Dimensions of Citizenship.
European Integration Policies from a Scandinavian Perspective

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Introduction

During recent decades, citizenship and integration policies in the European countries have been undergoing considerable changes. These policy processes have frequently been diagnosed as representing a retreat from multiculturalism towards assimilation (Joppke 2004; Entzinger 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005). Especially national policies aimed at non-European immigrants are said to have largely abandoned the idea of integration as a mutual process, instead emphasizing immigrants’ obligation to adapt to their new country (Wright 2008). This chapter aims at discussing the current “retreat from multiculturalism” by paying special attention to Sweden. My argument is that the Swedish case helps us to distinguish between two different aspects of the ongoing integration policy change throughout Europe, and therefore should contribute to a more nuanced account of current policy trends.

The first aspect has to do with the state’s approach to ethnic minorities. A distinctive feature of the current trend is a critical attitude towards previous multicultural ambitions intended to affirm and support immigrants’ ethnic affiliations. Countries that used to be proponents of a multicultural policy, such as the Netherlands and Great Britain, have largely abandoned those ambitions, now insisting on a policy of civic integration. In this chapter, I argue that, in this regard, Sweden must be considered a representative case of the current trend—or even a pioneer. Already in the 1980s, Sweden backed away from the previous goal to support immigrants as minorities, instead adhering to a policy of integration focusing on individual rights.

The second aspect of the present policy developments has to do with the aim to strengthen the national identity in the host country. One distinctive feature here is a new occupation with formulating mandatory courses, assessments and requirements in order to ensure that new arrivals and other non-citizens acquire certain skills (such as proficiency in the
majority language) and norms that are regarded as fundamental to the national identity. In other words, current civic integration reforms across Europe share a common focus on obligation, and a reverse de-emphasis on rights (Joppke 2007a, 14). Concerning this aspect, however, Sweden constitutes what might be regarded as an exception, or a deviant case. In contrast with several other European countries, Sweden has introduced neither formal language requirements nor other tests of knowledge as conditions for naturalization. Furthermore, there is no obligatory requirement for new arrivals to participate in particular introduction programmes (Djuve and Kavli 2007; Jacobs and Rea 2007).

The theoretical aim of this chapter is to sketch out a conceptual framework that can help us interpret and evaluate the current international trends in integration policies. Empirically I give an account of the integration policy developments in Sweden, with some comparative outlooks to the other Scandinavian countries.

In the theoretical part of the chapter, I present two ideal-typical conceptual frameworks. The first model highlights the distinction between integration policies aiming at civic integration and multiculturalism, respectively. The second model elaborates the distinction between integration logics based on notions of rights and duties. In the empirical part of the chapter, I give an account of how Swedish integration policy developments from the 1970s up to today can be analysed with reference to the suggested conceptual frameworks and ideal types. In a final section, I draw some conclusions based on my findings.

**Two dimensions of integration**

Over the past two decades, there has been an ongoing academic discussion on how to theoretically capture variations in citizenship and integration policies. Rogers Brubaker’s agenda-setting work *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (1992) argued that civic and universal principles of territory (*jus solis*) and ethno-cultural conceptions of “blood” (*jus sanguinis*) should be understood in terms of different understandings of nationhood. Brubaker’s distinction gave rise to an increase in comparative work in ethnic relations in the 1990s. However, it was also criticized for ignoring the cultural rights dimension that had been central to the academic and political discussion on multiculturalism (cf. Koopmans and Statham 2000, 19). Attempts were therefore made to integrate the principles of formal citizenship rules with those of cultural rights. Most renowned in this regard is Stephen Castles’ (1995) typology of three distinct citizenship models: a differentialist model, an assimilationist
model and a multicultural model. The *differentialist model*, exemplified with the former German “guest worker” policies, denies migrants and their descendants’ access to the political community or makes it extremely difficult for them to become naturalized. The *assimilationist model* and the *multicultural model* both provide easy access to formal citizenship, but represent diametrically different approaches to cultural diversity. While the assimilationist model insists on the adaptation of a set of general rules, the multicultural model advocates the granting of group rights for cultural minorities. Hence, the assimilationist model corresponds to the argument that access to *civic rights and duties* is enough for guaranteeing integration; ethnicity should in any case not be involved in public policy, but be reserved for the private sphere (cf. Barry 2001). The multicultural model, on the other hand, relates to the reasoning that some sort of public “recognition” of the citizens’ *ethnic and cultural identities* is a precondition for successful integration, in addition to individuals’ equal access to rights and duties (cf. Kymlicka 1995).

Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (2000) suggest a more comprehensive way of combining the question of citizenship with that of approaches to cultural diversity. They designed a two-dimensional analytical framework where the vertical axis concerns formal basis of citizenship, ranging from “ethno-cultural” to “civic-territorial”, while the horizontal axis represents “cultural obligations tied to citizenship”, ranging from “cultural monism” to “cultural pluralism”. Koopmans and Statham’s model represents an important development from previous, mainly unidimensional, accounts of policy variations, and it has been widely used by ethnic relations scholars. However, I find their own application of the model to some extent inconsistent. More precisely, I hold that Koopmans and Statham confound two dimensions and that this may lead to misjudgements, not least in an analysis of ongoing policy trends throughout Europe. My point can be explained in relation to the authors’ own account of the horizontal dimension in their framework (i.e., the one labeled “cultural obligations tied to citizenship”):

*Here, the continuum runs from conceptions of citizenship that insist on conformity to a single cultural model that is to be shared by all citizens, to culturally plural conceptions, which seek to retain, or even stimulate cultural heterogeneity and allow their subjects to follow a variety of cultural patterns (Koopmans and Statham 2000, 20–21).*

The quote reveals that in fact the authors include *two different dimensions* under the described axis. The first concerns whether the state takes a passive or active approach as regards *recognition* of ethnic diversity. The
second has to do with whether or not the state tolerates cultural diversity. However, the matter of tolerance should rather be regarded as part of the vertical dimension—related to conceptions of citizenship in ethnic or civic terms. Clearly, if states do not “allow their subjects to follow a variety of cultural patterns”, this may indicate that they are moving towards a typically ethnic notion of national identity (cf. Carens 2000, 139). Hence, what Koopmans and Statham fail to realize is that requirements of cultural assimilation and tolerance of cultural diversity should be analysed along the vertical, not the horizontal, dimension of the proposed model.

The same critical argument holds true in relation to the slightly modified version of the model that Koopmans et al. presented in 2005. Here the authors make a distinction between the dimensions “equality of individual access” and “cultural difference and group rights”. The first of these dimensions concerns “to what extent access to citizenship rights is color-blind in the sense that every legal resident in the state’s territory has access to equal citizenship rights, regardless of his or her race, ethnicity, or cultural background” (Koopmans et al. 2005, 34). The second dimension “cultural difference and group rights” again conflates the question of cultural group rights with that of requirements of cultural assimilation:

Two positions regarding differential rights can be distinguished. First the majority society may require assimilation to dominant cultural standards. The second, multicultural position is that such a privileging of the majority culture cannot be normatively justified, and therefore measures are necessary to help minority groups to preserve their language, culture, and religion and to combat disadvantages they suffer on the basis of their cultural or religious identity (Koopmans et al. 2005, 51).

Hence, the authors regard cultural demands for naturalization as an indication of to what extent a country is applying multicultural group rights. The choice not to regard cultural requirements as indicators on the vertical dimension “equality of individual access” stands out as even more remarkable because the authors include several other criteria for nationality acquisition under that dimension, namely years of residence, welfare dependence, facilitated access for second-generation immigrants, dual citizenship, the absence of special rights for “co-ethnics”, and naturalization rates (Koopmans et al. 2005, 35).

According to the reasoning of Koopmans et al., any sharpening of the cultural obligations in a country’s naturalization rules should be interpreted as a move away from the multicultural embracing of group rights towards an attitude of passive tolerance, typical of the position of civic integration. As I will try to make clear in the following, the new
focus on integration tests should rather be analysed along the dimension of equal access to individual rights, potentially implying a move towards a more communitarian (and illiberal) understanding of citizenship and national identity as *ethnos*.

In the following, I present a revised version of the framework proposed by Koopmans et al. that better captures the ongoing trends (Figure 2.1). The horizontal axis ranges from passive to active state approaches to ethno-cultural diversity. The vertical axis represents conceptions of the national community in which the continuum runs from *ethnos* to *demos*. The latter dichotomy has been criticized for being too simplistic, with its argument that a de-ethnicized and purely “civic” notion of the nation is impossible (cf. Yack 1999). Agreeing with this, my argument is that states in today’s multicultural societies are confronted with a constant tension between ethnos and demos (Borevi 2002). Hence, civic integration and multiculturalism may intend to promote integration to what is held to be a “civic” community of citizens. However, when it comes to their effects, both policy models inevitably run the risk of ending up in the upper part of the figure, representing an illiberal notion of the nation as an ethnic community. This, in turn, is due to the dividing line between ethnos and demos being constantly blurred. In other words, the ideal types of “ethnic assimilation” and “ethnic segregation”, respectively, comprise some sort of “worst-case scenarios” for any policy adhering to a liberal democratic ideal.

