the homes … and then we assess their problems and then accordingly we give them support” (Iqbal, 3 April, 2000).
⁴ For example Iqbal, 3 April, 2000, Firdaus, 29 March, 2000, and Matin, 27 March, 2000, refer to these activities.
that we see (if) there is any special problem in the family. If so, we assess that problem and then we give them support … (if) they need clothes, food, everything. So we give them”.\footnote{Iqbal, 3 April, 2000.}

According to party representative Iqbal, “(i)t is our … way to contact the people … through welfare”.\footnote{Iqbal, 3 April, 2000.}

Also the women’s wing of the party carries out a wide range of activities. These activities include welfare activities\footnote{Apart from these welfare activities, Iqbal cites numerous others like help in all sorts of ways during natural disasters, like earthquakes and cyclones, building hospitals, supporting people in jail. Other activities include provision of jobs and other sources of income, medical care and legal aid, according to Firdaus. The women’s wing or its departments also organises lectures, discussions and big rallies (Firdaus, 29 March, 2000, Qazi, 4 April, 2000). There are also more informal meetings and programmes for the children (Firdaus, 29 March, 2000). The women also gather for religious festivals, funerals and weddings (Ahmed, 22 February, 1999), and pursue different campaigns, like literacy campaigns and book-reading campaigns (Qazi, 4 April, 2000). In this context, an activity that the Party of Islam does not carry out, should be noted. The party does not operate mosques as a way to establish external linkage, in the way other religious parties in Pakistan do. The reason for this is that: “The Party of Islam generally has avoided to be labelled or to be part of … sectarian thinking” (Rahman, 10 April, 2000).} educational activities\footnote{For example in the Islamic Educational Project (including Quranic classes for women, Firdaus, 29 March, 2000), the Baithak (drawing-room) school, which is a “study aid project for the children, those children who cannot pay for the schooling” (Firdaus, 29 March, 2000) and schools and colleges for girls (these schools teach general subjects, as well as English and Islam in two-year courses (Ahmed, 22 February, 1999, Qazi, 4 April, 2000, Firdaus, 29 March, 2000, www.jamaat.org, “Women’s Wing”).} and social activities\footnote{For example in the Working Women Welfare organisation, which “is mainly for the working women… In that w e… arrange seminars and lectures, for their education. Social and religious education” (Firdaus, 29 March, 2000).}

Outside observers substantiate that the party carries out this wide range of activities on a long-term basis in practice. According to Nadeem, “the Party of Islam … work all the year… It is … organised and … scientific in its approach… (The party does) a lot of activities. As a religious-political party, they contact people in religious affairs. (It has) campaigns (and it has) established a Quranic study circle throughout the country, in residential areas particularly”.\footnote{Nadeem, 14 March, 2000.} Shah agrees, “they even provide dowry to the poor people, at the time of their marriages … (a)nd other social services during periods of calamities”.\footnote{Shah, 22 March, 2000. Haider states the same thing: “The Party of Islam runs clinics and}
activities all year around, the Party of Islam thus to a great extent resembles the ideal typical mass integration party.

In this context, it is important to note that the same kinds of activities could be utilised in a clientelistic manner; there could be a clientelistic logic underlying the extensive welfare programmes carried out by the Party of Islam. Indeed, as noted in previous chapters, it can be difficult to draw the line between “welfare” activities of mass integration kind and “service” activities of clientelistic kind. However, we saw earlier that party representatives and outside observers agree that the primary objective for these activities in the Party of Islam is ideological, not pragmatic. The activities are performed in order to draw the masses into the party and to make for a basic reform of society, not primarily to make people vote for the party, in return to services rendered. As also discussed earlier, one cannot discard, however, the presence of a clientelistic logic, which may manifest itself in these activities to establish external linkage. But for most parts, the activities of welfare character are carried out according to a mass integration logic in the Party of Islam.

All these far-ranging activities of mass integration character obviously have to be funded. To be able to fund all the activities, one important task of the party is to collect money. This is done in various ways and, interestingly, this fundraising provides the party with yet another opportunity to establish external linkage. Thus, in its efforts to collect money for its activities, the Party of Islam establishes linkage to the population. One example of this practice is the collection of sheep hides from the general public during the religious holiday (Eid-ul-Azha), when a lot of sheep are slaughtered. The public also pay the religious tax, zakat, and other contributions to the party. By collecting this money, the Party of Islam thus raises funds and establishes external linkage at the same time.

Apart from educational, social and funding activities, also more political activities are on the programme of the Party of Islam, ideally, strategically and in practice. According to party representative Matin, dispensaries … they do all sorts of things. And they have been doing it for a long, long time. And I don’t think that any other party has done it that way” (Haider, 3 April, 2000). Mahmood, 6 April, 2000 and Nasr, 1994: 91, passim, also refer to this kind of activities.

“(e)very month, we have a meeting (and) we call everyone there… We invite everybody, not in the party, (but) the general public, living in the vicinity… And we try to tell them: ‘Look, this is the base principles that we should stick to; these are the good things, these are the bad things’. And this we do everywhere. And I don’t know how many people we have reached by now, but according to our report, during the last 5 years, we have reached each and every home of Islamabad district’.\textsuperscript{1} Continuous activities of this kind more political also take place, just like in an ideal typical mass integration party.

The Party of Islam further exercises extensive and diverse campaigning activities through publications, mass gatherings and individual contacts with citizens: both between elections and in times of elections. Particularly, the party leader (Qazi Hussein Ahmad) is to keep a very high profile through such activities: "Within the country, Qazi Hussein Ahmad remains continuously in movement, undertaking (a) ceaseless campaign of mass awareness (and) mobilization”.\textsuperscript{2}

Also mass media is to be extensively used as an arena to proclaim the message of the party, in times of election as well as between elections. The media office of the party is to be active in informing the media of the doings of the party on a long-term basis.\textsuperscript{3}

In ensuring a continuous presence in the public debate, the Party of Islam thus again to a great extent resembles an ideal typical party of mass integration, ideally and strategically. That this ideal and strategy also are carried out in practice is vouched for by party representatives and outside observers. Thus, the executive editor of the English daily The News, Syed Talat Hussain, testifies to the active media strategy of the Party of Islam: “Oh, yes, they call, they come here… (Indeed) the Party of Islam’s pictures are published more frequently than any other party leader’s picture in The News, except General Musharraf’s pictures”.\textsuperscript{4} Also other outside observers state that the party’s media strategy is successful: “(T)hey (have) established themselves fairly strongly in the press”.\textsuperscript{5} To this effect, the party itself also

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\textsuperscript{1}Matin, 27 March, 2000.  
\textsuperscript{2}www.jamaat.org. “Leadership: Qazi Hussein Ahmad”.  
\textsuperscript{3}The media accessible to the Party of Islam is the press. Television is largely closed and controlled by the government (Jafar, 3 April, 2000). Outside observer Hussain, 28 March, 2000, states the same thing.  
\textsuperscript{4}Hussain, 28 March, 2000.  
\textsuperscript{5}Waseem, 7 April, 2000.
Apart from different more or less continuous campaigning activities, also more short-term activities of campaigning character are carried out, not least on different policy issues. One example of such a campaign is the nation-wide “referendum” on the CTBT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (not favoured by the Party of Islam), that took place at the time of the fieldwork for this study, in February 2000. By such activities, the party aims at making its presence felt (and its policies known) to the population at large.

Not least the party’s women’s wing is performing massive campaigning activities among the Pakistani women, especially in times of elections, according to a representative of the women’s wing: “Our major project is … (that) we meet the people in the election campaign… (In) the election campaign … most work is done by women… (F)rom morning to night we meet people, we arrange corner meetings … (we carry out) door-to-door campaign”.3

Elections are thus important for party: “We use election campaigns as a big source to communicate the message of Islam to people… To awaken the people and to tell them about Islam”.4 During election campaigns, the party stages “corner meetings … arrange(s) processions (and) rallies. There is a message and communication to people … throughout the country”.5 At times of election, the party thus carries out much the same activities as they do between elections, but “(d)uring elections, we speed up our activities”,

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1 Among the party’s own publications are the monthly *Tarjuman ul Quran* (A Commentator of *Quran*) and the weekly Asia, both directed primarily to party members, the daily *Jasarat* (Courage) and a weekly called Friday Special, both more focused on daily politics and *Aain* (Constitution), which discusses scholarly issues (Jafar, 3 April, 2000). There is also a monthly newsletter in Arabic, called *al-Mansoorah*. Further, each of the ancillary organisations has its own magazine (Munir, 22 February, 1999).

2 In the referendum, party workers went from door to door and asked people to vote for or against the CTBT. Ballot stations were also set up everywhere in the country. According to party representative Matin, 14-15 million ballots were collected, and out of them 95% were against the CTBT (Matin, 27 March, 2000). Another example of such a campaign was the demonstrations against the visit by the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee that took place in Lahore in February 1999.

3 Qazi, 4 April, 2000. That the women do most of the work during the elections is not agreed to by a male party representative, however; “(women are active in elections), but not as much as the men” (Malik, 3 April, 2000).


5 T Khan, 28 March, 2000. Other kinds of activities that the party performs in times of elections are “meetings, public lectures and distribution of literature” (Munir, 22 February, 1999). Malik continues: “(W)e convey our program to the common people … we go door-to-door (and) meet the people … (to) try to educate the people…” (Malik, 3 April, 2000).
and “(e)verybody is doing more during elections”.  

Outside observers agree that the Party of Islam is very active in pursuing campaigning activities, both between elections and in times of election. The party is particularly good at campaigns and demonstrations in the streets: “The reason the Party of Islam is better on the streets is because it is better disciplined. It has the work cadres, the people and it has the experience… When they want to be peaceful, they are very well disciplined, if they want to have a fight, they will have a fight”. All these activities of campaigning character have rendered the Party of Islam “immense street power”, which bestows them with a certain “nuisance value”, according to many outside observers.

Also regarding campaigning activities, the Party of Islam thus in many ways resemble an ideal typical party of mass integration, ideally, strategically and in practice. The party performs a wide range of long-term as well as short-term propaganda activities, acted out between as well as in time of elections.

Taken together, the Party of Islam thus largely resembles an ideal typical mass integration party, ideally and strategically, regarding activities to establish external linkage. For most parts, as we have seen, these activities are also carried out in practice.

Sometimes, however, the party does not succeed in performing the planned activities: “Admittedly, the ideal position is that whatever is planned, … should be 100 per cent observed. But it is not always like that”. There are further different rates of success in different kinds of activities, according to party representative Rahman: “(W)hen it (the activity) is issue-oriented, the success-ratio is higher. When it is not related to a particular issue, rather it is a regular activity, naturally the success-ratio … the achievement ratio is somewhat less”. An outside analyst substantiates this

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4 Adding to this impression is the fact that all the activities are closely monitored and evaluated (Matin, 27 March, 2000).
5 Rahman, 10 April, 2000.
6 Rahman, 10 April, 2000. The party also feels that there are financial restraints in achieving the activities visualised on ideal and strategic level: “The Party of Islam has a lot of manpower and it has among this manpower all kinds of capabilities. Whatever it would have liked to do, it (would) be in a position to do – if it (had had) financial resources matching for those tasks” (Rahman, 10 April, 2000).
picture: “Now (it seems as the party is) all the time in the streets. (This is) not really true. That activity catches the eye, make headlines. Routine activities (such as Qur'anic classes, religious-moral and social service programmes) do not catch the eye, make headlines”.

There are further indications that the party is less happy with its performance in times of election. In the own analysis, this is primarily due to a lack of resources. According to party representative Munir, “(w)e have not reached so many voters. When we go to them, they accept our policies, they accept our points, they say it is good. But we cannot reach to every person. It is because of the resource problem”.

Even if the Party of Islam feels that it cannot reach the high standards set in the ideal and strategy when it comes to what activities it is to carry out in order to establish external linkage, the party on the whole is quite content with the work carried out: “(G)enerally it (the level of activity) is very satisfying. (…) The Party of Islam feels that it is one of its strengths”.

Thus, regarding what activities it carries out to establish external linkage, the Party of Islam comes close to the ideal typical mass integration party, both ideally, strategically and in practice, even if there are some indications of clientelistic traits as well in practice.

In summary, the Party of Islam is thus a party which carries out continuous and long-term activities. It presents activities of different kinds, political and ideological as well as social and welfare activities. These activities are ultimately designed to call the people at large and make them change their opinions and attitudes, making them favour the ideals of the party and thus work for the Islamic reform of society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities to establish external linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
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<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
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<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Party of Islam. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

1 Ansari, 20 February, 1999.
3 Rahman, 10 April, 2000.
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Target of Party Efforts to Establish External Linkage

Regarding its activities to establish external linkage, the Party of Islam thus in many ways resemble the ideal typical mass integration party. Contrary to the ideal typical mass integration party, however, the Party of Islam does not appeal to a specific group in society. Instead, it has “put down roots among various social strata”.¹ The Party of Islam was originally against populism and had no intention of reaching out to the population at large. In this way, it reminded of a party of integration. At that time, it was a party with “small attendance and high-brow programmes”². According to outside analyst Hussein, the party at that time attempted “to have enough support in the establishment and state structure. Instead of targeting the social structure, they targeted the state structure; and they (were) able to penetrate deep and wide into the state structure”.³

Over time, however, the Party of Islam has changed its approach, as we have seen. Today it aims at broadening its support base. Therefore, the party appeals to diverse groups, even if some traces of the “old” approach remain.⁴ Ideally, strategically and in practice, the party thus primarily approaches all different groups in society, including people of different religious affiliations and indeed different religions: “(O)ur invitation is for all people…”.⁵ For instance, party representative Iqbal, speaking about the relief efforts carried out by the party, states that these efforts “are for all the people, all the people. Either they belong to our religion or not… There are so many Christians in Punjab, and also there are Hindus. So we must go to everybody. (---) Our target is to reach every person, every person”.⁶

That the party approaches all, and not particular groups, is vouched for by outside observers. Ziauddin states that the party “is not appealing to any specific (Islamic group)… (A)mong the religious parties, it is the most secular religious party. It is appealing to all … Shias and Sunnis, and

¹ Nasr, 1994: 47.
² Ansari, 20 February, 1999.
⁴ Thus, one party representative claims that the party targets “the influential…So that their influence can be used for the propagation for the politics” (Malik, 3 April, 2000).
⁵ Munir, 3 April, 2000. In bringing about the Islamic revolution, the women is seen as especially important by the Party of Islam, “the Pakistani woman (stands as) the last fortress of Islam”, according to the party (www.jamaat.org, “Women’s Wing”). Not least women are thus targeted by the party.
The party however not only directs its attention at people of different creeds, it also appeals to people regardless of their political belongings or social status. One party representative for instance state that “(e)ducation (is) given to all children regardless of (the) parents’ party. (Because) children are innocent”.\(^1\) According to another party representative, “we go to poor, middle and the elite class”.\(^3\)

That the party disregards any divisions in society is substantiated by outside observers. Nadeem states that “they address everyone… (It is) a national party … (it) addresses all the people without discrimination”.\(^4\) Bashir agrees and asserts that “I think that they would help anybody who is sick… They’ll help anybody…”.\(^5\)

In this regard, the Party of Islam thus to a great degree resembles primarily an ideal typical catch-all party, which appeals to all, and not an ideal typical integration party, that appeals only to a well-defined group in society. To approach all is thus the basic stance of the party, ideally and strategically. According to the website of the party, the aim is “…to reach out to all those persons who are disposed to righteousness, and are inclined to work for the establishment and who yearn to establish a noble and upright human society. Such persons should be identified…”, no matter where they are.\(^6\) This wide approach is also, as we have seen, the basic practice of the party.

In their drive to approach all, \textit{different} party people however appeal to \textit{different} segments in society. As one party representative asserts, “being a scientist myself, I have very little contact with the general mass. So my horizon is mostly educated people, dealing in science and … in education. But … other members, who belong to that strata, they are working among themselves”.\(^7\) The party also “arranges programmes according to (the) intelligence level (of the targeted group)”.\(^8\) The party thus designs its

\(^1\) Ziauddin, 20 February, 1999. Mahmood agrees that “the Party of Islam … is not a sectarian party. They have been trying to make a larger appeal to all the sects” (Mahmood, 6 April, 2000).
\(^3\) T Khan, 28 March, 2000.
\(^5\) Bashir, 6 April, 2000. Babaar contends that “(t)hey try and target everybody, but … where their main control is, is maybe on the village level” (Baabar, 23 February, 1999).
\(^6\) www.jamaat.org “Strategy for Change”.
\(^7\) Matin, 27 March, 2000.
\(^8\) Ahmed, 22 February, 1999. Firdaus gives examples of what activities are arranged for what
activities with the targeted group in mind. This is something noted also by outside analysts: “(The Party of Islam) talks to people according to their intellectual level”.

Even if the party thus aims at targeting all groups in society, ideally, strategically and in practice, the party in fact manages to reach some segments more than others, at least with certain activities. For example, party representative Rahman states that “much of the (party) introduction has been through its literature. So when there is illiteracy, you will not be reaching those”. The party also in other contexts refer to the fact that it has been able to reach educated groups to a larger extent than other groups: “The movement has significantly influenced the educated classes but its influence on the common mass of people deserved to be extended broadly”. Party representative Munir also refers to this fact: “Our first point is the educated people … but we address every section of the people”. Party representative Malik is however more pronounced in his emphasis on the importance of educated groups. According to him, the party goes to “engineers, educationalists, lawyers … business men … to convince them”, even if he also points to the wider approach: “We go to other peoples too, to common people…”.

Thus, even if the predominant ideal, strategy and practice of the Party of Islam is to target all people in society, some traits of a particular targeting are present in practice.

That the Party of Islam approaches educated people to a larger extent than other groups in practice is pointed to by outside observers. However, Baabar asserts that the party tends to “not target very highly educated people”, but rather the educated middle classes. According to Waseem, “(it is) the relatively conservative sections of the middle class, and usually the

groups (Firdaus, 29 March, 2000).

1 Rafi, 14 April, 2000.
2 Rahman, 10 April, 2000. In this context it should be remembered that it is only 35 to 50 per cent of the population that actually can read .
4 Examples are “women, students, female students, teachers, farmers, labour, transport labour, train labour, poets, writers, journalists…lawyers, judges…doctors, engineers…” (Munir, 22 February, 1999).
5 Malik, 3 April, 2000. Rahman, 17 February, 1999, also emphasises educated groups, not least in cities: “I think the Party of Islam has most support in urban areas. The reason is, you see, wherever you will find education, you will find independent thinking of the people”.
small-town based lower middle class, which (is) the target area.\(^1\) That the same course of action is taken by the women’s wing is evidenced by party representative Firdaus. While some activities, like the Quronic classes and training programmes, are for all the women “whoever likes to come and wants to learn about Islam”, other activities are more specialised, like different seminars and lectures.\(^2\) These are “(f)or a bit educated class”.\(^3\) But the welfare services provided by the women’s wing is “for everybody”.\(^4\)

In this context, it can be noted that it indeed also is in the educated middle classes that the Party of Islam has been most successful. According to outside observers, the party has “some kind of attraction over the middle classes, (the) educated middle classes… (Particularly) they pick up (educated) youngsters”.\(^5\)

Thus, even if the main approach is to reach all in society, the Party of Islam to some extent tends to focus its activities on groups where they are successful. This could indicate that there is an electoral side, especially of clientelistic character, to the targeting of particular groups.

On the other hand, there are indications that the groups which are particularly targeted are selected on ideological grounds. On the website of the party, it is for instance stated that establishment of external linkage is for the Party of Islam a step in the process of bringing about “change in society by reforming it in light of Islamic teachings”.\(^6\) This is to be realised “through a group of people dedicated to the cause of Islam, or at least having an Islamic orientation and a concern for the well-being of human society. They are motivated to take the initiative and spend their time, effort and resources to bring about maximal healthy societal change”.\(^7\) It is such people people that the party is interested in establishing external linkage to. On the basis of this, it could be argued that people with such characteristics are more likely to be found in the educated middle classes than anywhere else.\(^8\)

Thus, in this case the tendency to target specific groups, present in the Party

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\(^1\) Waseem, 7 April, 2000.
\(^3\) Firdaus, 29 March, 2000.
\(^6\) www.jamaat.org. “Strategy for Change”.
\(^7\) www.jamaat.org. “Strategy for Change”.
\(^8\) Outside observers note that the middle classes tend to be more religious than other groups (Hussain, 28 March, 2000, Ziauddin, 20 February, 1999, Waseem, 7 April, 2000).
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of Islam, is likely to be similar to that in an ideal typical mass integration party. Just like in an ideal typical mass integration group, a particular group is targeted for ideological reasons.¹

The ideal and strategy of the Party of Islam is thus to target all, with most of its activities to establish external linkage, like an ideal typical electoral party of catch-all character. Also in practice, the party primarily tries to reach all, even if the ideal has not been carried out to full extent. Indeed, the Party of Islam has reached some, seemingly ideologically defined, groups more than others. To some extent, ideal typical mass integration traits thus are present regarding the target of the party’s activities to establish external linkage in practice. However, since these groups are also groups where the Party of Islam have been successful, one cannot rule out a clientelistic element to this targeting. For most parts, however, the Party of Islam aims at going to all, also in practice, as an ideal typical catch-all party.

Table 6:10. Traits in the target of the activities to establish external linkage of the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
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Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Party of Islam. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

¹In this context, it should however be noted that establishment of schools by the party is mostly carried out in illiterate areas, and not primarily in urban areas. This testifies to the basic approach of appealing to all, regardless of education or anything else (Iqbal, 3 April, 2000). Party representatives indeed claim that they especially focus on villages. The reason for this is that the government facilities there are perceived as having large shortcomings: "(T)here are so many facilities available (in the cities). People have … their private schools, government schools... But in the village(s) … there are government schools, but there is no standard. So we give them standard education in the village(s) … very cheaply" (Iqbal, 3 April, 2000). Also according to a brochure, the party is “(w)orking in the field of education in rural and underdeveloped regions of Pakistan where the facilities of education are comparatively less functional” (“Baithak School. Learn and Teach”). However, one outside analyst; Ziauddin, 20 February, 1999, claims that this is not true. Indeed, the party has no activities in the villages; “They cannot simply go into the villages” the reason for this is, according to Ziauddin, that they have no support there (Ziauddin, 20 February, 1999). Whether this is so is difficult to establish. It is however clear that the ambition of the Party of Islam is to reach all people, also those in villages.
Performers of Activities to Establish External Linkage

The Party of Islam has a very elaborate organisation – it is organised on national, provincial, divisional, district and local levels.¹ The main part of the work to establish external linkage is carried out at the district levels of the party, i.e. in cities and villages, at least ideally and strategically. In practice, these branches are not evenly spread throughout the country: “We have our branches in (the) countryside, but not in every town. So it is a major problem for us, and we are trying to reach there”.² Despite this, the Party of Islam considers its organisation to be the most developed in the country: “(The Party of Islam) has a grass-root organisation which is incomparable to any other organisation in the country. And … this grass-root organisation is very homogeneous”.³ Outside analysts generally agree that the organisation of the Party of Islam is elaborate and nationally diffused.⁴

In describing how the activities are carried out in the districts, Iqbal states that “in every city … there are parts of the city… In every part, there is (a) unit, and there is a team working”.⁵ According to party representative Rahman, “the grass-root unit is expected to perform several activities. These activities include some dawah activities, some training activities, some welfare activities and some social activities as well … and when there (are) elections or something else, they are also expected to perform the political activities in that particular period. So with all these kinds of activities they have to interact with the people living in their particular village or in their particular locality. (…) It is almost similar all … over the country”.⁶

Thus, according to Rahman, “the district organisation is responsible to spread the working, they contact with the people and … organise activities in the district. But they (the district levels) have again subsidiary organisations, in the cities as well as in the villages. At this grass-root level, they organise various kinds of activities”.⁷

But not only the lower levels of the organisation are important for carrying out activities to establish external linkage. Also the central level is important in this regard, especially when it comes to activities that are more

¹ Part IV-VII of the constitution.
³ Rahman, 10 April, 2000.
⁶ Rahman, 10 April, 2000.
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related to current affairs or political activity.¹

Indeed, the party views the different organisational levels as equally important in running the activities of the party. According to party representative Malik, the “central and the districts … are very important”.² Party representative Munir puts it metaphorically: “When you fly in a plane, you can’t say that the front part is important, the middle is important of the last (part) is important. They are all parts of the whole”.³

The Party of Islam thus has a very diversified organisation on different levels. This fact and the fact that particular emphasis is put on the (equivalent of) the branch in carrying out outreach activities makes the party to a large extent resemble the ideal typical mass integration party, regarding the performer of activities to establish external linkage, ideally, strategically – but also in practice.

Also the importance of members in carrying out activities testifies to the resemblance with the mass integration party. Members are very important in the work to establish external linkage in the Party of Islam: “Members are our workers. They act according to our policies and communicate to people. We reach people through our members, through our representatives…, through our leaders at all levels”.⁴

Apart from the main party organisation with its different levels and active members, there are further very active affiliate and ancillary organisations attached to the Party of Islam. As we have seen, the party has one important affiliate organisation – the women’s wing – which is to target women and children in particular.

The women’s wing, in turn, has a host of different organisations and departments connected to it, like for example al-Khidmat (Women), the Islamic Educational Project, the Working Women Welfare Organisation, the Women Aid Trust, and Al Hafizaat Trust (for helpless, powerless and defenceless girls & women).⁵

² Malik, 3 April, 2000 (emphasis added).
⁴ T Khan, 28 March, 2000. On the women members in the party, particular obligations to work for the establishment external linkage are put. They should “convey the party’s creed and mission to her family and circle of acquaintance … propagate this to her husband, parents, brothers and sisters and other family members … (and) … try to kindle the light of faith in the hearts of her children” (article 10 of the constitution).
⁵ Firdaus, 29 March, 2000. According to the women’s wing itself, “(t)he circle for women can genuinely claim to be the largest, most influential, and the most organized body of Pakistani women” (An introduction to the Women Circle, p 1).
There is also a youth, or student, organisation connected to the party. This organisation is so close to the party that it is often considered – by outsiders – as affiliate to it, even if there are no organic connections between the student organisation and the party. This is the Islamic Student Organisation (for male students; Islami Jamiat-e Talaba, IJT). This organisation works mainly with “dawah activities on the campus, education activities and welfare activities”. It works through the universities and in other ways to reach out to the youth.

This student organisation is often regarded as the most active – and effective – part of the party, not least when it comes to activities to establish external linkage. This is substantiated not least by outside observers. Nasr, for instance, writes that the Islamic Student Organisation is “a decisive means for expanding the social base of the party”. Baabar states that the party’s “real strength is their student wing... It has always been the militant wing of the Party of Islam”. Parallel to the male Islamic Student Organisation, there is also a student organisation for female students (Islami Jamiat Talibat).

Moreover, there are numerous more specialised departments in the Party of Islam, departments that are ancillary to the party and thus have an independent set-up, even if they share ideology with the party: “(The party has) a host of affiliated, semi-autonomous institutions, (which) despite standing apart from the Party of Islam’s official organisation, greatly contribute to (the) party’s reach in society”. These ancillary organisations –

1 According to party representative Munir, “(t)hey have 100 000 workers, they have their own president, they have their own system, structure, constitution, offices, system of elections. They stand with us in ideology, but (their) functioning is independent” (Munir, 22 February, 1999).

2 Rahman, 10 April, 2000.


4 Nasr, 1994: 74. Mahmood, 6 April, 2000, and Abbas, 4 April, 2000, state the same thing.

5 Baabar, 23 February, 1999. It may further be noted that Baabar asserts that the student organisation is “very heavily armed” (Baabar, 23 February, 1999). This view is substantiated by outside analyst Mahmood, who claims that the Islamic Student Organisation at least used to have “full control over the campus ... (and that) they had access to arms, and they were quite prepared to use violence” (Mahmood, 6 April, 2000). This allegation is however heavily refuted by party representatives: “(Violence) is not allowed in the teachings of Islam. Violence, torture, underground activities, it is not part of true Islam. That is something else, that is not jihad” (Munir, 22 February, 1999).

6 www.jamaat.org. “Basic Facts”. Munir, 22 February, 1999, states the same thing. Examples are Islamic Publications in Lahore and bodies like the Islamic Research Academy, Karachi” (www.jamaat.org. “Basic Facts”). Other organisations include for example educational trusts (like the al-Ghazali Education Trust), foundations for needy people (like the Shabada Islam
– which are founded by the party, but not part of the structure of the party – are of two different kinds. The first kind deals with propagation and publications, the second deals with *dawah* and professional activities among specialised groups. It is primarily these organisations that carry out the social and welfare work of the party, referred to earlier.1 According to party representative Munir, there are also 19 different departments in party, with the objective of addressing specific groups.2

The presence of this wide range of bodies is vouched for by outside observers as well, who point to the importance of these organs in reaching out to new people. Through the activities of these organisations, “people who are not sympathisers come to know about (the party), (and) come closer to the Party of Islam; (they) come to take an interest in the ideology of the Party of Islam”.3 The party also uses these organisations for specific purposes: “When the Party of Islam does not want to come out directly, they come out via student organisations, labour organisations, farmer organisations”.4

There are also labour unions, active in different professional fields,

1 Iqbal, 3 April, 2000.
2 Among them are, except the “department for women, departments for students, female students, teachers, farmers, labour, transport labour, train labour, poets, writers, journalists … lawyers, judges … doctors, engineers” (Munir, 22 February, 1999). It is not clear whether Munir here refers to actual departments in the party, or to the different ancillary organisations. It is likely that he confuses the two categories. In that case, this would further attest to the close relationship between the party and the organisations. In a directory of “organizations and associations conforming with the Party of Islam” published on the website ([www.jamaat.org](http://www.jamaat.org), “Directory”) the following organisations are presented: *Jamiat-e Ittehadul Ulema* (religious scholars), *Islami Jamiat-e Talaba* (boy students), *Islami Jamiat-e Talibat* (girl students), *Islami Jamiat-e Wukala* (lawyers), *Kisan board* (farmers), *Jamiat-e-Talaba Arabia* (religious boy students), Pakistan Business Forum (business community), Homeopathic Islamic Association (homeo doctors), *Tahrik-e Mehnat* (factory workers), National Labour Federation (industrial labourers), PASH Forum (agric-scientist). Other “sister organisations” are *Shahab-e-Milli Pakistan* (youth organisation), *Tanzeem-e-Asatiza Pakistan* (professors and teachers), Pakistan Islamic Medical Associations (doctors), Pakistan Engineering Forum (engineers), PAIGHAM (power department labour) and PIASI (air transport workers), according to information from the party. Party representatives Munir, 22 February, 1999 and Matin, 27 March, 2000, also refer to a wide range of organisations. Interestingly, such organisations, especially those carrying out welfare, are regarded as having dual functions – they both attract those who wants to help and those helped. This idea is outlined in a booklet on *al-Khidmat Trust* (women) (Brochure, “Al-Khidmat Trust (Women)”).
3 Rafi, 14 April, 2000. Haider, 3 April, 2000, states the same thing.
4 Rafi, 14 April, 2000.
that are connected to the Party of Islam. Such unions “act both to propagate
the message of Islam among specific groups and to consolidate the Party of
Islam’s power through union activity, especially among new social groups
that have been born of industrial change in Pakistan… Most important are
the peasant, labour and student unions”.

The views of outside observers regarding the party’s labour unions however differ. According to one outside observer, “they are not very effective in the trade unions”. Another analyst however states that “(they have) very strong labour unions … especially in railways”.

The Party of Islam has developed a diversified and extensive network
of organisations to perform the wide variety of activities to establish external
linkage. This network is made up both of the main party organisation and
organisations affiliate and ancillary to it. In this regard, the Party of Islam
comes very close to the ideal typical mass integration party on ideal and
strategic level as well as in practice, when it comes to the performers of
activities to establish external linkage.

Table 6:11. Traits regarding the performer of the activities to establish external linkage of the
Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performer</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the
Party of Islam. D: Dominating trait.

Conclusions Regarding the Establishment of External Linkage

All in all, the Party of Islam to a great extent resembles an ideal typical party
of mass integration party, when it comes to its efforts to establish external
linkage. In almost all aspects, the party complies with the ideal typical
description in this respect. It presents long-term and continuous activities of
political and ideological as well as social character, it presents short-term
activities of campaigning character, and the activities are carried out by the
central headquarters, and the local branches as well as by organisations both

3. Abbas, 4 April, 2000.
affiliate and ancillary to the party. The activities are further not only devised on ideal and strategic level of the party – they are indeed acted out in practice as well, if to slightly lesser degree than planned for. It may be noted, however, that the presence of a clientelistic logic cannot be discarded entirely regarding the activities to establish external linkage in practice; but clientelistic traits are far from dominating.

Only in one respect the Party of Islam deviates from the ideal typical mass integration party type, regarding its efforts to establish external linkage – it aims at reaching out to all. When it comes to the target of the activities, the Party of Islam thus more resembles an electoral party of ideal typical catch-all variety, than one of ideal typical mass integration kind, even if there are traits of mass integration as well as clientelistic character in practice as well. The dominating traits when it comes to the efforts of the party of Islam to establish external linkage are presented in the table below.

Table 6:12. The full picture of the Party of Islam’s effort to establish external linkage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishing external linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the Party of Islam’s efforts to establish external linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

Returning to the theoretical expectations, it may thus be concluded that the efforts to establish external linkage in the Party of Islam to a large extent are in line with the predictions. The major expectation is that the Party of Islam should organise like a mass integration party, in line with its orientation. As we have seen, the Party of Islam indeed resembles primarily the mass integration party, when it comes to the activities to establish external linkage, and the performers that carry them out. Regarding the target however there seems to be an exception to this pattern. In this respect, the Party of Islam more resembles an ideal typical catch-all party. However, we should remember that there is a catch-all trait in the linkage objective – and the orientation – of the Party of Islam. This trait may account for the catch-all trait regarding the target of the activities, in line with the theoretical expectations. I will return to this outcome in the concluding section of this
chapter.

Maintaining External Linkage

Activities to Maintain External Linkage

The activities performed by the Party of Islam to maintain the external linkage, i.e. to maintain contacts with those persons that the party has succeeded in establishing linkage to, are largely the same as those used by the party to establish external linkage. Thus, both the wide range of long-term and continuous activities of political and ideological as well as social and welfare character described in detail earlier, and the more short-term activities of propaganda and campaign character, have the function of maintaining external linkage. In this sense, these activities are put to dual use – first they attract new people, then they hopefully make them stay. That this is the case on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice in the Party of Islam, is agreed on by party representatives as well as by outside observers.¹

Even if this is so, some activities are designed particularly to maintain external support. In this respect, it is especially the weekly Quranic classes that are important, according to party representative Qazi. According to her, the party maintains contacts "by the Quran classes, the weekly … like sermons".² Through these classes, the party keeps regular contacts with its supporters and continuously discusses issues connected to the ideology of the party. Also other educational efforts, as well as the different welfare arrangements (not least the monthly scholarships for needy people), are crucial for maintaining external linkage.³

That it may be hard to maintain external linkage is vouched for by party representatives. Party representative Malik states that “(m)aintenance is very difficult, at a large scale”.⁴ However, he describes how the party works to succeed in doing so. According to him, maintenance of linkage “is usually done by our workers in the streets… (They are) sitting in the streets (among) the people, he is our main man. He can contact and maintains this … contact”.⁵ Constant presence by the party among supporters is thus

² Qazi, 4 April, 2000.
³ Party representative Iqbal, 3 April, 2000.
⁴ Malik, 3 April, 2000.
⁵ Malik, 3 April, 2000.
regarded as important for maintaining external linkage, and it is the task of party members to ensure such a presence: “(W)e have regular contact with the people, through our members”.

