Competition or Co-operation:
Two Logics of Governance in Organizing Public Sector Reform

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Abstract
This paper examines how and why the spread of public sector reform is shaped by competing logics that generate variation in the governance of new organizational practices at the local government level. Since the 1970s local government in Sweden have been characterized by experimenting with public sector reform and innovation, most often so by introducing institutional changes aiming to increase efficiency and legitimacy of public services and generating growth either through reforms of market competition or civic cooperation. The findings indicate that the diffusion of these kinds of new practices are not the result of mere “a-rational” imitation, but rather dependent on the institutional considerations among key decision-makers of a delimited set logically-consistent reforms and the previous experience from similar technical solutions by the organization in the past. The data comes from questionnaire surveys performed in 2005 and 2009, with the leading politicians, administrators and union representatives, with participation from all the 290 Swedish local governments.

Keywords: Public sector reform, Innovation, Governance, Market-Competition, Civic-Cooperation, Logic-consistency, Local government.

Statsvetenskapliga förbundet, Arbetsgruppen Förvaltning som business, 30 september - 1 oktober 2010.
In institutional research and new institutionalism, a main line of reasoning is that diffusion of organizational reform and innovation emerges from a single or a few successful cases, which in a second stage are in a contagious way adopted by the great bulk of organizations within a field, more because of passive imitation than rational considerations (see, for example, Tolbert & Zucker 1983, Schmidt 1986, Strang & Soule 1998, Strang & Macy 2001). Nevertheless, recent studies in institutional research have started to question this two-stage model of diffusion. The main reason is that it fails to take into account that variation of reform and innovation depend on multiple or contested logics, rooted in organizations by previous organizational solutions and strategies that are institutionally embedded from technical considerations. Thus, what at a first glance can be seen as an “a-rational” imitation in the adoption of a new form of organizational practice, may in fact depend on a restricted set of solutions of key decision-makers, leading to logic-consistent decisions strengthening organizational identity and strategy (Bourdieu 1990, Ocasio 1997, Szücs 1998, 1999, Scott, Ruef, Mendel & Caronna 2000, Thornton 2002, Lounsbury 2002, 2007).

In this paper, I examine how the spread of public sector reform is shaped by competing logics that generate variation in the governance of new organizational practices at the local government level of the public sector in Sweden. This is done empirically by looking at the logic-consistency of local governments in implementing various public sector reforms, as perceived by its key decision-makers. Over the last two decades of the twentieth century, the state was challenged by a multidisciplinary theoretical approach within the social sciences of advocating decentralized political–administrative change (Szücs & Strömberg 2006, 2009). Mainly inspired by theories of public sector competition and competiveness, New Public Management (NPM) theory advanced
recommendations of solving public efficiency problems by means of decentralization, down-sizing, lean production, and privatization (Hood 1991, Pollit 1993, Olsen 1997, Ferlie et al. 1996, McLaughlin et al. 2003). Nevertheless, recent studies of NPM have objected that many of these NPM solutions are neither fair nor efficient (Dunleavy et al. 2006, Lapsley 2009). From the viewpoint of the governance theory approach, due to the increasing complexity of the solutions to public problems, it is not the logic of competition performed by market-orientated governance that generate greater institutional performance, but rather new forms of governance based on the logic of cooperation. This is clearly indicated by the implementation of new forms of public steering and decision-making based on cooperation – especially between government and non-government actors and non-state collective action approaches – to co-ordinate policy and solve public problems (Kooiman 1993, Putnam 1993, 2002, Stoker 1998, 2000, Clark & Hoffman-Martinot 1998, Pierre, 2000, John 2001, Szücs 1995, Szücs & Strömberg 2006, 2009). Hence, it is argued that reform and innovation of public services are driven by two, contested and contradictory logics of governance at the local government level. When a government tries to improve its governance thorough public sector reform and innovation under the logic of competition, key decision-makers delimit issues and solutions to reforms based on market-orientation, contracting out and privatization of public services. However, according to the opposite stand-point, key decision-makers of a government may very well be driven by a co-operative logic of practice when trying to improve the institutional performance of public sector services, for example through the creation of new networks and more formalized forms of partnership. Although several studies, at least indirectly, make the distinction between competition and co-operation in studies of reform and innovation in the service performance of local government (see, for example, Bel & Fageda 2007), much less is

The aim with this study is to verify institutional logic-consistency on a delimited set of solutions when implementing various forms of public sector reform based on ideas of market competition and civic cooperation. I will also try to explain why some local governments have introduced systems of competition, while other local governments base their reform and innovation on systems of cooperation. The study is based on a postal survey on local government reorganization, reform and innovation sent to key decision- and policymakers at the local level, including the leading politician, administrators and union representatives of employees in local public services. The survey has been performed twice, in 2004-05 and in 2008-09 with a response rate of 67 percent. Both surveys include participation from all the 290 Swedish municipal local governments (Szücs & Hemström 2010).