A policy of assimilation to an ethnically defined national culture (Ideal Type 1 in the figure) was historically applied in the founding of the nation-states. When ethnos and demos were assumed to presuppose each other (i.e., the principle of “one people one nation”), the state attempted to counteract diversity within the population, trying to make people adjust to what was held to be the homogeneous national culture. In Sweden, for
example, the Sami minority in the northern part of the country has historically been exposed to rather tough assimilation attempts, justified by the common goal of national cohesion (Mörkenstam 1999). A second diametrically opposed strategy can be identified, stemming from the same conception of ethnic nationalism, namely a policy of ethnic segregation (Ideal Type 2 in the figure). Again the attitudes towards the Sami minority in Sweden provide an illustrative example. During certain periods of time, the Swedish government has understood the Sami population to be genuinely different from Swedes, thus regarding assimilation as an impossible goal. The attitude was instead guided by a segregationist strategy, intending to maintain the identity of the Sami minority intact but marginalized from the rest of society, e.g. by withholding from Sami children the possibility of education in the Swedish language (Mörkenstam 1999).

It is difficult to see how either of the above two strategies could be justified from a liberal democratic point of view. An explicitly ethnic notion of the national community is inherently in conflict with fundamental liberal democratic principles, such as individual integrity, freedom of thought and expression or freedom of religion. Similarly it sharply contrasts with the liberal view that the state ought to be neutral with respect to citizens’ different identities or conceptions of the good. According to this view, the state has no business supporting or opposing any particular identity or culture—but should apply a hands-off approach to culture. Therefore civic integration and multiculturalism (Ideal Types 3 and 4 in the figure) do not differ as regards the conception of national unity: in principle they both take as their point of departure the notion of a community of citizens—a demos. What distinguishes them is instead how such a community should be achieved: through passive tolerance of the ethnic affiliations of the inhabitants (civic integration) or through active promotion of such affiliations (multiculturalism).

When analysing the ongoing policy development in Europe, it is instructive to distinguish between the two dimensions sketched out in Figure 2.1. The first aspect of the policy trend suggests that there is a general movement away from a multicultural approach of actively promoting ethnic diversity (Ideal Type 4) towards an attitude of passive tolerance, typical of the position of civic integration (Ideal Type 3). The arguments put forward in this policy process reflect criticism that has been levelled at multiculturalism in theoretical terms. The group-differentiated measures advocated by multicultural policies have been rejected as potentially harmful to the goal of integration into the politically defined demos. It has been argued that multicultural policies stem from a static,
simplistic and essential notion of culture, which exaggerates both the differences between cultures and the internal homogeneity within a majority culture (Benhabib 2002). Some scholars have contended that support for cultural minorities might imply violation of individual rights, e.g. discrimination of women (Okin 1999). Others have claimed that support for cultural minorities happens at the expense of resources to counteract socio-economic disadvantages and that multicultural policies may work to stigmatize—thus reinforcing the differences between different groups (Barry 2001; cf. Banting and Kymlicka 2006). All in all, critical remarks like these boil down to the general argument that a policy of multiculturalism is foredoomed to end up in the illiberal position of ethnic segregation (Ideal Type 2). As I will demonstrate shortly, during the period from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, Sweden made a journey from the position of multiculturalism to that of civic integration, and theoretical arguments such as those mentioned above were present in the debate leading up to the policy change.

The second aspect of the current European integration policy trend concerns the widespread practice of introducing different types of tests as a condition for obtaining a residence permit or achieving citizenship status. These measures signal a new engagement in promoting national identity that corresponds to the vertical dimension in Figure 2.1. This raises the question of whether tests and requirements should be regarded as legitimate based on a liberal democratic notion of the nation as demos, or whether they represent an improper move towards the conception of the nation as ethnos. This issue has recently provoked heated academic debate (see, e.g., Bauböck and Joppke 2010). Those who welcome the current reforms claim that courses and tests are benign or “harmless” forms of assimilation requirements, as they contribute to securing fundamental liberal principles by ensuring that new arrivals and other non-citizens know about and accept principles such as tolerance, human rights, and equality (Joppke 2004; Hansen 2010; Koopmans 2010). Others see this

1 E.g., the Netherlands has extended the obligation to pass an integration exam from “newcomers” (nieuwkomers) to “oldcomers” (oudkomers), which includes all foreigners from non-EU countries regardless of their time of residence in the Netherlands, except if they have followed at least eight years of primary or secondary education in the Netherlands or hold a diploma or certificate from a Dutch educational institute. Furthermore “spiritual counsellors” (geestelijke bedienaren), working for a religion or place of worship (e.g., imams), are defined as specific target groups for the mandatory integration exam (Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 2010).
trend as more troubling, claiming that it leads to de facto ethnic exclusion. Even to the extent that the reforms may be viewed as promoting assimilation to “general” liberal principles, they nevertheless function as excluding, because they are only directed towards non-European immigrants, who are consequently referred to and stigmatized as representatives of non-liberal values (Phillips 2007; Carens 2010; Carrera 2006).