Party representative Rahman points to the diversity of the activities aimed at maintaining external linkage. These activities are adjusted to the particular individual in question, to suit him and his interests: “(I)f someone is joining the dawah activities like the Quranic lessons … it is contact with relations to dawah. And if someone is not joining those activities, but (is) saying that ‘OK, I agree with the working of the Party of Islam and with the objectives of the Party of Islam’, then the local unit workers … will try to keep him in contact through some other means … (like) to ask him ‘OK, if you cannot join us physically, can you donate something?’; OK, he will donate something. So it will be a regular contact when he donates something… Similarly, they may have different campaigns, welfare campaigns … (and) they may ask: ‘OK, if you cannot join us regularly, we are having certain functions, certain activity, in a certain period. So join us in those ways. So that is the way they try to keep contact with maximum number of people”.

Specific activities are thus designed for specific groups of people: “So we have projects for farmers, we have projects for labour, we have projects for teachers, we have projects for students…”

In a booklet form the women’s wing it is further stated that “the organizational function (of the women’s wing) constantly aims at organizing the thousands of women who have been influenced by the party into its organizational folds. It tried to activate them and involve them into the programs of the party”.

These diversified means to keep contact with supporters suggest that it is very important for the party to maintain the external linkage.

Further, newspapers and magazines also form workable tools in maintaining regular contacts to supporters. The party tries to stay connected to its supporters both by a continuous presence in the general media and through party-related media.

The same goes for the recurrent propaganda activities and campaigns carried out by the party – these too serve the function of maintaining the

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2. Rahman, 10 April, 2000, also A A Khan, 3 April, 2000.
contact between the party and its supporters. According to a party representative, “the (election) campaign of the Party of Islam is … (a) step-by-step campaign. Throughout the session, not for the election periods … (in our units), there is (a) constant method of mass contact”.¹

Another activity to maintain external linkage is the large conventions that are held annually or bi-annually by the party. One such big meeting was held in 1998 in Islamabad and it drew a “large assembly of supporters, well over 150 000”². Another convention was held in October 2000, and it was “attended by nearly half a million men and women from across the country”.³ In such meetings, the supporters of the Party of Islam are given an opportunity to meet, and the party is given an opportunity to imbue their supporters with their ideas.

In these respects, the Party of Islam thus again to a great extent resembles an ideal typical mass integration party, regarding the activities it performs to maintain external linkage. Just like in an ideal typical mass integration party, such activities are of long-term as well as short-term character, and they are of ideological and social as well as of campaigning kind.

As we have seen earlier, there are however indications that certain service activities are provided by the Party of Islam as well, such as intercession with government authorities, and “help … to get jobs”.⁴ This indicates that a clientelistic logic not is totally absent from the party’s efforts to maintain external linkage. However, as we also saw previously, the scope of such activities is limited.

Even if there thus are (limited) traits of the ideal typical clientelistic party type, when it comes to what activities the Party of Islam carries out to maintain external linkage, the long-term and continuous work of political/ideological and social character as well as more intermittent activities of campaigning character dominate on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice in the Party of Islam. This makes the Party of Islam to a large extent resemble an ideal typical party of mass integration kind,

³ (www.ijtimaa.org). Also the party women arrange such enormous congregations annually or bi-annually. One such meeting was held in Islamabad in October 1998 and it drew around 100 000 supporters (women and children) (Firdaus, 29 March, 2000), another one was held in Islamabad in August 1999, drawing ”thousands of women” (“Crystals”, undated: 3).
regarding the activities to maintain external linkage.

Table 6:13. Traits in the activities to maintain external linkage of the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Party of Islam. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

**Target of Activities to Maintain External Linkage**

The activities to maintain external linkage are directed at those whom the party has succeeded in establishing a relation to, i.e. the supporters of the party, regardless of race, religion or class. This is so on ideal and strategic level, and in practice. However, as was the case regarding the efforts to establish external linkage, there are indications the party works harder to maintain linkage with some groups in the Pakistani society than with other groups, at least in practice. To some extent, certain supporters thus seem favoured over others. In favouring some groups, the Party of Islam primarily seems to be ideologically motivated, like an ideal typical mass integration party, even if the presence of a clientelistic logic cannot be ruled out.

For most parts, the target of the Party of Islam however resembles that of the ideal typical catch-all party in that it targets all supporters in its activities to maintain external linkage.

Table 6:14. Traits in target of the activities to maintain external linkage of the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Party of Islam. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

1 Party representative Iqbal, 3 April, 2000, states this, as does outside observer Ziauddin, 20 February, 1999.
Performer of Activities to Maintain External Linkage

The same kinds of activities are thus largely utilised first to establish and then to maintain external linkage in the Party of Islam. The same is true for the performer of the activities, i.e. it is largely the same party bodies (or bodies related to the party) that establishes and maintains the linkage to the persons in question, and this is so on ideal as well as strategic level and in practice.

As we saw earlier, the district and local organisations are very important when it comes to carrying out activities to establish external linkage. These branches are also intent on maintaining this linkage.\(^1\) Not least the lowest organisational bodies are important in when it comes to maintaining the external linkage. According to party representative Rahman, “the grass-root unit is expected to perform several activities… So with all these kinds of activities, they have to interact with the people living in their particular village or in their particular locality”.\(^2\) Such interaction is carried out on a long-term basis.

The affiliate and ancillary organisations of the party also play an important role in maintaining external linkage. These organisations provide an opportunity for the supporters to be involved in diverse welfare and other activities, without actually being part of the party. For people who may have doubts about the overall programme of the party, but who sympathise with the party in particular aspects, this might be a suitable arrangement.\(^3\)

It is not least these affiliate and ancillary organisations that are emphasised by outside observers, when discussing how the Party of Islam maintains its contacts with its supporters, especially in practice. Particularly the student organisation connected to the party is perceived as important in this regard.\(^4\) These organisations further serve the function of engaging those people who do not meet the strict requirements to become a member of the party. According to outside observer Mahmood, “those who could not be enrolled in the Party of Islam, could be associated with the various organisations (that) the (party) created”.\(^5\)

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5. Mahmood, 6 April, 2000. We will return to the strict membership criteria soon. In relation to this discussion on the efforts of the Party of Islam to maintain external linkage, it may
Thus, the same organisations (not least affiliate and ancillary) in the Party of Islam that work to establish external linkage, also work to maintain this linkage to people in different ways. Those better off may be maintained through Quranic classes and continuous welfare work, while those worse off may be maintained through provision of different sorts of welfare activities. In this sense, the organisation in question is put to dual use.

To conclude, it can be established that the Party of Islam again largely resembles an ideal typical mass integration party, when it comes to what bodies performs the activities to maintain external linkage. Just like in the mass integration party, such tasks are entrusted to the local branch as well as to affiliate and ancillary organisations in the Party of Islam.

Table 6:15. Traits regarding the performer of the activities to maintain external linkage of the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performer</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Party of Islam. D: Dominating trait.

Conclusions Regarding Efforts to Maintain External Linkage

In all, the Party of Islam very much resembles an ideal typical mass integration party when it comes to what activities are performed to maintain external linkage. Like the ideal typical mass integration party, the Party of Islam works through long-term and continuous activities of political, ideological and social character, as well as through more short-term activities of propaganda and campaigning character. These activities are however be noted that the Party of Islam has succeeded rather poorly in its ambition to maintain contacts with society at large. Outside observer Nasr notes that “while the Party of Islam has done much to create the ‘Islamic vote bank’ in Pakistan, denying membership to its own group of voters has kept it from consolidating the same base of support… It cannot count on affiliates and sympathetic voters, because to ensure their loyalty, it must have some organizational control over them. (…). The strict criteria for membership have so reduced the interactions between the Party of Islam and the society…” (Nasr, 1994: 99). Attempts at improving the situation by devising ancillary organisations with lax membership criteria aiming at organising sympathisers (particularly the Pasban organisation) have failed due to contention within the party (Nasr, 1994: 100, Haider, 3 April, 2000).
carried out by local branches as well as by affiliate and ancillary organisations, and they are drawn up on ideal and strategic level as well as acted out in practice.

Unlike the mass integration party, however, the primary objective, ideally, strategically and in practice, is not to target particular supporters, i.e. only supporters in a well-defined social group. Instead, for most parts, supporters of all kinds are targeted. In this sense, the Party of Islam resembles primarily the ideal typical catch-all party.

Even if there are some traits of catch-all kind regarding the target of the efforts to maintain external linkage, the conclusion is that the Party of Islam primarily resembles the ideal typical mass integration party in this regard. The findings of the dominating traits in this regard are presented in the table below.

Table 6:16. The full picture of the Party of Islam’s effort to maintain external linkage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintaining external linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the Party of Islam’s efforts to maintain external linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

Returning to the theoretical expectations, we can again establish that the anticipations of a linkage outcome of mass integration kind, in line with the dominating mass integration linkage objective, based on the orientation of the party – in line with the ideal typical mass integration model – are largely met in the Party of Islam, also when it comes to the efforts to maintain external linkage.

Again, however, the target of these efforts is at odds with the mass integration pattern. Again the Party of Islam in this respect, at least for most parts, resembles an ideal typical catch-all party. Even if this outcome is contrary to the mass integration party model, it is not contrary to the party-centred theoretical models at a general level, however, as there is a catch-all trait in the orientation as well as in the linkage objective of the Party of Islam. I will return to this outcome in the concluding section of this chapter.

After having analysed the efforts to establish and maintain external
linkage in the Party of Islam, the time has now come to take on the internal linkage of the party.

**Establishing Internal Linkage**

**Member-Recruitment Policy of the Party**

Members are of central importance for the Party of Islam. In the party, members are valued *per se*; indeed, it is via its membership that the Party of Islam hopes to attain its ultimate goal of societal reform.

But, when it comes to its membership, the Party of Islam is ambivalent. On the website of the party, this paradox is evident. There, it is stated about the party that “(i)t appeal is indeed global but its qualitative stress inexorably makes it restrictive in its organisational scope. Everybody is most welcome to join it”.

Further, it is stated that “the Party of Islam always emphasises the necessity of maintaining an inner core of dedicated and virtuous men and women as the foundation of Islamic revival. Since a lasting revolution depends on popular support, the party has opened its door for people to join as members”. From these – rather ambiguous – words, two things are understood: a) that the Party of Islam is interested in recruiting members and that it wants to reach broad segments of the society in its efforts to do so, and b) that there are certain, rather strict requirements regarding the quality of the members.

As noted, this seems to be a paradox. How can the party welcome “everybody” and at the same time place a “qualitative stress” on the members? Ideally, strategically and in practice, this paradox is solved through a multi-tier membership in the Party of Islam: “Everybody” is invited to become a passive associate member of the party, more dedicated individuals are welcome to become active associate members (*mutaffiq*), while only the distinguished few can become full members (*rukn*, sing., *arkan*, pl.).

The full members are of crucial importance for the Party of Islam. Originally, it was the full members who were to create the vanguard or holy community. Full members are not actively recruited, however. Interested persons either apply to become members at their own initiative – or are

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3. Cp. Nasr, 1994: 48, 95. We will return to the requirements for different categories of members shortly.
asked by the party to file such an application.\(^1\) Thus, the efforts on the part of the party to recruit full members are very limited in the Party of Islam. In this sense, the party much resembles an ideal typical total integration party when it comes to recruitment of members. This situation applies ideally, strategically and in practice, regarding full members.

In 1997-1998, the Party of Islam however launched a massive membership campaign in order to attract and register predominantly passive associate members (hitherto referred to as supporters and not registered).\(^2\) According to one analyst, the passive associate members are more or less the voters of the party.\(^3\) This effort was in line with the ideas to broaden the base of the party. On the website of the party, it is stated that “(t)oday we offer membership to all Pakistanis and seek their votes”.\(^4\) By 2000, more than 3 million associates had been recorded by local branches in the membership-campaign.\(^5\) These “recruits” were either old “supporters”, or entirely new people attracted to the party.\(^6\)

Thus there are, or at least at times have been, quite substantial efforts to recruit associates to the Party of Islam, in a way that points to a resemblance with an ideal typical mass integration party, even if the membership-campaigns do not seem to be on-going. This situation prevails on ideal and strategic level, as well as in practice.

There is thus a difference between “members” and “associates” in the Party of Islam, when it comes to the membership-recruitment policy of the party. Whereas “associates” are recruited in as large numbers as possible (even if some qualitative requirements are placed on at least the active associates, as we will see soon), the party is more restrictive in recruiting “members”.

In this regard, the Party of Islam resembles an ideal typical mass integration party when it comes to recruiting “associates”, whereas it

\(^1\) Rafi, 14 April, 2000.
\(^3\) Rafi, 14 April, 2000.
\(^4\) www.jamaat.org, “The membership drive of Jamaat-e-Islami”.
\(^5\) Matin, 27 March, 2000, T Khan, 28 March, 2000. Different figures are stated by different party representatives regarding how many associate members were registered in the 1997-1998 membership campaign: 4 million according to Rahman, 17 February, 1999 and 5 million according to Iqbal, 3 April, 2000. According to the website, 2.2 million associate members were registered by mid-August 1997. The target set for the period ending October 1997 was 5 million (www.jamaat.org, “The membership drive of the Jamaat-e-Islami”, “Basic facts”).
resembles an ideal typical total integration party when it comes to recruiting “members”. This situation applies on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice.

Table 6.17. Traits in the member-recruitment policy of the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member-recruitment policy</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Party of Islam. D: Dominating trait.

Restrictions to Enter the Party

As has become clear, the Party of Islam cherishes its virtuous inner core, and places a “qualitative stress” on full members. Therefore, it is quite difficult to become a full member in the party. According to the constitution of the party, the criteria for membership, i.e. the requirements for at all being eligible for membership, is that the member-to-be (man or woman), apart from grasping and subscribing to the creed, the goal and the discipline of the party, should not be a member of another party and should convince the party “cadres” of his/her suitability for membership. Further, the member-to-be must observe the mandatory obligations of the Sharia and follow a lifestyle in accordance with the Islamic injunctions.¹

While the some of these requirements are of such a nature that they apply in most kinds of parties, other requirements are indicative of the high moral and religious stress placed on the member-to-be in the Party of Islam. In posing strict restrictions on admittance to the party, the Party of Islam resembles an ideal typical total integration party. The resemblance to the total integration party is further emphasised by statements on the website of the party. Here it is contended that “(i)t is these constraints, self-imposed in the interest of immaculate purity and excellence, that operate as fastidious factors to render the Party of Islam qualitatively selective in its

¹ Article 6 of constitution. Women members are in this context thus referred to in a parallel manner to the male members. As we will return to, women are however not part of the main party organisation, but only of its women’s wing.
Ideally and strategically, the membership rules – and the discipline – of the Party of Islam are thus very strict indeed and place a lot of restrictions – not least of moral kind – on the life of the full member. In the article 8 of the constitution, the obligations of members that have joined the party are listed. These obligations include requirements of knowledge of Islam, adoption of a lifestyle in accordance with Islam and a readiness to work for the creation of an Islamic society. The quality of the members is heavily emphasised in the constitution of the party. It is also made clear that if the strict requirements are not met, the member will be excluded.

It is obvious that the party wants the members to devote their entire lives to the party and to let the principles of the party (and hence the religion) permeate all doings. The member should also comply with the party in all matters. On the website of the party it is stated that “(t)here is a demand for total submission to (the) party’s objectives and decisions”. However, it is not enough to lead a moral and committed life to fulfil the membership requirements. A member has to propagate the views of the party on every occasion as well.

That these strict requirements, outlined on ideal and strategic level, also are carried out in practice is vouched for by party representatives as well as outside observers. Party representative Rahman, for example, refers to the strict membership criteria and states that a member-to-be needs to be monitored for some time, so that the party can ensure his or her qualities. A recommendation is also needed for membership, “The party observes (the member-to-be) for a few weeks or a few months – the level of involvement, the level of commitment, the level of knowledge of the ideology. It is important… (Then) he is approved or disapproved. (In) 99% (of the) cases, it is approved”. This procedure is referred to also by outside observers: “(To

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2. Constitution, article 8.
3. Article 12 of the constitution.
4. Article 90 of constitution. According to Nasr, purges were not uncommon in the party in its early days (Nasr, 1994: 26, 37, 38, 48). Apart from these requirements, there are even further demands placed on the members. According to party representative Rahman, “the whole programme has been designed in that context, that whoever joins the Party of Islam he should be a balanced personality. He should be a good professional, he should be a good communicator, he should be a good citizen, that is all” (Rahman, 17 February, 1999).
6. Article 9 of the constitution.
7. Rahman, 17 February, 1999. Munir, 22 February, 1999 states the same thing, as do Matin,
be a member) he should go through some process of training”.¹

Also in other aspects, outside observers attest to the strict requirements – and discipline – in the Party of Islam in practice. According to outside observer Mahmood, for example, “(m)embership of the Party of Islam is restricted. Everybody cannot be admitted”.² Bashir states that “(i)t is elitist, elitist”.³ Nasr further notes that the party demands total commitment from the member – the wives of the members are encouraged to become involved in the women’s wing and the children are encouraged to join students wings that arrange children’s programmes. Nasr also notes that there is an increasing number of peripheral activities under the party’s central command.⁴ The Party of Islam thus clearly aims at organising the whole life of the members. That full membership in the Party of Islam is a lifelong commitment is noted also by other outside analysts: “Once you are a member of the party, you are always a member of the party”.⁵ A result of this stance on full membership is that the number of members is necessarily limited. According to party representative Malik, there were 15 000 full members in Pakistan in 2000.⁶

The severity of the restrictions is however down-played by some party representatives. According to Malik, “(i)t is not very difficult (to become a member). The obligations given for Muslims by Quran and Sunnah, these are the only necessary things. Anyone who fulfil these things, can become a full member”.⁷ Yet other party representatives point to the distinction of the members. According to Khan, a member should be “performing good and (be) … really educated (in Islam), (and) … got some vision”.⁸

In all, the Party of Islam thus to a large extent comes close to an ideal

² Mahmood, 6 April, 2000.
³ Bashir, 6 April, 2000.
⁵ Abbas, 4 April, 2000.
⁶ Malik, 3 April, 2000. T Khan, 28 March, 2000, states the same figure. Somewhat diverging information is given as to the total number of the membership. According to Matin, there were 10 000 members in 2000 (Matin, 27 March, 2000), and according to Rahman, there were 12-13 000 members in 1999 (Rahman, 17 February, 1999). On the website, the following figures are presented: In 1996, there were 10 330 full members, and 795 women full members. On the waiting list, there were 1261 male and 329 female candidates (www.jamaat.org, “Basic Facts”).
⁷ Malik, 3 April, 2000.
typical party of total integration regarding what criteria are to be met in order to become a full member in the party. This is the case on ideal and strategic level, and in practice.

These strict requirements for membership have created problems for the party, however, as not all sympathisers are willing to subject themselves to such severe rules. Not all are interested in building a holy community.\(^1\) To solve the problem, the category of “(active) associate member”, without such strict requirements attached to it, was invented when the party hierarchy was revised in 1950-51.\(^2\) In this way, also people who agree “with the mission, strategy, program, and organization of the party”, but who “due to some reason (are) unable to perform out the responsibilities of membership”, can be organisationally connected to the party.\(^3\) Thus, “(t)hrough (associates) the party’s rigid organization structure could interact with the society at large”.\(^4\)

According to the website of the party, “(t)here are no restrictions on becoming an associate”.\(^5\) Party representative Rahman states the same thing. According to him there are “no requirements (to become an associate). The only requirement is that he (the member-to-be) should be a Muslim and (that) he is ready to become a member”.\(^6\)

Thus, the requirements to become an associate member seem to be

\(^{1}\) Nasr, 1994: 48, 58.


\(^{3}\) Article 9 of the constitution.

\(^{4}\) Nasr, 1994: 95.

\(^{5}\) www.jamaat.org, “Objectives, goals and approach”.

\(^{6}\) Rahman, 17 February, 1999. Malik, 3 April, 2000, states the same thing. Different statements are made by different party representatives on whether non-Muslims can become associates of the party. On the one hand, party representative Malik asserts that “non-Muslims can be associate members” of the party, even if they are “very few” (Malik, 3 April, 2000). Iqbal, 3 April, 2000, Firdaus, 29 March, 2000, and T Khan, 28 March, 2000 state the same thing. Khan underlines that “associate members they (the non-Muslims) can be” (T Khan, 28 March, 2000), but non-Muslims cannot become full members (Iqbal, 3 April, 2000, states the same thing). On the other hand, Rahman states that non-Muslims cannot be associate members “since … the form he fills, it says that ‘I am joining the Party of Islam in its effort to Islamise the country or for the Islamic system’. So one cannot expect a non-Muslim to be supporting the Islamic system...” (Rahman, 10 April, 2000). However, Rahman agrees that the party has tried to connect non-Muslims to the party in a more formal way: “(T)he Party of Islam has been positive in taking these people in any capacity that means not to be registered members, but maybe take part of different activities ... welfare activities, maybe political activities. So if someone joins the party in that capacity, ... for activities, it is OK, but for the all over movement it is quite understandable, that (a) non-Muslim would not commit himself” (Rahman, 10 April, 2000). Rahman here indicates that to the extent that non-Muslims are connected to the party, they are organised in an ancillary organisation, not in the party itself.
quite limited, ideally, strategically and in practice. However, other data contradict this picture. On the website, it is made clear that associates are meant to “join hands with the party in the struggle for the establishment of Din (Islamic code and conduct of life)”. According to party representative Khan, the associate member fills in a form, agreeing to “support the Party of Islam for the Islamic revolution (and to) support the party for the elimination of corruption and lawlessness and other vices of the society”.

In this sense, associates largely seem to be for the Party of Islam, what members are for the ideal typical mass integration party. This view is substantiated by other pieces of information. Indeed, the party does not in fact accept anybody as an associate, ideally, strategically nor in practice. Even if the requirements are not strict in the Muslim context, the associates are asked “to obey the obligations in the Quran and Sunnah” and they are to be “just right Muslims”. Further, it is stated on the website that “membership (in the party) is open to all, but it demands commitment from those who submit to its discipline”. Thus, there are indeed formal restrictions on becoming an associate member. In this sense, the Party of Islam resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, when it comes to restrictions to enter the party as an associate, ideally, strategically and in practice.

As we saw earlier, passive associates, i.e. associates that “have filled a form and have become (associate) members (but) are not active”, are registered since 1997. “Associate members” today thus include active as well as passive supporters of the party, who have filled in some sort of membership-form. The difference between these categories thus seems to be

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1 Article 9 of the constitution.
3 Malik, 3 April, 2000, Qazi, 4 April, 2000.
4 www.jamaat.org, “Strategy for change”.
5 In this context, it may be noted that not everybody in the party is fond of the presence of associate members. Critics also feel that the standard of the full members has deteriorated over time (e.g. outside observers Zaidi, 21 March, 2000 and Al-Ghazali, 27 March, 2000). According to Nasr, “(o)rganizational reform and membership criteria continue to preoccupy the Party of Islam’s leadership, reflecting its continuing struggle with tensions born of applying its ideological perspective to the pursuit of its political goals” (Nasr, 1994: 100). Indeed, Nasr states that it was “an anomaly (to have such a) rigid organizational structure in electoral politics” (Nasr, 1994: 98).
6 Rahman, 10 April, 2000. These were earlier called supporters and were not registered by the party, nor given organisational status.
7 It must be noted here that the term ”associate” is used in different ways by different party representatives; from denoting non-Muslims connected to the party (Iqbal, 3 April, 2000), to
be the level of activity – not the membership requirements. Both groups are registered in the party and have to fulfil some formal criteria, just as members are in an ideal typical mass integration party, but they differ in the extent to which they are active in the party.¹

Associates, active and passive, and members thus form different categories in the party organisation. Associates might however become members with time – and with some training: “We have … decided a syllabus … they read the books … and (participate in) those workshops and training courses. (And after having completed these courses and training) and after practicing a Muslim’s obligations, they can become full members”.²

To summarise, there are thus traits resembling the ideal typical total integration party (regarding full members) and traits resembling the ideal typical mass integration party (regarding associates) in the Party of Islam, when it comes to the restrictions to enter the party as a member. By using these different tiers of membership, the party thus tries to preserve its inner core and to attract a wider circle people to, if not membership, so at least to “associateship” with the party.

denoting members who are active in the party, but who are not full members (Rahman, 10 April, 2000). Here, I have reserved the term “associate” for those who are registered by the party (whether they are active or not), without being full members. According to party representative Munir, the party had 200 000 active associates and 4.5 million passive supporters in 1999 (Munir, 22 February, 1999). Here, it should also be noted that the term “worker” is used in different ways – from denoting all who works in the party, be they full or associate members (Firdaus, 29 March, 2000), to more or less all individuals active in some way or another in the party, whether or not they have been registered by the party (Matin, 27 March, 2000).

¹ This contradicts the statement that passive members are “more or less the voters of the party” (Rafi, 14 April, 2000). In this analysis, more is required from passive associate members than only to vote for the party; indeed they have to sign a form and submit to certain obligations as well.

² Malik, 3 April, 2000.
### Table 6:18. Traits in the restrictions to enter the party in the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictions to enter the party</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal:</strong></td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy:</strong></td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In practice:</strong></td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Party of Islam. D: Dominating trait.

### Conclusions Regarding Efforts to Establish Internal Linkage

Regarding the efforts to establish internal linkage in the Party of Islam, it can be established that different situations apply to full members and to different categories of associates. As to full members, there is no doubt that the Party of Islam to a large extent resembles the ideal typical total integration party, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice, both regarding the membership recruitment policy and regarding the criteria to be admitted as a member. Just like an ideal typical total integration party, the Party of Islam extends limited efforts to recruit full members and it places heavy emphasis on quality. Only a limited, distinguished cadre is bestowed with full membership in the party.

When it comes to associates, however, quantity is more important, even if quality also matters. Regarding associates, the Party of Islam thus resembles the ideal typical mass integration party ideally, strategically and in practice.

### Table 6:19. The full picture of the Party of Islam’s effort to establish internal linkage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishing internal linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal:</strong></td>
<td>Recruitment, restrictions (associates)</td>
<td>Recruitment, restrictions (members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy:</strong></td>
<td>Recruitment, restrictions (associates)</td>
<td>Recruitment, restrictions (members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In practice:</strong></td>
<td>Recruitment, restrictions (associates)</td>
<td>Recruitment, restrictions (members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the Party of Islam’s efforts to establish internal linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

Returning to the theoretical models, we can thus note that the expectations
on the basis of the orientation of the party yet again are largely met. However, whereas the orientation and linkage objective of the party predict primarily an outcome of mass integration kind, the Party of Islam presents mass integration traits only when it comes to associate members. Regarding full members, total integration party traits dominate in the Party of Islam. This outcome deviates for the ideal typical mass integration party model, in this regard.

However, there is a foundation also for total integration party traits, in the orientation and linkage objective of the Party of Islam, even if this foundation is not particularly strong. In this sense, the total integration party traits in the efforts to establish internal linkage of the Party of Islam can be attributed to the traits of total integration kind, in the orientation and linkage objective of the party, in line with the general theoretical model. I will return to this outcome in the concluding section of this chapter. Now, I will take on the last aspect of linkage – the efforts to maintain the internal linkage.

**Maintaining Internal Linkage**

**Activities to Maintain Internal Linkage**

As we have seen, the original ideal of the Party of Islam was the holy community. In line with this ideal, the party members were to live all their lives by the rules and activities outlined by the party. The initial organisation of the party – not least in India, before the move to Pakistan and Lahore – was an extension of these ideas. The party members lived and worked together. According to an outside observer with personal experience of this community, “most of the members had the same … dream. The same ideas. And they were living very close to each other, they were friendly to each other. Whenever they had a problem, they met and discussed”. As the party’s following grew larger and as the initial ideas on how to attain the Islamic revolution changed, the ideas on how to maintain internal linkage changed accordingly. Total encapsulation, such as that initially outlined, is further difficult to achieve in practice, something that the party is well aware of. Nevertheless, the party has sought to provide conditions for education and for encapsulation of members and – to lesser extent – associates, through an elaborate organisational network and diverse peripheral activities, ideally, strategically and in practice.

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This ambition of far-reaching activities, that organise most of the time of the member, is not least evident in a report book, issued by the women’s wing of the Party of Islam. In this report book, it is stated what activities the women members are expected to perform on a daily basis. The report book has the form of a diary, where the women are to fill in what activities they carry out every day. Further, the report book lists tasks “for personal attention”, dealing with the member’s personal religious efforts.

These encompassing and diverse activities are obligatory for the women party members and they are to be performed every day, day in and day out. The idea with this report book is stated by party representative Qazi. According to her, “(we are to) check ourselves before God checks us”. Further, she underlines what happens if the party member fails to do good deeds: “If you have done evil, you will take on some punishment, for example money to needy, prayer, (studying the) Quran”.

The same degree of activity that is required from the women members is required also by the men, according to party deputy Amir Ahmad: "Each and every plan would remain a mere piece of paper so long as it is not acted upon and all-out efforts are not made to achieve its targets. The success of our call and plan depends, after Allah’s will and help, a great deal on the resolve, toil and sacrifice of workers. Each one of us, at the level of worker or leadership, should first of all be concerned about one’s own deeds with a sincere prayer that Allah may keep us on His way and enable us for being witness unto Truth… Another requisite is to reach out to others, share their grievances and joys and win their confidence”.

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1 According to this report book, the members are expected to, for example, study the Quran daily, study the Hadith (traditions of Holy Prophet) daily, perform prayers with due punctuality, note the names of persons for promotion of the message, always bring sets of promotional books with them, distribute books and magazines, make allies, make supporters, make members, contact households, identify target persons, collect donations, hold family meetings to convey the message and for training in Islamic manners, feeding the hungry, visiting the sick, fulfil needs of the needy (Report book. Women’s Wing, Party of Islam, Pakistan). The performance of members are then reviewed weekly.

2 Thus, members should consider and act in accordance with the Holy Quran, memorise the Holy Quran, show love for the Holy Prophet and obedience to Holy Prophet in day-to-day affairs of life, associate with propagation of the organisation and collectivism, study the literature (of the organisation), make arrangements for returning towards Allah and soliciting his exoneration after mistakes and shortcomings, allocate time and abilities for party responsibilities, sacrifice worldly wealth is for the sake of Allah (Report book. Women’s Wing, Party of Islam, Pakistan).

3 Qazi, 4 April, 2000.

4 Qazi, 4 April, 2000.

5 Ahmad, 1999.
question that these activities will form the life of the member entirely, if adhered to. It is also clear that the members generally do adhere to the directions they are given in practice.\footnote{1}

Apart from the activities to be carried out by members themselves, there are further activities provided by the party for the party workers (men and women, members and associates): “(F)or our workers, we have special training courses, so as to increase their level of education. For this … most of the district level centres…have (a) weekly class of study at their homes, in smaller units”.\footnote{2} In such Quranic classes, “all of them … are required to participate… Because even if you have acquired (a) minimum level (of knowledge), you need to continue it and you need to have a regular update”.\footnote{3}

There are also regular party-meetings for the full members and associates: “(E)very Friday, usually on Fridays, we have a meeting of our workers. In this meeting, there is a part of Quranic lecture and organisational discussion.\footnote{4} Indeed, “(e)very party unit (holds) regular meetings during which personal, local and national issues (are) discussed and every member (gives) an account … of his week’s activity to his superiors… Since every local party unit (is) part of a larger unit, each of which (holds) meetings of its own, members could end up attending several meetings each week”.\footnote{5}

Another activity that serves to maintain the sense of internal linkage with the party is the monthly payment, which is compulsory for members. Members “must give some part of their income (every month); as much as (they) can afford”.\footnote{6}

Moreover, in what seems as an attempt to manifest the high degree of

\footnote{1}{Munir, 22 February, 1999.}
\footnote{2}{Firdaus, 29 March, 2000. Also Rahman, 17 February, 1999. Matin also gives evidence to this kind of activities (Matin, 27 March, 2000).}
\footnote{3}{Rahman, 10 April, 2000.}
\footnote{4}{Munir, 22 February, 1999.}
\footnote{5}{www.jamaat.org. “Basic Facts”. In the report book of the women’s wing, it is stated that the “(w)eekly congregation of workers, which is backbone of the organisation, should be centre for extension of promoting the message, character building, and work for stability and planning of the organisation” (Report book. Women’s Wing, Party of Islam, Pakistan). All these activities are meticulously monitored by the party at different levels (Firdaus, 29 March, 2000).}
\footnote{6}{Qazi, 4 April, 2000. Members are expected to pay zakat, the religious tax, as well as making other donations to the party. Indeed, according to the constitution “party members shall compulsorily deposit their zakat, ushr and obligatory charities in the party funds (Constitution, article 95: 7). Party representatives state that “(the member pays) according to his earnings … (because it is a) religious binding on him” (A A Khan, 3 April, 2000). Abbas, 4 April, 2000, state the same thing.}
involvement that is aimed for by the party, the party provides houses and other forms of accommodation in particular areas for at least some of the members. This arrangement makes it easier for the members to fulfil the wide range of tasks required from them. The most obvious example of this is the party headquarters, Mansura, in Lahore. The fenced area of Mansura constitutes a mini-society – it houses not only all the administration of the party headquarters, but also various educational, research and welfare institutions, a hospital and a mosque. In the area, the top leaders and some other members of the party are also provided with accommodation.

In these senses, the Party of Islam thus seems to aim at encapsulating the members in the party. When it comes to activities to maintain internal linkage to full members, the Party of Islam thus must be said to come very close to the ideal typical party of total integration, ideally and strategically and in practice.

Also the associate members are required to be active in the activities to maintain internal linkage, however. Party representative Rahman contends that “when they are at the grass root level, in one unit, all have to perform the same function”. It is indeed emphasised that the same activities are carried out by all, “they may be illiterate and they may be highly literate people, but this … local grass-root unit activity would be the same”. When it comes to working in and for the party, there is thus little difference between (active) associates and members: “The members and the associate members work together. There is no difference in working. (…) The associate members are now participating also in these activities with the full members”.

It is the level of commitment that is the different between the full members and the associate members. Rahman spells out this difference in the following manner: “(F)or (a) full member … it is a commitment that ‘I

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1 Examples of educational institutions located in Manura are the Centre for Islamic Education, the Mansura Model School for Boys, the Mansura Model School for Girls, the Mansura Model Degree College, the Syed Maududi International Education Institute, the Centre of Islamic Education for Girls and the Centre for Learning the Quran by Heart (www.jamaat.org, “Institutions”). The planned “Qurtaba: A City of Knowledge” project is also meant to constitute such a mini-society, focused on the educational needs of the country as envisioned by the party, and particularly the need to bring the conventional (religious) and modern (scientific) education together (www.jamaat.org, “JI Pakistan, Qurtaba – City of Knowledge”).

2 Rahman, 10 April, 2000.

3 Rahman, 10 April, 2000.

4 Malik, 3 April, 2000.
shall observe whatever duties are assigned’. (The associate) member is not saying that; (an associate) member is just registering himself”.¹ As we saw earlier, demands on associates are thus not as strict as on members. Thus, when it comes to activities to maintain internal linkage, associates are looked upon much in the same way as members are in an ideal typical mass integration party – ideally, strategically and in practice.