The theoretical explanations to public sector reform and innovation are usually divided into three general categories: instrumental, ideological and structural. In a study of the degree of privatization in all Finnish local governments it was shown that instrumental and structural explanations overpowered ideological or political considerations (Granqvist 1997). In this paper, I will in a first step test the power of instrumental structural considerations and path dependency (North 1990, Szücs & Strömberg 2006), by looking at the correlation between the current practice of various types of public
sector reform governance leaning towards either market competition or co-operation, as well as previous technical solutions of public sector reform of a local government. Thus, the paper is so far restricted to test hypotheses about local governments being logic-consistent in their implementation of public sector reform geared toward governance based on logics of market competition and civil society cooperation. Naturally, in a next step, and beyond the analysis of this paper, it will be tested to what such underlying logics of governance are determined by ideological differences or “ideo-logics,” based on the political power structure in local government. In the next section I will list the most important types of public sector reform based on the logics of competition and co-operation.

**TYPES OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND INNOVATION**

Public sector reform today includes a whole range of models performed by local government introduced and performed to in order to improve local well-being through service delivery and economic growth.

**Market-oriented approach to government and privatization generally**

The logic of competition through market-orientation governance among local governments in Sweden has gradually increased from the early 1990s and onwards. A major shift in this direction happened after the 1991 elections, when coalitions based on bourgeois parties came to power in many local governments for the first time after the implementation of the new Swedish local system, established in the early 1980s (Strömberg & Westerståhl 1983, 1984, Szücs 1993, 1995, Szücs & Strömberg 2009). Recently, the introduction of a new law called LOV (lagen om valfrihetssystem), from
the first of January 2009 local and regional governments are encouraged to implement systems based on the idea of competition between public and private service providers.

**Enabling citizen authority (voucher systems)**

Since the early 1990s, Swedish local governments, particularly in larger municipalities and cities, have introduced voucher systems with the aim to enable more citizen authority, by giving the parents a voucher in order to provide for the option to choose the school for their children. At the same time, the system of free schools was introduced in Sweden (in part based on the Danish model) which opened up a market for competition between public and private schools (Jarl & Rönnberg 2010).

**Provides both public and private alternatives**

By the introduction of LOV in 2009, systems opening up for competition in which local governments are able to offer both public and private alternatives are being introduced in the areas of social services and health care.

**Purchases from private service providers**

An increasing proportion of local government expenditures is provided by non-public or private organizations. Local government expenditures for buying services from non-public providers amounted to 15 percent of local governments’ total expenditures for running their services in 2008. The largest proportion comes from elder care, followed by secondary school, primary school and preschool daycare. The increase in local government expenditures to private service providers were 12 percent units in both 2006 and 2007. However, this gradual increase in local governments’ expenditure of private services was evident also before the 2006 elections and bourgeois party rule in
many local governments (when many local governments still were dominated by the Social Democrats): the increase of private service providers of local government expenditures in 2005 was 10 percent (SCB 2009). Thus, the competition between service providers has increased gradually but steadily as shown by the rising level of local government expenditures for running different public services.

**Systems enabling local residents to take part in public sector work**

Systems that enable citizens in the community to take part in the implementation of public sector services (system för brukarmedverkan), has quite a long tradition in Sweden. Today there are many examples of such councils (brukarråd) where parents/relatives have some sort of influence over the work in schools, elder care and health care (see, for example Montin 2004, Jarl 2010).

**Individuals in voluntary or non-paid work for local government**

Local governments are increasingly using voluntary workers in order to implement different public sector services. This kind work is most often unpaid, although there are also cases when relatives are getting some sort of pay, for example when elder care is carried out at home or in a similar environment (anhörigmedverkan).

**Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) performing public services**

The role of NGOs in performing services in cooperation with local government has increased, especially within the field of social services and aid to poor people (Johansson 2001, Lindgren 2001).
**Governmental cooperation with university/higher educational institutions**

Local and regional government levels are today increasingly involved in some sort of cooperation with universities and higher educational institutions. This kind of cooperation mostly, but not only, concerns cities with their own university (Zaring, Szücs & Marton 2008).

**Governmental cooperation with business and industry**

Local and regional cooperation with business and industry has a longer tradition than that with higher educational institutions. From the 1980s and onwards, many local governments support and cooperate with business and industry in order to effect local growth (see, for example, Pierre 1992, Szücs & Strömberg 2009).

**HOW AND WHY REFORM AND INNOVATION SPREAD: HYPOTHESES**

In this paper, I propose that the diffusion of reform and innovation within the local public sector are spread, not because of “a-rational” imitation from other organizations. Rather, I assume that key decision- and policy makers of local government report a delimited set of logically consistent reforms that has evolved in their own community, which are based previous technical considerations of reform in the community. In line with this reasoning, I propose to test the following three hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1. Local governments with privatized public services are more likely to have other market solutions which include voucher systems and separately performed services, as well as internal and external systems of buying private sector services.*
Hypothesis 2. Local governments with systems for making inhabitants taking part in public sector work are more likely to have voluntary/non-paid workers, Non-Government Organizations that perform public services, as well as cooperation with institutions of industry and higher education.

Hypothesis 3. Local governments with a higher level of public sector reform in accordance with a certain logic are more likely to have an institutional embeddedness of such technical considerations in the past.

QUANTITATIVE DATA, METHODS, AND ANALYSIS

The indicators of the construct and variables are based on data collected in a survey of key decision-makers in all Swedish municipalities in 2004-2005 and 2008-2009 (only data from the second take was used for this article). The questionnaire was sent to a sample of 1,996 persons with a status as the leading politician (the chairman of the executive council), administrators (chief administrative official, managers (in HR, old age care, school/preschool), and union representatives (blue collar and white collar representatives). The response rate was 67 percent (1,342) with at least one respondent from all 290 local governments. The questionnaire has been approved by The Swedish Association of Local and Regional Authorities (SALAR, Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting, SKL)

The nine manifest variables (see indicators below in the dependent variables section) are based on the following question in the questionnaire: “A number of new organizational forms, programs and models have been introduced by many local governments in
Sweden. Which organizational forms are present in your municipality today, or were present in the past?"

The coding of the variables ranges between 100 (i.e., the respondent say that the suggested public sector reform is in practice today within his or her local government, 67 (i.e., the respondent say that the suggested public sector reform previously had been in practice within his or her local government), 33 (i.e., the respondent say that the suggested public sector reform have been discussed within his or her local government), and 0 (i.e., respondent say that the suggested public sector reform have not been discussed within his or her local government). These data have been aggregated to the local government level to reflect the average perception of each of the 290 municipality local governments about whether or not each of the nine selected public sector reforms are in practice.

Previous studies of local public sector reform in Sweden came to quite different results, most probably because only one key person was asked about whether a local government had implemented a new organizational form or not. By asking several key political, administrative and union leaders from each local government about this information, the chance of getting an accurate answer increases (Bäck 2000:100). Further, by adding information about whether the suggested public sector reform has been in practice before, or at least has been discussed to be implemented, increases the level of information into an hierarchy going from having it today, have had it, or at least have discussed it. Finally, by getting the aggregate average perception from each local government, the analysis can be performed on the ordinal scale level.
Dependent variables

**Indicators of institutionalized competition logic in local government reform:**
(1) Market-oriented approach to government reform (privatization generally of a local government); (2) enabling citizen authority (voucher systems); (3) provides both public and private alternatives; (4) purchase from private service providers.

**Indicators of institutionalized cooperation logic in local government reform:**
(1) Cooperation-oriented approach to government (systems of citizen participation in local government work); (2) Voluntary /non-paid work; (3) NGOs in public sector work; (4) government cooperation with university/higher educational institutions; (5) government cooperation with business and industry.