We will return to the question of whether or not the current trend of imposing integration tests and requirements should be interpreted as a move towards an ethnic understanding of the nation. At this stage, I merely wish to stress that the “integration tests” in question should be analysed precisely along this dimension, and not the horizontal one concerning the state’s approach to the diverse ethnic affiliations within the population. For the sake of clarity, it is important to distinguish between the two aspects of the current integration policy developments that we have now touched upon—the retreat from multicultural recognition of ethnic groups, on the one hand, and the formulation of new conditions for achieving certain rights, on the other.

Rights versus duties

Another theoretical approach that will help us understand the current trend of integration policies in Europe is the distinction between two opposing integration logics—one stressing the extension of individual rights, the other emphasizing demands on individuals to fulfil certain duties.

T. H. Marshall’s influential citizenship theory from 1950 advocates rights as the main vehicle to enhance integration in society. Every individual’s access to equal civil, political and social rights is the fundamental prerequisite for realizing the goal of integration in liberal democracies. Indeed Marshall discusses responsibilities too, emphasizing that there has to be an interplay between rights and duties. Education, for example, is defined as both a right and a duty. In the same fashion, the possession of citizenship rights implies a duty (although vaguely defined) “to live the life of a good citizen” (Marshall 1950, 11). Hence, it would be wrong to see Marshall’s theory as promoting an ideal of passive, in contrast to active, citizenship or as a one-eyed celebration of rights that
does not take into account obligations (Johansson and Hvinden 2007, 42; Goul Andersen 2005, 80).\(^2\)

Still it is obvious that in Marshall’s theory the rights tend to come before the duties. Access to certain rights is fundamentally seen as a precondition for a person’s capacity to fulfil certain duties, not the other way around. Civil, political and social rights are interdependent; without one of them, the other two cannot be fully realized. Social rights in particular play a crucial role in this respect. According to Marshall, they work like a kind of tool the individual needs to make use of the other rights: “The right of freedom of speech has little real substance if, from lack of education, you have nothing to say worth saying, and no means of making yourself heard if you say it” (Marshall 1950, 35). But it also means that one cannot expect individuals to practice the duty “to live the life of a good citizen” without first being in the possession of certain fundamental rights. Furthermore, besides playing a crucial role in enabling individuals to be “good citizens”, the extension of rights is important to the individual’s status in relation to the collective (i.e., the rest of the citizenry). Access to a common bundle of social rights is required if a person is to regard herself and be regarded by others—as a full and legitimate citizen (cf. Bengtsson, this volume). The rights thereby provide the necessary integrative “glue” for the whole society.

The recent trends in European integration policies towards promoting a more “active citizenship” with a stronger focus on citizens’ duties and responsibilities presuppose a certain logic of integration that is the opposite of Marshall’s, as the relationship between rights and duties is reversed. Rather than regarding access to rights as a condition for the fulfilment of certain responsibilities attached to citizenship, the fulfilment of certain duties is defined as a condition for achieving rights. Contrary to the Marshallian position, duties come before rights. First, the individual has to fulfil certain obligations in order to show that she merits the rights, not the other way around.

To conclude, there are two ideal-typical positions with reference to how the aim of integration is best pursued—one that stresses rights, another

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\(^2\) As Johansson and Hvinden (2007, 42) observe, for some critics Marshall seems to have served as “the straw man” for a more general criticism of how generous redistributive welfare arrangements, especially social benefits systems, supposedly had an adverse effect on citizens’ attitudes towards self-reliance, paid work, and responsibility for personal welfare and risk protection.
that emphasizes duties. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, one may distinguish a “rights-line” from a “duty-line”. These ideal types are characterized by giving opposite answers to three main questions: (1) Where does the main responsibility for achieving goals lie—with society (as the rights-line would argue) or with the individual (which would be the typical answer from the duty-line)? (2) What type of measures are seen as the most efficient way to promote the goals—those focusing on providing the individual with adequate resources (rights-line) or those introducing incentives to increase the individual’s motivation (duty-line)? (3) What is regarded as most important in attaining public legitimacy for the policies—formulating more comprehensive and universal systems with general rules, in order to avoid the negative side effects of stigmatization and individual control (rights-line), or opting for more selective policies, defining and supervising strict conditions and eligibility rules in order to guarantee that social resources only go to people who deserve them (duty-line)?

Next, I will apply the models in Figure 2.1 and 2.2 in an analysis of Swedish integration policy. Sweden is clearly characterized by welfare state arrangements that embrace the ideal type of a “rights-line”, as

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3 These ideal-typical positions roughly correspond to the distinction between universal welfare policies, where benefits and services are intended to cover the entire population on the basis of uniform rules, and selective (or residual) welfare policies that target assistance only to the economically weakest part of the population, i.e. those considered to be the “truly needy” (see Titmuss 1968; Esping-Andersen 1990; Rothstein 1998).
presented above. Furthermore, the country has won an international reputation as a proponent of one of the most elaborated multicultural policies in the European context. In the next section, we will see how during the 1980s Sweden underwent a change along the horizontal dimension in Figure 2.1, but adhered to the ideal typical rights-line in Figure 2.2.