While active associates and full members – men as well as women – thus are expected to put a lot of work into the party, passive associate members are not expected to do as much, however. This does not mean that there are no activities for them to participate in, which serves the function of maintaining internal linkage. The annual or bi-annual big meetings and rallies, that serve the function of maintaining the external linkage, obviously fill the function of maintaining internal linkage as well. Here, the whole party meets – members, active and passive associates as well as other people attracted to the party – and this common act serves to strengthen the solidarity in the party.²

Another means of maintaining internal linkage in the party, which is directed at active as well as passive associates, is the circulation of different kinds of papers. One such example is the weekly spokes-paper Asia, which has “the format of a party circular”.³ Also the scholarly A Commentator of Quran (Tarjuman ul Quran) fills the function of continuous communication to the members.⁴

Thus, even if passive associate members are not required to do much work in the party, there is a broad range of activities which is utilised by the party in order to maintain internal linkage to them. That the party has a strong hold over its members and associates is vouched for also by outside analysts.⁵ In this sense, the Party of Islam again resembles an ideal typical mass integration party.⁶

² Rahman, 17 February, 1999. Malik, 3 April, 2000, states the same thing. Also representatives from other Islamist parties and movements attend those conventions. In 2000, there were participants from Jordan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Tajikistan, Sudan, Lebanon and Qatar (www.ijtimaa.org).
³ Jafar, 3 April, 2000.
⁴ Jafar, 3 April, 2000.
⁶ Also the non-Muslims attached to the party are involved in such activities aimed at maintaining internal linkage. According to party representatives Khan, “we do accommodate them, we have links and we do look after them. Our social sector (is) looking after them. On Christmas, we are … giving gifts to the poor…” (T Khan, 28 March, 2000). Again, there is a
Apart from the traits of total and mass integration character in the activities to maintain internal linkage, outside analysts point to the presence of internal clientelistic practices in the Party of Islam as well. According to Shah, “they financially … support their workers to get their lives better, to run their business, and once he starts floating in the market, once his business is in swing, he repays it back. Without any credit”. ¹ Waseem states the same thing: “They are providing patronage to their own kith and kin, to their own (party) workers”. ²

Party representatives however generally deny that the party acts on a clientelistic logic to any great extent, even if the party at times does extend “help (to)…cadres to get jobs”. ³ According to party representative Rahman, employment of party members by the party “may be a natural consequence of their relationship with the Party of Islam, but it is not a planned or designed behaviour”. ⁴ Even if clientelistic traits thus may be present in practice in the maintenance of internal linkage, they are far from dominating.

In sum, it can be concluded that, the Party of Islam to a large extent resembles an ideal typical total integration party, when it comes to activities to maintain internal linkage to full members, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. Less encapsulation is envisioned and carried out for active associates, and even lesser for passive associate members. Still, various activities are provided in order to make these associates remain attached to the party. In this sense, activities to maintain internal linkage to associates in the Party of Islam resemble those of an ideal typical mass resemblance with the ideal typical mass integration party.

² Waseem, 7 April, 2000. Abbas, 4 April, 2000, states the same thing.
³ Outside observer Mahmood, 6 April, 2000.
⁴ Rahman, 10 April, 2000. He gives an example in this context: “You see, … a person may be a very good Islamic worker, but when you need a telephone operator, you need a telephone operator!” (Rahman, 10 April, 2000). Party representative T Khan, 28 March, 2000, Qazi, 4 April, 2000. Munir, 22 February, 1999 and Rahman also underline that members are not paid for the welfare work that they carry out. Indeed, according to Munir, “throughout the country we have thousands and thousands of workers, and they work free for the pleasure of the Almighty. They don’t get a penny” (Munir, 3 April, 2000). According to party representative Khan, even the party leader, Qazi Hussein Ahmad, does not get paid for the work he does in the party (T Khan, 28 March, 2000). Even if the party representatives unanimously state that the workers are not paid, this is thus something that the outside observers question. According to Mahmood, “(the party) has the money and the resources to employ large number of people as full-time people … paid, full-time workers” (Mahmood, 6 April, 2000). Ziauddin, 20 February, 1999, asserts the same thing, as does Haider, 3 April, 2000. It is however difficult to establish whether outside observers here refer to staff employed or to ‘workers’ as defined by the party.
integration party. Traits of internal clientelism to both full members and associates also seem present in practice in the Party of Islam, but they are limited.

Table 6: Traits in the activities to maintain internal linkage of the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td>P (members, associates)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Party of Islam. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

Performers of Activities to Maintain Internal Linkage

The organisational structure of the Party of Islam is very elaborate and widely spread. The party is established on every level from the national level – via provincial, divisional and district level – to the grass-root local level, in a formalised hierarchy. The party’s structure is also duplicated in the women’s wing of the party. At least, this is the ideal and strategy of the party. In practice, the party is not equally well represented in all parts of the country – its organisation is concentrated to conservative areas such as the urban areas in Punjab and Sindh, and to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province.¹ Still, the organisation is well developed and diffused, however.

Like the activities to establish external linkage, the activities to maintain internal linkage are primarily – ideally, strategically and in practice – carried out by the district and local organisations of the party, as well as by the affiliate and ancillary organisations, even if activities to this effect also take place at higher levels in the organisation.

The district level seems to be particularly important in this work: “(T)he district is the basic unit … there the actual working is done”.² As the districts are quite large, they however have “subsidiary organisations, in the cities as well as in the villages”.³

¹ Haider, 3 April, 2000, Rafi, 14 April, 2000.
² Malik, 3 April, 2000.
³ Rahman, 17 February, 1999. According to party representative Khan, the local organisations in Islamabad district each comprises on average 2500 members (T Khan, 28 March, 2000).
However, activities to maintain internal linkage take place at even lower levels as well. According to party representative Khan, “basic activities take place at (sub-local organisation) (social) committee level”.¹ Also party representative Matin refers to these lowest levels in the party: “(Below the districts) there are some zones (i.e. local organisations), and then below the zone, there are units (---) Most activities are (on unit level). The other levels are mostly (for) guidance, and consultation”.² According to Matin, the number of members in such a sub-local unit varies, but generally it is very small, “(i)n some places you will find only 4 members, in some … there are 50 members. It depends on the area”.³ On this level, the members “usually meet once week, for half an hour…”.⁴

Separate from the main party organisation is the women’s wing. The women’s wing (halqah-e khawatin) was detached from the main party in January 1978, and it has its own set-up, prescribed by the central Amir in consultation with the working committee.⁵ The women’s wing of the Party of Islam is organised completely independent from the main party. Women attached to the Party of Islam are thus always attached to the women’s wing, and not part of the party per se. In this way, the Party of Islam separates the sexes organisationally, in line with its ideology – even if the two parallel organisations do cooperate.⁶ The set-up of the women’s wing much resembles the set-up of the main party with provincial, divisional, district and local units.⁷

That the women’s wing is organised in the outlined manner is vouched for by the party. According to a booklet from the women’s wing, “(the) organization possesses the primary and street units leading to circles, district and divisional organizational units. They in turn form provincial units. From provincial units we make one national unit at the centre under the Amir of the Party of Islam… (T)he number of primary units at present

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¹ T Khan, 28 March, 2000.
³ Matin, 27 March, 2000. The lowest organisational level in the party is thus the local unit, which is “established where there are more than one member of the party” (article 81 of the constitution). Even if the units are small, they are always geographical, however. Thus they do not have the shape of the ideal typical cell typical of the total integration party, which is has an occupational basis. Instead they resemble the ideal-typical subdivisions of branches, found in the ideal typical mass integration party.
⁴ Malik, 3 April, 2000.
⁵ Article 88 of the constitution.
⁶ Qazi, 4 April, 2000, Introduction to the Women’s Wing, undated: 5.
⁷ The set-up of the women’s wing is described in the constitution, appendix VI.
exceeds one thousand which are spread all over the country”.¹ Party representative Qazi also refer to this structure, claiming that “(there are) about 2500 (local units) in Pakistan… (A)ll over, in … villages, in all the towns, very small towns”.²

Hence, the work to maintain internal linkage in the Party of Islam is carried out by branches, or subdivisions of branches, and affiliate organisations, in a way that much resembles the way in which those activities are carried out in an ideal typical mass integration party. Occupational cells, typical of the ideal typical total integration party, are not present in the Party of Islam.

Also ancillary organisations – like the organisations for teachers, farmers, labour, transport labour, train labour, poets, writers, journalists, lawyers, judges, doctors and engineers et c – obviously also may serve to maintain internal linkage. These are important not least for passive associate members, which are not so active in the party per se. Even if these organisations are claimed to have set-ups completely independent from the party, they “stand with (the Party of Islam) in ideology”.³ Also the Islamic Student Organisations (Islami Jamiat-e Talaba, for male students, and Islami Jamiat Talibat, for female students) can be regarded as filling the function of maintaining internal linkage to young people who are attached to those organisations, but not yet members of the party.

Regarding the bodies performing the activities to maintain internal linkage, the Party of Islam thus in many ways is similar to the ideal typical mass integration party – on ideal as well as strategic level and in practice.

Table 6:21. Traits regarding the performer of the activities to maintain internal linkage of the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performer</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Party of Islam. D: Dominating trait.

¹ Introduction to the Women’s Wing, undated: 7
² Qazi, 4 April, 2000. Firdaus, 29 March, 2000, also refers to this organisational structure of the Women’s Wing.
**Mode of Intra-Party Communication**

The mode of intra-party communication is highly structured in the Party of Islam, ideally, strategically and in practice, not least regarding party internal elections. The details on how the *party internal elections* are to be carried out are outlined in the constitution of the party. According to the constitution, “(t)he system of the Party of Islam Pakistan shall be consultative. (…) The consultative system means that the dismissal or appointment of the President (Amir) and members of the Shura (consultative council) shall be through the advice of the members of the party and all the affairs of the party shall be conducted according to Islamic teachings with mutual consultation”.

The constitution thus draws up the rule for intra-party elections. Party representatives claim that the ideal and strategy in this regard also are carried out in practice.

According to article 16 of the constitution, “(t)he ultimate powers in all affairs of the Party of Islam Pakistan shall vest in the General Assembly”. The General Assembly is “that session of the members of the Party of Islam to which all members of the party or their appointed delegates are invited”. However, “(t)he ultimate responsibility for running the party organisation and the movement shall be of the Amir (president) and he should be accountable to the consultative Shura (council) and the members of the party. The Amir shall devise the party’s policies and take decisions on important issues in consultation with the central consultative Shura”.

According to the constitution, “(t)he Amir of the Party of Islam shall be appointed through direct election by members of the party and simple majority shall be decisive in this vote… The Amir shall be elected for a period of five years”.

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1. Article 11 of the constitution.
3. Article 16 of the constitution.
4. Article 100:16 of the constitution.
5. Article 19:1-2 of the constitution. The status of the Amir is moreover established in the constitution, in that “party members shall be bound to obey him in the fair and rightful matters” (article 17:1 of the constitution).
6. Article 17:3-4 of the constitution. The criteria are very strict for becoming an elected representative (president or other) of the party (article 12 of the constitution). Eligibility is decided “on the basis of one’s adherence to the commandments of Allah and His Messenger, his understanding of Din and its practice, one’s ability to run the affairs of the party and to offer sacrifices of his time, labour, and mental and material resources for the cause of the
Assisting the Amir in his leadership of the party are, apart from the Shura council, the Working Committee and the vice president(s) (both drawn from the members of the central Shura council), the secretary general and his deputies and the heads of the central departments. These are appointed by the Amir in consultation with the Shura.

The Shura council (Majlis-e-Shura), consisting of at least 60 members proportionally allocated from the provinces, is also elected by direct vote by the full members of the party. Its tenure is 3 years. Usually, the Shura council meets once a year to discuss “the report on the work of the party, the budget and the audit report of the central fund … the work of the party during the last year … and the programme for the next year”. In between the ordinary Shura meetings, the Amir may “summon an extraordinary session of the Shura at any time”. Among the duties of the Shura are further to supervise the work of the party and the Amir and to see to it that both conform with the ideology of the party.

On each level in the party, there are further such Amirs, Shuras, and secretaries. The Amirs are appointed by the central Amir in consultation with the Amirs on higher levels and in consideration of the opinions of the members in the unit. On each level, the members in the party” (article 12 of the constitution). Interestingly, the requirements for being elected as president in the party or to the Shura council (at the central or any other level) are “that he should not be a candidate…, nor should there be any such manifestation to reveal that he has been seeking or striving for the post…” (Article 13 and 14 of the constitution). This practice is also referred to by party representative Matin. According to him, “there is no campaign in our system… Because we think that the man who campaigns for him, he is the most unsuitable person for the post, because he has some interest in his mind” (Matin, 27 March, 2000. Malik, 3 April, 2000, states the same thing).

The departments are: Information department, external relations department, finance department, computer department, education department, training department and administrative department. According to the website, “the number and duties of (the departments) change depending on the needs of the party” (www.jamaat.org, “Basic Facts”). Apart from the departments listed above, the website mentions departments for social services and welfare, theological institutions, election department and department for parliamentary affairs.

1 The departments are: Information department, external relations department, finance department, computer department, education department, training department and administrative department. According to the website, “the number and duties of (the departments) change depending on the needs of the party” (www.jamaat.org, “Basic Facts”).
2 Article 21 of the constitution.
3 Article 23 of the constitution.
4 Article 24 of the constitution.
5 Article 25:1 of the constitution.
6 The Shura may further dispose the Amir with a qualified majority, discuss all matters related to the party and appoint various bodies required for the work of the party (articles 30:1-2 of the constitution).
7 On local level, a candidate for the position as Amir is proposed by the members. According to party representative Matin, the members actually vote for the position of Amir in the
Chapter 6: Explaining the Linkage of the Pakistani Party of Islam

respective unit however directly elects the Shura council on that level. These Shura councils meet regularly.

Consensus on major issues, especially doctrinal matters, is sought by the Shura council. This emphasis on consensus is also referred to by party representative Matin, even if majority decisions also are taken at times. According to Matin, the party is "always … trying to make it consensus. Always… (U)ntil we have consensus we try our best… But for some purposes, … we need 2/3 majority; for some routine purposes, single majority is enough". The members are thus encouraged to discuss their view during meetings, but once a decision is taken, that is the end of the discussion. According to the constitution, members “shall accept as the party’s decisions, whatever decision shall be arrived at by majority vote in the party”, even if they have the right to work for a change in the decisions.

Thus, fairly participatory processes are outlined – and practiced – in the party internal elections of the Party of Islam. For members, internal democratic procedures are thus envisioned. The party attests that such democratic internal procedures also take place in practice: “Through a clean democratic process the party arranges internal elections and this whole system is working according to a laid down constitution. If we attempt to disturb this foolproof process, it will badly hurt the organization of the party, which is a precious asset and trust of the nation”. In this sense, there seem to be resemblances with the internally democratic mass integration party.

However, it is only the virtuous core of full members that can vote in the party internal elections. The associates take little part in the intra-party elections, even if their views are allegedly taken into account as well. According to Khan, “(associate) members … cannot vote. But they can give

district and the Central Amir approves or disapproves; “but in 99% (of the) cases, the person who gets the most of the votes, is selected” (Matin, 27 March, 2000). Munir, 22 February, 1999, states the same thing.

1 On local level, a local Shura is established in consultation with the party, if deemed necessary.
2 Article 29:1 of the constitution. This practice “reflects the Muslim ideal of consensus (ijma). The majority must convince the minority of its wisdoms…” (www.jamaat.org, “Basic Facts”). However, “…in case of divergence in opinion, the decision of the majority of the members present in the session shall be considered to be the decision of the whole Shura” (article 29:1 of the constitution).
4 Article 93:2 of the constitution.
their suggestions, and they do participate in conventions and … meetings and … processions. And … in writing or orally, they can leave suggestions”. In this sense, there is thus a big difference between associates and full members. When discussing the associates, Malik states that “(w)e take them into our fold … we consult them, but they don’t have the right to vote or to elect. This is the difference”.2

Outside observers agree that there is a substantial degree of democracy in the Party of Islam (as long as only full members are taken into account). Abbas states that “(t)he leadership is elected through the proper channels”.3 Shah agrees, contending that “as far as their internal organisation is concerned, they are highly organised… And another quality (is) that their internal democracy is known to everybody in Pakistan … (they have) real party elections”.4

On the other hand, it must be noted that the Amir, although constitutionally bound, is bestowed with supreme authority in the party: “The Amir is the supreme source of authority in the party and can demand unwavering obedience of all members”.5 This points in a more autocratic direction, resembling the situation in the ideal typical total integration party. Party representatives however ensure that “(e)verybody … answer to somebody, including the chief of the party”.6

Recently, there has however been criticism levelled against the party leadership in this regard. Outside observer Al-Ghazali observes that “(t)he Party of Islam has elections. But lately there have been complaints, and these

1 T Khan, 28 March, 2000. Apart from this, associates can “attend the session also … with a special permission … (and) with the permission of the Chair, he can speak … (but) he cannot vote” (Rahman, 17 February, 1999 and Munir, 22 February, 1999, states the same thing). Obviously this permanent route of communication is open to full members as well (Iqbal, 3 April, 2000). These rights of the members are established in the constitution of the party: “(O)rdinary members of the party shall be entitled to attend the meetings of the Shura as audience”, if not the Amir decides otherwise (article 26 of the constitution). Non-members may also participate in these meetings, but only when invited by the Amir (article 27 of the constitution).

2 Malik, 3 April, 2000.

3 Abbas, 4 April, 2000.


6 Munir, 3 April, 2000. T Khan, 28 March, 2000, states the same thing.
have never been before”. Thus, there seems to be traits of ideal typical total integration kind, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. The same can be said regarding the total obedience to the party’s decisions. This too points to a resemblance with the ideal typical total integration party in this regard. These traits however do not seem to dominate, or at least have not dominated historically.

Moving on to the women’s wing of the party and thus the role of the women members in the party internal elections of the Party of Islam, the constitution prescribes that the central Amir is to appoint the secretary general of the women’s wing for three years in consideration of the opinions of the women members from all over the country. The women members in the provinces are further to elect the women Shura and to assist the secretary general, according to the constitution.  

The women members also take part in the general intra-party elections of the party: “We select our Amir of the Party of Islam, female wing also vote for him, our votes are also included”. Further, party representative Firdaus states that they “participate in … the main Shura”. This feature is not mentioned in the constitution, however; there only a separate women’s Shura is mentioned. This suggests that the women members indeed are involved in the party internal elections in practice.

When it comes to the participation of the women members in the party internal elections of the Party of Islam, it can thus be stated that some provisions for such participation are outlined ideally and strategically. In

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2 The central Amir moreover appoints the heads of the provincial, district and local units in the women’s wing, taking due consideration to the opinions of the women members and consulting the women’s secretary general (Constitution, appendix VI). Not stated in the constitution, but described by women representative Qazi, is that there in every province is an “elected provincial council … (and there is also a) divisional council” of the women’s wing (Qazi, 4 April, 2000).
3 Firdaus, 29 March, 2000. In the constitution of the party, it is stated that the women are entitled to vote in the men’s local party elections: “(The) separation of women’s organisation does not mean to make them unable to exercise the right of vote in men’s local party elections. Instead, women members of the party of Islam do have right to vote in the election of local Amir” (interpretation of article 88). However, nothing is stated in the constitution regarding the women’s right to vote in the election of the central Amir of the party.
5 In a manner consistent with the party ideology, the women are not present in the same room as the men when participating in the main Shura: “(We sit in a) separate disclosure, separate room. We listen to them and we can participate in that, we can send our message and we can give our comments and suggestions … (and) we vote” (Firdaus, 29 March, 2000).
practice, the participation of women however seem to be even more extensive than what is provided for on ideal and strategic level. In this sense, there seem to be certain similarities with the ideal typical mass integration party also when it comes to women members, not least in practice.1

Also when it comes to other party internal communications than intra-party elections, the elaborate set-up of the party is very important. As noted previously, this elaborate set-up of the party is duplicated on every level in the organisation; on provincial, divisional, district and local level.2

In this way, the organisation of the Party of Islam forms a tightly knit network, which makes constant reciprocal communication between the levels possible. Such communication also takes place, but it is emphasised that the lower levels have a substantial influence on how for example local activities are to be worked out in detail. Not least the district level is important in this regard: “(The) centre gives directions, guidance … but they (the districts) have their own working plans. In the light of (the) centre plans, they decide their own plans”.3

The local levels thus largely decide on what work is to be carried out, because they have the required knowledge on local circumstances. According to party representative Rahman, “they know that their main target is to reach out to … the maximum (number) of people. For that purpose, they organise according to their own unit. Because … in every area, there will be a different kind of activity required. So (it) is the local organisation that is responsible”.

Some activities are directed from the top however: “(N)aturally sometimes, there may be activities that are more related to current affairs or political activity. In that case, they may be given some directions from the higher organisation”.5 However, also in this case “this plan will contain broad outlines how to implement it at the grass root level, (but it) … is the grass root organisation’s task (to decide)”.

The local activities are meticulously monitored by the party at

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1 Outside observers could provide no information on the position of women members in the Party of Islam in relation to the party internal elections.
2 Part IV-VII of the constitution. According to Rafi, the divisional level only exists in Sindh and Baluchistan, and not in the other provinces (Rafi, 14 April, 2000). The same set-up is present in the women’s wing.
3 Malik, 3 April, 2000. Rahman, 10 April, 2000 states the same thing.
6 Rahman, 10 April, 2000.
different levels. According to Firdaus, “they (at the unit level) give their report … about their different activities, whatever they did. Then, these reports are collected and they are sent to the upper level, district, then from district to division and then to province and then to centre. And there the whole of the activity of the person and branch are summed”. Those reports are regarded as very important, because “(m)aking of high quality is needed to run an organisation. An organisation cannot be stable if you don’t have high quality”. Every month there is also a general meeting to evaluate the efforts of the party. On the basis of the reports and these meetings, an evaluation of the activities is thus carried out and “then a plan is made”.

There are also other ways, besides the regular meetings, in which the party prescribes for the members what activities they should carry out: “(W)e have a circular system. We send written circulars to them (full and associate members), instructions on every occasion. For their motivation, for giving them directions”.

But, as noted previously, the communication is not only one-way. Members can also communicate upwards through the organisation: “We have meetings of our full members regularly, at district level. And then they can ask any question to the representatives, about the party, the working of the party, the organisation, about their policy and the various issues… The Amir is accountable, they can ask him every question”.

Furthermore, the heads on different levels in the party organisation regularly tour the area to discuss with different units. Iqbal, who is general secretary for Punjab, asserts that “I am always on tour, almost 20 days of the month. I go to the … districts and units, and contact them and we discuss problems. (I) hear their opinions, about anything”.

Regular, two-way communications thus take place in the Party of Islam. In this way, there are similarities to the ideal typical mass integration

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2 Firdaus, 29 March, 2000. Qazi, 4 April, 2000, states the same thing.
4 Malik, 3 April, 2000.
5 Firdaus, 29 March, 2000. The same procedure takes place in the men’s as well as in the women’s part of the organisation, and the plan is given to the men’s as well as the women’s part of the organisation, which presents it to the lower levels in turn (Firdaus, 29 March, 2000).
8 Iqbal, 3 April, 2000.
9 Especially the Amirs on different levels are responsible for communicating with levels
party when it comes to general party internal communication in the Party of Islam, ideally, strategically and in practice. Whether this two-way communication includes also associate members is however less clear.

It can also be noted that quite a substantial degree of control of lower levels is carried out by the party leadership, ideally, strategically and in practice. It is difficult to ascertain the character of this control. To the extent that it is of directive character, there are similarities with they total integration party in this regard.

Regarding the women’s wing, the constitution indicates that the women are primarily to receive directions from the men, but merely report back. This practice is also suggested by party representative Ahmed, who while emphasising that the women’s wing is independent, asserts that the women indeed “take advice from men”. This indicates the presence of total integration traits regarding the internal communication with the women’s wing.

When it comes to other organisations connected to the party, like the student organisations, peasant organisations and trade unions, the party representatives claim that these are fully independent from the party organisation and that the communication between these organisations and the Party of Islam is informal. For example, “there are a lot of ex-members of the Islamic Student Organisation in the party, so they have close personal contacts”.

Not all outside observers agree with this description, however. According to outside observer Mahmood, these so called independent bodies are entirely controlled by the leadership of the Party of Islam. The control of the ancillary bodies suggested by those remarks makes for a resemblance with the ideal typical total integration party in this respect.

To conclude, the internal elections in the Party of Islam is characterised by participatory democracy for the chosen few – male and female members – ideally, strategically and (at least to a certain extent) in

above and below (articles 42, 53, 56, 67, 70, 84, 85 of the constitution).

1Appendix VI of the constitution.


3Rahman, 10 April, 2000. According to party representatives, continuous informal communication also takes place with non-Muslims attached to the party: “They can give their suggestions, for their community. And … we have contacts with the Christians and other nationalities” (T Khan, 28 March, 2000).

4Mahmood, 6 April, 2000. Also Nasr claims that there is a tight organisational connection between these bodies and the party (Nasr, 1994: 55).
practice. However, participation in elections is not for the larger circles, i.e. associates may not participate in the internal decision-making of the party.

Indeed, the associates are placed in a peculiar situation. On the one hand, they are continuously communicated to by the party leadership. On the other hand, they have themselves little opportunities to communicate to the top. From their horizon, then, the Party of Islam resembles an ideal typical total integration party, ideally, strategically and in practice. Regarding members, the Party of Islam however predominantly resembles an ideal typical mass integration party (even if ideal typical total integration traits do seem present in practice as well).

Regarding other party internal communication, the Party of Islam to a large extent resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, with regular two-way communication between higher and lower levels – at least for the male members. For women members, there are indications of practices of more of total integration party kind.

The Party of Islam thus presents a mix of traits when it comes to the mode of intra-party communication; in some respects it is similar to the mass integration party, in others to the total integration party, both on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. More specifically, the party primarily resembles a mass integration party from the point of view of the members, while it from the point of view of the associates resembles a total integration party.

Table 6:22. Traits in the mode of intra-party communication in the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Intra-Party Communication</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td>D (members)</td>
<td>D (associates)</td>
<td>P (members)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents to what extent traits of the four ideal types is present in the Party of Islam. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

Conclusions Regarding Activities to Maintain Internal Linkage

In all, the Party of Islam presents traits both reminiscent of the ideal typical mass integration party and of the ideal typical total integration party, when it comes to its efforts to maintain internal linkage. Between these two, it is difficult to say that one or the other is dominating on a general level. The
reason for this is that the Party of Islam presents different traits in different aspects – and regarding the different tiers of membership.

Regarding members, the Party of Islam to a large extent reminds of an ideal typical party of total integration, when it comes to what activities it performs to maintain internal linkage. Just like a party of total integration, the Party of Islam provides its members with encapsulating, all-encompassing activities of political, ideological and social character, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. However, when it comes to what bodies in the party that perform the activities and the mode of party internal communication in the case of the members, the Party of Islam more resembles an ideal typical party of mass integration, ideally, strategically – and in practice.

Things are (almost) diametrically opposite regarding the associates of the party. While the associates are offered activities found in an ideal typical mass integration party to maintain internal linkage, performed by such party bodies that would perform these activities in an ideal typical mass integration party, the associates are not included in the party internal communication in a mass integration manner. In this regard, the means of influence of associates resembles that of members in the ideal typical total integration party – associates are communicated to, but they have little opportunities to make their voices heard, on ideal and strategic level, as well as in practice.

Apart from these dominating traits, there are traits in practice pointing to the presence of some party internal clientelistic practices. However, these traits are far from dominating, in the case of members as well as in the case of associates. The dominating traits in the efforts to maintain internal linkage in the Party of Islam is presented in the table below.
Table 6.23: The full picture of the Party of Islam’s effort to maintain internal linkage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintaining internal linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideal:</strong></td>
<td>Activities (associates), intra-party communication (members) Performer</td>
<td>Activities (members), intra-party communication (associates)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy:</strong></td>
<td>Activities (associates), intra-party communication (members) Performer</td>
<td>Activities (members), intra-party communication (associates)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In practice:</strong></td>
<td>Activities (associates), intra-party communication (members) Performer</td>
<td>Activities (members), intra-party communication (associates)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table presents the Party of Islam’s efforts to maintain internal linkage based on the dominating traits in the different aspects.

From the point of view of the theoretical models, it can yet again be established that the expectations on the basis of the orientation of the Party of Islam are largely met; mass integration traits as well as total integration traits dominate the efforts to maintain internal linkage. But it is a mixed picture indeed. Whereas the activities to maintain internal linkage largely follow the pattern from the efforts to establish internal linkage (i.e. that members are treated in a total integration way, whereas associates are treated in a mass integration way), things are quite the opposite when it comes to the intra-party communication. Here, members are treated as in a mass integration party, whereas associates are looked upon as they are in a total integration party. When it comes to the bodies performing the activities to maintain internal linkage, the Party of Islam however resembles the mass integration party.

I will now summarise the findings regarding the linkage outcome of the Party of Islam and discuss this outcome on the basis of the theoretical models.

**Summarising the Linkage Outcome of the Party of Islam**

Having gone through all the aspects of linkage in the Party of Islam, it is now time to summarise the findings. The linkage objective of the Party of Islam is of dominantly mass integration character – the Party of Islam wants
to draw the masses into the party in different ways, ideally, strategically and in practice. However, there are traits of the total integration party in this respect as well. To some extent the Party of Islam wants to enclose the members within the party, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. Also traits of more electoral character – of primarily of catch-all, but also of clientelistic kind – are present in the linkage objective of the Party of Islam. Catch-all traits are present ideally strategically and in practice, whereas clientelistic traits only are present in practice.

According to the theoretical models in this case, a linkage objective of primarily mass integration kind would be the result of the orientation of the party. As the analysis of the motivation for the linkage objective in the Party of Islam shows, the theoretical expectations are met in this case: The linkage objective of primarily mass integration kind is attributed to the orientation of the party, both by party representatives and outside analysts.

The traits of total integration kind in the linkage objective of the party are in line with the theoretical expectations as well. Also these are attributed to the orientation of the party in line with the model. The same can be said for the traits of catch-all kind, found in the linkage objective in the Party of Islam. The trait of clientelistic kind, present to some extent in the party linkage objective in practice, is however attributed to the societal setting of the party. This too is in line with the specified theoretical model.

When it comes to the efforts to establish external linkage in the Party of Islam, definite resemblances with the mass integration party are in place. Just like the ideal typical mass integration party, the Party of Islam pursues wide-ranging activities of social as well as political, educational and campaigning activities, both on long-term and on short-term basis, ideally, strategically and in practice. Just like in the ideal typical mass integration party, these activities are also performed by the party itself to some extent, but also by a wide array of organisations related to the party, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. However, unlike the mass integration party, the activities to establish external linkage in the Party of Islam is not directed at a well-defined mass group, but rather at the population at large, at least ideally and strategically. In practice, there are traits of some targeting of particular groups, but also here the main idea is to target all. In this sense, there are definite resemblances with the ideal typical catch-all party, when it comes to the target of the efforts to establish external linkage in the Party of Islam.

For most parts, the theoretical model, based on the orientation of the
party, thus applies. In the orientation of the Party of Islam, elements primarily resembling those of a mass integration party are found, but traits of the ideal typical total integration and the ideal typical catch-all party are also present. These elements arguably to make for the particular outcome at hand.

The same picture emerges as we move on to the efforts to maintain external linkage. Also in these efforts, the Party of Islam employs activities of mass integration kind, performed by the party itself as well as organisations affiliate and ancillary to it, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice, in a mass integration kind of way. Again, the activities are however largely directed at supporters at large, as activities of the ideal typical catch-all party are, and not primarily at a particular group. Again, the theoretical model focusing on the orientation of the party is thus valid.

Regarding efforts to establish internal linkage, quite different situations apply for different categories of members. Whereas associate members are looked upon largely as members are in an ideal typical mass integration party, regarding the recruitment policy and membership requirements, ideally, strategically and in practice, things are very different regarding the full members. Thus, whereas associates are actively recruited and are required to meet some formal qualifications to become members, just as members are in the ideal typical mass integration party, full members are not actively recruited and are to fulfil very strict requirements in order to be accepted as members. Full-members-to-be also go through a probationary period. In this sense, then, both the recruitment policy and the membership requirements for members in the Party of Islam very much resemble those in an ideal typical total integration party, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice.

The theoretical model based on the orientation of the party again is applicable, even if different elements in the orientation – and in the linkage objective – have to be emphasised in relation to different categories of members.

When it comes to efforts to maintain internal linkage, yet another picture emerges. Regarding associate members, such are treated in much the same way as members are in an ideal typical mass integration party, regarding activities to maintain them in the party and regarding what bodies perform these activities. Just like in the ideal typical mass integration party, associate members are catered for with various activities of different kinds, including social and educational activities. Such activities are performed by the party itself on its different level, as well as by affiliate and ancillary
organisations. This is the case on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. However, in the internal communication of the party, the associate members of the Party of Islam do not have the opportunities given to the members in the ideal typical mass integration party. Instead, the communication to them is unidirectional (top–down) and they have little opportunities to influence the work of the party. This situation, which applies on ideal and strategic level and in practice alike, resembles the situation in the ideal typical total integration party.

However, regarding full members, the opposite situation is valid: Full members are enclosed in activities encompassing the whole life, just as members in ideal typical total integration parties are, ideally, strategically and in practice. But contrary to the members in a total integration party, members in the Party of Islam do have a continuous say in the party internal communication and they do participate in party internal elections, on ideal and strategic level as well as in practice. In this sense, the members of the Party of Islam are treated in much the same way as members are in an ideal typical mass integration party.

In one aspect, the situation for the full members and the associate members however converge, and that is regarding the performer of the activities to maintain internal linkage. These performers are of mass integration kind in both instances, ideally, strategically and in practice.

The party-centered theoretical model focusing the orientation of the party thus succeeds in predicting the linkage outcome in this case, at least if different elements in the orientation (and in the linkage objective) are emphasised in different aspects. Just as expected, the Party of Islam presents traits of mass integration kind. However, also the total integration traits, that are found in this aspect, have a foundation in the orientation of the party. In some aspects, there are total integration traits in the orientation of the Party of Islam.

To conclude, it can thus be established that the Party of Islam to a large extent organises its linkage as an ideal typical mass integration party does. But it is not a case of a complete resemblance. Instead, the Party of Islam combines traits typical of an ideal typical mass integration party with elements typical primarily of an ideal typical total integration party. This is most pronounced regarding aspects of the internal linkage of the party.¹

¹ It is interesting to note that outside observers draw a parallel between the Party of Islam and totalitarian parties, primarily the Leninist party. Indeed, the Party of Islam is said to have been inspired by the Leninist party when setting up its organisation, but “to that extent, you can
In some distinct respects, traits of other ideal typical kinds of linkage are also present in the Party of Islam. Especially the target of activities to establish and maintain external linkage reminds of the target in the ideal typical catch-all party, i.e. the target is everybody.

To far lesser extent, there are ideal typical clientelistic traits present in the way the Party of Islam organises its linkage. Such traits are revealed in some practices of the party. However, these clientelistic traces are very limited.

In the concluding section of this chapter, I will discuss how we are to explain the linkage outcome of the Party of Islam. Especially the catch-all traits, which are quite contrary to the other traits displayed, need to be discussed.

**Applying the Party-Centred and Institutional Explanations**

All through the analysis of the Party of Islam, I have been able to establish that the party-centred model, based on the orientation of the party, is the explanation that best accounts for the linkage outcome of the party. Just like the model expects, on the basis of the orientation of the party, the Party of Islam presents a linkage objective and a linkage outcome dominated by traits found in an ideal typical mass integration party – and in accordance with the model, the party refers to its orientation in accounting for this particular linkage.