Independent variables

**Embeddedness of technical solutions in the past**
1) Privatization 1993-95 is a measure where a higher index value indicates a higher degree of privatization in local government services 1993-95. Index composed of each municipality’s average ranking based on five indicators: (1) Percent privately employed in local government services (2) Percent pupils in privately run schools (3) Amount of non-public sector institutionalized elder care (4) Amount of non-public sector arranged child care. Source: Kfakta 2007 (Department of Political Science, Lund University);
2) Privately performed pre-school services 1997 is a measure (Source: Kfakta 2007, Department of Political Science, Lund University);

3) Privately performed pre-school services 2002 is a measure (Source: Kfakta 2007, Department of Political Science, Lund University);


RESULTS

In Table 1 it is shown that the suggested public sector reforms fall into the two hypothesized categories. According to Factor 1 in the table, local governments with privatized public services are more likely to have other market solutions which include voucher systems and separately performed services, as well as internal and external systems of buying private sector services. Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected because there is a logic-consistency on sharing a delimited set of public sector reforms in the governance aiming at market-orientation and competition.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

As shown in Table 2, the inter-correlation estimates of the construct are high, and so is the reliability measure (.79), well above the rule of thumb. According to Factor 2 in the same table (Table 1), local governments with systems for making inhabitants taking part in public sector work are more likely to have voluntary/non-paid workers, Non-Government Organizations that perform public services, as well as cooperation with
institutions of industry and higher education. Hence, Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected because of a logic-consistency on sharing a delimited set of public sector reforms aiming at civic-society orientated cooperation governance. The correlation estimates of the cooperation construct shown in Table 3 are all above well or fairly above 0.30 and the reliability measure is quite high at 0.78.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

These findings do not support the pattern of a random, “a-rational” and contagious organizational behavior of imitation in the diffusion of public sector reform. Rather, the findings point in the direction of organizations within a field (local governments) that implement reforms in a logic-consistent behavior based on a delimited set of alternatives founded on two contested principles of organization: competition or cooperation. Thus, the answer to the “how-question” in this paper is that the spread of public sector reform is shaped by different principles that generate a systematic and logic-consistent variation in the governance of new organizational practices.

Nevertheless, as seen in Table 1, these two logics of governance in organizing public sector reform are not totally separate. The correlation between the two factors is 0.37, which means that some of these local governments practice a dual logic of governance reform that includes both strong elements of competition and cooperation.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Finally, in line with recent findings from recent institutional research, the results in Table 4 show that local governments with a higher level of public sector reform are
more likely to have an institutional embeddedness of quite similar technical practices in the past. In particular this is shown in relation to the logic of market-competition. Local governments with a higher current level of market/competition-orientated public sector reform logic in general had significantly more developed practice of privatization as far as over 15 years ago. The correlation between the 1993-1995 privatization measure and the 2008-2009 market competition scale is quite high at 0.66.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

These findings verify Hypothesis 3. Thus, the answer to the “why-question” of this paper is that the logic-consistent variation in the governance of new organizational practices (competition-market-orientation) is to a great deal determined by previous practices with privatization and public choice implemented by the local government in question.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this paper, I examined how and why the spread of public sector reform is shaped by competing logics that generate variation in the governance of new organizational practices at the local government level. Since the 1970s local government in Sweden have been characterized by experimenting with public sector reform and innovation, most often so by introducing institutional changes aiming to increase efficiency and legitimacy of public services and generating growth thorough either reforms of market competition or civic cooperation. According to recent findings within institutional research, the diffusion of these kinds of new practices are not the result of mere “a-rational” imitation, but rather dependent on the institutional considerations among key
decision-makers of a delimited set logically-consistent reforms and the previous experience from similar technical solutions by the organization. The findings support the three stipulated hypothesis about two separate and logic-consistent dimensions of public sector reform in local government as reported by its key decision- and policy-makers. Thus, the findings do not support a random, “a-rational” and contagious organizational behavior of imitation in the diffusion of public sector reform. Instead, local governments implement reforms in a logic-consistent behavior based on a delimited set of alternatives founded on two contested principles of organization: competition or cooperation. Nevertheless, these two logics of practice are not totally separated. Some local governments practice a dual logic of governance that includes both market competition and civic cooperation. Finally, it is shown that this logic-consistent variation in the governance of new organizational practices (competition/market-orientation) to a great deal harkens back to previous practices with privatization and public choice.