The Swedish journey from multiculturalism to civic integration

After World War II and up to the beginning of the 1970s, immigrants who arrived to Sweden were predominantly labour-market migrants. In the late 1960s, a specific integration policy concerning immigrants started to develop. Even before that, however, the foreign labour force was generally included in the universal welfare programmes on an equal footing with the rest of the population. Hence, Sweden never came near the type of guest worker policies applied in, for example, Germany. In 1968, the government officially declared that policies towards immigrants should be guided by the goal of equality. At the same time, a regulation of immigration was introduced. The regulation was regarded as a prerequisite for upholding the principle of equality. Immigration had to be accommodated to the capacity of society to provide immigrants with employment, housing, social care and education on the same terms as the rest of the population (Government bill 1968, 142).

Referring to the previous discussion about the relationship between rights and duties, one can say that in principle the immigration regulation implied that the duty to work—the Swedish concept arbetslinjen (“work-line”)—was applied in controlling the inflow of migrants. In order to get a residence permit, an immigrant had to find a job with adequate terms. Essentially from day one, immigrants became an integrated part of the labour market, thereby embracing the ideal of the "citizen as worker". Once having obtained a residence permit, the guiding norm was that immigrants should have equal access to most citizen rights. Principally it was therefore predominantly the external control of immigration that represented the conditions and demands circumscribing rights (Borevi 2010; cf. Lund and Ohlsson 1994). In accordance with a "rights-line", access to equal rights was regarded as a necessary condition for immigrants to integrate into Swedish society. During the 1970s, reforms in several areas were launched with the aim of granting immigrants equal formal rights. For example, immigrants with permanent residence in Sweden were given voting rights in local elections in 1975, and in the
same year, requirements for naturalization were liberalized to promote immigrants’ full citizenship rights. In addition, special services and benefits, such as Swedish language instruction and civic information in the immigrants’ mother tongues, were established to meet the needs of the newly arrived. These measures, even though they were clearly sensitive to the cultural and linguistic backgrounds of the immigrants, should be regarded as a policy of civic integration rather than multiculturalism, as the intention was to facilitate the process of integration into Swedish society.

However, as mentioned, with the immigrant policy of the mid-1970s Sweden established a radical multicultural policy. Aiming to avoid previous forms of ethnic “Swedifying”, the policy was oriented towards affirming and supporting immigrants’ ethnic affiliations. Besides the goal to promote social equality, the new immigrant policy should also try to achieve cultural equality. Immigrants were seen as belonging to minority cultures and languages in Swedish society, a situation that motivated certain compensatory rights. Through social measures, immigrants and their children were to be given a real possibility to retain their own language, practice their cultural activities and maintain contact with the country of origin (Government bill 1975/76, 26). The cultural rights of immigrants were protected in a new formulation in the constitution. The new “multicultural” reforms included support for journals produced in immigrant languages, support for instruction in the home language in the public school system and financial support for ethnic organizations. The support to minority organizations involved an ambition that minority groups should become equal partners involved in the corporatist Swedish political system (Soysal 1994).

The decision to regard immigrants as minorities was one of the most important features of the Swedish multiculturalism of the 1970s. As pointed out by Maritta Soininen, the Swedish policy can be seen as an experiment characterized by a desire to question the existing division between immigrant and minority policy found in traditional countries of immigration (Soininen 1999). Indeed the Swedish goal of treating immigrants on an equal footing with national minorities was radical. Insisting that immigrant groups should have the same status as national minorities, the policy definitely went further than what Will Kymlicka

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4 The Swedish Instrument of Government (SFS 1974:152, chapter 1) states that “opportunities should be promoted for ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities to preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own.”
advocates in his theory of multicultural citizenship. Surprising as it may seem, considering his reputation as the primary advocate for multicultural policies, Kymlicka’s position is actually very much in line with the position of civic integration (i.e., Ideal Type 3 in Figure 2.1):

Promoting the good of cultural membership for immigrants is primarily a matter of enabling integration, by providing language training and fighting patterns of discrimination and prejudice. Generally speaking, this is more a matter of rigorously enforcing the common rights of citizenship than providing group-differentiated rights. In so far as common rights of citizenship in fact create equal access to mainstream culture, then equality with respect to cultural membership is achieved (Kymlicka 1995, 114).