Also the origin, background and experiences of the party would suggest such a linkage. However, these factors are not referred to in accounting for the linkage in this regard and can thus not be said to be decisive in this case, even if they may well influence the orientation.

For most parts, the orientation of the Party of Islam thus explains its linkage objective as well as its linkage outcome. But the mass integration model cannot explain all aspects of the linkage of the Party of Islam. Instead, other models must be taken into account as well. Thus, traits of total integration kind accompany the traits of mass integration kind in the linkage objective and linkage outcome of the Party of Islam. These too are in line with the theoretical expectations on the basis of some particular elements in the orientation of the party.

Interestingly, features that resemble a mass integration party and also draw the same kind of parallel with the Fascist parties” (Haider, 3 April, 2000). For the parallel to the Leninist party, see particularly Nasr, 1994.
features that resemble a total integration party are found in particular aspects of the linkage of the Party of Islam. Mass integration traits are found primarily in the linkage efforts directed at the public at large, like the activities to establish and maintain external linkage, and the recruitment of and requirements for the wider member category of associates. The total integration traits are, on the other hand, found in the internal matters of the Party of Islam, regarding recruitment of and requirements for full members and the activities for full members.¹

This pattern is likely to be a reflection of the internal strife in the party, between those who want to reach out to the public at large and those who want to keep the party “pure”. This strife in indeed a reflection of diverging features in the orientation. By organising in this particular way, the party seemingly attempts at reaching all – and at keeping the core pure.

The discussion of the different “open” and “closed” traits in the Party of Islam leads on to a discussion of the traits in the linkage of the Party of Islam that most clearly deviates for the traits found in the ideal typical integration types – namely, that the party targets everybody in its activities to establish and maintain linkage, in a catch-all manner.

Going back to the theoretical explanations, we find that the institutional arrangements, or, in particular – the electoral system, in Pakistan make for such an outcome. May thus this electoral system be the reason why the Party of Islam targets all? Of course, this might be some part of the explanation. However, institutions are not referred to by party representatives or outside observers in accounting for the linkage of the Party of Islam. That the Party of Islam targets all primarily as a result of the institutions thus seems unlikely.

May then the targeting of all be attributable to the catch-all element, that after all exists in the orientation of the party? This seems more likely. In its orientation, the Party of Islam emphasises that its ideology embraces all. Such a stance is likely to lead to a catch-all trait in the linkage objective of the party, as well as in its linkage outcome.

What about the impact of the societal setting of Pakistan then; does the societal setting at all influence the linkage of the Party of Islam? Indeed, there is a trait of clientelism in the linkage objective of the Party of Islam in practice and there is a slight presence of clientelistic traits in the activities to

¹ The exception to this “rule” is the intra-party communication. Here, associates are treated as members are in a total integration party, whereas full members are treated as the members are in a mass integration party.
establish external linkage of the Party of Islam in practice and regarding the
activities to maintain internal linkage in the Party of Islam. However,
overall, the linkage outcome in the Party of Islam does not display any
general clientelistic traits. The societal setting can thus not be regarded as
decisive for the linkage outcome at large in the Party of Islam, even if some
– limited – traits may be attributed to it. To the extent that this is the case, it
is in line with the party-centred theoretical model.

For most parts, it is thus the orientation of the Party of Islam that
accounts for its specific way of organising its linkage. However, no
particular theoretical model can account for the outcome as a whole. Instead,
traits from primarily the mass integration party, but also from the total
integration party and the catch-all party are found in the Party of Islam.

Still, the general theoretical assumption underlying the party-centred
model, i.e. that a party’s orientation results in a particular linkage objective,
which in turn results in a specific linkage outcome, is substantiated in the
case of the Party of Islam. The origin, background and experiences of the
Party of Islam however do not seem important in shaping the linkage of the
Party of Islam, at least not directly, nor does the institutional setting. The
findings of this chapter are presented in the model below.

*Figure 6:4. Relation between explanatory factors, linkage objective and motivation and
linkage outcome in the Party of Islam.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Linkage objective and motivation of dominantly mass integration kind and to some extent of total integration kind on ideal and strategic level and in practice, and of catch-all kind (in one aspect), ideally, strategically and in practice</th>
<th>Linkage outcome of dominantly mass integration kind and to some extent of total integration kind on ideal and strategic level and in practice, and of catch-all kind in one respect, ideally, strategically and in practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Origin, background, experiences favouring party of primarily mass integration kind</td>
<td>No influence on linkage objective</td>
<td>No influence on linkage outcome</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the Party of Islam, the orientation of the party thus primarily accounts for its linkage outcome. As we saw earlier, the religious elements in the orientation are of vital importance. These largely motivate the linkage objective of mass integration kind – and thus also the linkage outcome of mass integration kind.

However, in the Party of Islam the religious concerns not only influence the linkage objective and thus the linkage outcome to be of mass integration kind. Instead, the willingness to act in line with the commands of God seems to influence the linkage outcome directly. On the website of the party, it is for instance stated that “(i)ts Allah’s will that the poor and the sick should be cared for, and that people should strive with all their might to do good and lead honourable lives. After death, such people will be richly rewarded for their efforts. But those who purposely do evil will receive terrible punishment, unless they are sincerely sorry for what they have done and ask Allah to forgive them”.\(^1\) Also party representative Firdaus discusses this aspect: “Our main objective is to get reward from Allah (by being) of service to mankind. And the service to mankind is to build a happy, contented welfare state and society. And that we can do partly by educating and by providing social services to the people and helping them in this and that way. But we can do it in its most perfect form through the political change”.\(^2\)

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The social activities, which form such a large part of the linkage activities of the Party of Islam, thus seem to take place not only for the intrinsic value of alleviating the needs of the poor and draw their support for the reform of society (as it is in an ideal typical mass integration party), but also because the party regards the performance of such activities as God’s will. In carrying out such activities, the Party of Islam thus acts at the command of God.

With this final reflection, we have thus come to the end of the first part of this study, where the linkage of three Islamist parties have been analysed, with the help of different theoretical models. It is now time to turn to part II, where I will discuss whether there are reasons to speak about a particular religious way of organising political linkage.
ANALYSIS PART II:
CAN RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY EXPLAIN THE LINKAGE OF ISLAMIST PARTIES?
CHAPTER 7

A RELIGIOUS PARTY TYPE?

In part I of this study, three Islamist parties have been analysed as to how they organise their linkage and what may explain why they organise their linkage the way they do. It has been established that particularly the party-centred explanations, but also the institutional explanations, do contribute in different ways to an understanding of the way in which Islamist parties organise their political linkage.

Here, in part II of this study, we will move on to compare the Islamist parties to one another. To what extent are there similarities and differences between them? May it be argued that there is a particular Islamist – or more generally – a particular religious way of organising political linkage? This is what is examined in this chapter.

As we have seen, explanations of linkage outcomes differ quite extensively between the parties here under study, and on a general level the linkage outcomes also differ. Thus, the Virtue Party presents a linkage objective of electoral kind, stemming in an electoral orientation and a societal setting favouring clientelistic parties. This linkage objective is followed by a linkage outcome marked by clientelistic and mass integration party traits in the Virtue Party. The Islamic Action Front (on its own) also presents a linkage objective of electoral – and more specifically – catch-all kind, however stemming in an orientation of primarily mass integration party kind. The linkage outcome in the Islamic Action Front largely resembles that of a catch-all party, if with certain mass integration elements. The Party of Islam presents a linkage objective of predominantly mass integration kind, stemming in an orientation of largely mass integration kind. The linkage outcome is of largely mass integration character, if with certain total integration and some electoral elements.

May we then conclude that there does not seem to be a particular “Islamist” way of organising political linkage? Do the Islamist parties rather organise in ways similar to other parties in the same national context? In that case, institutional – or other national – factors would seem to be decisive for their linkage. This will be analysed in more detail here. Moreover, I will end this chapter by developing an embryonic model of linkage of Christian

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1 These findings will be summarised in Chapter 8.
Democratic parties. On a general level, the linkage of Islamist parties is then compared to this model. This comparison serves to establish whether there at all is reason to speak about a particular “religious” way of organising linkage.

**Similarities and Differences in the Linkage of the Islamist Parties**

Without going into detail, I will here undertake some comparisons between the three Islamist parties included in this study. To what extent do these parties present similarities and to what extent do they present differences regarding different aspects of linkage?

Looking first at the linkage objective of the Islamist parties under study, it can be established that linkage objectives of electoral kind dominate in two parties (the Virtue Party and the Islamic Action Front, considered on its own), while such are but present in the third party (the Party of Islam). To a non-negligible extent, Islamist parties thus seem to be vote-maximising parties, even if they are vote-maximising in different ways and to different extents. In one of the parties (the Party of Islam), a linkage objective of mass integration kind however dominates. Here, total integration traits are present in the linkage objective as well, beside some electoral traits.

Regarding the linkage objective of the Islamist parties, a unanimous picture can thus not be found. The strongest pattern, however, is that of vote-maximisation.

When it comes to efforts to establish external linkage, activities and performers of mass integration kind dominate in two parties (the Virtue Party and the Party of Islam), if the Virtue Party is regarded only on ideal and strategic level. If the Islamic Action Front is regarded in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood, this pattern of mass integration is decisively strengthened, as the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood in conjunction present next to ideal typical mass integration efforts to establish external linkage. On its own, the Islamic Action Front also presents some mass integration traits, regarding the performers of the activities to establish external linkage, on ideal and strategic level.

However, electoral traits are prominent in this aspect as well – the

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1 These comparisons are based on the summaries of each aspect in each case, in Chapters 4-6. In this context, it is important to remember that it is only the dominating traits that are included in these summaries (the exception to this is the linkage objective, where also present traits are included). For details, consult the specific chapters.
Virtue Party in practice and the Islamic Action Front on its own present largely electoral activities of clientelistic (the Virtue Party) and catch-all (the Islamic Action Front) kind in their efforts to establish external linkage.

Regarding the target of the activities to establish external linkage, an interesting pattern is revealed. All three parties target all and everyone in their respective country, ideally and strategically, like an ideal typical catch-all party. The ideal and strategy are largely borne out in practice in the Islamic Action Front and the Party of Islam, whereas the Virtue Party in practice primarily resembles a clientelistic party in this respect, targeting primarily particular groups.

Despite the differences, some similarities can thus be detected regarding the efforts to establish external linkage in the Islamist parties. The broad targeting and at least the ambition to pursue activities of mass integration kind stand out most clearly (especially if the Islamic Action Front is viewed in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood). This pattern is however blurred by the electoral traits present in two of the parties, the Islamic Action Front (alone) and the Virtue Party in practice.

A next to identical pattern is found regarding the efforts to maintain external linkage. Also here, the activities and performers of such activities are of mass integration kind on ideal and strategic level in the Virtue Party and in the Party of Islam; in the Party of Islam, this ideal and strategy is realised in practice as well. Also the Islamic Action Front in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood present a close resemblance with the ideal typical mass integration party when it comes to activities and performers of the efforts to maintain external linkage in practice. The Islamic Action Front alone presents mass integration traits regarding the performers in this respect on ideal and strategic level.

As was the case concerning the efforts to establish external linkage, electoral traits are however also present in the efforts to maintain such linkage. Activities of electoral kind are found on all levels in the Islamic Action Front on its own (of catch-all kind), and in the Virtue Party in practice (of clientelistic kind).

Regarding the target of the efforts maintain external linkage, strong electoral traits are again evident in all parties. On ideal and strategic level, the target resembles that of an ideal typical catch-all party in all three parties. In the Party of Islam and in the Islamic Action Front on its own, such a target is found in practice as well, whereas the target in this aspect in the Virtue Party is of clientelistic kind in practice. Only the Islamic Action Front
considered in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood disrupts this pattern – here the target is primarily of mass integration kind in practice.

In sum, we can thus establish that a heterogeneous picture emerges regarding the efforts to maintain external linkage; however not one without specific patterns. Like in the case of the efforts to establish external linkage, the broad targeting stands out in this aspect; it is the ideal and strategy to maintain external linkage with a cross-section of the population in all parties, even if the practice differs somewhat in this respect. Also the fact that performers are largely of mass integration kind, particularly if the Islamic Action Front is viewed in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood, stands out. Activities to maintain external linkage are of mass integration kind on ideal and strategic level in the Virtue Party and the Party of Islam. In the Party of Islam, these activities are carried out in practice as well, as they are in the Islamic Action Front viewed in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood. In practice, however, the activities to maintain external linkage are primarily of clientelistic kind in the Virtue Party. Electoral activities (of catch-all kind) also dominate on all levels in the Islamic Action Front regarded on its own.

Moving on to the internal linkage, and more specifically to the efforts to establish internal linkage, it can be noted that traits typical of the ideal typical integration parties, and primarily the ideal typical mass integration party, dominate in the three Islamist parties under study. Thus, in all parties, restrictions to become a member in the party are of mass integration kind, on all levels (in the Party of Islam regarding associates; regarding full members, the restrictions are of total integration kind).

A more diverse picture emerges regarding the membership recruitment policy. The Party of Islam again presents ideal typical mass integration traits in this regard, regarding associates (regarding members, the membership recruitment policy resembles that of an ideal typical total integration party). Also in the Virtue Party the membership recruitment policy resembles that of an ideal typical mass integration party on ideal and strategic level. In practice, however, the recruitment policy is of primarily clientelistic kind in the Virtue Party. In the Islamic Action Front, such clientelistic traits dominate on all levels in this regard.

A rather homogeneous pattern thus presents itself when it comes to the efforts to establish internal linkage in the Islamist parties. For most parts, these efforts resemble those in an ideal typical mass integration party (even if there is a resemblance with the total integration party regarding the
Chapter 7: A Religious Party Type?

members in the Party of Islam). Regarding the membership recruitment policy, however, clientelistic traits are important in the Islamic Action Front and the Virtue Party, especially in practice.

Regarding the last aspect, the efforts to maintain internal linkage, an even stronger resemblance between the Islamist parties under study and the ideal typical mass integration party is found. In all aspects, except the activities to maintain internal linkage in practice in the Islamic Action Front (alone) and the Virtue Party and the performer carrying those activities out in practice in the Islamic Action Front (in which cases the parties present electoral traits), the Islamist parties present mass integration party traits. Thus, all parties present mass integration party traits regarding activities, performers and intra-party communication on ideal and strategic level. Intra-party communication also takes place in primarily a mass integration kind of way in all parties, ideally, strategically and in practice. Interesting to note is that the organisation in all parties is gender-separated. In all parties, there is a women’s wing which organises in a parallel manner to the main party. It can also be noted that the Islamist parties, at least the Virtue Party and the Party of Islam, demand quite a lot from their members, at least ideally and strategically (in the Party of Islam also in practice) and disciplinary actions are outlined in cases of non-compliance; the activities of the parties are further tightly controlled by the party leadership in these parties.

In the Party of Islam a particular division is present when it comes to the efforts to maintain internal linkage. Whereas associates are treated as members are in an ideal typical mass integration party regarding activities (i.e. they are catered for with various broad – but not encapsulating – activities), they are treated as members in a total integration party regarding the internal communication (i.e. they are largely excluded from such communication). The diametrically opposite situation applies for full members in the Party of Islam – they are encapsulated in party internal activities as members are in a total integration party, but they are admitted to participate in the party internal communication, as members are in a mass integration party. Regarding the performer of the activities to maintain internal linkage, those are however of mass integration kind in the Party of Islam – both for members and for associates. These findings are summarised in the following table. For details, consult Chapters 4-6.

1 In the Islamic Action Front, the situation regarding the women’s commission is not completely clear. However, for most parts, the Islamic Action Front women seem to organise in a parallel manner to the men.
Table 7.1. The full picture of the linkage of the Virtue Party, the Islamic Action Front and the Party of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage objective</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Establishing external linkage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td>Performer</td>
<td>Activities, target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td>Performer</td>
<td>Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In practice:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Performer</td>
<td>IAF/ MB: Activities, target, performer</td>
<td>Activities, target, performer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
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<td><strong>Maintaining external linkage</strong></td>
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<td>Strategy:</td>
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<td>In practice:</td>
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<td><strong>Establishing internal linkage</strong></td>
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<td>Ideal:</td>
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<td>Recruit-ment, restrictions (associates)</td>
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<td><strong>In practice:</strong></td>
<td>Performer, intra-party communication</td>
<td>Intra-party communication</td>
<td>Activities (associates), intra-party communication (members), performer</td>
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<td>Comment: The table describes the linkage objectives and the linkage outcomes of the Virtue Party, the Islamic Action Front (and the Islamic Action Front in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood in practice, IAF/MB) and the Party of Islam. The summary is based on the dominating traits in the different aspects, except regarding the linkage objective where present traits are included as well. For details, consult Chapters 4-6.</td>
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In an attempt at condensing these findings in a few sentences, with all the oversimplification it entails, one may note a particular pattern. Thus, even if they are not a homogeneous group – far from it – the Islamist parties here under study do present certain distinct similarities. The Islamist parties covered in this study are – with one exception – parties that aim primarily at electoral success (the Party of Islam with its objective of primarily mass integration kind is the exception to this). However, to achieve such electoral success, the Islamist parties do not primarily aim at organising as electoral parties. Instead, traits resembling those in an ideal typical mass integration party stand out, particularly regarding organisational matters, even if electoral traits also are found in practice, not least regarding activities. The Islamist parties thus want to achieve electoral success by organising largely as mass integration parties, even if they sometimes end up acting more like electoral parties.

In one particular aspect, there is an exception to this ambition to organise as a mass integration party: the target of the outreach activities. Instead of targeting a particular mass group, like the ideal typical mass integration party does, the Islamist parties employ a broad approach – they typically at least intend to target the population at large, even if they not always do so in practice.

In this context, we may further note the internally democratic traits that are present in the Islamist parties. Even if true party internal democracy is questioned on some accounts, most analysts agree that the party internal communication at least to some extent is carried out in a democratic manner in these Islamist parties.

Even if the different parties do present deviations from this pattern in different ways, there are thus definite similarities between the Islamist parties in these regards.\(^1\)

However, these particular linkage traits are perhaps common to all the different parties in the countries under study? In that case, one could not put down the particular linkage traits to a “religious”, or more specifically, an “Islamist” factor. In that case, there would seem to be other explanations to this specific outcome.

To make possible an evaluation of whether there indeed seems to be a

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1 In some aspects, this pattern is blurred if the Islamic Action Front is considered alone. However, if the Islamic Action Front is considered in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood – as there are strong reasons to do in practice – the pattern is even further strengthened. Regarding the linkage objective, the Islamic Action Front however should be regarded alone for this pattern to apply.
particular Islamist way of organising linkage, or whether the similarities here detected are common to also other parties in the different national contexts, I here carry out a short and necessarily sketchy comparison with other, non-Islamist parties in the different countries at hand. In one country, Pakistan, a short analysis of another Islamist party is further carried out. By these comparisons, we will find out whether the traits that are similar in the Islamist parties under study are particular to Islamist parties, or whether they are common also in other (primarily non-Islamist) parties.

The Linkage of Other Parties

In this section, I thus carry out some comparisons with other, primarily non-Islamist parties, in the three different countries included in this study: Turkey, Jordan and Pakistan. What is analysed here is primarily the linkage outcomes of the parties, regarding their linkage objective and their efforts to establish and maintain external and internal linkage.¹

The Linkage of Other Parties in the Turkish Context

In Turkey, there are mainly four different party groupings with historical roots. In the Kemalist (later leftist) tradition, the Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) and the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Partisi*) are found. The conservative tradition is today represented by the True Path Party (*Dogru Yol Partisi*) and the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*). These parties were created on the basis of different conservative and liberal tendencies after the coup in 1980. The Islamist tradition is, as we have seen, incarnated in the National Order Party–National Salvation Party–Welfare Party–Virtue Party succession of parties, and the nationalist tradition is represented by the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetci Hareket Partisi*).²

¹ More extensive attempts at explaining these outcomes further do not take place here, even if some notes are made in this regard. These analyses cannot be carried out in any depth. A general estimation of the linkage must thus suffice, disregarding a systematic division into ideal, strategic and actual linkage.


³ Today, there are also other parties on the political arena in Turkey. However, here I will take
Starting with the linkage objectives of the parties, it can be established that the republican principle on unity in the Turkish nation seems to have a great impact in this respect on Turkish parties. As we have seen, Turkish parties are not allowed to appeal to the people in a way that would risk polarising the nation, according to the Constitution of the country. This is one explanation to the fact that all Turkish parties, from the Democratic Left Party to the Nationalist Movement Party, in their rhetoric aim at targeting the population at large to maximise votes in elections. Like the Virtue Party, all of Turkey’s major political parties are thus of electoral character in this sense. Thus, all "(p)arties appeal to all... All parties (appeal to) all social strata, (there is) no discrimination".¹ This indicates a linkage objective of catch-all kind in all Turkish parties.

This broad appeal thus seems to be part of the ideal and strategy in all Turkish parties. In some parties, notably the Democratic Left Party, the ideal and strategy are also carried out in practice. For others, notably the rightist parties, clientelistic traits largely dominate the linkage objective in practice. That the patronage tradition is strong in Turkey is vouched for by many analysts: “Political patronage has been a distinguishing mark of parties like the True Path Party, particularly parties on the centre-right resorted to political patronage. And then of course others, not to be left behind, also took up this strategy”.²

Regarding its linkage objective, the Virtue Party thus does not seem to be unique in Turkey. Indeed, most parties – especially on the right wing – present linkage objectives of catch-all kind on ideal and strategic level and of clientelistic kind in practice, just like the Virtue Party.

The activities to establish external linkage are to a large extent similar in the major Turkish parties, among those in the rightist as well as those in account only of parties with some stability.

¹ Ayata, 14 May, 1999.
² Heper, 29 April, 1999. Other outside observers like Balci, 23 April, 1999, Erder, 6 May, 1999, Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999, Sahin, 17 May, 1999 and Özbudun, 28 April, 1999 state the same thing. That clientelistic traits are found in the right-wing parties and not in the leftist parties in Turkey is often explained by the fact that that it is mainly rightist parties that have been in government after the introduction of multi-party system in 1950, something that have provided them with an opportunity to offer services in exchange for votes. This is not so for the parties in the leftist tradition, which have had to stay outside government most of the time. The party leader in many leftist parties, Bülent Ecevit, is also known for his anti-clientelistic sentiments. However, also the rightist Nationalist Movement Party subscribes to an anti-clientelistic discourse. Just like the leftist parties, though, the Nationalist Movement Party does not have a tradition of being in government (Erder, 6 May, 1999, Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999, Özbudun, 28 April, 1999).
the leftist tradition. Media campaigns and party leader speeches (accompanied by car-convoys) in times of election seem to be the major activities to reach out to the Turkish people. Indeed, most Turkish parties pursue linkage activities only in times of election and not generally between elections. These activities are targeted at the population at large or at clientelistic networks and are carried out mainly by the leaderships of the different parties. In this way, most of the Turkish parties resemble the ideal typical electoral parties, of primarily catch-all kind (especially leftist parties), but also of clientelistic kind (especially the rightist parties).

Only two major parties deviate from this pattern and present activities of more ongoing kind, performed by various bodies of the party organisation on different levels. The Virtue Party is one, the Nationalist Movement Party is the other. Even if the activities of the Virtue Party primarily are of clientelistic kind in practice, they are carried out in close contact with the population. With the exception of the Nationalist Movement Party, “other parties don’t try this face-to-face talking”. According to Özbudun, “(a)ll the other parties go under the nature of a cadre party. But the Nationalist Movement Party and the Virtue Party do the real organisational work”.

Regarding the efforts to establish external linkage, the Virtue Party thus differs from the other parties in the Turkish context, except the Nationalist Movement Party. Contrary to those parties, different bodies in the Virtue Party carry out different activities (of mass integration kind ideally and strategically, but of largely clientelistic kind in practice), on a long-term basis.

The same situation largely applies when it comes to activities to maintain external linkage. Again, most parties in Turkey carry out occasional activities of campaigning nature, resembling the activities of catch-all parties to maintain external linkage. Again, in the Virtue Party (as in the National Movement Party) various bodies carry out activities on long-term basis to this effect. Also in this regard, the Virtue Party thus is different from most other Turkish parties.

In a way true to their electoral character, most Turkish parties engage only in very limited activities to establish internal linkage in the parties. While members are welcomed, there are no efforts to recruit them and there are no restrictions for membership, even if members-to-be in all parties are

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1 Balci, 23 April, 1999.
2 Özbudun, 28 April, 1999. Heper, 29 April, 1999 states the same thing. However, no welfare work is reported from the Nationalist Movement Party.
required to fill in an official form, which is to be sent to the High Election Committee. Most Turkish parties thus resemble the ideal typical catch-all party when it comes to the efforts to establish internal linkage.

As we have seen, things are different in the Virtue Party. Here, the efforts to establish internal linkage primarily resembles those in an ideal typical mass integration party, even if some clientelistic traits exist in practice. Also, the Nationalist Movement Party resembles the ideal typical mass integration party in this respect. But these two, the Virtue Party and the Nationalist Movement Party, to a large extent differ from the other Turkish parties in this regard.

Also regarding the efforts to maintain internal linkage, most Turkish parties have an unmistakable electoral touch. Activities to maintain internal linkage with members are few and far between and consist primarily of activities of the parties’ leaderships. Even if they do have general congresses (such are required by law), the parties do not seem to have true elections of representatives to their decision-making bodies, from the lower levels of the party organisation. Little continuous communication also seems to take place between the different levels of the parties.

The Democratic Left Party is the extreme in this regard. At the time of the fieldwork for this study, the Democratic Left Party was very much the leader’s, Ecevit’s, party.\(^1\) He himself (together with his wife) selected the representatives at the general congresses and decided on all matters of importance. Indeed, also members of the party admit that there is no party organisation to talk about in the Democratic Left Party.\(^2\) The Democratic Left Party thus to a large extent resembles the ideal typical catch-all party, with the difference that in the catch-all party elections generally do take place.

The other parties in the Turkish context seem to feature traits of electoral kind of less extreme variety in their internal activities. Whereas the leadership is generally strong in these parties, some party internal communication does take place and there is some degree of internal democracy. The Motherland Party and the Republican People’s Party are for example said to have more internally democratic features than the True Path Party.\(^3\) However, outside observers note that party internal democracy generally does not characterise Turkish parties. Özbudun states that “(i)n

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\(^{1}\) Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999, Özbudun, 28 April, 1999.
\(^{2}\) Korkut, 12 May, 1999.
At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist Parties

none of them, there is perfect internal democracy…”.¹ According to Özbudun, “the law on the paper is democratic, because at all levels you have elections. But elections can be manipulated and they are manipulated… And party leaders control nominations to parliament… They are not really elected”.²

The rightist parties also pursue party internal patronage to maintain internal linkage, while the leftist parties rely primarily on catch-all tactics in this regard.³ When it comes to the internal organisation of the Turkish parties, it can be noted that women generally organise together with men, even if there are specific women sections. It can also be noted that the parties generally are organised on different levels. As we have seen, there are rather strict regulations pertaining to how parties should organise internally in the Turkish party law. Apart from the requirements for party internal elections, one of the requirements is that the party should organise on all administrative levels of the state. The party laws thus make both for an elaborate organisation and for internal democracy in Turkish parties. However, most Turkish parties follow these regulations only formally. In practice, internal democracy is not a distinguishing mark of Turkish parties, nor is activities at different levels of the party organisation. In different ways, these parties thus generally resemble the ideal typical electoral parties, regarding the efforts to maintain internal linkage in practice.

As we have seen, the Virtue Party differs in this respect. Indeed, the Virtue Party for most parts resembles the ideal typical mass integration party when it comes to efforts to maintain internal linkage, even if questions have been raised as to the degree of true internal democracy in the party. The difference is evident especially regarding the performer of the activities. In the Virtue Party, different party organs indeed seem to be active on the different levels, in a manner resembling the ideal typical mass integration party.⁴

The Nationalist Movement Party also differs from the general catch-all picture. Whereas party representatives claim that there is democracy in the party, outside observers contend that the Nationalist Movement party is marked by total integration traits in its efforts to maintain internal linkage.

¹ Özbudun, 28 April, 1999.
² Özbudun, 28 April, 1999.
⁴ In this context, it may also be noted that, unlike other parties, the Virtue Party employs a gendered-separated organisation.
According to Atacan, the organisation of the National Movement Party “is a kind of Fascist organisation. Very authoritarian. Most of the politicians (are) coming from ... Grey Wolf background”.¹ The Nationalist Movement Party also, for instance, provides extensive educational and ideological activities, not least through the “party university” located in Ankara. In these senses, the internal linkage of the Nationalist Movement Party is marked by integration traits, of either mass integration or total integration kind.

To conclude, it can thus be established that the Virtue Party presents traits both similar to and different from the other parties in the Turkish context. The similarities are most striking when it comes to the linkage objectives of the parties – all Turkish parties appeal to the Turkish population at large in order to get their votes in elections. Regarding efforts to establish and maintain external linkage, the Virtue Party provides broader activities at more levels in the party organisation than do most other parties, except perhaps the Nationalist Movement Party. Especially the focus of the Virtue Party on welfare activities seems to be unique in Turkey. However, the clientelistic practices pursued by the Virtue Party are found also in other parties, primarily in parties of rightist tradition.

When it comes to efforts to establish internal linkage, the Virtue Party requires more from their members than do most other parties, again with the exception of the Nationalist Movement Party. Regarding efforts to maintain internal linkage, the Virtue Party is active on all levels, unlike most other parties. The most important activities to maintain internal linkage are however of largely clientelistic kind in the Virtue Party, and such activities are found in the other parties as well. In the Virtue Party, internal elections with at least some degree of democracy take place. Internal democracy of any extent is rare in Turkish parties.

The Virtue Party thus to a large extent resembles the other Turkish parties in its linkage objective of electoral kind. In all likelihood, this is at least to some extent a result of certain institutional features in Turkey. However, the mass integration party traits found in the Virtue Party primarily on ideal and strategic level, and regarding performer in practice, are lacking in the other Turkish parties (with the exception of the Nationalist

¹ Atacan, 7 May, 1999. Sakallıoğlu, 11 May, 1999, Erder, 6 May, 1999 and Günes-Ayata, 13 May, 1999 state the same thing. The Grey Wolf organisation is a youth organisation related, but not formally connected, to the party. The Grey Wolves were dreaded in the 1970s for their violence. Also Heper points out that the Nationalist Movement Party is “the most hierarchically structured party” (Heper, 29 April, 1999).
As suggested earlier, these traits may be attributed to the orientation of the party, in a way not foreseen by the theoretical models.

The clientelistic traits that mark much of the activities of the Virtue Party are however found also in other rightist parties in Turkey, and they have their basis largely in the societal setting of the country. Thus, the Virtue Party draws on a tradition of patronage, but it seems to have developed its own brand – clientelistic activities with an ideological touch. With this combination of clientelistic and ideological traits, the Virtue Party thus diverges from the other Turkish parties.

The Linkage of Other Parties in the Jordanian Context

In Jordan, parties have traditionally played a minor role in the political process, not least because they have been prohibited for many years. Instead, the political process is more focused on candidates than on parties, something that also has to do with the tribal traditions of the country. Parties in the Jordanian context are thus generally evasive phenomena – they are often made up of different coalitions, and they are often short-lived. Indeed, most analysts contend that there is only one proper political party in Jordan – the Islamic Action Front. To analyse the “other parties” in the Jordanian context is thus tricky. To make possible the comparisons aimed for in this context, an attempt must however be made. As it is difficult to speak about parties in a general sense in Jordan, as was possible in the Turkish context, two different parties have here been selected for comparison – the National Constitutional Party (Hizb al-Watan al-Dustouri) and the Communist Party (Hizb al-Shuyui al-Urduni).

The National Constitutional Party was the second biggest party at the

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1 In this context, it can be noted that the Nationalist Movement Party to a large extent is an ideological party, contrary to the other Turkish parties. This ideological orientation might account for the mass integration (and total integration) traits in the Nationalist Movement Party.

2 The data in this section are drawn primarily from interviews with representatives of the different parties (party leader Awwad Al-Khaldi and general secretary assistant Al-Nasser, the National Constitutional Party, 24 October, 1999, and party leader Munir Hamarneh, the Communist Party, 24 October, 1999). Also interviews with outside observers in Jordan such as Fakhuri, 25 September, 1999, Al-Khazandar, 12 October and 30 November, 1999, Khoury, 24 November, 1999, Momani, 24 November, 1999, El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999, Abu-Rumman, 5 October, 1999 and Sheiwi, 17 November, 1999 have been carried out.

3 In this context, it could be noted that the Islamic Action Front not is the only Islamist party in Jordan, but it is the dominating one. Other Islamist parties, that have been active to various extents, are the moderate Doa’a and the militant, outlawed Liberation Party (Hourani, 5 October, 1999).
time of the fieldwork, and it is made up of a coalition of different, previously independent, parties. The Communist Party, on the other hand, has had very limited success in elections. Indeed, at the time of the fieldwork, it had only had one representative in parliament since 1989, and this representative was subsequently suspended from the party.\footnote{Hamarneh, Munir, 24 October, 1999.}

The two parties here selected for analysis are thus very different between themselves, and very different from the Islamic Action Front. If these different parties present similar traits regarding linkage, there is reason to believe that these traits are induced by contextual factors.

Starting with the linkage objective, it can be established that this is clear in the National Constitutional Party. According to the party leader, Al-Khaldi, the party aims at reaching “the place of the decision-making in the country”.\footnote{Al-Khaldi, 24 October, 1999.} In order to do so, the party needs to maximise votes in elections, and is thus clearly an electoral party. Indeed, the party leader himself refers to the party as “pragmatic”.\footnote{Al-Khaldi, 24 October, 1999.} Whether it is a pragmatic party of catch-all or clientelistic variety is more difficult to establish. While the party leader emphasises that the party aims at reaching all in times of election, in order to gain votes, like an ideal typical catch-all party, another party representative – Al-Nasser – refers to the importance of people who are “very strong in their districts” and that it is important for the party to attract influential people.\footnote{Al-Nasser, 24 October, 1999.} This indicates a linkage objective of clientelistic kind.

The Communist Party is ambivalent towards elections. On the one hand, the party leader claims that elections are not everything (the party has polled poorly in elections), on the other hand he asserts that the party wants to make an impact, not least through elections.\footnote{Hamarneh, Munir, 24 October, 1999.} Despite this ambivalence, the linkage objective of the Communist Party primarily seems to resemble that of an electoral party. The party leader does not emphasise any ambition to reform (or revolutionise) society. Instead, he emphasises the importance of winning the public opinion to win support.\footnote{Hamarneh, Munir, 24 October, 1999.} In this sense, the Communist Party primarily resembles a catch-all party.

Also other parties in Jordan are reported to be of vote-maximising kind. According to one observer, all parties “want to have … more voters. If
you have more voters…, you will have more members in the parliament”.¹

In this respect, the Islamic Action Front does not diverge from the other parties in the Jordanian context. Just like these, the Islamic Action Front primarily embraces a linkage objective of catch-all kind.