This last finding indicate support for a path dependency pattern of local government (see, for example, also Szücs & Strömberg 2006) in trying to explain logic-consistency behind the governance of current public sector reform in the in local government. Nevertheless, a first limitation of my research so far is that less is still known about the power of ideological, instrumental and structural explanations in the diffusion of public sector reform. In the next step, hence, I will test to what extent such underlying logics of diffusion in governance reform are determined by structural, instrumental or ideological differences. This kind of research need analyses based on both quantitative data as well as qualitative data in order to survey the roots of local governance reform based on competition or cooperation. A second limitation is that less still is known about the
efficiency and legitimacy these competing logics of governance reform in the relation to local government performance. For future research, it would be great to be able to evaluate the impact of these competition and cooperation driven reforms in relation to the performance of local government, looking at both internal service impact as well as external growth effects.
REFERENCES


### Tables

**Table 1. Dimensionality of new organizational forms in governing public sector services (factor loadings sorted by size, oblique rotation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators: New forms of organizing local government</th>
<th>Factor 1 Competitive solutions</th>
<th>Factor 2 Cooperative solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Privatized public services</td>
<td><strong>0.84</strong></td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voucher systems (for example, school vouchers)</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buying private sector services</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separately performed services (for example independent schools/separate preschools)</td>
<td><strong>0.68</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orderer-performer boards</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental cooperation with business and industry</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td><strong>0.88</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental cooperation with university/higher educational institutions</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td><strong>0.78</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs Performing Public Services</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td><strong>0.69</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary/non-paid workers</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td><strong>0.59</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems for inhabitants taking part in public sector work</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td><strong>0.54</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance explained (%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factor loadings for the community data after an oblique rotation over 0.50 in bold type. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.82. Correlation between factors = 0.37.
Table 2. Reliability analysis of the market-competition scale (Pearson Correlation, Chrombach’s Alpha)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Privatized public services</th>
<th>Voucher systems</th>
<th>Buying private sector services</th>
<th>Separately performed services</th>
<th>Orderer-performer boards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Privatized public services</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voucher systems</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buying private sector services</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private performed services</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orderer-performer boards</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Comment*: Alpha = 0.79 (N=290)
Table 3. Reliability analysis of the civic-cooperation scale (Correlation, Chrombach’s Alpha)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Governmental cooperation with business/industry</th>
<th>Governmental cooperation with university/HEI</th>
<th>NGOs Performing Public Services</th>
<th>Voluntary/non-paid workers</th>
<th>Systems for inhabitants taking part in public sector work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governmental cooperation with business/industry</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental cooperation with university/HEI</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs Performing Public Services</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary/non-paid workers</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems for inhabitants taking part in public sector work</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: Alpha = 0.78 (N=290)
Table 4. Correlation of the competition and cooperation indices with other indices measuring local governments’ market and cooperative reform (Pearson Correlations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Market-Competition</th>
<th>Civic-Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of public choice 2005*</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately performed pre-school services 2002 **</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately performed pre-school services 1997 **</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization 1993-95 ***</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** Source: Kfakta 2007 (Department of Political Science, Lund University)

*** A higher index value indicates a higher degree of privatization in local government services 1993-95. Index composed of each municipality’s average ranking based on five indicators: (1) Percent privately employed in local government services (2) Percent pupils in privately run schools (3) Amount of non-public sector social care in ordinary homes (4) Amount of non-public sector institutionalized elder care (5) Amount of children (age 1-12) in non-public sector arranged child care. Source: Kfakta 2007 (Department of Political Science, Lund University).
## APPENDIX

**Table 1 in Swedish.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indikatorer: Nya organisations- och samverkansformer, program och modeller</th>
<th>Faktor 1 Marknad/Konkurrens</th>
<th>Faktor 2 Samhälle/Samverkan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Privatiserade verksamheter</td>
<td><strong>0.84</strong></td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valfrihetssystem (t ex skolpeng)</td>
<td><strong>0.79</strong></td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Köp av tjänster från privat sektor</td>
<td><strong>0.70</strong></td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enskild bidragsfinansierad verksamhet (t ex fristående skolor /enskilda förskolor)</td>
<td><strong>0.68</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beställar-utförarnämnder</td>
<td><strong>0.62</strong></td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovationssambete med näringsliv</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td><strong>0.88</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovationssambete med universitet</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td><strong>0.78</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frivilligorganisationer som utför kommunal service</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td><strong>0.69</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volontärer/frivilligarbetare</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td><strong>0.59</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System för brukarmedverkan</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td><strong>0.54</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Variance explained (%)**

| 39 | 16 |

Factor loadings for the community data after an oblique rotation over 0.50 in bold type. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.82. Correlation between factors = 0.37.