In the 1970s, Sweden introduced a multicultural policy through which immigrants were given the same position as national minorities. This type of multiculturalism was very much intertwined with the welfare state—it had to do with state interventions, or the definition of immigrants’ positive right to obtain resources in order to uphold and develop their traditional cultural substructures. Swedish multiculturalism can thus be distinguished from multiculturalism as a negative right, more focusing on minorities’ right to be left alone by the state. Arguably, multicultural policies in Britain came closer to that negative form, in defining diverse types of exceptions from common law to members of religious communities (Favell 2001). An often cited example is the exemption granted to Sikhs to drive a motorcycle without wearing a helmet, in order not to be forced to take off the turban (e.g., Barry 2001, 44–49). It is difficult to find anything corresponding to this in the Swedish case, where politicians generally have been very restrictive with regard to exemptions on cultural or religious grounds.5

Furthermore, Swedish multiculturalism was combined with a strong commitment to the integrative logics of a Scandinavian type of welfare state, advocating standardized institutional arrangements and rules that apply equally to all recipients. In this regard, the Swedish multicultural policy can be distinguished from its counterpart in the Netherlands. In contrast to the Dutch tradition, Sweden had a very sceptical approach to

5 For instance, the type of slaughter required by Jewish (kosher) or Muslim (halal) tradition is prohibited in Sweden, with reference to the prevention of cruelty to animals. It should also be noted, however, that there is no prohibition against selling kosher or halal meat in Swedish grocery stores (Nilsson and Svanberg 1997).
special institutions designed for ethnic groups. The introduction of mother
tongue instruction in the public school system should be seen in this light,
as an effort to combine recognition of diversity with a conviction about the
importance of institutional integration.\textsuperscript{6} All in all, the implementation of
cultural pluralism should take place within the tradition of Swedish
welfare policy, including its comprehensiveness and universalism.

The capacity to control immigration in view of the situation on the
labour market was regarded as the cornerstone of the generous and
universal policy course that Sweden entered upon in the 1970s, and
presumably also in the design of an ambitious multicultural approach.
Ironically, the launching of the Swedish immigrant and minority policy in
1975 coincided with the arrival of a large group of refugees from the
dictatorship of Pinochet in Chile. This marked the beginning of a new type
of immigration that soon became dominant and largely eliminated the
former presumptions about immigration control. The admission of
refugees and family members was now to be based on consideration of
human rights principles and international conventions rather than on the

In the context of a changing character of immigration, with refugees and
family members to an increasing extent arriving from distant countries, the
multicultural direction of the policy was soon re-evaluated. Should the
goal of cultural freedom of choice, formulated in 1975, be interpreted as
meaning that immigrants were not obliged to follow laws and norms that
applied to the rest of the population? What was the state’s responsibility
for the long time preservation of minority groups? It was now argued that
the goal to support the upholding of minority identities was unrealistic and
that it might compete with the aim to promote integration in society.
Multicultural policies implied the risk of misdiagnosing the problems that
immigrants faced—there was a tendency to define economic marginaliza-
tion or ethnic discrimination as “multicultural questions”—thus hindering
an effective solution to the problem (SOU 1984:58; SOU 1984:55).

In 1986, only ten years after the launching of the immigrant and minority
policy, the parliament accepted the government’s proposal (1985/86, 98)
of a reformulation of the minority-oriented policy. Ethnic groups consisting
of immigrants who had arrived after World War II should not be
considered to constitute linguistic or national minorities. Hence the policy

\textsuperscript{6} The Swedish state combined ambitious and generous mother tongue instruction
in the comprehensive schools with a reluctant attitude towards private schools
established by religious, ethnic or linguistic minorities (Borevi 2002).
goal was *not* that immigrant groups should have equal opportunities to retain and develop their mother tongue and practice their culture. The previous multicultural feature of the policy was dismantled, and the policy area was renamed from “immigrant and minority policy” to “immigrant policy”. Thus the reform brought the Swedish policy into line with a position of civic integration. In 1997, the retreat from the former multicultural immigrant policy was again declared in a government bill proposing a new “integration policy” (Government bill 1997/98:16). The main argument put forward was that policy measures directed at ethnic categories worked in a stigmatizing manner, thereby reinforcing the notion of “us and “them”. However, despite bombastic claims about it representing a paradigm shift, the 1990s integration policy amounted to little more than a confirmation of the change in course that had already been made in the 1980s (Borevi 2002).

### The current trend of civic integration

I have shown that the Swedish policy development as regards the state’s approach to ethnic groups (i.e. the horizontal dimension in Figure 2.1) is largely similar to what can be observed in the rest of Europe. Indeed, in the mid-1980s, Sweden pioneered the retreat from multiculturalism (Ideal Type 4 in Figure 2.1) towards civic integration (Ideal Type 3 in Figure 2.1), which a decade later was to become the common trend in Europe. The multicultural approach has been dismantled in all countries that were previously seen as representatives of such a policy (e.g., the Netherlands and Great Britain). Hence, on the whole, no European country is currently advocating a multicultural position. In other words, there seems to be an overwhelming consensus in favour of civic integration policies.

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7 The decision put an end to the previous equalizing of immigrant and national minorities, e.g. implying stricter conditions to obtain mother tongue instruction in public schools for immigrant children, as compared to children belonging to an officially recognized national minority. However, most policy measures remained intact, pointing to the fact that the policy shift primarily concerned how the measures were justified (Borevi 2002; cf. Dahlström 2004).