When it comes to efforts to establish and maintain external linkage, the National Constitutional Party primarily underlines the importance of campaigning activities – especially in times of elections, but also in between elections. The party thus seeks to be active in different “hot” political issues and to make its views known. In this work, the party directs itself to everyone. In this sense, the National Constitutional Party resembles the ideal typical catch-all party, not least since they “approach everybody”.²

Also the Communist Party to a large extent resembles the ideal typical catch-all party in this aspect. This party too emphasises the importance of being continuously active in different political issues to make its views known. In this work, the party targets the population at large, even if the poorest sections – peasants and labourers – are specifically targeted. To the extent that such particular targeting takes place, the Communist party thus resembles an ideal party of integration. For most parts, the party however underlines its broad approach.

Both the National Constitutional Party and the Communist Party thus basically act like catch-all parties in their outreach efforts. According to an outside observer, this approach is common to all parties in Jordan: “(A)ll the parties … (use) the same way of reaching the people, they adopt the same means”.³ Apart from these campaigning activities, Jordanian parties – except the Islamic Action Front – are generally inactive. Indeed, contrary to the statements of party representatives, observers claim that between elections, “we do not have any other political parties, we only have one political party, … the Islamic Action Front, which acts as a political party…”.⁴

However, when it comes to what activities are carried out, the Islamic Action Front does not differ from the other Jordanian parties. Like these, the Islamic Action Front primarily carries out catch-all activities. Unlike these parties, the bodies carrying out these activities are primarily of mass integration kind in the Islamic Action Front however, at least ideally and

¹ Fakhuri, 25 September, 1999.
² Al-Khaldi, 24 October, 1999.
⁴ El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999. Islamic Action Front representative Said states the same thing (Said, 16 October, 1999).
strategically, if not in practice. In the National Constitutional Party and the Communist Party, it is primarily the party leadership that carries out activities, as in an ideal typical electoral party.

If the National Constitutional Party and the Communist Party both to a large extent resembles the ideal typical electoral party in their linkage objectives and external linkage efforts, things are different regarding the efforts to establish and maintain internal linkage. In this aspect, both parties at least claim to present traits similar to primarily the ideal typical mass integration party.

Both parties value voters more than members, but emphasise that members are important as well. Particularly the quality of members is regarded as important. To become a member of either party, the member-to-be must go through a probationary period and the members are provided with different kinds of education, not least on political issues. To some extent, both parties thus present some similarities with the ideal typical integration party, regarding the establishment of internal linkage.

When it comes to the internal communication in the parties, both parties too assert that there is a regular internal communication between different levels of the party. Both parties also claim to have party internal elections at every level, in which the members can participate. In this sense, the parties thus ideally resemble the ideal typical mass integration party. That such internal party democracy is flawed in practice is however admitted by Communist Party leader Hamarneh. He claims that "(w)e have to train the people (in democracy), but still I tell you, ourselves, we have to be trained. (...) (T)he leadership is not trained in democracy".3

Both the National Constitutional Party and the Communist Party further claim to be organised on central as well as on branch level, and they claim to have a diversified organisation at each level. Also regarding the internal organisation of the parties, this has thus a lot in common with the ideal typical mass integration party in both parties, at least on ideal level. At least the National Constitutional Party also claims to have a wide variety of

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1 In the National Constitutional Party, members are important, not least to gain more voters (Al-Khaldi, 24 October, 1999).
2 In the National Constitutional Party, the membership however seems restricted to notables, in a way that reminds of the membership in a party type not further developed in this context: the cadre party.
3 Hamarneh, Munir, 24 October, 1999.
4 In this context, it may further be noted that women members seem to organise together with the men in these parties.
activities for its members, not least social gatherings.¹

In most of these respects regarding the efforts to establish and maintain internal linkage, the Islamic Action Front resembles the two parties here selected for analysis. Just like these, the Islamic Action Front primarily values voters, but puts some formal restrictions on members, and just like envisioned in these, there is a regular internal communication in the Islamic Action Front, between lower and higher party bodies.

The two parties here selected for comparison – the National Constitutional Party and the Communist Party – thus present interesting and somewhat peculiar similarities. Even if the parties are of very different backgrounds and ideological leanings, they present many similarities when it comes to the organisation of linkage. Both present linkage objectives and external linkage of electoral kind, whereas the internal linkage is claimed to be of primarily mass integration kind.

This is the linkage as presented by the parties (or, more specifically, by the party leaders) themselves. It is however difficult to establish whether this is a “true” picture. It can be noted that outside observers do not totally agree with these descriptions. Whereas little is said at all on the insignificant Communist Party, the common evaluation of the National Constitutional Party is that it resembles a pro-governmental political club of influential tribal figures, relying on the provision of patronage more than anything else.²

In this analysis, the National Constitutional Party would thus resemble primarily an ideal typical clientelistic party in practice.³

Another observer notes that parties in Jordan, with the exception of the Islamic Action Front, “do not really have (a) mass base at all”.⁴ Instead, “(i)t is elite type of organisations”.⁵ This indicates that the ideal of mass integration party kind regarding the organisation is just an ideal. In practice, Jordanian parties are ruled from the top.

In this context, however, the resemblance between these two parties and the Islamic Action Front is interesting. Just like the National

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¹ Al-Khaldi, 24 October, 1999.
³ One observer notes that such clientelism is common. Parties offer jobs et c in return for votes (Fakhuri, 25 September, 1999). Also Khoury notes that most parties carry clientelistic traits (Khoury, 24 November, 1999, Al-Khazandar, 12 October, 1999). El-Sherif claims that there are two kinds of parties in Jordan. According to him, parties are “either tribalistic in nature…or backed by the government” (El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999).
⁵ Sheiwi, 17 November, 1999.
Chapter 7: A Religious Party Type?

Constitutional Party and the Communist Party (ideally), the Islamic Action Front (considered alone) presents a linkage objective and external linkage of catch-all kind, whereas its organisation and party internal activities to a large extent resembles that of an ideal typical mass-integration party. The Islamic Action Front thus does not present a unique case in Jordan regarding the way in which it organises its political linkage (at least ideally).\(^1\) Quite on the contrary, the three parties present remarkably similar linkage outcomes in this regard. Therefore, one may ponder whether there are some contextual characteristics in Jordan that make for this outcome.

These observations are interesting. At the same time, it must be remembered that outside observers generally do assert that the Islamic Action Front does stand out in the Jordanian context. El-Sherif, for example, claims that the Islamic Action Front “is the only well-organised, popular party in Jordan”.\(^2\) Outside observers also state that while many parties pay lip-service to internally democratic procedures, the election proceedings taking place inside the Islamic Action Front can be considered as a totally new phenomenon in political and party life in Jordan.\(^3\)

Nevertheless, there seem to be substantial structural similarities between the Jordanian parties. Here is not the place to go into a detailed discussion on the causes of this outcome. It may however be noted that the internally democratic procedures, that the parties claim to adhere to, may be a result of the legal regulations in this regard, which stipulate such democratic procedures. The electoral objectives of the parties are however more difficult to account for by referring to institutional factors. Even if legal regulations at first sight seem to breed electoral traits in parties, it has been established that this is not the case in practice (cp. Chapter 5).

Institutional factors thus seem to be important for explaining primarily the internal organisation of Jordanian parties, in any case on ideal level. This view is substantiated by outside observers who point to the importance of official restrictions in forming party organisations.\(^4\) Even if institutional

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\(^1\) It may however be noted that unlike the other parties, the Islamic Action Front has a women’s wing which organises in a parallel manner to the party.


\(^3\) Hourani et al, 1993: 42-43. El-Sherif further states that “they (the Islamic Action Front) have some kind of democratic values in their own structure… It is as democratic as it can get in Jordan… Because in other parties, you have more dictatorship…” (El-Sherif, 2 October, 1999).

factors thus seem important in this context, one should not forget the possibility that other Jordanian parties may emulate the successful Islamic Action Front.

To end this section on the comparison between the Islamic Action Front and other parties in the Jordanian context, it must however be noted that the results of such a comparison would be totally different if the Islamic Action Front was considered in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood. As we have seen, if these two organisations are viewed as one, they to a large extent resemble not the ideal typical catch-all party, but the ideal typical mass integration party; an outcome that in all probability can be attributed to their specific orientation. On its own, however, the Islamic Action Front does not organise its linkage in a particular way compared to the other parties in the Jordanian context.

The Linkage of Other Parties in the Pakistani Context

Quite contrary to the situation in Jordan, parties are a common feature on the political scene in Pakistan. The most important and influential parties in Pakistani politics during the 1990s were the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan Peoples’ Party. At the time of the fieldwork for this study, the general feeling in Pakistan was that “(t)here are no … other parties that can compete in the strength and following that these two parties command”. Because there are so many parties in Pakistan, statements on parties “in general” are rather difficult to make. Thus, in the Pakistani context, three

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2 Husain, 29 March, 2000, 29 March, 2000. However, in the elections of October 2002 things changed; the Muslim League (Nawaz) polled poorly with only 12 seats won. It was largely replaced by Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam), often referred to as the “King’s Party”, which won 118 seats.

3 Other parties in the Pakistan context are: Muttahida Qaumi Mahaz (United National Movement; until 1997, Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz, Refugee National Movement), Awami National Party and Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf. There are also quite a few religious parties, for example Jamiat Ullama-i-Islami, Fazlur Rehman and Jamiat Ullama-i-Pakistan. According to Haider among others, these religious parties are “basically sect-based” (Haider, 3 April,
parties have been selected for analysis. Two of these parties are the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan Peoples’ Party.

For a comparison with other parties in the national context, aiming at finding out to what extent Pakistani parties are alike when it comes to their organisation of linkage, comparing the Party of Islam to these two parties would have sufficed. If the Party of Islam presents similarities with both these parties, it may indeed be argued that Pakistani parties generally resemble each other. However, the wider objective of this chapter is to find out whether there is a typical “Islamist” way (or even “religious” way) of organising political linkage. As a test case in this endeavour, I have therefore included yet another Islamist party in the analysis at this point – the Pakistan Popular Movement party (Pakistan Awami Tehreek). If there is a particular “Islamist” way of organising political linkage, the Popular Movement Party should also organise in that manner. If it does not, the notion of an “Islamist” way of organising linkage must be questioned.

In starting out to analyse the linkage objective of these parties, it can be established that both the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League to a large extent resemble the ideal typical electoral party in this respect. In both parties, there are catch-all traits as well as clientelistic traits. The parties attest that they, like the ideal typical catch-all party, appeal to the population at large to maximise votes in order to win elections and to get to power. Outside observers however emphasise the clientelistic traits in both these parties. According to Haider, the Peoples’ Party did not rely on clientelistic tactics “when it began its journey… But then it also picked up

1 The Pakistan Popular Movement is sprung from the Minhaj-ul-Quran (Path of Quran) movement, which is a non-political, spiritual movement, active on the international level in more than 80 countries (www.minhaj.org). In this context, it must be noted that all parties in Pakistan favour Islam. This point is stressed not least by the Muslim League representative: “(I)n Pakistan every party cannot move away from Islam, because Pakistan was created because of Islam” (Aziz, 7 April, 2000). Outside observers Kiessling and Husain, 29 March, 2000 state the same thing: “(E)verybody swears by Islam…You cannot afford not to swear by Islam” (Husain, 29 March, 2000). However, this feature does not make all Pakistani parties Islamist. As discussed in Chapter 1, Islamist parties want to establish a political order in line with their perception of Islam; in the words of Husain: “Political religious parties…base their entire programme on Islamic ideology” (Husain, 29 March, 2000). Other parties do not want to work against Islam and indeed may be inspired by Islam, but they have other goals than the introduction of the Islamic system. Hence they are not Islamist.

all this stuff”.

That clientelistic traits are strong in the Muslim League as well is emphasised by outside observers. According to Haider, “they have … relied on patronage”. Both the Muslim League and the Peoples’ Party thus seem to rely to a large extent on a clientelistic logic in their linkage objective. Whereas some observers argue that there is “no difference between the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League” in this regard, others assert that “the people in the Peoples’ Party…do it (more) openly… (and the Muslim League) tries to do it in a more sophisticated manner”.

The Islamist Popular Movement is different in all these respects. A representative of the movement and the party states that these two organisations have four functions to perform: To purify man, to help needy people, to educate the people and to seek political power to be able to implement the objectives. In this sense, the linkage objective of the Popular Movement party resembles that of an ideal typical party of integration. That the party is motivated by an ambition to reform society rather than to revolutionise it is further stated on the website. This attitude makes the Popular Movement resemble the ideal typical party of mass integration, rather than the ideal type of total integration. However, the basic motivation for being in politics at all is religious. The Popular Movement party acts at what it believes to be the command of God. Party members work for the reform of society, but also for their personal salvation: “(I)f we don’t get the

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1 Haider, 3 April, 2000.
2 Haider, 3 April, 2000. Hussain, 28 March, 2000, states the same thing. In this context it is interesting to note that both the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League seem to offer candidatures for money (Aziz, 7 April, 2000, Hussain, 28 March, 2000).
3 All analysts point to the fact that clientelism is the general way of doing politics in Pakistan. E.g. Waseem states that “(in) the election in … Pakistan … you vote for the person, the local influential, who would get things done for you”; the reason for this is that “(h)ere, people do not have access to the state... People have to go through the intermediaries, who are the patrons... In Pakistan patronage, not policy, rules... (The Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League) are the brokers in the locality. They are the parties of influentials. They get things done for the masses” (Waseem, 7 April, 2000). Further, it can be noted that charismatic personalities rather than ideology and political ideas usually are the rallying point for most Pakistani parties. In the words of outside observer Ziauddin: “(I)n the subcontinent … charisma rather than the party (is what matters). The masses follow a charismatic leader” (Ziauddin, 20 February, 1999). Anwaar, 30 March, 2000, states the same thing. Further, both the Muslim League and the Peoples’ Party have been in government on different occasions and have then had ample opportunities to employ clientelistic practises.
5 Fazal-Ameem, 5 April, 2000.
6 www.minhaj.org
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The Party of Islam presents much the same linkage objective as the Popular Movement. In this sense, the two Islamist parties thus largely differ from the two major parties in the Pakistani context.

When it comes to efforts to establish external linkage, the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League again resemble an ideal typical electoral party. The founder of the Peoples’ Party, Z A Bhutto, was famous for his enormous mass rallies, directed at the poor masses of Pakistan. Still, “the Peoples’ Party mobilises political support on the basis of … Bhutto’s name, charisma”. Today, favoured activities by the Peoples’ Party are general meetings, corner meetings, distribution of posters and hand-bills, magazines and banners. It is also emphasised that “(g)ood relations will be maintained with the press and other mass media”. Even if Bhutto particularly targeted the poor masses, activities are today directed at “every citizen in this country”. These activities, which to a large extent are of short-term, intermittent and campaigning character, resemble those of an ideal typical catch-all party. However, party representative Gilani primarily emphasises activities typical of the ideal typical clientelist party. That such clientelistic practices exist are vouched for also by outside analysts.

To help carry out these activities, there are different departments in the Peoples’ Party. Thus, the idea is that “various subordinate and affiliated organizations may be erected”. Interestingly, it is the “(d)istrict organization … (that is to be the) basic unit in respect of organizational

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1 Rashid, 5 April, 2000.
3 Rules and regulations for the Pakistan Peoples’ Party: 7, 9, 12.
4 Rules and regulations for the Pakistan Peoples’ Party: 11, 12.
5 Gilani, 11 April, 2000.
7 E.g. Haider, 3 April, 2000.
8 Rules and regulations for the Pakistan Peoples’ Party: 5. Examples are the departments of students, labourers, farmers, businessmen and the intelligencia. There is also, among others, a women’s wing, a student’s wing, a youth wing, a lawyer’s wing, a labour’s wing in the party, according to party representative Gilani, 11 April, 2000. These wings are not parallel to the main party, but are intended “more to supplement, to help, to highlight their programmes… (They are what we call) allied wings” (Gilani, 11 April, 2000).
9 Rules and regulations for the Pakistan Peoples’ Party: 5. The party is organised on many different levels: federal, provincial, divisional, district, tehsil, urban and rural level. Rules and regulations for the Pakistan Peoples’ Party: 4-5. That this is so and that all the levels are active is also stated by a party representative, Gilani, 11 April, 2000.
activity”.1 When it comes to organisational build-up, the Peoples’ Party thus resembles the ideal typical party of mass integration, at least on ideal level. In practice, the leadership however seems to be all-important in carrying out activities, as it is in an ideal typical electoral party.

Also the Muslim League resembles an ideal typical electoral party in its activities to establish external linkage. The main party organisation mainly seems to carry out large-scale activities of campaigning character, not least in times of elections, like “advertising campaign(s) in election times. (---) And very, very big … election rallies”.2

Between elections as well, different kinds of rallies (such as protest rallies, welcome rallies, train marches and other marches) are very important, according to party representative Aziz.3 In this sense, the Muslim League thus largely resembles the ideal typical catch-all party. However, as is the case with the Peoples’ Party, clientelistic activities are also important in the Muslim League.4 The target of those activities is sometimes the population at large, sometimes particular groups – not least the urban middle classes. According to outside observers, the Muslim League to a large extent has “relied on its strong base in big business”.5

Different bodies help carrying out these activities on different levels in the Muslim League, but different party wings have also been established, for example wings for women, youth, lawyers and businessmen.6 When it comes to the performers of activities to establish external linkage, the Muslim League thus – like the Peoples’ Party – resembles an ideal typical mass integration party, at least ideally. Like in the Peoples’ Party, the leadership however seems to be of crucial importance for carrying out activities in practice, just as it is in an ideal typical electoral party.

The Popular Movement, on the other hand, again resembles the ideal typical mass integration party when it comes to its efforts to establish external linkage. Just like this ideal typical party, the Popular Movement offers long-term activities of political, ideological as well as social,

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1 Rules and regulations for the Pakistan Peoples’ Party: 5. That the district levels are seen as especially important in this regard is verified by Gilani: “(It is the) district organisations which mainly interact with the people” (Gilani, 11 April, 2000).
2 Aziz, 7 April, 2000.
3 Aziz, 7 April, 2000.
4 Such are referred to both by party representative Aziz, 7 April, 2000 and outside observer Haider, 3 April, 2000.
6 Aziz, 7 April, 2000.
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educational and welfare character.¹ That these activities are also carried out in practice, is vouched for by an outside observer, Abbas.² Unlike the ideal typical mass integration party, however, the Popular Movement targets everybody, like an ideal typical electoral party, and not a selected group even if it is “generally … the middle class … (that) believes in these things”.³

To carry out the broad range of activities, the Popular Movement party “has a network at the grass root level in all the four provinces … (and its) workers, under the guidance of their leadership, are contributing a great deal in (the) political as well as social sector of the country”.⁴ The party also has different wings, including women, youth and cultural wings.⁵ The Popular Movement party further relies on the different bodies of its mother organisation, the Path of Quran, in carrying out activities.⁶

Again, there is a strong resemblance between the Popular Movement party and the Party of Islam when it comes to the efforts to establish external linkage. To the same extent, the Party of Islam diverges from the two major parties in this regard.

Regarding the efforts to maintain external linkage, both the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League seem to rely on the same activities that are carried out to establish external linkage, i.e. activities of electoral kind (with catch-all and clientelistic traits). Again, these activities are to be performed by diverse bodies in a way resembling the ideal typical mass integration party. In practice, however, both parties are more similar to an ideal typical electoral party. The Popular Movement party, on the other hand, presents traits resembling the ideal typical mass integration party also in this regard. The same is true for the Party of Islam.

Concerning the efforts to establish internal linkage, the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League again resemble an ideal typical electoral party, primarily of clientelistic character. There are no restrictions on becoming a member in either party, thus “it is very easy” to become a member, ¹ Fazal-Ameem, 5 April, 2000, www.minhaj.org.
² Abbas, 4 April, 2000.
⁴ www.minhaj.org.
⁵ www.pat.com.pk. Other wings are the lawyers’ wing, the labour wing, the minority wing, the scholars’ wing, the traders’ wing, the welfare and human rights wing and the farmers’ wing. Apart from these wings, there are different directories in the party.
⁶ These different bodies include, for example, a social welfare and human rights society, an education society, a women league and a student movement (www.minhaj.org and Fazal-Ameem, 5 April, 2000).
according to an outside observer. Members seem to be recruited at times, not least to act as workers for the parties. That members are important for both parties is clear: “In a way, you get voters if you have a good membership.” Members are thus valued primarily as vote-getters, directly or indirectly, as they are in the ideal typical electoral party.

Also in the Popular Movement party it is very easy to become a member. Indeed, you can become a member by filling in a form on the party’s website, agreeing that you support the principles, goals and aims of the party. In posing few restrictions on becoming a member, the Popular Movement party thus resembles an ideal typical catch-all party. The party has many members, according to party representative Fazal-Ameem, and “we want more and more people to join us.” The Popular Movement party thus seems to recruit members continuously. Members are however not primarily regarded as vote-getters, as they are in the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League. Instead, more members for the Popular Movement party means that ”we can do more functions” in the educational and welfare field. This view of the members resembles that of the ideal typical mass integration party. Regarding the establishment of internal linkage, the Popular Movement party thus seems to present an interesting mix of traits. In some aspects, it resembles the ideal typical catch-all party, while in others it resembles the ideal typical party of mass integration.

The Party of Islam poses very strict criteria for full membership, unlike any of the parties here used for comparison in the Pakistani setting. For associateship, however, criteria are slacker in the Party of Islam, even if some requirements have to be met. In this regard, the Party of Islam thus differs from the other Pakistani parties here analysed.

Finally, when it comes to the efforts to maintain internal linkage, a long-term commitment of service character towards the members seems to exist, both in the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League. In the regulations for the Peoples’ Party, the party workers are provided with procedures to

\[^1\] Nadeem, 14 March, 2000. Party representatives Gilani, 11 April, 2000 and Aziz, 7 April, 2000 state the same thing. In both parties, the members are to fill in a membership form, but few requirements are attached to the membership. Both parties claim to have very large memberships (Gilani, 11 April, 2000, Aziz, 7 April, 2000).

\[^2\] Gilani, 11 April, 2000.

\[^3\] Gilani, 11 April, 2000.

\[^4\] www.pat.com.pk.

\[^5\] Fazal-Ameem, 5 April, 2000.

\[^6\] Fazal-Ameem, 5 April, 2000.
bring “problems and complaints … to the notice of the Chair-person”, indicating that the party will give help of service character to members, just like an ideal typical clientelistic party would. In this sense, both the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League primarily resemble the ideal typical clientelistic party in their activities to maintain internal linkage.

When it comes to party internal communication, it is clear in both parties that this is a top–down matter. In the rules and regulations for the Peoples’ Party, it is constantly emphasised that orders are issued from the top level and the lower levels report back to the top. No party internal elections are further mentioned in the Peoples’ Party, only “recommendations” are referred to. That party internal elections do not take place in the Peoples’ Party – and that the personal charisma of the party leader is crucial – is noted by outside analysts: “(The party structure) is hand-picked and manipulated from the top… For instance, Benazir Bhutto was never elected as the party chairman”. When it comes to its efforts to maintain internal linkage, the Peoples’ Party thus largely resembles the ideal typical clientelistic party.

The Muslim League has an elaborate organisational set-up with different departments, committees, affiliated branches and wings. Further, it is organised on central, provincial and local level, apart from its overseas branches. That this set-up also is present in practice is vouched for by party

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1 Rules and regulations for the Pakistan Peoples’ Party: 23. Other internal activities are “meetings…(and) seminars on various issues at the district level” (Gilani, 11 April, 2000). Aziz also refers to clientelistic practices in the Muslim League (Aziz, 7 April, 2000).
2 Cp. e.g. Rules and regulations for the Pakistan Peoples’ Party: 5, 13. The same thing is stated by party representative Gilani (Gilani, 11 April, 2000). Even if “(the districts) can decide for themselves on ordinary, day-to-day matters”, major decisions are only taken on the top level and then “(t)he decision of the President will be final” (Gilani, 11 April, 2000, Rules and regulations for the Pakistan Peoples’ Party: 20). The Peoples’ Party is thus organised on different administrative levels. That this is so is also vouched for by outside observers, even if “it is a loose arrangement” (Hussain, 28 March, 2000). Shah, 22 March, 2000, states the same thing.
3 Rules and regulations for the Pakistan Peoples’ Party: 15.
5 The wings include, on provincial level, a women’s wing, a youth wing, a lawyer’s wing, a trade and industry wing, a labour wing, a religious scholar’s wing, a peasant’s wing and a minorities wing (Constitution of Pakistan Muslim League, December, 1996, article 61). According to Aziz, this structure also exists in every district (Aziz, 7 April, 2000). It can further be noted in this context that women seem to organise together with the men in both the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League.
6 More specifically, the Muslim League is organised on district, city, tehsil, town and primary level (Constitution of Pakistan Muslim League, December, 1996, article 110).
representatives as well as by outside observers. In this sense, the Muslim League thus resembles the ideal typical mass integration party. Constant communication between the different bodies is further prescribed in the constitution of the Muslim League and party representative Aziz claims that such communication takes place in practice: “(W)e have two–way communications”. Further, party internal elections, taking place at every level in the organisation, are provided for in the Muslim League. Indeed, all office-bearers of the Muslim League are to be elected. It can thus be established that the party in this sense resembles the ideal typical mass integration party, at least on ideal level. However, the degree to which such elections are “real” is difficult to establish. Outside observer Shah, for instance, asserts that “they never vote in party elections. They just sit around and through consensus elect the party president and secretary and et c”. According to Nadeem, “they have some fabricated elections in their party to show up, but no real democracy”. One can therefore question the degree to which the party internal relations in the Muslim League are democratic in practice. Elections rather seem “staged” as they commonly are in clientelistic (and total integration) parties.

Also the Popular Movement party has an elaborate set-up with organisations on national, provincial, ward and unit level. According to the website of the party, this organisation is present “all over the country”. Organisatorically, the Popular Movement party thus resembles the ideal

1 Aziz, 7 April, 2000. However, Aziz admits that the party is better organised in Punjab and the North West Frontier Province, than in Sindh and Baluchistan. Outside observer Shah, 22 March, 2000, among others, states the same thing.
2 Aziz, 7 April, 2000.
3 Constitution of Pakistan Muslim League, December, 1996, article 10.
4 Constitution of Pakistan Muslim League, December, 1996, article 12. Election of those office-bearers is made by the elected councils on the different levels (Constitution of Pakistan Muslim League, December, 1996, articles 29, 42, 63, 64, 97, 103, 107, 112). Every member in the Muslim League is to be involved in series of elections, as “(e)very member of the Primary Muslim League shall be the member of its Council” (Constitution of Pakistan Muslim League, December, 1996, article 112). It is further stated that “(t)he Pakistan Muslim League shall hold party elections at all levels in a free and fair manner and by secret ballot” (Constitution of Pakistan Muslim League, December, 1996, article 120). The presence of such elections is vouched for by a party representative (Aziz, 7 April, 2000).
7 Fazal-Ameem, 6 April, 2000.
8 Apart from party organisational bodies, there are specified bodies such as the women’s wing, the Kashmir wing, the youth wing and the cultural wing (www.minhaj.org and www.pat.com.pk).
typical mass integration party. Regarding the activities to maintain internal linkage, the activities of the party again seem to coincide with the activities of the mother organisation, the Path of Quran. These activities are all-encompassing in character, involving all spheres of life.¹

It is difficult to establish the degree to which there is any real two-way communication and party internal democracy in the Popular Movement party. On the website of the party, it is however stated that “(t)he entire management is managed under the top–down module of distribution of work from the Patron-Chief”.² At the same time, it is stated that “(t)he party upholds the democratic values with biannual internal elections down to the basic unit level and propagates active participation of women in all spheres of life”.³ A party representative further asserts that the “office bearers are elected”.⁴ Elections to different party bodies thus may take place. It is however clear that the founder of the party, Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Quadri, is highly revered in the party.⁵ This reverence gives the impression that he is the undisputed leader and final decision-maker in the party and that no one in the party would do anything contrary to the will of the leader. This view is also supported by an outside analyst, who states that “the leader is all they have. (There is) no tradition of electing members (of party offices)”.⁶ In this sense, the Popular Movement party presents a mix of traits in its efforts to maintain internal linkage. In some respects, it resembles the ideal typical mass integration party. In other respects, it more resembles a less participatory party type, like the ideal typical party of total integration kind.

The Party of Islam to a large extent resembles the Popular Movement party also when it comes to its efforts to maintain internal linkage. Just like in the Popular Movement party, and to some extent in the Muslim League (but not in the Peoples’ Party), mass integration traits dominate in the Party of Islam in this respect, and total integration traits are present in the Party of Islam as well.

In summarising the linkage of the parties selected for comparison in the Pakistani context – the Peoples’ Party, the Muslim League and the Popular Movement party – it can be established that the Peoples’ Party and

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¹ Such activities include for example an “annual ten-day educational and spiritual training camp for its workers…in the Islamic month of Ramazan, in Lahore” (www.minhaj.org).
² www.pat.com.pk
³ www.pat.com.pk
⁴ Fazal-Ameem, 5 April, 2000.
⁵ www.minhaj.org
⁶ Abbas, 4 April, 2000
the Muslim League primarily resemble the ideal typical electoral party types, with some catch-all, but predominantly clientelistic traits. In their linkage objectives and in their efforts to establish and maintain external and internal linkage, electoral traits clearly dominate. Some traits of ideal typical mass integration party character are however present, particularly regarding the organisation of the parties. Not least the Muslim League seems to be well organised on different levels, like an ideal typical mass integration party. However, in practice both parties to a large extent seem to rely on the activities of the party leaderships in an electoral way.

The Popular Movement party differs in many ways from the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League. Instead, the Popular Movement party primarily resembles an ideal typical mass integration party. However, unlike the mass integration party, the Popular Movement party targets the population at large in its outreaching efforts. Further, the Popular Movement party does not pose formal restrictions for membership. The degree of party internal democracy in the Popular Movement party may also be questioned. In these respects, then, the Popular Movement party diverges from the ideal typical mass integration party type.

For most parts, the Party of Islam resembles the Popular Movement party regarding its linkage, and it largely diverges from the Muslim League and the Peoples’ Party regarding the way in which linkage is organised.

In sum, it may thus be concluded that political parties in Pakistan are not all alike. Indeed, there seem to be big differences between different parties, and institutional arrangements in Pakistan do not seem to cast all parties in the same mould. The differences detected arguably result from the different orientations of the parties, which in the case of the pragmatic parties probably are influenced by the societal setting in the country. Thus, in Pakistan, pragmatic parties seem to organise in one way, whereas ideological (religious) parties organise in a different way.

In some senses, the different parties – the Peoples’ Party, the Muslim League, the Popular Movement party and the Party of Islam – however resemble each other. For instance, all parties at least claim to be well-organised on different levels. To the extent that this is the case also in practice, it may be attributed to an institutional feature: the organisation of the state into different administrative levels. Even if it cannot be established

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1 Indeed, the Peoples’ Party and the Muslim League to a large extent seem to present the particular mix of catch-all and clientelistic traits that Widlund found in the South Indian Dravidian parties (Widlund, 2000).
in this context, this feature seems to make the parties organise on these different levels, although they do not particularly claim to be influenced by institutional arrangements.\(^1\)

Another similarity between all the parties in Pakistan is that a member-to-be has to fill in a membership form to become a member. As this is not required according to the party legal regulations, an institutional influence (interpreted broadly) of another kind may result in this common practice.

A third similarity is that all parties in Pakistan direct themselves at the population at large in their activities.\(^2\) As we saw in Chapter 6, such an outcome was expected on the basis of the electoral system in place. This feature in the institutional setting may thus account for the broad approach in the parties. We may recall, however, that at least the Party of Islam does not claim to be influenced by institutional arrangements to any greater extent. Another explanation, of party-centred kind, may thus account for the broad appeal in at least some of the Pakistani parties.

A fourth similarity between the Pakistani parties here under study is that all the parties at least to some extent claim to make use of internally democratic procedures, even if such were not legally required at the time.\(^3\) As we have seen, outside analysts do not, however, regard political parties in general as internally democratic in Pakistan. Some observers point to the Party of Islam, though, as being different in this regard. Indeed, the Party of Islam is often pointed out as the only internally democratic party in Pakistan.\(^4\)

In most aspects, however, the Party of Islam does not resemble the

\(^1\) The importance of the organisation of the state for the organisation of political parties is not neglected in the party theoretical literature. According to Harmel & Janda, "Lawson, for instance, notes that ‘decentralized, federal governments breed decentralized parties; centralized, unitary governments foster parties with power equally concentrated’…" (Harmel & Janda, 1982: 64). The findings in the Pakistani case show that this factor indeed is important.

\(^2\) That this is so is noted by Peoples’ Party representative Gilani: "No party (in Pakistan) has this system of going to some in particular, not even the Party of Islam. We all go everybody". (Gilani, 11 April, 2000).

\(^3\) A legal requirement for political parties to have internal elections was introduced before the elections in 2002.

\(^4\) Baabar points to the democratic mind of the Party of Islam: "I think that they are democratic in the sense that it is the only political party that has elections … within its ranks… (T)rue elections … very bitterly fought elections" (Baabar, 23 February, 1999). Hussain also claims that the Party of Islam stand out in this respect: “In the Party of Islam, frankly, over the years, the elections were pretty genuine…They were not manipulated… As compared to other political parties, the Party of Islam is more democratic” (Hussain, 28 March, 2000).
two biggest parties in Pakistan, the Muslim League and the Peoples’ Party, when it comes to linkage. Indeed, in most respects – notably regarding the encompassing, on-going activities externally and internally – the Party of Islam organises in ways very different from them.¹

Interesting in this context, however, is the clear similarities between the Party of Islam and the other Islamist party here included for analysis – the Popular Movement party. Both these parties primarily resemble the ideal typical mass integration party, with long-term activities of various kinds.

Some particularly interesting exceptions to this mass integration kind of linkage however present themselves in both Islamist parties. For instance, these parties primarily direct themselves at the population at large, as the ideal typical catch-all party does. There are also traits of less participatory character when it comes to their efforts at maintaining internal linkage.²

This indicates that there might be a particular “Islamist” way of organising linkage, after all. This is something I will discuss as we conclude these comparisons between the Islamist parties and the other parties in the different national contexts.

Conclusions regarding the Comparisons with Other Parties in the Different National Contexts

In some respects, the Islamist parties in the three countries here analysed share distinct traits with other parties in the same national context, regarding the way in which they conceive of and organise their linkage.

For instance, the Virtue Party shares with other Turkish parties the objective to reach out to all in order to win as many votes as possible. Also the clientelistic traits found in the Virtue Party are present in other, rightist, parties. Turkish parties also generally claim to be well-organised, even if they are not so in practice (with the exception of the Virtue Party and the Nationalist Movement Party).³ The similarities in the linkage objectives and

¹ As one outside analyst states: “Parties like the Party of Islam, they work all the year, but Muslim League and Peoples’ Party they seem more active in election day, (they) are not so strong between. The Party of Islam is more organised, more scientific in its approach” (Nadeem, 14 March, 2000, Shah, 22 March, 2000 and Mahmood, 6 April, 2000, state the same thing).
² There are also certain differences between the Party of Islam and the Popular Movement party. For instance, the Popular Movement party does not seem to place as much emphasis on its inner core and it does not seem to have particularly distinguished full members. Further, outside observer Abbas states that “the Party of Islam is more organised” than the Popular Movement (Abbas, 4 April, 2000).
³ Another similarity is that members-to-be in all Turkish parties have to fill in an official
the claims of an elaborate party organisation in the Turkish parties may thus, to at least some extent, be a result of institutional factors, such as legal regulations.¹ Clientelistic traits, in rightist parties, can in all probability be attributed to the societal setting in Turkey.