8 Qualifying my point here, making use of a distinction suggested by Joppke and Morawska (2003, 8) between “de facto multiculturalism, which is required by the logic of liberal states, and official multiculturalism, in which states have deliberately and explicitly recognized and protected immigrants as distinct ethnic groups”, there is currently little support for the latter type of “official” multiculturalism.
In the following, my analysis will not concern the horizontal dimension in Figure 2.1, but variations within the position of civic integration. More precisely, the question is whether there has been a movement from an ideal-typical “rights line” towards a “duty line” (as presented in Figure 2.1) and if so, what such a move implies in relation to the vertical dimension in Figure 2.1 (i.e., ethnos vs. demos). Indeed, the current trend to introduce mandatory courses and tests as a condition for obtaining a residence permit and/or achieving citizenship status suggests a new logic of integration. European countries tend to be moving away from the idea that integration is best obtained through the extension of rights, instead conceiving of these rights as an incentive or a reward for a person who succeeds in achieving certain integration policy goals. Hence, a crucial change in attitude seems to have occurred, as observed by Christian Joppke: “So far the prevailing view across Europe was that a secure legal status enhances integration; now the lack of integration is taken as grounds for the refusal of admission and residence” (Joppke 2007b, 250).

In the following, I provide an account of how Sweden has responded to this apparent trend from rights to duties, including some comparative outlooks especially on Denmark and Norway. The Scandinavian tradition of universal welfare policies (Esping-Andersen 1990) comes close to the ideal-typical rights line, which makes it particularly interesting to study how these countries deal with the current trend of introducing mandatory integration programmes and demands.

As stated above, the overarching question is whether mandatory integration programmes are compatible with the position of civic integration or whether they move towards a “worst case scenario” of ethnic assimilation/exclusion, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Arguably, the answer critically hinges on how soft or hard the penalties for non-compliance are—are they only monetary or is legal residence and future citizenship status made contingent on completing the programmes (cf. Joppke 2004, 248)? Another potentially important aspect is whether the mandatory element concerns merely participation in the programmes, or whether the

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9 Another crucial feature of the ongoing development, which I will not be able to elaborate on further in this text, is the intricate relationship between integration policies and migration control, implying that the intention in fact might not be to enhance integration but rather to prevent unwanted immigration (see Joppke 2007a and 2007b; cf. also Boréus, this volume, on the political debate in Denmark and Sweden related to these issues).
participants should also prove their integration achievements through a test.

**Scandinavian introduction programmes in comparative perspective**

Since the 1990s, all Scandinavian countries have developed introductory programmes for newcomers that share certain traits: they are extensive, involve full-time activity every day for up to three years, they are offered free of charge, and they contain strong activation elements. Furthermore, the programmes, in theory at least, should be designed with respect to each participant’s individual qualifications, needs and preferences (Hagelund and Brochmann 2010; Djuve and Kavli 2007). The introduction programmes constitute a right as they are offered free of charge, but to varying degrees also a duty, in as much as people who refuse to take part in them risk penalties.

Common to the three countries is the usage of economic incentives to encourage new arrivals to participate in introduction programmes. In principle, the programmes provide participants with a specific introductory benefit that represents a source of income other than social assistance. Thereby the programmes could be said to contain a certain de facto mandatory element, “as the introductory benefit replaces social assistance for the targeted categories, programme participation becomes compulsory for those unable to support themselves financially” (Hagelund and Brochmann 2010, 153). In Sweden, this mandatory element has recently been more pronounced. Previously it was up to the different municipalities to decide whether or not they should reduce economic benefits for those who did not participate in introductory programmes (Quist 2008). In March 2010, the parliament agreed on a government bill proposing centralization of the administration of the introductory benefits in order to implement a common norm that non-participation should be sanctioned by withdrawing or reducing of benefits (Government bill 2009/10, 60). Hence, increased efforts are being made to specify and supervise that beneficiaries fulfil certain duties before receiving economic compensation. This reflects a general move since the early 1990s in welfare policies towards a new emphasis on “activation” and “workfare”. Hence, the common trend has been to impose stricter demands for the admission of social allowances, and at the same time to accentuate that beneficiaries
should make an active effort to become self-supporting. The emphasis on duties has been justified with arguments for putting an end to “something-for-nothing” welfare (Ferrera and Rhodes 2001).

However, when it comes to penalties other than monetary, Sweden differs from its Scandinavian neighbours (and from most other European countries as well) in not tying residence permit or citizenship acquisition to the individual’s participation in an integration course or passing of an integration test. In contrast, Denmark requires both participation and a passing mark on a language test to grant residency, while Norway takes up a middle position requiring participation in 250 hours of Norwegian language classes and 50 hours of civic education, but no language test (Hagelund and Brochmann 2010). This could be compared with the Netherlands, where the state does not offer any introduction courses at all—and consequently has no demand on participation—but requires immigrants to pass an integration test. The situation is summarized in Figure 2.3.