The Islamic Action Front on its own to a large extent resembles the other political parties in the Jordanian context. Just like the other parties, the Islamic Action Front aims at reaching out to all with activities of campaigning kind and just like the other parties, the Islamic Action Front in its internal linkage activities in some aspects resemble the ideal typical mass integration party, at least ideally. Some of these similarities – but not all – may be attributed to the institutional framework in Jordan; other features are however unaccounted for by this explanation.

If the Islamic Action Front is regarded in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood, however, few resemblances to the other parties in the Jordanian context are present, indicating that other than institutional factors are accounting for this outcome.

Also the Party of Islam shares traits with the other parties in the Pakistani context. Just like the other parties, the Party of Islam directs itself at the population at large, it requires members-to-be to fill in a membership form, it claims to be well-organised on different levels and to employ internally democratic procedures. On the whole – and in practice – these similarities are rather insignificant however, to the extent that they do exist, they may be put down to institutional influences (broadly interpreted).

However, whereas the similarities between the Party of Islam and the big parties (the Muslim League and the Peoples’ Party) are limited in practice, the similarities between the Party of Islam and the Islamist Popular Movement party abound.

Comparing the Islamist parties in the three contexts, it can further be established that they do not share traits with the other parties in certain aspects. Interestingly, the Islamist parties in those aspects however resemble each other, especially if the Islamic Action Front is regarded in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Thus, as we saw earlier, the Islamist parties primarily are parties with electoral linkage objectives (except the Party of Islam). The Islamist parties further primarily present activities and performers of mass integration kind

¹ The actual presence of such elaborate structures in the Virtue Party may however be put down to other than institutional factors.
in their external linkage efforts (at least ideally and strategically). Despite this similarity with the ideal typical mass integration party, all Islamist parties target the population at large, as an ideal typical catch-all party. Also in their internal linkage efforts, mass integration party traits dominate in all Islamist parties. In all parties, there is further a women’s wing organised in a parallel manner to the main organisation. We may also note that traits of internal democracy are present in the Islamist parties, even if the degree to which this internal democracy is carried out in practice may be questioned. However, in some instances Islamist parties seem to be more democratic in their internal procedures than other parties in the same national context.

These findings give the impression that there indeed seems to exist a particular “Islamist” way of organising linkage, a way that is different from the way in which other parties organise their linkage. This impression of an “Islamist party type” is strengthened by the fact that also the fourth Islamist party included in this study – the Pakistan Popular Movement party – presents many of those distinctive traits.

There are thus indications pointing to the presence of a particular Islamist way of conceiving of and organising political linkage. But why stop at that? Maybe this “Islamist” way of organising political linkage instead is a more general religious way of organising linkage? I will continue this chapter by discussing whether there are reasons to believe that this is so.

**A Religious Linkage Type in the Theoretical Literature?**

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the category of religious parties has not been the object of much theorising traditionally by party scholars.\(^1\) Nevertheless, some clues about religious, or more specifically Christian Democratic parties – which are the religious parties most often found (and analysed) in a Western

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\(^1\) Cp. Demker, 1998: 52-53. Indeed, Christian Democratic parties in general for a long time seemed rather under-researched, or so complains various scholars (cp. Kalyvas, 1996: 6, Hanley, 1994: 1-2, Irving, 1979: preface). Others state that it “is beginning to receive the attention it deserves” (Donovan, 1998: 267). One reason for this neglect may be that Christian Democratic parties for a long time was grouped together with Conservative parties and not given particular attention (van Kersbergen gives examples of such instances, 1994: 32). Another reason for this scarce interest in religious parties might be that secularisation of politics long was regarded as the future in all parts of the world, in the wake of the process of modernization (cp. Huntington, 1971). Today, however, scholars all over the globe have noted that secularisation is not inevitable, religion in politics is not necessarily an element of the past. Instead there seems to be a “current growth of new anti-secularist and politically committed religious movements” (Westerlund, 1995: 3). There is thus evidence that religious parties will continue to play important roles in the future.
context – may be drawn from party theoretical works, and more specifically from *party-centred* theoretical works.

Duverger, as we have seen, contends that these Christian Democratic parties have some traits in common with mass integration parties or, to a lesser extent, with total integration parties, depending on their specific ideological orientation. However, Duverger also states that Christian Democratic parties are not similar to the mass (or total) integration parties in all aspects. In making his categorisation of parties into different "sociological types", referred to in Chapter 2, Duverger indicates that certain parties fall outside of this categorisation. Among those, he mentions the religious parties of Catholic and Christian Democratic type, which, according to him, occupy a position between the middle class party and the Socialist party. Unfortunately, Duverger does not specify closer what this mix of organisational traits looks like, and on several occasions, as we have seen, he places Christian Democratic parties on par with Socialist parties regarding organisation of linkage.

Even if religious parties thus have not been the object of much systematic study, more recent scholars, focusing specifically on Christian Democratic parties, also observe that these parties often seem to present a particular mix of organisational traits, even if these scholars rarely refer directly to the political linkage of the parties. These scholars generally agree with Duverger that Christian Democratic parties in some aspects share traits with middle class parties, while they in other respects share traits with mass parties.

So far, no homogeneous model of linkage of Christian Democratic parties has however been developed. The theorising on religious, or more specifically Christian Democratic parties, is still in the initial stages and the theoretical assumptions for these parties are not as developed as those underlying the different ideal types that I have made use of earlier in this study. Nevertheless, one may construe an embryonic model of the linkage of Christian Democratic parties on the basis of the theoretical seeds found in the scholarly works on Christian Democratic parties. This is what I will do here.

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1 Duverger, 1951/1964: passim; cp. also Neumann, 1956: 405. Kirchheimer, 1966: 184. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967: 15. Duverger for example notes that both the class party (Communist and Socialist) and the denominational, religious party are marked by their strong ideology, i.e. they can be regarded as ideological parties.


3 This embryonic model is based primarily on Hanley, 1994: 1-11, van Kersbergen, 1994: 31-
In this section, I thus discuss how Christian Democratic parties (ideal typically) organise their linkage, but also – to some extent – why they organise their linkage the way they do. I further discuss whether the Christian Democratic parties can be said to organise their linkage in a particular way. Then, I look into the issue of whether such a way of organising can be said to resemble the organisation of linkage in Islamist parties. If Islamist parties and Christian Democratic parties organise in largely similar ways – for largely the same reasons – it may indeed be argued that we can speak about a particular religious way of organising political linkage.

Like the ideal types presented in Chapter 2, the embryonic Christian Democratic party type will obviously and necessarily be an ideal type, not to be found in the real world. In the real world, there are always particularities and unique traits – as Irving puts it, “(t)here are considerable variations between the Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe… But, despite these differences, which owe much to different historical, cultural and social traditions, there are a number of common characteristics and common principles which together constitute the distinctive political phenomenon of Christian Democracy.”

To facilitate the comparison between the embryonic Christian Democratic party type and the Islamist parties, I develop the embryonic Christian Democratic party ideal type along the same lines as the earlier ideal types. Thus, I start to outline the societal setting in which the Christian Democratic party typically originated, its origins, background and experiences, and its general orientation. Then, I proceed to delineating the

45, Irving, 1979, 1973, Kalyvas, 1996, Gunther & Diamond, 2003: 182-183. It must be noted that it is primarily Catholic Christian Democratic parties that forms the basis for this ideal type, and Catholic Christian Democratic parties as they were in the early and mid-1900s. Some parties stand out from the mainstream. One such example is the Italian Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana, DC), which – at least in the south and after the initial stages – can be characterised as a next to ideal typical clientelistic party (Chubb, 1982, Allum, 1997). In northern Italy, however, the Italian Christian Democratic party more resembled a mass party, at least initially (Chubb, 1982, Allum, 1997). The Italian Christian Democratic Party was a main player in the tangentopoli, “bribesville”, scandal which erupted in Italy in 1992 and hence, in 1994, the Italian Christian Democratic party was dissolved. A new party was however founded, the Popular Party (Partito Popolare, PP). Also the German Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU-CSU) has been regarded as an atypical Christian Democratic party with its conservative traits. In some respects, however, these parties also coincide with the more typical Christian Democratic party. I want to underline that this is a first attempt at an embryonic model of Christian Democratic party linkage. This model must be developed in further studies.

1 Irving, 1979: xviii.
ideal typical linkage objective and motivations of the Christian Democratic party, and, finally, its efforts at establishing and maintaining external as well as internal linkage.

**Societal Setting, Origin, Experiences and Orientation of the Ideal Typical Christian Democratic Party**

The Christian parties generally developed in the same societal setting that gave birth to Socialist mass parties, i.e. in a society marked by "sweeping industrialization, radical urbanization and international migration … world wars and total revolutions", recent introduction of universal suffrage and a state that not always succeeded in providing welfare for its people.¹ Like the Socialist parties, the Christian Democratic parties typically have their origin in pre-suffrage times, when (Catholic) religious movements worked for political influence. Like the Socialist parties, the Christian Democratic parties were thus also often linked to a social movement (of Catholic kind).² According to Irving, "(t)he Christian Democratic movement can only be understood in the light of its 19th century origins… Catholics held that something must be done to alleviate the economic and social misery that had accompanied industrialisation and urbanisation... (Thus) Christian Democracy developed as a political response to the French Revolution, a socio-political response to militant secularism and an economic response to the industrial revolution".³ Like the Socialist parties, the Christian Democratic parties further were based on a communitarian outlook, in line with the dominating view in society at large – and at times they were opposed by the state.⁴

¹ Neumann, 1956: 404, Irving, 1979: 1, Lipset & Rokkan, 1967: 15. To call these early Christian parties “democratic” is premature, according to Hanley, as they were based in “organist or corporatist modes of thinking, the relationship of which to modern electoral democracy was not always evident” (Hanley, 1994: 3). At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, however, these parties – at least those in Western Europe – generally favoured parliamentary democracy. The commitment to the democratic principles was further strengthened by the experience of fascism. At the end of World War II, the Christian parties were decisively Democratic (Hanley, 1994: 3-4, Irving, 1979: 18, 28).


³ Irving, 1979: 1.

⁴ Thus, according to Kalyvas, “Christian Democratic parties and Social Democratic parties are
The ideological orientation of the Christian Democratic parties was however different from that of the Socialist (and Social Democratic) parties, “the great rivals” of Christian Democracy.\(^1\) The Christian Democratic parties were not intent on integrating and mobilising a particular class into society. Instead, they had – and have – other objectives. I will shortly return to what these are. First, we must however note that the ideological orientation of Christian Democracy is something much discussed in the literature. Not least the degree to which the orientation is ideological or pragmatic, and the extent of the uniqueness of the Christian Democratic ideology in general, are issues discussed.

In this context, it is important to note that Christian Democracy can be divided into a more principled and a more pragmatic variety. According to Hanley, there are two polarities within the Christian Democratic movement: Very principled Christian Democratic parties (especially in smaller states) and parties with a much looser, pragmatic interpretation of the ideology, aiming at securing power and achieving results.\(^2\) According to Hanley, there is also a “tension between those who (are) in politics to pursue a Christian vision and those more concerned with preserving the social order, providing it (accommodates) certain religious demands”.\(^3\) Christian Democratic parties have thus always been polarised between the principled and the pragmatists. This tension has become stronger, with the advantage going to the pragmatists; it is in its pragmatic variety that Christian Democracy has been most successful, something that I will return to soon.\(^4\) In this sense, Christian Democracy is thus far from homogeneous. This outline is however based primarily on Christian Democratic parties of pragmatic variety.\(^5\)

Much debate has also taken place on the issue whether the ideology of Christian Democracy is something unique, or whether it is a “hotchpotch of ideology”, drawing together elements from liberal, conservative and socialist thought alike to a “grey, happy medium”, which has little to do with a proper ideology as we know it.\(^6\)

\(^{1}\) Hanley, 1994: 6.
\(^{3}\) Hanley, 1994: 5.
\(^{4}\) Hanley, 1994: 5.
\(^{5}\) Here, I will not go into detail regarding how principled Christian Democratic parties differ from pragmatic when it comes to linkage. That will have to be elaborated upon in future studies. Some suggestions, to be tried out later, are however presented in footnotes.
\(^{6}\) van Kersbergen, 1994: 33-34. For such criticism, see e.g. Irving, 1979.
Christian Democrats themselves (and some scholars too) claim that the ideology of Christian Democracy indeed is a unique ideological stand, which follows from the core values of the movement, and which just happens to place itself between the other ideologies.\(^1\) Thus, in this view, Christian Democracy indeed is often pragmatic and centrist, but not non-ideological. Instead, it is distinct by virtue of its specific model of social and economic policy and because religion gives it an opportunity to adapt to changing circumstances.\(^2\) In this interpretation, the pragmatism and centrism of many of the Christian Democratic parties are thus results of the particular Christian Democratic ideology.\(^3\)

One important element in this unique ideology is the concept of (social) personalism, which emphasises the place of the individual within different types of communities, such as the neighbourhood, church, family or nation.\(^4\) Another important, and distinct, trait is solidarity, which according to Hanley translates into pro-welfare policies.\(^5\) Such welfarism and emphasis on social rights are also important elements in the Christian Democratic ideology, as is family orientation and emphasis on private property.\(^6\) In those aspects, the Christian Democratic doctrine is based on Catholic social thought, according to Hanley.\(^7\) Christian Democratic parties are also committed to cultural pluralism and are basically developmental and modernising in their outlook.\(^8\) In economics, Christian Democrats adhere to their “own model of social policy”, namely social capitalism, which combines a basic commitment to capitalism with a social safety net, not least

\(^{1}\) Only the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany is generally categorised as a conservative party. Other Christian Democratic parties are generally regarded as centre parties (cp. e.g. Irving, 1979: xviii).


\(^{3}\) Cp. e.g. Hanley, 1994, van Kersbergen, 1994 and Det Gemensamma Bästa (The Common Good), 2002. Irving takes something of a middle-position, stating that “although Christian Democrats have never claimed to have an all-embracing ideology … they are committed to certain common ideas and principles which amount to a solid corpus of Christian Democratic theory” (Irving, 1979: 29).


\(^{5}\) Hanley, 1994: 4.


\(^{7}\) Hanley, 1994: 3. Indeed, van Kersbergen argues that “(t)he welfare state … is an implicitly Christian form of societal inclusion” (van Kersbergen, 1994: 44). van Kersbergen also sees social policy as “fundamentally comprising a theological dimension…in the sense that the Christian obligation to give produces a religious side to the public provision of benefits” (van Kersbergen, 1994: 44).

\(^{8}\) Hanley, 1994: 3, 6.
through the family.¹

According to van Kersbergen, the Christian Democratic parties strive for integration and societal accommodation and not least class reconciliation in society.² On the national arena, Christian Democratic parties are thus flexible and prone to compromise in a way that may be interpreted as being opportunist and pragmatic. On the international arena, Christian Democratic parties are marked by “unswerving attachment to European federalism and uncritical Atlanticism”.³ According to Hanley, the aspirations to a “supra-national identity” stem in the “universalist pretensions” of the church.⁴

The ideology of the Christian Democratic parties thus seems to be a particular mix. The central concept of personalism combines individualism and communitarianism, underlining the freedom of the individual within a community network, adding social responsibility. Christian Democratic ideology thus seems to be pragmatic, but with an ideological core.⁵

The ideological objective of the Christian Democrats is thus ideal typically to create a society based on these values. According to Irving, “they wanted a political and social revolution, but they wanted it to be presided over in a non-violent manner by their own new mass party, which would implement the social teaching of the Church without being directly dependent on it”.⁶ In this way, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party presents an ideological orientation which sets it apart from other parties: While it is pragmatic, in the sense that it wants to come to power, it does not want to come to power only to implement some policy changes, like the ideal typical catch-all party. Instead, it wants to come to power to reform society at its base, along its restricted orientation. In this sense, the Christian

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¹ van Kersbergen, 1994: 40-41.
³ Hanley, 1994: 3.
⁵ Cp. Demker who argues that religious parties are parties for which ideology, drawn from the specific religion, is very important. According to her, religious parties could thus generally be regarded as ideological parties, as the political activity rests on the notion that the members subscribe to the common ideas, including not only the way in which society should be ordered, but also the relation between the individual and God (Demker, 1996: 26). Demker further contends that religious parties are to be regarded as “community parties”, i.e. mass parties created outside of parliament and ideological parties as they adhere to an all-encompassing view of life (1998: 52-53).
⁶ Irving, 1979: 8. Irving underlines that Christian Democrats argue that reforms should only be carried out by constitutional means, and never as a result of revolutionary violence (Irving, 1979: 33).
Democratic party presents an *ideological pragmatism*, with similarities primarily to the ideal typical mass integration party, even if some similarities to the ideal typical catch-all party are present as well.\(^1\)

As to their *experiences*, it can be noted that initially the Christian Democratic parties were not so successful. However, after World War II, Christian Democratic parties in many countries experienced enormous success, not least because they were regarded as “clean” after the war – they had often been part of the resistance movement and opposed to the dictatorial politics.\(^2\) The pragmatism, flexibility, adaptation and willingness to compromise – following from the ideological emphasis on integration – also contributed to their success. Thus, in many European countries, Christian Democratic parties came to power – and stayed in power for considerable lengths of time, as long as into the 1990s. This fact and the continuing modernisation (and secularisation) of Western society further enhanced the pragmatism and flexibility of many Christian Democratic parties. This occasionally provoked criticism of Christian Democracy – the Christian Democrats were by their critics portrayed as non-ideological, spineless opportunists, as centre populists with only one political goal: to be in power.\(^3\) This criticism, along with other factors, sometimes led to electoral losses for the Christian Democrats. However, for most parts, Christian Democratic parties have had experiences typical of the ideal typical catch-all party.

To summarise, it can be concluded that it indeed – as was witnessed by Duverger – is difficult to place Christian Democratic parties in a particular ideal typical linkage type, on the basis of their societal setting, origin, experiences and orientation. In some aspects, notably regarding their origins, Christian Democratic parties share traits with Socialist parties, something which would lead to a mass integration type of linkage according to the theoretical expectations. In other aspects, not least regarding their experiences, Christian Democratic parties share traits with the ideal typical catch-all party, making for a catch-all party kind of linkage. In some

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\(^1\) Principled Christian Democratic parties can be expected to share the reformist ambition. Presumably, principled Christian Democratic parties are however even more intent on reforming society than coming to power.

\(^2\) Not all pre-war Christian parties opposed Fascism however. In Austria for example, the Catholic Socials introduced the so-called *Austro-Fascism*, which lasted between 1934-1938 (Müller & Steininger, 1994: 87).

\(^3\) Cp. e.g. Irving, who suggests that “Christian Democrats are more interested in power than in ideology… (and that) …it is easy to contend that the history of Christian Democracy in Western Europe since the Second World War confirms such a view” (Irving, 1979: 29).
respects, like orientation, Christian Democratic parties present a unique mix of mass integration and catch-all traits, where however mass integration traits dominate.

As to their societal setting, origin, experiences and orientation, Christian Democratic parties thus present a mixed, but specific picture. This ideal typical picture is outlined in table 7:2.

Table 7:2. The ideal typical societal setting, origin, background, experiences and orientation of the Christian Democratic party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal setting origin</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>background of the party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiences of the party</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation of the party</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table describes the societal setting, origin, background, experiences and orientation of the ideal typical Christian Democratic party using the ideal typical positions previously outlined in party-centred theoretical works. D: Dominating trait, P: Present trait.

But how, then, does the ideal typical Christian Democratic party organise – and what is its linkage objective? This is what I will turn to now.

Linkage Objective and Motivation

Christian Democratic parties are part of the wider Christian Democratic movement. As such, they are not only interested in winning as many votes as possible in order to come to power: “We are a Movement, not an electoral machine…”1 Christian Democratic parties have wider objectives of social reform, in line with their orientation. In this sense, the motivation of Christian Democratic parties, based primarily on their orientation, resemble

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1 Irving, 1973: 91, citing the Republican Popular Movement. Cp. also van Kersbergen, 1994: 35, Irving, 1979: 42, Kalyvas, 1996: 67. The Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union in Germany seems to be an exception from this. According to Broughton, the Christian Democrats in Germany “(a)bove all … are a party for winning power and maintaining themselves in office rather than implementing a clearly set out ideological stance” (Broughton, 1994: 102). Also the Christian Democrats in Italy, “placed power and its retention before any other goal” (cited in Allum, 1997: 24). The Italian Christian Democrats’ stated goal, however, was "realizing the Christian society" (Allum, 1997: 24). In this context, it is to be remembered that both the German and the Italian Christian Democrats to a large extent are regarded as "atypical" Christian Democratic parties.
that of the parties of integration, not that of electoral parties – Christian Democratic parties want to reform society, they not only want to come to power.¹

However, unlike the ideal typical parties of integration, the linkage objective of Christian Democratic parties is not focused on drawing the masses for integration into the party and thus into society. Instead, what they primarily aim at is getting votes. In this sense, Christian Democratic parties resemble the ideal typical catch-all party. In Christian Democratic thinking, it is only through votes that the Christian Democratic party can come to power and implement the social reform that it strives for.²

When it comes to the linkage objective and motivation, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party thus presents a mix of traits from the established ideal types, but it is a distinct mix. Thus, in its linkage objective, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party resembles an electoral, vote-maximising party of primarily catch-all kind. Unlike the ideal typical electoral party, however, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party wants to maximise votes in order to reform society in line with its ideological orientation, not primarily in order to come to power for the sake of power. In this sense, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party thus resembles an ideal typical (mass) integration party. A motivation of primarily mass integration kind thus leads to a linkage objective of catch-all kind in the ideal typical Christian Democratic party.³ The linkage objective and the relation between the motivation of the ideal typical Christian Democratic party and its linkage objective is described in, respectively, table 7:3 and figure 7:1 below.

¹ In this context, there are few references indicating that the ideal typical Christian Democratic party is motivated by its origin, experiences and societal setting, at least directly and on ideal level. The possible impact of these factors has to be analysed in further studies.
² Principled Christian Democratic parties can be expected to differ in this sense. While votes still may be important, social reform presumably heads the agenda of principled Christian Democratic parties.
³ Principled Christian Democratic parties can instead be expected to resemble primarily parties of (mass or total) integration in this regard.
A deeper motivation for being in politics at all is also found in the ideal typical Christian Democratic party. According to Hanley, “(a)ll political parties have long memories of where they came from. Christian Democrats remain conscious of their religious origins first and foremost; they are in politics to express a Christian vision of humankind and its destiny. This vision had implications at both doctrinal and behaviour levels”. Analysts thus argue that the Christian Democratic parties act and organise the way they do largely “at the command of God”, or at least in line with the teachings of Christianity as they interpret them.

The religious motivation thus seems to underlie the Christian Democratic ambition to reform society. In the ideal typical Christian Democratic party, the linkage elements thus seem to be related in the following manner: The religious motivation leads to a willingness to reform society, which in turn leads to a linkage objective intent on maximising votes.

**Establishment of External Linkage**

But how does the ideal typical Christian Democratic party attract as many voters as possible, so that it can reform society in line with its ideological orientation, following the religious commands?

Unfortunately, not much is said in the theoretical literature on what

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1 Hanley, 1994: 4.
activities Christian Democratic parties pursue in order to establish external linkage. However, as I will return to soon, it is often mentioned that the Christian Democratic parties rely on the work of related organisations, i.e. organisations that are part of the religious social movement, but which are not organisationally connected to the party. Such organisations often carry out activities of welfare character.\footnote{For example, in France the organisation Catholic Action (which included all Catholic lay groups approved by the Hierarchy) provided the Republican Popular Movement (\textit{Mouvement Republicain Populaire}, MRP) with grass-roots support (Irving, 1973: 78). Christian Democratic parties also have “informal links with large Catholic trade union federations”, Irving, 1979: xxi.} Relating to different kinds of organisations thus seems to be one important activity of Christian Democratic parties: “We must make contact with the social, professional and economic organizations, listen to their suggestions, and win them over to our Movement”.\footnote{Irving, 1973: 91, citing the Republican Popular Movement.}

In other instances, there are examples of activities of particular Christian Democratic parties. Thus, Irving contends that the French Republican Popular Movement was involved as much in political education as it was in working for electoral success.\footnote{Irving, 1979: 3, \textit{Partito Popolare Italiano}, PPI. Enyedi states for the Hungarian Christian Democratic party that it is a party “concerned with the education and socialization of citizens” (Enyedi, 1996: 378).} The Italian Popular Party is also reported to have been involved in charitable and educational work.\footnote{Irving, 1973: 91.}

Irrespective of whether the Christian Democratic parties carry out such activities by themselves or whether they rely on a connected organisation to carry them out, it can be established that outreach activities associated with the Christian Democratic parties often are of ideological, social and welfare kind. In this sense, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party resembles the ideal typical mass integration party.

However, also activities of more exclusively campaigning kind seem to be important for Christian Democratic parties, not least in times of election. In this sense, there are resemblances to the ideal typical catch-all party.\footnote{Cp. Kalyvas, 1996: 100, who cites examples of modern campaigning techniques in Catholic organisations as early as 1913, such as fund raising, distribution of position papers, posting of banners, use of radio and public address, monster rallies. Catholic organisations were however not only active in times of election. Instead, they “kept up a high and constant level of political activity between electoral campaigns” (Kalyvas, 1996: 103).} In this context, it must be remembered that also ideal typical mass integration parties undertake such campaigning activities, however. Thus,
from this somewhat scarce information, it may be concluded that the ideal typical Christian Democratic party primarily resembles the mass integration party when it comes to activities to establish external linkage.¹

If little information is to be found in the theoretical works on the activities to establish external linkage by Christian Democratic parties, more is said on the target of such activities. The target of the activities of the ideal typical Christian Democratic party is broad: All and everybody in society is targeted. The Christian Democratic party has a distinctly cross-class, cross-sectional approach.

According to van Kersbergen, the Christian Democratic parties “attempt at integrating and reconciling a plurality of societal groups with possibly opposed interests”; i.e. they promote class compromise and reconciliation to counteract societal discord.² The Christian Democratic parties work towards this end by stressing the inter-class character of the movement. Thus, according to van Kersbergen, “Christian Democracy manages to attract voters by appealing to catholicity understood in its literal sense”.³ In this sense, “Christian Democracy was a catch-all party avant la lettre”.⁴ This approach makes the Christian Democratic parties distinctive.

¹ There are suggestions that these activities have lost their significance in favour of catch-all activities along with modernisation and with the governmental experiences of the Christian Democratic parties (cp. Lucardie & ten Napel, 1994, Broughton, 1994). This proposition has to be further looked into.
² van Kersbergen, 1994: 36. The Christian Democratic emphasis on compromise, reconciliation and synthesis is also stressed by Irving (Irving, 1979: xxi). Cp. also Kalyvas, who asserts that “(b)ecause religion was their primary appeal, confessional parties became heterogeneous interclass parties” (Kalyvas, 1996: 235). Different examples of this are presented. Lucardie & ten Napel for instance point out that the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) addresses “itself as a ‘people’s party’ to the entire Dutch population, irrespective of religious belief or social status” (1994: 64). Also Enyedi refers to the fact that the Hungarian Christian Democratic party encompasses various social strata (1996: 384). According to Müller & Steininger, the Austrian People’s Party also sees itself as a “non-socialist catch-all party” (1994: 87) and the German Christian Democratic Union opened up after the war and broadened the party’s base (Broughton, 1994: 102). Also the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) “has usefully been described as an ‘all-class…party’ which seeks, by means of a non-ideological programme, to mobilize electors of all social, religious and even ethnic backgrounds (Allum, 1997: 26).
⁴ van Kersbergen, 1994: 39. Indeed, van Kersbergen states that “catch-allism in the case of Christian Democracy is not so much an effect of the transformation of Western European party systems and of the growing intensity of electoral campaigning, but rather the manifestation of the very nature of these parties (van Kersbergen, 1994: 39). Cp. also Allum, 1997: 23. Also Kalyvas states that “confessional parties were catch-all parties from their very conception” (Kalyvas, 1996: 237). Kalyvas further points to the fact that Catholic parties evolved into secular Christian people’s parties (Kalyvas, 1996: 245). This was an endogenous
Chapter 7: A Religious Party Type?

To some extent, this wide approach is based on the ideology of the party, intent on societal accord. But the wide approach is also based on the universality of the ideology: “Religious appeal is in principle universal in the sense that it attracts all people who share a common religion (across cleavages)... Religion cuts across class and acts to unite different social groups...”¹ Moreover, the appeal is not confessionally limited. Instead, Christian Democratic parties also go beyond confessional fault-lines.² The broad appeal thus has deep roots in the religious ideology of the ideal typical Christian Democratic party.

Analysts however point out that the wide appeal of Christian Democratic parties not only rests on their ideology and religious foundations. To some extent it is also “the logic of electoral competition (that) structures the nature ... of Christian Democracy in a specific way. It forces Christian Democracy ... to moderate societal cleavages ... in order to attract voters from all social layers and especially from the working class”.³ Both ideological and pragmatic reasons thus seem to lie behind the wide approach making up the target of Christian Democratic parties.⁴

process, according to Kalyvas, “(d)eclericalization was launched by the parties to solve the critical problem of their dependence on religion and church”, not “a reaction imposed on these parties exogenously by a secularising societal environment” (Kalyvas, 1996: 256). Irving too notes that Christian Democracy has striven to develop their parties as inter-class Volksparteien (Irving, 1979: 35). The all-embracing appeal of Christian Democratic parties is also discussed in Det Gemensamma Bästa, 2002. In this context, van Kersbergen however notes that “religion as an electoral magnet is very much like a real magnet: it has the disposition to both attract and repel...having religion as an electoral asset means that Christian Democracy can never become a full-blown catch-all party (van Kersbergen, 1994: 35, 38). According to van Kersbergen, this liability is however offset by the flexibility and generality of the religious ideology. At times, such a broad appeals may not be beneficial for the party, as it risks leading to defections by members of the dedicated core, which want to keep the party “pure”.⁵ On the other hand, it may be difficult for the party to reach out to all, not least to these non-religious, or even anti-religious. Placing little emphasis on the doctrinal core would probably lead to broader appeal, but defections by the core. Much emphasis on the doctrinal core would lead to the opposite outcome – less wide appeal, but a more dedicated core. The Christian Democratic party has to weigh those factors against each other. Often the flexibility of the ideology makes it possible to find a compromise (cp. van Kersbergen, 1994, Kalyvas, 1996: 232).

¹ van Kersbergen, 1994: 40.
² Irving, 1973: 75.
³ van Kersbergen, 1994: 41.
⁴ Irving notes that such a wide approach not always was typical of Christian Democracy, however. According to him, the main objective of the pre-war confessional parties was to defend the interests of Catholics, rather than to appeal to the electorate as a whole. The wide approach, which has been one of the main objectives of the post-war Christian Democratic parties, thus came later (Irving, 1979: xix). This observation would indicate that electoral
As we have seen, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party does not see itself as a political party, but as being part of a wider social movement.\(^1\) In its efforts at reaching out to people at large, the Christian Democratic parties also to a large extent rely on voluntary organisations in *performing* activities to establish external linkage.\(^2\) Many Christian Democratic parties have “important ‘Social Christian’ wings … and informal links with large Catholic trade union federations”.\(^3\) But party organisation itself is also important, and many Christian Democratic parties place emphasis on their grass-root organisation.\(^4\)

Activities related to the ideal typical Christian Democratic party are thus generally carried out by a broad range of performers, both by organisations *in* the party and by organisations *related to* the party in one way or another. In this sense, there is a definite similarity between the ideal typical Christian Democratic party and the ideal typical mass integration party.

Taken together, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party thus presents a particular mix of traits, when it comes to its efforts to establish external linkage. Regarding the *activities* to establish external linkage and the *performer* of those activities, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party primarily resembles the ideal typical mass integration party. However, when concerns play a not insignificant role for the broad approach of Christian Democratic parties. Whether the propensity to target all in a society is a trait based on the ideology (or the particular history) of the Christian Democratic party or whether it is a development in line with the general trend towards catch-all parties, is difficult to establish at this point in time. Further studies of Christian Democratic parties in this regard are thus needed.

\(^1\) Irving, 1979: 42. 
\(^3\) Irving, 1979: xxi. Other examples are provided by various scholars. According to Irving, “Catholic Action” – which was an all Catholic lay groups approved by the Hierarchy – provided the Republican Popular Movement with important grass-roots support (Irving, 1973: 78-80). Allum states the same thing for the early Christian Democratic party in Italy (DC) (1997: 28). Cp. also Enyedi, who states that the Hungarian Christian Democratic party “is deeply embedded in the subcultural network of organizations” (Enyedi, 1996: 377) and that it is a party that devotes “time and energy to building up organizational networks which are able to provide services to their adherents in diverse, not only political, spheres of their life…” (Enyedi, 1996: 378, cp. also 379, 387). Various organisations are also created by the party for various activities (Enyedi, 1996: 390). A similar situation is found in the Austrian People’s Party, which is largely made up of specialised organisations, such as the women’s organisation, the youth organisation and the pensioner’s organisation (Müller & Steininger, 1994: 88). Moreover, this party is connected to various non-political organisations of diverse kinds, which help out in mobilising supporters (Müller & Steininger, 1994: 92). 
it comes to its target, another picture emerges. Here, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party primarily resembles the ideal typical catch-all party.¹

Table 7.4. The establishment of external linkage in the ideal typical Christian Democratic party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment of external linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal typical Christian Democratic party</td>
<td>Activities, Performer</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table shows in what aspects the ideal typical Christian Democratic party resembles other ideal types in its efforts at establishing external linkage.

**Maintenance of External Linkage**

Particular references to the efforts at maintaining external linkage in the Christian Democratic parties are hard to find. However, it is reasonable to argue that the ideal typical Christian Democratic party maintains external linkage largely in the same way as it establishes it. This would mean that the Christian Democratic party, and organisations close to it, pursues campaigning activities as well as ideological and educational activities, towards its supporters at large.

As the ideal typical catch-all party does not pursue much activities to maintain external linkage, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party thus resembles primarily the ideal typical mass integration party in this sense. The difference is that while the mass integration party is narrower regarding the target of the activities to maintain external linkage, the target of the ideal typical Christian Democratic party is in all likelihood broad, as in an ideal typical catch-all party.²

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¹ The principled Christian Democratic party can be expected to share these traits.

² The principled Christian Democratic party can be expected to share these traits.
Table 7:5. The maintenance of external linkage in the ideal typical Christian Democratic party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintenance of external linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal typical Christian Democratic party</td>
<td>Activities, Performer</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table shows in what aspects the ideal typical Christian Democratic party resembles other ideal types in its efforts at maintaining external linkage.

Establishment of Internal Linkage

In the literature on Christian Democratic parties, there are few references to the membership recruitment policies and the membership requirements of Christian Democratic parties. As we will see soon, however, members are generally regarded as important in the ideal typical Christian Democratic party. Further, there are suggestions that Christian Democratic parties rely “less on disciplinary techniques than on loyalty, based on common doctrinal objectives...” This shred of evidence – importance of members, but emphasis on loyalty instead of discipline – would point to a resemblance with the ideal typical mass integration party in this aspect. As the evidence is scarce, I however put this categorisation in brackets.

Table 7:6. The establishment of internal linkage in the ideal typical Christian Democratic party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment of internal linkage</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal typical Christian Democratic party</td>
<td>(Recruitment, restrictions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table shows in what aspects the ideal typical Christian Democratic party resembles other ideal types in its efforts at establishing internal linkage.

Maintenance of Internal Linkage

When it comes to efforts to maintain internal linkage, more references on Christian Democratic parties are found in the theoretical literature.

1 Demker, 1998: 52.
Regarding activities to this effect, it is clear that Christian Democratic parties see party membership as something more than being only of strictly political character. This is a stance that is based on the Christian Democratic view of man. According to Irving, an ideal citizen in Christian Democratic ideology is to be educated, responsible and fully involved in the life of his family, his community and his state. Engage
tment in not only politics but also in society at large is thus important for Christian Democratic parties. To this end, “traditional oligarchic political parties must be transformed into modern political movements, through which the militant can engage himself actively and regularly in politics…”. It is thus important for the ideal typical Christian Democratic party to provide regular activities of various kinds for its party members.

That this ideal of Christian Democratic parties not always is met in practice is however evidenced by Irving, who cites an example from the Republican Popular Movement: “In practice … the Federations and Sections did not fulfil the dynamic role envisaged for them. This was partly due to the decreasing enthusiasm of the militants, who … found … political education less exciting”. Ideal typically, though, wide activities, not least of educational kind, are envisaged for party members. In this sense, there is a definite resemblance to the ideal typical mass integration party regarding what activities the ideal typical Christian Democratic party is to pursue to maintain internal linkage.

In order to perform such wide activities, Christian Democratic parties

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1 Irving, 1979: 42.
2 Irving, 1979: 42.
3 Enyedi points to the importance of members in a party like the Hungarian Christian Democrats and that such a party caters for the members “from cradle to grave” with broad activities emphasising not least education, but also arranges sports events, exhibitions, concerts etc (Enyedi, 1996: 380, 389). The women’s section provides courses for languages, embroidery and other handicraft and organises charity. Other activities are organised in close cooperation with related organisations (Enyedi, 1996: 389). In other cases, such as regarding the Austrian People’s Party, the Christian Democratic party does not develop ancillary organisations, but relies on the pre-existent network of independent Catholic organisations such as student, social, family and sport organisations (Müller & Steininger, 1994: 92). According to Broughton, also “the CDU-CSU has established a number of associations … such as youth groups, women’s groups and local government associations … whose chief functions are to communicate, mobilise and recruit members for the party” (Broughton, 1994: 197).
4 Irving, 1973: 95-96. Also in other ways, party internal activities were not carried out properly in the Republican Popular Movement: “Federations and Sections were not meeting enough, they were slack about distributing party leaflets, too few ideas were being sent up to party headquarters” (Irving, 1973: 98).
generally seem to have a fairly elaborate structure.\(^1\) The Republican Popular Movement, referred to by Irving, may serve as an example in this regard. There, “all … members had to be members of a Federation, composed of at least five sections with a total membership of not less than one hundred. The federation ran its own specialized teams for women, workers, young people and professional groups.”\(^2\)

Regarding the party internal communication, the different bodies in the ideal typical Christian Democratic party are to be in constant contact with each other and the party provides for recurrent elections to leadership posts in an internally democratic way. A Christian Democratic party should be “a democratic movement with ideas flowing from base to summit and vice versa.”\(^3\) Such procedures not always take place to the extent required in “real world” Christian Democratic parties.\(^4\) But the ideal remains. In this sense, there are thus definite resemblances to the ideal typical mass integration party.\(^5\)

\(^{1}\) Cp. Kalyvas, who points out that “(i)n the early 1990s, Christian Democratic parties still had a mass membership and a highly elaborate organization with numerous ancillary organizations” (Kalyvas, 1996: 2).

\(^{2}\) Irving, 1973: 96. Cp. also Lipset & Rokkan, 1967: 15. Another example is the Catholic People’s Party in Hungary (1895–1907), described by Eayedi, 1996: 382. Also the Christian Democratic Appeal in the Netherlands “has retained the organisational structure of a mass party” (Lucardie & ten Napel, 1994: 57), even it is run by professional politicians. Again, the Christian Democratic Union has been an exception to this, with its underdeveloped party structure (Broughton, 1994: 104). However, since 1982, “the CDU has moved towards an organisational structure more appropriate for a mass party” (Broughton, 1994: 105). Whether the men and women members generally organise together in the same organisation in Christian Democratic parties, or whether the organisation generally is gender-separated in this sense is not clear.

\(^{3}\) Irving, 1973: 95, 96-97 (referring to the Republican Popular Movement). Other scholars state the same thing: Irving, 1979: 5 (referring to the Italian Popular Party), Müller & Steininger, 1994: 90 (referring to the Austrian People’s Party), and Broughton, 1994: 104 (referring to the CDU). The Italian Christian Democratic party (DC) was, according to Allum, an exception to this however, with its highly centralised structure (Allum, 1997: 28).

\(^{4}\) Thus, Irving – speaking about the Republican Popular Movement – notes that “in theory… the supreme national authority … lay … with the … annual party congress. In practice, this congress … was dominated … by the leaders of the parliamentary party” (Irving, 1973: 101-102). Also the congress of the Austrian People’s Party is referred to as being “more a carefully planned media event than a forum of intra-party debate and substantial decision-making”, even if some direct communication between the party and its members does take place (Müller & Steininger, 1994: 90). Cp. also Lucardie & ten Napel, 1994: 55-57.

\(^{5}\) Not all scholars agree with this analysis, however. According to Demker (1998: 52-53), religious parties typically resemble the ideal typical total integration party in this respect. Demker claims that the religious “community” party is ruled from the top – by the leaders, and that the leaders demand loyalty from the members when it comes the decisions taken in the party. In this view, the party leadership exercises its authority on the basis of the
Taken together, the efforts at maintaining internal linkage in the ideal typical Christian Democratic party thus to a large extent resembles those in an ideal typical mass integration party.\footnote{The principled Christian Democratic party can be expected to share these traits, possibly with elements of total integration kind.}

}\footnotetext{1}{The principled Christian Democratic party can be expected to share these traits, possibly with elements of total integration kind.}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
Maintenance of internal linkage & Mass integration party & Total integration party & Catch-all party & Clientelistic party \\
\hline
Ideal typical Christian Democratic party & Activities, performer, intra-party communication & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The maintenance of internal linkage in the ideal typical Christian Democratic party.}
\end{table}

\footnotetext{1}{The principled Christian Democratic party can be expected to share these traits, possibly with elements of total integration kind.}

\footnotetext{2}{At least this was so initially. With time (and governmental experience), activities of catch-all...}

\textbf{Summarising the Embryonic Christian Democratic Ideal Type of Party Linkage}

The embryonic ideal type of Christian Democratic party linkage may thus be summarised. The ideal typical Christian Democratic party embraces a \textit{linkage objective} of catch-all kind, aiming at winning votes in elections. This linkage objective is however not primarily \textit{motivated} by an ambition to come to power \textit{per se} as it is in an ideal typical catch-all party, but by an ambition to reform society in line with the (primarily) ideological orientation of the party; in this sense, it resembles an ideal typical mass integration party.

This linkage objective of catch-all kind, following from a motivation of primarily mass integration kind, sets the ideal typical Christian Democratic party apart from the other ideal types and makes the Christian Democratic party type unique.

In order to win votes in elections, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party itself – or organisations related to it – primarily seems to carry out activities of mass integration kind to \textit{establish external linkage}.\footnote{At least this was so initially. With time (and governmental experience), activities of catch-all...}
However, unlike the activities of the ideal typical mass integration party, the activities of the ideal typical Christian Democratic party is targeted at the population at large, as in an ideal typical catch-all party. Unlike the situation in an ideal typical catch-all party, it is however not only the leadership that is active in activities. Instead, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party organises in a diversified manner and on different levels, and a wide variety of organisations typically carry out activities, just like in an ideal typical mass integration party. The same pattern is found in the efforts at maintaining external linkage.

By approaching the population at large, with activities of not only campaigning but also of social, educational and ideological character, performed by the party itself or by organisations related to it, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party again presents a unique combination of traits, mixing mass integration party traits and catch-all party traits in a specific manner.

When it comes to the internal linkage, however, the ideal typical Christian Democratic party more closely resembles the ideal typical mass integration party. Especially in the efforts to maintain internal linkage, mass integration party traits are marked. In the ideal typical Christian Democratic party, activities of various kinds generally are carried out by diverse organisational bodies, and party internal communication is generally two-way and democratic. In this sense, the Christian Democratic party type thus does not present unique traits, but traits resembling those in an ideal typical mass integration party. The particular combination of traits in the different respects however makes the ideal typical Christian Democratic party type unique.

In conclusion, the embryonic ideal typical Christian Democratic party thus presents a particular ideal type, with distinct traits when it comes to the way in which it organises its linkage. This ideal type is presented in the table below.

Kind have seemingly taken on more importance.
Table 7:8. Summary of the ideal typical Christian Democratic party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal typical Christian Democratic party</th>
<th>Mass integration party</th>
<th>Total integration party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Clientelistic party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage objective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of external linkage</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of external linkage</td>
<td>Activities, performer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of internal linkage</td>
<td>(Recruitment, restrictions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of internal linkage</td>
<td>Activities, performer, internal linkage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table shows in what aspects the ideal typical Christian Democratic party type resembles other ideal types. D: Dominating trait.

Not only the linkage of the ideal typical Christian Democratic party makes up a particular type, however. Indeed, it seems as we may speak about a particular ideal typical Christian Democratic model of party linkage, which to a large extent follows the logic of the party-centred explanatory models. Just like in these, primarily a specific orientation leads to a specific linkage objective in line with a specific motivation. This linkage objective then results in a specific linkage outcome. The ideal typical Christian Democratic party however presents a unique combination of traits in those different respects.

In the ideal typical Christian Democratic party, the orientation primarily of mass integration kind results in a linkage objective of catch-all kind. This linkage objective in turn leads to a distinct linkage outcome, as we have seen, marked by a mix of ideal typical catch-all and mass integration traits. This Christian Democratic model of party linkage would thus look as outlined in figure 7:2 below.

Figure 7:2. The ideal typical model of Christian Democratic party linkage.
In this sense, the Christian Democratic ideal type must thus be said to constitute a distinct theoretical model. Maybe this is what Duverger was getting at in placing Christian Democratic parties between the middle class cadre (later catch-all) parties and the Socialist mass parties – i.e. a unique combination of traits: Broad activities carried out by a wide range of organisations (as in the Socialist parties) directed at all (as in the middle class parties).

However, institutional factors are not altogether unimportant for the linkage of particular Christian Democratic parties. Hanley, for example, points out the importance of the electoral system in this regard, not least in France and Britain. Indeed, he contends that “(i)t would be facile to believe that they are immune to national factors”. Similarities between the Christian Democratic parties however abound. Notwithstanding institutional influences, it is thus the party-centred factors that seem decisive in making for the ideal typical Christian Democratic party type as here outlined.

Components of the Religious Linkage Ideal Type

In conclusion, we may thus establish that there are indications pointing to the existence of a particular religious type of party linkage. In all aspects, both Islamist and Christian Democratic parties organise their linkage in largely similar ways. This is one of the main conclusions of this study.

I will return to the foundations and logic of this particular type in the next chapter. Here, this chapter is concluded by a short recapitulation of the

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1 Hanley, 1994: 7.
3 That Christian Democratic parties are remarkably similar, despite the fact that they exist in diverse institutional and structural contexts is pointed out by Hanley: “(T)here is undoubtedly a very high degree of cohesion across national boundaries; the fact is that all these actors have common origins and common political culture; they share many common policy options and they have a distinct style… (Indeed) the Christian Democrat’s cohesiveness is arguably much higher than that of the… social democracy” (Hanley, 1994: 10). Johansson also claims that “the Christian Democrats make up a relatively cohesive party family” (Johansson, 2002: 434).
4 It must again be remembered that Christian Democratic parties are not immune to developments in, for example, the societal setting. As we saw above, Christian Democratic parties are characterised by their flexibility and adaptability. Therefore, they are not immune to the general organisational development towards catch-all parties noted by many scholars. However, as we have seen, organisational legacies are often remarkably long-lasting, making it probable that Christian Democratic parties do retain the particular traits here outlined in one way or the other.
5 A summary of the linkage traits in Islamist parties has been presented earlier in this chapter. Note that the particular Islamist parties in different ways diverge from this summary outline.
constituent components of the suggested religious linkage type, drawing
together the evidence from the Islamist as well as the Christian Democratic
parties.¹

Thus, a religious party is generally – with some exceptions – an
electoral party: It wants to win many votes in elections in order to come to
power.² However, it does not want to come to power for the sake of power
itself, or in order to implement only some policy changes. Instead, it wants
to come to power to reform society at its base, in line with its ideological
orientation.

In working towards this end, a religious party pursues broad activities
of various kinds (campaigning, political, educational and social activities).
These activities are performed by diverse organisational bodies, which are
part of or related to the party. In some religious parties, electoral activities
are particularly marked. However, in all religious parties activities are
primarily carried out by a wide variety of organisational bodies on different
levels. These activities are directed not to particular groups, but to the
population at large.

The internal activities and the members of the ideal typical religious
party are very important. Activities are, ideally, of various kinds – not least
educational activities are important – and these are carried out by the party
itself, as well as by affiliate and ancillary organisations. In the ideal typical
religious party, there is a continuous two-way communication between
higher and lower party levels and it is internally democratic, with elections
to every level in the party organisation.

This ideal typical type of religious party linkage is presented in table
7:9 below.

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¹ Obviously, what is outlined here is an ideal typical religious party, not to be found in this
exact version in practice.
² Principled religious parties differ in this respect.
**Table 7.9. Summary of the ideal typical religious party type of linkage.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage objective and motivation</th>
<th>Ideal typical religious party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>maximisation of votes by appealing to all (linkage objective) in order to act in line with the primarily ideological orientation (motivation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of external linkage</td>
<td>through long-term and continuous work of political/ideological and social character and short-term activities of campaigning character in times of election (sometimes particular emphasis on electoral activities) (activities), towards population at large (target) by local branches as well as ancillary, affiliate and interest organisations (performer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of external linkage</td>
<td>through long-term, continuous work of political/ideological and social character and intermittent activities of campaigning character (activities) towards supporters (target) by local branch as well as ancillary, affiliate and interest organisations (performer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of internal linkage</td>
<td>through far-reaching efforts to recruit members via on-going membership campaigns, emphasis quality and quantity of members (recruitment policy), formal requirements to enter party (membership requirements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of internal linkage</td>
<td>through continuous, multifaceted, far-ranging activities of political/ideological and social character towards members (activities), carried out mainly by the branch, but also by ancillary and affiliate organisations (performer) and continuous, reciprocal communication between lower and higher party levels on policy matters and recurrent elections to every level (party internal democracy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having established that we indeed may speak about a particular religious way of organising political linkage, it is now time to turn to the final chapter, drawing the conclusions of this study together.
CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 8

UNDERSTANDING THE LINKAGE OF ISLAMIST PARTIES

As this study draws to a close, it is time to summarise the findings. Before turning to the conclusions on how the political linkage of Islamist parties is to be explained, I will however return to the discussion on whether Islamist parties constitute a dilemma for democracy, that was announced in Chapter 1.

Islamist Parties: A Democratic Dilemma?

As was discussed in Chapter 1, there is an intense debate on whether Islamist parties have a place in a democratic political system. This debate has primarily been focused on the ideology of Islamist parties and on whether Islam per se is compatible with democracy. In party studies, however, party organisation is often pointed to as having certain effects for democracy. In the analysis that follows here, the results of this study on the linkage of Islamist parties are discussed in relation to different theories on how party organisation may promote or counteract democracy. In this way, some conclusions can be drawn as to whether Islamist parties do constitute a dilemma for democracy.

Obviously, there are numerous ways in which parties may promote or prevent democracy. For instance, their ideological positions on democracy, their projected policies, their role in government, their effect on the government and their mobilisation of marginalized groups might be important in this context.

Islamist parties often constitute the major opposition to the regime in place in the countries where they operate, they often show a willingness to participate in the political process and they have often been very successful in mobilising marginalized segments of the population, but they do not always act on firm democratic foundations. Obviously, the stance of Islamist parties on these and other matters are important for judging whether they are promotive or detrimental to democracy.¹

¹ The argument has often been that the Islamists claim to be democratic as long as it benefits them, but that democracy will be disposed of once the Islamists come to power. In this discussion, I agree with Norton and Göle, who both point out that you cannot discuss the
What I am concerned with here is not this broad view of how Islamist parties may promote or prevent democracy; that would be too an exacting task in this context and also such a discussion could not be based on the findings of this study. Instead, I focus here on the matter pointed out in party studies, i.e. how parties should be internally organised to promote democracy; and I discuss, on a general level, the organisation of the Islamist parties studied in relation to this. Thus, does the internal organisation of the Islamist parties here under study make them promote or prevent democracy?

How parties should be organised internally to promote democracy is something highly contentious among party scholars. Different lines of argument can be discerned in the scholarly debate on the matter, stemming from different conceptions of democracy. Here, I make a general outline of the two basic stances and then discuss the Islamist parties in relation to these.¹

On the one hand, there are those who claim that parties should be internally participatory organs to promote democracy (the participatory democracy model).² Widfeldt asserts that "parties need to be open and internally democratic membership organisations to fit into a democratic system. (…) (A) vital contribution to democracy by the parties is that they are open and voluntary membership organisations … (and) … political parties can promote democracy by involving citizens in political activity".³ Other ways in which internally democratic parties promote democracy, according to this line of reasoning, is that they provide democratic education and an opportunity to claim responsibility from leaders within the party. Internally democratic parties are also bestowed with legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate, and internal interest articulation is possible in such a party.⁴

“hidden agenda” of Islamists (or anybody else for that matter). Instead, you have to look at what the Islamists actually do. In this context, it is important to note that Islamists are often remarkably pragmatic in day-to-day politics, and this pragmatism is recognised by ideological opponents. As Communist Party leader Munir Hamarneh in Jordan states: “We are contrary to (the Islamists) and against them. But we meet on certain points. We know that it is not the time to build Socialism and they know that it is not the time to build Islamic society. And in the way of struggle we face Israel and the reflections of its existence, imperialism and the reflections of its policies… And we suffer from the local policies, politically and economically. And for the short coming time, we see that we can work together on certain issues” (Munir Hamarneh, 24 October, 1999).

² Widfeldt, 1997: 2.
By providing these functions, participatory, internally democratic parties contribute to democracy, according to this school of thought.

The only party type that meets these criteria and that is open, membership-based and internally democratic is the mass integration party. According to the “participatory democracy” perspective, only parties with mass integration traits thus promote democracy. Parties which organise differently are detrimental to democracy, according to this perspective.

On the other hand, there are those (notably Schumpeter, 1976), who assert that it is not the participation within parties that makes for democracy, but the competition between parties (the competitive elites model or the competitive model of democracy).\(^1\) An argument against participatory, internally democratic parties is that parties should be efficient to be promotive of democracy. To be able to act quickly and decisively, a party requires a strong leadership and not participation by the party members. Indeed, such participation rather creates indecisiveness and internal strife in the party. Scholars of this conviction contend that democracy is to be realised by “individuals (who) acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.\(^2\) Indeed, citizens should “not control their political leaders in anyway except by refusing to re-elect them”.\(^3\) Another argument against participatory, internally democratic parties is that party leaders should be responsible to voters, not to members (representative linkage).\(^4\) Internal democracy distorts opinion representativeness in relation to the voters and pluralism in relation to other actors on the political arena, such as interest organisations.

According to this argument, parties should thus have strong leaderships and they should be responsive to the public opinion and to various interests in society, in order to promote democracy. Thus, to promote democracy, parties should be of catch-all kind, according to the competitive model.

These are the two ends of a spectrum regarding the relationship between how parties are organised internally and to what extent they promote democracy. These perspectives are in many aspects diametrically opposed; what is regarded as promotive of democracy according to one view, is regarded as detrimental to democracy according to the other, and

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\(^{4}\) Lawson, 1988: 16-17.
In applying these two theoretical perspectives on the internal organisation of parties to the Islamist parties here studied, we can conclude that these parties – at least ideally and to a certain extent also in practice – are promotive of democracy according to the participatory model. Ideally, the Islamist parties provide for intra-party democratic procedures, with continuous participation of members in party internal workings; an ideal for which they cite foundations in Islam (particularly the concepts of Shura, consultation, and ijma, consensus).

According to the competitive model, such internally democratic procedures would be too ineffective to be good for democracy, however. According to this perspective, listening to party members would also turn the party away from the public at large, in a way detrimental to democracy. On ideal level, then, Islamist parties are promotive of democracy according to the participatory model, but not according to the competitive model.

However, we have seen that the participatory ideals not always are carried out in practice in the Islamist parties. In one party – the Party of Islam – one category of party members is even excluded from the party internal decision-making altogether, both ideally and in practice. To the extent that members do not participate in the internal workings of the Islamist parties in practice, the parties cannot be said to be promotive of democracy according to the participatory model.

Does this mean that Islamist parties are promotive of democracy according to the competitive model, in cases where members are not involved in the party internal decision-making in practice? That depends on the activities of the party leadership. To the extent that the party leadership listens to and acts in line with the public opinion, Islamist parties would be

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Not all perspectives on the internal organisation of parties and its relation to democracy are located at either end of this spectrum. Lewin (1970) for example claims that both participatory and representative linkage are necessary for a party to be a vital part of democracy – the interactive democracy model. Lawson also asserts that a combination of the electoral and participatory linkage is most common in practice, calling it representative-democratic linkage (Lawson, 1988: 17). The two types that have been outlined here – the participatory and the competitive models – however present analytically fruitful ideal types in this context. The two perspectives might be regarded as the “classical” perspectives on the relation between the party’s internal organisation and democracy. From the 1980s on, they have received competition from another democratic theory pertaining to parties: the deliberative model (Teorell, 1998: 356-359). However this model has, in this context, essentially participatory consequences, and may thus here be included under the participatory model (even if the arguments in favour of the deliberative model differ from those underlying the participatory model).
promotive of democracy according to the competitive model. Indeed, such surveying of – and acting in accordance with – the public opinion is observed by the Islamist parties. However, Islamist parties do not follow the public opinion blindly – they only act on opinions which are in accordance with their own. Such opinions may indeed find substantial support in the public at large (like the scarf-issue in Turkey, anti-Normalisation with Israel in Jordan and the Kashmir issue and anti-Americanism in Pakistan). To the extent that the party leadership takes (parts of) the public opinion into account, the party thus promotes democracy according to the competitive model. However, the competitive model requires parties to change policies, and party leaderships to step down, if the party is not successful in elections. Such changes are not generally to be expected in the Islamist parties. To the extent that the Islamist parties do not listen closely to – and act in line with – the public opinion, they are not promotive of democracy according to the competitive model.

If Islamist parties present clientelistic or total integration traits in their internal organisation – which they occasionally do, as we have seen – it may further be difficult to claim that they promote democracy, as “it is questionable whether the clientelistic and directive linkage types are applicable to a democratic political system”.\(^1\) On the other hand, representatives of the competitive model claim, according to Teorell, that for parties to promote democracy “oligarchic rule within parties is needed”; indeed, “(d)emocracy within the polity could … only be accomplished by abolishing it within the parties”.\(^2\)

On the basis of such a view, it can be argued that clientelistic and total integration parties do not counteract democracy as a result of their internal organisation. This is not to say that they do not counteract democracy in other ways, also according to the competitive model. For instance, the parties must be responsive to the electorate at large and adapt to the public opinion to promote democracy according to the competitive model, something which is difficult to envisage in at least total integration parties.\(^3\) Obviously, as noted previously, there are other ways in which parties may promote – or counteract – democracy, than via its internal party organisation.

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\(^1\) Widfeldt, 1997: 14.

\(^2\) Teorell, 1999: 364 (emphasis in original), 365.

\(^3\) In this context, it can also be noted that other non-democratic traits may prevail in Islamist parties. Cp. for instance the indications (which indeed are not substantiated by all), that the Islamic Action Front is fully controlled by an external body – the Muslim Brotherhood. Such a situation would not be promotive of democracy according to either perspective.
Thus, do Islamist parties promote or counteract democracy? Are the Islamist parties a dilemma for democracy? The answer to this question must be that it depends. It depends on the theoretical perspective applied, and it depends on the actual organisation and the actual activities of the particular Islamist party at hand. However, as a category Islamist parties are not, per definition, detrimental to democracy.

**Traditional Theories Explaining the Linkage of Islamist Parties**

After having drawn some conclusions on whether Islamist parties constitute a dilemma for democracy, the time has come to summarise the findings on how the linkage of Islamist parties can be explained.

First, I discuss what conclusions can be drawn regarding the traditional theoretical models, on the basis of the findings in part I of this study. Have the traditional theoretical models, developed in the West, been useful in this study of the political linkage of Islamist parties?

Thereafter, religion as a factor explaining the linkage of Islamist parties is further looked into. A particular religious way of organising linkage is discussed, on the basis of the findings in part II of the study, and the foundations for this particular religious linkage in religion *per se* are spelled out.

**The Traditional Explanatory Models in the Three Different Cases**

In summarising the findings regarding the traditional explanations of party linkage, it can be concluded that while the party-centred and institutional models utilised indeed have been useful in providing analytical tools for the analysis of the parties at hand, they have not always applied in their original form. Here, I bring together these explanatory factors and their impact on each party studied.

In the Turkish case, the linkage objective and outcome of the Virtue Party in practice, for most parts, can be explained by the societal setting in Turkey, which favours clientelistic parties. In many respects, in practice, the Virtue Party presents clientelistic traits. This result is in line with the part of the specified party-centred model that emphasises the importance of the societal setting.

However, the Virtue Party also presents other traits. For instance, catch-all party traits are found in the linkage objective of the party. These can be attributed to the orientation of the party, in line with the specified
party-centred model emphasising the importance of orientation. The catch-all traits in this regard may however also be attributed to institutional influences, in line with the institutional model. The comparison with other parties in Turkey further shows that all parties in Turkey present the same linkage objective in this regard, something which attests to the influence of institutional factors.

In the linkage outcome of the Virtue Party, catch-all traits are however not found to any greater extent. Indeed, catch-all traits are found only regarding the target of outreach activities, ideally and strategically, which is likely to be a result of the orientation and the institutions in conjunction. Instead, primarily mass integration traits are found in the linkage outcome of the Virtue Party (particularly on ideal and strategic level and regarding different aspects of internal organisation) beside the dominating clientelistic traits (which stand out particularly in activities in practice). This outcome – which is contrary to the theoretical expectations – poses the question of whether a linkage objective of catch-all kind might result in a linkage outcome marked by traits of mass integration kind (at least on ideal and strategic level)? Maybe a mass integration kind of organisation is considered electorally effective in the particular context at hand, and thus is regarded to be in line with the pragmatic orientation?

There might further be another explanation for the mass integration traits in the Virtue Party in this respect, however. Also other parties in the Turkish context claim to be well-organised on different levels, in a mass integration kind of way, in line with the legal regulations. Such a claim may thus be a result of institutional influences also in the Virtue Party. In this sense, it is interesting to note that the impact of the institution is direct, it is not mediated via the linkage objective of the party, as there are no mass integration traits in the linkage objective of the Virtue Party.

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1 In this context, it can be noted that it is sometimes difficult to separate a “pure” social (welfare) activity (typical of a mass integration party) from a service activity with social content (typical of a clientelistic party). The same kind of activity can be carried out for different reasons. Thus, to be able to establish the character of such an activity, it is important to ascertain the motivation underlying the particular activity. However, these motivations may themselves be dual: The objective may be to actually help people – and to get their votes. This is a general problem, not previously unknown (cp. e.g. Widlund, 2000). In the case of the Virtue Party, however, the party motivates activities of clientelistic kind on primarily pragmatic grounds.

2 Another similarity between Turkish parties is that members-to-be in all Turkish parties have to fill in an official membership form. Also in this regard, all parties are affected by the institutional arrangements making for mass integration traits.
When it comes to Turkish parties in general, it can however be noted that most parties are not well-organised in practice. Thus, the Virtue Party is rather exceptional (together with the Nationalist Movement Party) in actually organising as envisioned in this regard. This might indicate that there is something else than institutional influences that contributes to this fact. Maybe, there is something in the communitarian character of the ideologies of the two parties (Virtue Party: religion, National Movement Party: nationalism), which makes them put extra emphasis on organisation?\footnote{In this context, it should however also be noted that the Virtue Party, which at the time was afraid of being closed down, and the National Movement Party, which is a staunchly Kemalist party, might have particular reasons to follow the legal regulations in this regard closely. Maybe these parties act according to legal regulations for different reasons.}

In sum, the findings of this study suggest that the linkage of the Virtue Party in practice is explained primarily by the societal setting of the country. On ideal and strategic level, the linkage of the Virtue Party is more difficult to explain. However, both the orientation of the party and the institutional setting in Turkey seem to account for this outcome, however in ways that in some aspects are contrary to the theoretical expectations. For example, the electoral orientation of the Virtue Party arguably results in a linkage of partly mass integration kind quite contrary to the expectations. Further, the institutional factors only partly affect the linkage outcome via the linkage objective of the party, as was expected; institutional features also influence the linkage outcome directly in a way not theoretically foreseen.

Whereas the societal setting and the orientation of the party, as well as the institutions of the state, thus influence the linkage outcome of the Virtue Party in certain ways, the origin, background and experiences of the Virtue Party however do not seem to account for the linkage outcome, at least not directly. While party-centred factors indeed are important for the linkage outcome of the Virtue Party, these factors influence the linkage in different ways, and not as one combined model. To apply in this case, the party-centred model therefore has to be specified, and the impact of each component must be studied separately.

In the Islamic Action Front, an orientation of mass integration kind leads to a linkage objective of largely catch-all kind. This is quite contrary to expectations on the basis of the party-centred theoretical model.\footnote{Note however the similarity with the ideal typical religious party outlined in Chapter 7.} This linkage objective is in turn followed by a linkage outcome marked by catch-all traits, primarily regarding outreach activities, ideally, strategically and in practice (in line with the model) and mass integration traits, primarily...
regarding internal organisation, ideally and strategically (contrary to the model). Again, mass integration traits in the linkage outcome thus follow from a linkage objective of catch-all kind – at least regarding internal organisation, and at least on ideal and strategic level – just like in the Virtue Party. In practice, however, the Islamic Action Front presents the expected catch-all traits in its organisation, at least in most aspects. In this case, the theoretical expectations on the basis of the orientation of the party are thus largely thwarted, even if there are some resemblances with the model.

To some extent, the societal setting in Jordan seems to make for a certain clientelistic trait in the linkage objective and, to a slight extent, in the outreach activities of the party in practice. Maybe also the clientelistic trait in the membership policy of the Islamic Action Front can be attributed to the societal setting. However, also the electoral system makes for such a presence of clientelistic traits. The societal setting and the electoral system thus work in conjunction to make for certain clientelistic traits in the Islamic Action Front, in line with the expectations of each factor.

Interestingly, the Islamic Action Front on its own to a large extent organises its linkage in ways similar to other parties in Jordan. Just like these, the Islamic Action Front presents an electoral linkage objective and just like these, the Islamic Action Front claims to be internally democratic. This indicates that institutional influences are at play in this regard; particularly the legal regulations stipulating internal democracy seem important.1

However, if the mass integration traits in the internal organisation of the Islamic Action Front are influenced by the legal regulations, this institutional influence would be direct and unmediated via the linkage objective, in a way contrary to the expectations, as there are no mass integration traits in the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front (cp. the Virtue Party).

As was the case regarding the Virtue Party, it is however notable that the Islamic Action Front also in practice at least to some extent realises the ideal when it comes to party internal democracy; contrary to other Jordanian parties, the Islamic Action Front does make use of internally democratic procedures. This may indicate that there are other motivations than just a willingness to follow the law that result in such mass integration features in

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1 However, it cannot be ruled out that other parties copy the successful Islamic Action Front in different regards. Indeed, analysts assert that only the Islamic Action Front really works as a party.
the Islamic Action Front in this respect.

Even if the Islamic Action Front on its own thus to a large extent resembles the other parties in the Jordanian context, the same does not apply when including the Muslim Brotherhood into the picture. Indeed, the picture of the linkage of the Islamic Action Front changes dramatically when the Muslim Brotherhood, which on most accounts cooperates closely with the Islamic Action Front in practice, is taken into the equation. The linkage efforts of the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood in conjunction to a large extent differ from those of other Jordanian parties. These linkage efforts thus do not seem to result from institutional factors. Indeed, such a close cooperation between a party and a social movement organisation is contrary to the legal regulations in Jordan. On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that legal regulations are important in accounting for the division of work in the Jordanian Islamist movement. Arguably, it is because of legal regulations that there is an Islamist party at all, and not only a social movement.

Orientation rather than legal regulations seems to account for the linkage of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front in conjunction. Presumably with an orientation of largely mass integration kind, which would lead to a linkage objective of mass integration kind, the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood viewed in conjunction organise their linkage in a way that much resembles that of the ideal typical mass integration party. In some aspects, they however direct themselves at all and everyone, in a way contrary to the mass integration model.

In sum, the findings of this study suggest that the orientation of mass integration kind in the Islamic Action Front – in a way contrary to the theoretical expectations – makes for a linkage objective of catch-all kind, and a linkage outcome marked by catch-all traits in some respects and mass integration trait in others. However, institutional influences cannot be overlooked in certain aspects. Nor can the influence of the societal setting be overlooked in relation to the Islamic Action Front. However, there are no indications that the origin, background and experiences of the Islamic Action Front influence its linkage to any particular extent, at least not directly. Again, party-centred factors thus are important for the linkage of an Islamist party, sometimes in conjunction with institutional influences. Again, however, party-centred factors do not work as one model; instead, different party-centred factors influence the linkage in different ways, and not always in the way expected.
Finally, the Party of Islam is motivated by its orientation, which is primarily of mass integration kind, even if some features of total integration and – in one aspect – catch-all kinds are present. On the basis of this orientation, the Party of Islam forms a linkage objective of largely mass integration kind, with some elements of total integration and – to some extent – electoral kind. This linkage objective makes for a linkage outcome of largely mass integration kind, if with one catch-all feature (regarding target), and some total integration elements (particularly in the internal organisation of the party). In this sense, the theoretical expectations based on orientation are in line with the party-centred model in the case of the Party of Islam.

A slight clientelistic trait in the linkage objective and the linkage outcome of the Party of Islam may further be attributed to the societal setting in Pakistan, in line with the party-centred theoretical expectations emphasising societal setting.

Moving on to institutional impact, it is noted that the linkage outcome in the Party of Islam is very different from the linkage outcomes found in the two big parties in Pakistan. However, certain similarities between the Party of Islam and these parties occur, indicating some institutional influences. Thus, Pakistani parties generally direct themselves at everybody in a way that is expected on the basis of the electoral system; they at least ideally and strategically require members to fill in a membership form; they claim to be well-organised in a way that suits the administrative set-up of the state and they claim to be internally democratic. This similarity between Pakistani parties thus indicates some influence of institutional factors on linkage outcomes, even if requirements for membership forms, an elaborate organisation and internal democracy cannot be found to have a basis in legal regulations in Pakistan. Thus, perhaps other institutional features make for these traits in Pakistani parties.

Whereas Pakistani parties indeed also in practice seem to direct themselves at everyone, it only seems to be the Islamist parties that have lively organisations at grass-root level and something like internally democratic procedures (at least the Party of Islam) in practice. This suggests that these traits of mass integration kind not primarily are a result of institutional factors. Instead, it seems likely that these traits are a result of other factors, arguably the religious ideology. I will return to the influence of the religious ideology on political linkage shortly.

In sum, the findings of this study suggest that it for most parts is the
orientation of the Party of Islam that accounts for its linkage outcome, even if some – very limited – influences from the societal setting cannot be ignored. The importance of the institutional setting cannot either be overlooked, even if it is difficult to establish in what way the institutional setting is influential. The origin, background and experiences of the Party of Islam however do not seem to influence the linkage outcome of the Party of Islam to any particular extent, at least not directly. Again, the party-centred explanation thus is important, even if in slightly different ways than expected. An institutional impact cannot be ignored, even if it is difficult to pinpoint.

**Party-Centred vs. Institutional Models: To what Extent do they Explain the Linkage of Islamist Parties?**

In evaluating the applicability of the different traditional theoretical models, utilised to explain the linkage of Islamist parties in this study, it can thus be established that factors pointed out by the party-centred model generally have a decisive impact on the linkage of the parties studied, at least on a general level; party-centred factors lead to a particular linkage objective, which in turn results in a particular linkage outcome. I argue, on the basis of the findings of this study, that the Islamist parties are influenced primarily by party-centred factors, in conceiving of and acting out their political linkage.

Especially the orientation of the parties is important for their linkage objectives and linkage outcomes, if not always in the way theoretically expected. The Party of Islam however meets the theoretical expectations in this regard: An orientation of primarily mass integration kind results in a linkage objective of primarily mass integration kind, which in turn leads to a linkage outcome of primarily mass integration kind.

In the Virtue Party, the picture is more blurred. Here, the societal setting influences the linkage objective and linkage outcome, making for clientelistic party activities in practice. However, in the linkage outcome of the Virtue Party there are also traits of mass integration kind, which cannot be accounted for by referring to the orientation or societal setting of the party – unless one envisages that the party considers an organisation with certain mass integration traits to be the most effective in achieving the electoral objective. This is indeed not improbable. However, the expectation in line with the specified party-centred theoretical model based on the orientation of the party, i.e. that the Virtue Party is to present a linkage outcome of primarily electoral kind, is partly thwarted because of these mass integration
traits in the organisation. For the party-centred model to apply in this case, it thus has to be modified so that a linkage objective of electoral kind indeed can be expected to result in a linkage outcome with traits of mass integration kind, at least in particular contexts.

In the Islamic Action Front on its own, the orientation of the party does not at all result in the expected outcome. The party presents an orientation of mass integration kind, but it presents a linkage outcome of largely catch-all kind. Maybe the Islamic Action Front finds that a linkage of catch-all kind is the best way to act in line with the mass integration orientation?

Inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood into the equation solves this theoretical puzzle. The Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood in conjunction organise in a way that largely follows from their (supposed) joint orientation.\(^1\) In this view, there is just a division of work between the two: The Islamic Action Front carries out campaigning activities of catch-all kind, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood carries out other, broader activities, of mass integration kind. As pointed out previously, there are reasons to believe that this division of work can be accounted for by the legal regulations.

The Islamist parties included in this study are thus – primarily – motivated by party-centred factors in conceiving of and carrying out their political linkage; factors specific to the parties are decisive in making for the linkage outcome. However, the linkage outcomes in the different parties are not always in line with the theoretical expectations. In these cases, the party-centred models have to be modified to apply. Notably, the party-centred model generally does not apply as a full model. Instead, the different party-centred factors often point in different directions, and influence the linkage in different ways. Particularly, the orientations of the parties, making for different outcomes as we have seen, and the societal setting, in all cases making for at least some clientelistic traits in the parties, are important. However, there are no indications that the origin, background and experiences of the parties influence the linkage of the Islamist parties in any decisive way, at least not directly.

Further, this study shows that the institutional factors here focused – the electoral systems and legal regulations on parties – are not generally of

\(^1\) Again it has to be noted that I have not studied the Muslim Brotherhood directly. Thus, I can here but presume that the orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood – like that of the Islamic Action Front – is of mass integration kind.
decisive importance for the way in which the Islamist parties organise their linkage, at least not in most cases.\(^1\) This does not mean that institutional factors are altogether insignificant. Indeed, institutional factors – and particularly the legal regulations – do seem important for all the parties in different ways, not least in conjunction with party-centred factors. In fact, in Jordan it is arguably because of legal regulations that there is a party at all.

Particularly for the big parties in this context – the Virtue Party and the Islamic Action Front – institutional influences are important. This indicates that being big and having a real prospect of coming to power induces some flexibility and readiness to adapt to the demands of the state on the part of a party. As noted previously, other factors – such as fear of being closed down – also may be important in this context. This in turn indicates that the parties do not act in line with the institutions (particularly not with the legal regulations) because it is effective, as was suggested by the theoretical model in this regard. Instead, parties act in line with legal regulations to please the state.

Further, it is interesting to note that legal regulations often seem to influence the linkage outcome in parties directly, without being mediated via the linkage objective (cp. the Virtue Party and the Islamic Action Front). This is contrary to the theoretical expectations, and indicates that legal regulations are complied with, without being incorporated into the linkage objective. In certain cases, however, institutional influences take place in the expected way, i.e. they influence the linkage outcome via the linkage objective of the party (cp. e.g. aspects of the Virtue Party).

Also the electoral system is sometimes of importance for the organisation of linkage in Islamist parties. For example, the presence of some clientelistic traits in the linkage objective and outreach activities of the Islamic Action Front may be attributed to the electoral system (besides the societal setting).

In Pakistan, other institutions than the legal regulations and the electoral system – such as perhaps the administrative set-up of the country – seem to be important for the organisation of linkage in the parties, particularly on ideal and strategic level, less in practice, even if this is difficult to establish here.

In sum, the findings of this study suggest – on a general theoretical level – that whereas institutional factors do seem to be important (if not

\(^1\) Other national factors, such as the size and history of the countries do not seem to matter at all.
decisive) for the linkage outcomes of the Islamist parties in specific respects, this influence does not primarily take place in the way expected.

In this study, a requirement was placed on explanations for them to be regarded as applicable: The factors that the explanations point out should be referred to by the parties, i.e. the party representatives (or party documents) should motivate the organisation of linkage in the party by referring to the particular factor(s) at hand. Linkage outcomes should also be based in linkage objectives. Only if the outcomes are arrived at “in the right manner” – i.e. the “right” factors are referred to by party representatives and the linkage outcome is based on the linkage objective – explanations would be regarded as applicable.

As we have seen here, parties primarily refer to and emphasise the orientation of the party in accounting for certain outcomes, and the outcomes are also based – if not always in the way expected – on the linkage objective(s) of the party. These outcomes are thus arrived at “in the right manner”, according to the theoretical framework drawn up.

Institutions are also referred to in this context, if to lesser extent. However, institutional influences on linkage outcomes primarily seem to be direct; they influence linkage outcomes directly, without being mediated via the linkage objective, as theoretically expected. Thus, the institutions are referred to as making for a specific outcome, but the traits which the institutions promote are not included in the linkage objective. The institutional model as here outlined must therefore be modified to some extent on the basis of these findings. In some cases, institutions affect linkage outcomes directly, without influencing linkage objective of the party.¹

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Even if institutional factors thus have some bearing on the organisation of linkage in the Islamist parties here under study, primarily when it comes to the big parties, it is the party-centred factors that stand out as most important in making for the particular linkage outcome in the Islamist parties – even if

¹ In some cases, institutional factors however do influence the linkage in the way expected. For example, the electoral system in Jordan (along with the societal setting) arguably makes for some traits of clientelistic character in the linkage objective of the Islamic Action Front, which in turn make for some clientelistic features in the linkage outcome of the party in practice.
the party-centred model in this regard needs to be modified. Not least the orientation of the parties is important in this regard, just as was expected by the party-centred model. However, the orientation of the party affects the linkage as expected only in one case – in the Party of Islam. In both the Virtue Party and the Islamic Action Front on its own, the orientation influences the linkage in ways contrary to the expectations. In these cases, the model thus has to be modified to apply.

The societal setting of the parties is important in all cases in making for particular traits in the linkage outcome. However, in two cases – the Islamic Action Front and the Party of Islam – the societal setting accounts only for minor traits. In the third case, the Virtue Party, things are different: The linkage outcome of the Virtue Party in practice is indeed largely influenced by the societal setting.

Whereas both the orientation and the societal setting of the parties thus are important for their linkage in different ways, the origin, background and experiences of the parties have little bearing on party linkage, at least directly. For most parts, these factors are not decisive for the linkage outcome in the Islamist parties. This does not necessarily mean that these factors are completely without importance in this regard. Instead, it is likely that they – at least at times – are embedded into the orientation of the parties and therefore not referred to by the party explicitly.¹

In this context, it is however important to note that the different party-centred factors – contrary to the theoretical expectations – do not generally point in the same direction, when it comes to what linkage objective and hence linkage outcome they promote. Indeed, different factors often point in different directions and thus promote different linkages in parties. As full models, the party-centred explanations are thus not readily applicable to the cases here in place.

It should also be noted that different factors may influence different “levels” of linkage. Whereas the linkage ideal, strategy and practice for most parts go together, at least in the Islamic Action Front and the Party of Islam, this is not always the case. As witnessed in the case of the Virtue Party, some factors influence the ideal and strategy (the orientation and institutions in the case of the Virtue Party), whereas other factors influence the linkage outcome in practice (the societal setting in the Virtue Party). Therefore, the

¹ Particularly in the Islamic Action Front and Party of Islam this is probably the case. In the Virtue Party, the origin, background and experiences however largely point in different directions than does the orientation.
Virtue Party ends up visualising one kind of linkage, but carries out another. Despite the theoretically unexpected outcomes, the traditional theoretical models, both the party-centred and the institutional, prove to be a good help in analysing and understanding the way in which Islamist parties organise their linkage, even if they do not always apply in their original form. The theoretical models originating in the West, as here construed, have thus proved to be successful in pointing out important aspects of linkage also in Islamist parties. Through these models, I have been able to break down Islamist party linkage in its constituent parts and to analytically pinpoint various interesting aspects of the linkage, not least regarding where the linkage differs from the original models. These models have thus proved to be analytically useful also outside their original setting. I see the construction of these models on the basis of the party theoretical works as an important contribution of this study.

The meta-theoretical question posed on this matter at the beginning of this study can thus, on the basis of these findings, be answered in the affirmative: Party theoretical models developed in the West can be fruitfully used on parties in a non-Western context. This is one of the main findings of this study.

That the theoretical expectations not always are met must be seen as an opportunity to develop the models. Thus, it can for instance be noted that institutional factors, such as the legal regulations, sometimes seem to influence the linkage outcome directly, without being mediated via the linkage objective of the party, as was suggested by the institutional model.

It can further be noted that an organisation of mass integration kind (with a diverse organisation on different, particularly local, levels) indeed might be viewed as a useful tool in maximising votes. Arguably, this may particularly be the case in less individualised societies, where person-to-person contacts are still regarded as important. Orientation is thus a powerful factor in explaining linkage outcomes, but the relations existing between certain orientations and certain linkage outcomes in present day

1 In this context, it should be remembered that the mass integration party in the early 20th century Europe indeed was feared by its opponents for its vote-catching abilities. To argue that a mass integration kind of organisation furthers vote-maximisation is thus not completely contrary to the initial situation, on which the general theory is based. However, it must also be remembered that the objective of the mass integration party at that time was not primarily to catch votes, but to draw members into the party. Here it may further be noted that both the Virtue Party and the Islamic Action Front view face-to-face activities of social character as a an effective means to come close to the people in a way that circumvents the legal regulations. This fact adds an aspect to the theoretical contentions.
Western parties are not always possible to translate to Islamist parties.

Also the finding that the party-centred model can be usefully specified and that the different factors can be applied separately – and thus not necessarily have to be joined together in a cluster – contributes to the development of theory, as does the finding that the societal setting directly and on its own at times proves to be decisive for the linkage of a party, at least in practice (cp. the Virtue Party).

Even if the linkage of the Islamist parties thus can be largely explained by using different, sometimes modified, elements from the traditional party-centred and institutional theoretical models, no particular model is able to fully explain the linkage of these parties, even if the mass integration party model is closest in this respect, at least regarding the Party of Islam and the Islamic Action Front and Muslim Brotherhood in conjunction. May therefore a new model provide a better explanation of the linkage of the Islamist parties? May such a model better account for the distinct traits in the Islamist parties – like the activities of mass integration kind, which are targeted at everyone, and the organisation of largely mass integration kind? Next, I will, on the basis of the findings of this study, develop the foundations of such a new model of religious party linkage.

**Religion as a Factor Explaining Linkage: Linkage at the Command of God**

As we have seen, the orientation of the Islamist parties generally is of importance in making for a particular linkage objective and a particular linkage outcome, even if often in different ways than expected and even if other influences also are at play.\(^1\) But not only the orientation is important in this regard; also the religious ideology seems to be important. An important finding of this study is that there indeed seems to be a particular Islamist, but also a more general religious, way of organising linkage.

As we saw in Chapter 7, religious parties typically embrace an orientation similar to that of an ideal typical mass integration party, i.e. an

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\(^1\) That Christian Democratic parties are influenced by their orientation rather than the societal development is an argument pursued by van Kersbergen, 1994. In opposition to scholars who claim that Christian Democratic parties are pragmatic as a result of the societal development, in line with the catch-all party thesis, van Kersbergen claims that it is the particular orientation of the Christian Democratic parties that result in this outcome, as Christian Democracy is of a “pragmatic, opportunistic and reformist tradition” (van Kersbergen, 1994: 39).
orientation intent on reforming the society at its base. But unlike the case in the mass integration party, the linkage objective that follows from this orientation is not of mass integration kind in the religious party, but of electoral character. Religious parties want to win votes in elections. However, in order to reach this goal, the religious party does not organise as a catch-all party. Instead, it focuses both on electoral activities of campaigning character and on broad, long-term activities of educational and ideological kind, performed by a wide variety of organisational bodies on different levels. These activities are further not, as in an ideal typical mass integration party, directed at a particular group, but – for ideological reasons – at the population at large.

To become a member of the religious party, there are at least some formal requirements. Quality is important, not least for electoral reasons –

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1 Notably, the Virtue Party presents an exception to this, with its orientation of electoral character. One may discuss what factors lead to this electoral orientation in the Virtue Party. The institutional factors and the fact that parties with an obvious religious orientation are generally closed in Turkey are probably not insignificant in this context, though. We can however also trace religious traits in the orientation of the Virtue Party, even if they are well hidden.

2 As for the Islamist parties included in this study, it may be noted that the Party of Islam in Pakistan is an exception to this, as it primarily presents a linkage objective of mass integration kind. Cp. the discussion in Chapter 7 on principled and pragmatic religious parties. The Party of Islam in this context must be regarded as a principled religious party, and thus deviates somewhat from the ideal typical religious party type as here outlined, as this is primarily based on religious parties of pragmatic variety. This difference between principled and pragmatic religious parties is something that has to be further looked into in later studies. Suffice here to note that even if principled parties differ from pragmatic parties regarding primarily the emphasis in their orientation and their linkage objective, there are definite similarities between the two types in their linkage outcome, something which indeed suggests a particular impact of the religious ideology on the political linkage of religious parties.

3 Note that the suggested relations between the linkage objective of electoral kind and the mass integration features in the Virtue Party ideally and strategically, and to some extent in practice, thus are in line with this tentative model of religious party linkage. Note also that the relation between the orientation of mass integration kind, the linkage objective of catch-all kind and the mass integration traits in some aspects of the linkage outcome (at least ideally and strategically) found in the Islamic Action Front, are in line with this religious party model as well. However, contrary to this model, the Virtue Party does not present a mass integration orientation, and the Islamic Action Front does not, on its own, present a linkage of mass integration kind in all aspects of the linkage outcome. The Party of Islam presents an orientation of mass integration kind, but it does not – as it should according to the religious party model – present a linkage objective of primarily catch-all kind, even if some catch-all traits are present in the linkage objective of the Party of Islam. However, as suggested by the model, the Party of Islam presents largely mass integration party traits in its linkage outcome. As was discussed in Chapter 7, the three Islamist parties however present striking resemblances in their linkage outcomes, at least on ideal and strategic level, even if they differ on orientations and linkage objectives. I will return to this discussion shortly.
qualified members are effective vote-getters. Internal activities in the religious party are typically fairly encompassing. The member is expected to participate in broad activities of various kinds, not least activities of educational and ideological character. Members are also typically involved in the decision-making of the religious party and generally play an active role in the organisation (linkage outcome).

There thus indeed seems to be a particular religious way of organising political linkage. I argue that this particular linkage type is based on the religious ideology of the parties. That religious tenets live on in the organisation of religious parties is indicated by the Islamist parties themselves as well as by scholars, not least by scholars on the Christian Democratic parties. Here, I will elaborate somewhat tentatively on the influence of the religious ideology in making for those particular linkage traits. Further studies need to be undertaken to deepen this analysis.

First, I focus on the distinct traits in the external activities of religious parties, such as the work to reach out to the population at large, with activities of various (not least social and educational) kinds. Then, I discuss the internal organisation of religious parties. Note that I here isolate the importance of the religious ideology. Obviously, as we have seen, “real-world” religious parties are also influenced by other factors, not least institutional factors and the societal development. What I deal with here is – again – the ideal typical religious party, of either Islamist or Christian Democratic kind (examples from the Islamist and the Christian Democratic parties are here used alternately). The propositions as outlined here will later have to be tested against other real-world religious parties.

Religious Ideology as an Explanation for a Particular Political Linkage

In this context, it must first be noted that most Islamists point to religion as the reason why they are active in politics at all. Islamists are thus generally in politics to work for a better society in line with what they see as the will of God; this is their basic motivation. However, does such a general call to be in politics say anything about the particular way in which religious parties should organise? That is what I argue here. I argue that there indeed is a basis in the religious ideology for the particular organisation of linkage of religious parties.

When it comes to external activities, religious parties are characterised by their broad-ranging activities, particularly of educational and social kind, even if electoral activities of campaigning character are carried out as well.
Regarding these broad-ranging activities, it can be noted that religious parties are parties that embrace an ideology that extends beyond the purely political field, and into the social and other realms of life. Therefore, strictly political and campaigning activities are not enough; the religious outlook is much broader than that, and the religious parties pursue activities that reflect this broad outlook. According to this interpretation, the character of religion – as encompassing life in its entirety – thus makes for the wide-ranging outreach activities found in the religious parties.

But there seems to be also another foundation for these broad-ranging activities than the encompassing character of the religion per se. Indeed, in the interpretation of the religious parties themselves, it is the duty of the believers to pursue such activities, particularly welfare activities of social and educational kind.¹ To be a good Muslim or Christian, the individual should thus perform good activities and – again in the interpretation of religious parties – such activities are best performed (on societal level) through a political party. In this way, good deeds are carried out towards individuals, at the same time as the party works for a reform of society.²

In this context, it can also be noted that religious parties draw on a tradition – in Islam as well as in Christianity – of religious institutions to pursue welfare activities.³

Both these aspects of religion – its encompassing character and the

¹ This ideal, and its cross-religious application, is expressed by Fazal-Ameem (from the Pakistani Popular Movement party): “If you are a practising person, if you are a practising Christian…, you help others, because that gives you inner satisfaction. And similarly, if you are a good practising Muslim, so you like to help others” (Fazal-Ameem, 5 April, 2000). Further, in Islam, dawah (call or mission of the religion) is essential and forms the basis of Islamic style welfare and social activism. Turkish sociologist Sencer Ayata refers to this fact. According to him, “religion has to do with … redistribution, (self)sacrifice, helping poor (Ayata, 14 May, 1999, Jordanian analyst Al-Khazandar, 12 October, 1999, states the same thing). For Christian Democratic parties, van Kersbergen argues that “…is an implicitly Christian form of societal inclusion” (van Kersbergen, 1994: 44). van Kersbergen also sees social activism as “fundamentally comprising a theological dimension…in the sense that the Christian obligation to give produces a religious side to the public provision of benefits” (van Kersbergen, 1994: 44). Even if van Kersbergen here primarily discusses the rule of the state, it can be argued that the same logic – the duty to pursue good activities – underlies the organisation of the Christian Democratic parties.

² In this context, it should be noted that all Islamist parties here under study regard social activities as an offshoot of their general policies (even if that is not always the main motivation for the activities). In all parties, performance of social activities is further regarded as bringing personal satisfaction (salvation) to individual party members. Both these aspects can be considered as a reflection of the underlying religious ideology.

³ The motivations for those welfare activities are arguably the same as for welfare activities in the parties.
duty for individual believers to carry out good deeds – thus make for extensive and broad-ranging activities, of particularly social and educational character, and for a well-developed organisation on different levels.

Further, the religious ideology is an ideology with an ambition to reach all, like the faith itself: Everyone is to be invited to become a Muslim or Christian, and everyone is invited to join the party. In this sense, the religion, as well as the religious party, is universal.\(^1\)

It may thus be argued that it is the religious ideology that makes religious parties organise in a particular way, when it comes to their external activities. It may be argued that the religious commandments impose on the religious parties to organise in a particular manner, identical with the manner in which the religion (Islam or Christianity) should be preached and practiced: The religion is all-encompassing and it should be followed at all times, it is social in content, and it should be directed at everyone.\(^2\)

Therefore, the religious party should organise in a way that meets those criteria. In this sense, the religious party can be said to organise the way it does “at the command of God”.

It is interesting to observe that quite a few Islamists note that it is important to follow the commands of God, not only for the value of doing so in itself – but also for their own personal salvation. By acting in the way they believe that God wants them to act, members of religious parties aim at pleasing God. Hence, they work for the betterment of society and, at the same time, for a better position for themselves in the Hereafter.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Even if religious parties, ideal typically, direct their efforts at the population at large, some parts of the population are more likely to be receptive to the efforts of the religious parties than others. In Pakistan – and in Europe – notably the educated (lower) middle class is repeatedly referred to as being most receptive, not least as middle class individuals are generally more prone to be religious than others, according to analysts (Ziauddin, 20 February, 1999, Waseem, 7 April, 2000. Cp. also Irving, 1979: xxi). Islamist party representative Fazal-Ameem states the same thing, and, like the analysts, he claims that the same is true for all religions alike: “Generally, my feeling … and this may be true in Christianity also and in other religions also, generally, the mediocres, the middle class, they believe in these things…” (Fazal-Ameem, 5 April, 2000). In Turkey, the Islamist party has been successful primarily among the “outsiders” (Özdalga, 4 March, 2004). This particular receptiveness in particular social strata may – in practice – lead the religious party to focus its activities on these particular groups out of electoral concerns. Ideally, however, the religious party directs its activities to all.

\(^2\) These features are similar at least in the religions dealt with here. It would be an interesting topic of another study to analyse whether these traits also are to be found in religious parties based on other religions.

\(^3\) The presence of this logic is referred to also in Christian Democratic parties. Thus, Enyedi cites a newsletter from the Hungarian Christian Democratic party, which emphasises that
Efficiency concerns are however not at all absent from the decisions on what activities to pursue in religious parties. To a large extent, religious parties pursue the activities that they think are effective for making more votes, in line with their electoral linkage objective. Such activities may differ from the activities which are generally regarded to be “vote-maximising” in (recent) Western party literature, as a result of the particular societal setting at hand. In less modernised, less individualised societies, face-to-face activities with a social content indeed are arguably more effective in an electoral sense than ordinary “catch-all” activities.¹

Electoral efficiency in the religious parties is not only an objective per se, however. To be effective is also, I argue, something that is seen as being commanded by God. The religious parties believe that it is their task to work for the making of a more religious society. For them to be able to do so, they must be effective in getting votes. Thus, they should organise in the best way to maximise votes, according to the current logic of party organisation in each particular setting. Sometimes, this logic may be of mass integration character, sometimes of electoral character, depending on the societal setting in place.

Religious parties thus live under dual obligations – at the command of God. On the one hand, there is the obligation to act in line with the general tenets of the religion. On the other hand, there is the obligation to be electorally successful.

While the first obligation invariably results in linkage activities of mass integration kind and a target of catch-all kind, regardless of the societal setting in place, the second obligation may favour different kinds of activities depending on the particular setting at hand; activities of mass integration kind in some contexts, and activities of electoral kind (catch-all or clientelistic) in other contexts.

Each religious party has to solve this organisational dilemma in the particular context at hand. Sometimes, the two obligations reinforce each other, in making for activities of basically mass integration kind, with catch-all traits in the target (cp. the Party of Islam). Sometimes, the two obligations counteract each other and make for a more mixed picture (cp. the Virtue party workers should understand “that they are not working only for the sake of the Church and the world, but also for the sake of their personal salvation” (Enyedi, 1996: 381).

¹ Cp. the activities of the ideal typical mass integration party, in the early 20th century, which were regarded as so effective that other parties emulated them, hence the “contagion from the left”.
However, as one of these obligations remains constant regardless of the societal setting, i.e. the obligation to act in line with the tenets of the religion, there are reasons to expect at least some mass integration activities directed at everyone in the outreach efforts, in all religious parties.

When it comes to the internal activities of the ideal typical religious party as here outlined, these also, I argue, follow at the command of God. Typically, religious parties provide broad-ranging activities for their members and the (qualified) members are expected to participate in those activities on a regular basis.

Again, party internal activities, I argue, reflect the religion: As the religion itself, party internal activities in the religious party are rather all-encompassing and they extend beyond the purely political field. Members are important for the religious party, and the members are expected to meet at least some criteria. Even if quantity of members is important, the quality of members is not insignificant. Some devotion is required on the part of the members. This too may be a result of religious commands: The religion demands at least some commitment from the believer, as does the religious party.

In the party organisation of the Islamist parties, it can further be noted that the women are generally separated from the men and that the women’s wing organises in a parallel manner to the main organisation. This feature too has a basis in Islamic traditions.¹

As to the internal workings of the religious parties, these are – as we have seen – generally, and at least ideally, democratic. This trait as well, I argue, has a foundation in the religion. Islamist parties are quick to point to Shura (the principle of consultation) and ijma (the principle of consensus) in accounting for the internally democratic procedures. According to those principles, Muslims should consult with each other in political decisions and decisions should be reached in consensus.² At least in the interpretation of Islamist parties, then, party internal democracy is considered as being commanded by God.³

¹ In this context, it can also be noted that the position of women, for example in the internal communication of the Islamist parties, not always is clear.
² It must be noted that there are widely diverse interpretations of the true meaning of these concepts. Such interpretations may warrant everything from rule by a single individual, to rule by the whole congregation of Muslims, ummah.
³ As we saw earlier, in Chapter 7, there are also indications that Christian Democratic parties ideally are internally democratic. Not all scholars subscribe to this analysis, however.
The religious ideology thus in all aspects seems to be of vital importance for the way in which religious parties organise, internally and externally. Hence, I argue that there indeed seems to be a particular religious – Islamist as well as Christian Democratic – way of organising party linkage. This theoretical proposition has to be tried out in later studies.

In this context, it is interesting to note that both outside observers and Islamists point to the similarities between (at least some) Islamist parties, when it comes to their linkage activities, even if differences due to different contexts also are underlined. These similarities are often put down to the religious ideology.\(^1\) Further, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is often pointed to as the communal forerunner for these Islamist parties, particularly in terms of activities and organisation. Islamists often refer to the Muslim Brotherhood as a source of inspiration in this, and other, contexts.\(^2\)

It is also interesting to note that there are indications that the early Muslim Brotherhood, in turn, was influenced by activities carried out by Christians in outlining its activities – if only to counteract those Christian activities. In a study of the early Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Lia writes that the “twofold aim (of an early predecessor of the Muslim Brotherhood) was to build the moral character of the people and (to) check the missionary activities of three young women from the Christian Biblical Mission who ‘were preaching Christianity in the guise of nursing, teaching embroidery work and providing asylum to orphan children’”.\(^3\) These activities seem to have influenced Al-Banna, who later founded the Muslim Brotherhood. Religious tenets – and a willingness to achieve success – thus motivated the early activities and organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood.\(^4\)

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\(^2\) In Lia’s study of the early Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, many resemblances between the original Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist parties can be found. According to Lia, the Muslim Brotherhood thus pioneered “a new kind of Islamic organization” (Lia, 1998: 53).

\(^3\) Lia, 1998: 27. That Islamists are influenced by Christians is also referred to by Pakistani outside observer Bashir. According to him Islamists “see that the Christian missionary hospitals, churches did help Christianity …, (the) spread of Christianity”, and thus they try the same thing (Bashir, 6 April, 2000).

\(^4\) However, Islamist parties in different countries also regularly meet and exchange experiences on different issues (Rahman, 17 February, 1999, 10 April, 2000, Munir, 22
The religious ideology of religious parties thus, I argue, makes for a particular linkage outcome – a linkage outcome that is identified in religious parties of both Islamist and Christian Democratic variety. This does not mean that religious parties are not susceptible to other influences as well, such as institutions or the societal development. In large parts, however, I argue that there are reasons to claim that religious parties organise the way they do “at the command of God”.

February, 1999, Kilani, 15 November, 1999. In Turkey it is more difficult to refer to cooperation with parties in other countries, as such cooperation is illegal). Primarily, policy issues are discussed at those meetings, but organisational issues may also be raised. Lessons are thus drawn from the experiences of other Islamist parties, but each Islamist party takes care to adapt its activities to the local context. That organisational similarities between Islamist parties depend wholly on such consultations however seem unlikely. When asked whether different Islamist parties organise in similar ways, party representative of Party of Islam Rahman answers: “Not necessarily. By chance, it may be similar” (Rahman, 17 February, 1999). Instead, it is primarily the ideology that is regarded by party representatives as being similar in Islamist parties in different countries, not the organisation. Rahman underlines that organisation must be adapted to the local context (Rahman, 17 February, 1999).
Appendix 1.

Here follows the interview-guides utilised in the collection of data for this study. The interview-guides are here presented in their “ideal typical” form. By referring to the interview-guides as “ideal typical”, I wish to point out that questions were not always posed in the same order or phrased in the same way. Different things were highlighted during different interviews. In short, the “ideal typical” interview-guide was never completely followed, but it at all times structured the interviews.

Note also that what is here presented is the questions in their brief form. During the interview itself, the questions were more elaborated upon. Questions in **bold** characters are main questions, questions in ordinary characters are follow-up questions. Remarks in **bold and italicised** characters are more general remarks.

**Interview with party representatives of Islamist parties**

Interviewee’s name and position:

Date:

- Can I use a tape-recorder?
- In general, **I am interested in how the party is organised and how it works in relation to its members and voters.**
- **How is the party organised?** Locally? Regionally? Nationally? Relations between the levels? Affiliate organisations (such as women’s and youth wings, general in scope)/ancillary organisations (specific in scope)? Relations to interest organisation and other networks?
- Where does the main part of the party work (towards members and voters) take place? On what level? Frequency of activities? How spread geographically?
- **What is the smallest organisational unit in the party?** Frequency of activities? How spread geographically?
- **How are decisions taken in the party (regarding policies)?** If somebody in the party wants to change the party’s policies, **how does he act?** Who can raise such issues? What is the procedure?
- How are different bodies and the leaderships on different levels selected?
- What opportunities are there for members and voters to communicate with the leadership of the party?
- How often are meetings held at the national/local level?
- **How important are members for the party?** Why? Does the party recruit members? How?
How do you become a member of the party? What are the requirements? What are the duties of membership? How many members?

So far we have been talking about the internal workings of the party. Now let us move onto the activities of the party, internally and externally.


What kinds of activities does the party undertake in times of election? How often (in times of election)? How many people are active? Are the workers paid?

How are the election-time activities organised? Planned/administered by what organ? Carried out by what organ? What is the role of the HQ/local party organisations/affiliate organisations/ancillary organisations/interest organisations? Other networks? What is the relation between those?

What kinds of continuous activities does the party undertake (i.e. activities undertaken also in inter-election periods)? How often? How many people are active (locally, centrally)? Are the workers paid?

How are continuous, inter-election activities organised? Planned/administered by what organ? Carried out by what organ? What is the role of the HQ/local party organisations/affiliate organisations (such as women’s and youth wings, general in scope)/ancillary organisations (specific in scope)/interest organisations? What is the relation between those?

Who does the party approach in outreach activities? Everybody or specific groups? Do you go to all districts or specific ones?

Why do you approach these groups?

Is there a difference in inter-election time activities and election-time activities regarding who the party approaches? Are there special activities for members and voters respectively, or are all activities directed at everybody (i.e. also people who are not members/voters of the party)?

When the party decides what activities to pursue, what criterion is then used? On the basis of what criterion do you evaluate party activities? On the basis of what do you decide what activities to pursue? How do you reason regarding what activities to pursue?

We have already touched upon this, but I would like you to elaborate a little.

Why do you organise and act the way you do? What is the main/basic purpose or the party organisational activities?

Why have you chosen to organise and act in this way (examples from the answers) and not in another way? What are the reasons for this kind of activities?

So far, we have talked about how things are in practice. But how would the party have organised ideally? What activities should it carry out ideally?
Appendix

- What is the ultimate goal of the party? How is the party working towards this goal? (This question was not asked in all interviews)

Thank you!

Interview with outside observers
Interviewee’s name and position:
Date:

- Can I use a tape-recorder?
- (General background questions, relating for example to different social, institutional and political circumstances. These questions differed widely between the interviews).
- In general, I am interested in the organisation and activities of Turkish/Jordanian/Pakistani parties, and especially the Virtue Party/the Islamic Action Front/the Party of Islam.
- How do the different parties work towards their members and voters? How does the Virtue Party/the Islamic Action Front/the Party of Islam work in this regard? In times of election? In between elections? Campaigning activities? Political/ideological activities? Social activities? Service activities? What bodies plan and administer the different parties’ activities?
- Is there a difference between the Virtue Party/the Islamic Action Front/the Party of Islam and the other parties when it comes to activities? In times of election? In between elections?
- How do the different parties approach members? How does the Virtue Party/the Islamic Action Front/the Party of Islam approach members? Is there a difference in the approach to members between parties?
- What channels do the parties in general, and the Virtue Party/the Islamic Action Front/the Party of Islam in particular, use to connect to the people? Only party channels or also other networks? What role does patronage play in the connections the parties make with the people?
- Who do the parties target? Who does the Virtue Party/the Islamic Action Front/the Party of Islam target? All people or certain groups? Is there a difference between the parties in this regard?
- How are decisions taken in the parties? How are decisions taken in the Virtue Party/the Islamic Action Front/the Party of Islam? Is there a difference between the degree of internal democracy between the parties?
- What is, in your opinion, the aim of the party organisation and activities in the different parties? Why do the parties organise the way they do? What about the
Virtue Party/the Islamic Action Front/the Party of Islam? Is there a difference between parties in this regard?

- What is, in your opinion, the ultimate goal of the Virtue Party/the Islamic Action Front/the Party of Islam? How the party working towards this goal? (This question was not asked in all interviews)

Thank you!

Interview with representatives of other party

Interviewee’s name and position:

Date:

- Can I use a tape-recorder?
- In general, I am interested in how the party is organised and how it works in relation to its members and voters.
- How does the party work towards the members and voters? What activities are undertaken? In times of elections? In between elections? Campaigning activities? Political/ideological activities? Social activities? Service activities?
- Who decides what activities to carry out? Who carries the activities out?
- Who does the party target in its activities? Everybody or specific groups?
- How is the party organised on different levels?
- How are decisions taken in the party? What opportunities are there for members and voters to communicate with the party’s leadership?
- How are different bodies on different levels selected?
- How important are members for the party? Does the party recruit members? How?
- How do you become a member of the party? What are the requirements? What are the duties of membership? What are the members required to do? How many members?
- Why does the party work and organise the way it does?

Thank you!
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