As illustrated in the figure, neither Sweden nor the Netherlands has any official requirement concerning participation in introductory courses, while this is the case in both Norway and Denmark. In the Dutch case, the reason is simply that integration courses no longer constitute a right. In contrast to the Scandinavian situation, migrants in the Netherlands are

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10 It should however be noted that in the Scandinavian countries (and most notably in Sweden) this idea is not altogether a new one, but has rather a long history of social democratic active labour market policy and assertion of the so called work line (Halvorsen and Jensen 2004; Johansson 2006; Junestav 2004).

11 It should be noted that the dimensions in this figure do not correspond to those in Figure 2.1. Comparing with Figure 2.1, the discussion here rather concerns variations within the position of civic integration (i.e., Ideal Type 3).
required to pay for the integration courses in full. Furthermore, the Dutch state has farmed out the courses to private organizations, reducing the state’s involvement to administering a standardized test at the very end (Joppke 2007a, 249–251; 2007b, 5–9). In Sweden, the introduction programme constitutes a right in so far as it is offered free of charge. It has been argued that more severe duties could potentially imply strengthened rights (cf. Joppke 2004; Hagelund and Brochmann 2010). Indeed, such an argument could be seen to have some substance, as municipalities in Norway and Denmark are obliged to provide civic education, while for the Swedish municipalities this has so far been voluntary. Furthermore, in Sweden and Norway, the programmes are targeted only to refugees and their dependants, while in Denmark (with the strongest emphasis on duties in the Scandinavian context) all non-EU family migrants have the right—and duty—to participate in the programmes. However, a recently presented Swedish government inquiry runs contrary to the same argument, proposing a reform whereby nearly all newly arrived are given the right to participate in civic orientation and whereby municipalities are required to offer the civic orientation according to certain standardized measures and forms, but without introducing any formal obligations on the part of the immigrant (SOU 2010:16; SOU 2010:37).

When considering the second dimension in the figure, whether or not the state applies integration tests, Sweden and Norway end up in the same position, refraining from such a possibility, while Denmark and the Netherlands both require a passing mark on an integration test. Hence, the latter countries clearly adopt the logics of integration corresponding to the “duty line”, discussed above. Starting from 2002, when the right-wing populist Danish People’s Party won governmental influence, the naturalization requirements have become more and more severe (cf. Boréus, this volume). The government has sharpened the language and conduct demands, arguing that Danish nationality should be something to strive for; “a ‘carrot’ for foreigners to adapt to Danish society, be independent, learn Danish and be able to socialise with the Danes” (Ersbøll 2006, 131). In 2005, the Danish skill requirements were raised considerably to the effect that a large proportion of the applicants have failed in passing the test (Adamo 2008). Another expression of the restrictive rules in Denmark is the decision to refuse applications for exemptions from the language and citizenship test requirements of those suffering from PTSD (Posttraumatic stress disorder) “even if the condition is chronic and this is documented by a medical declaration” (Ersbøll 2006).
in their ever-increasing demands on immigrants’ integration achievements. However, as shown above, Denmark differs from the Netherlands in simultaneously offering integration courses that, in theory at least, should give the individuals the opportunities to achieve the requested integration goals.

If Denmark clearly follows the integration logics according to the ideal-typical “duty line”, Norway represents an interesting effort to find a middle way or balance between the rights line and the duty line. Norway’s refusal to apply language tests can be interpreted as an expression of reluctance, typical to the rights line, towards individual control and scrutiny, as that always carries the risk of having stigmatizing effects. The Norwegian solution is to merely require participation in the courses, thus applying a more universal and impersonal rule, avoiding the procedure of assessing each and every individual’s achievements. Hence, Norway and the Netherlands could be said to represent diametrically different attitudes. The Dutch state does not care whether or not the courses are actually attended; only the result counts. The Norwegian state does not care whether or not the individuals really profit by the education; only their participation counts.

Finally, as already mentioned, Sweden rejects the whole idea of tying residency or citizenship either to participation in integration programmes or to specific integration achievements. Furthermore, Sweden belongs to a minority of European countries that do not apply any official language requirements for citizenship. In 1999, the Swedish Citizenship Committee argued against introducing a language requirement in the following manner:

Such demands could result in longer qualification periods for certain categories of applicants before they can become Swedish citizens. Furthermore it could exclude certain people from ever becoming Swedish citizens. The committee regards citizenship as a path to societal cohesion and as an essential part of the integration process. Increasing the qualification demands would instead have the counterproductive result of decreasing cohesion in the nation as a whole (SOU 1999:34, 318).

13 In Swedish: "Sådana krav skulle kunna leda till att det tar längre tid för en del att kvalificera sig för att bli svensk medborgare. [Det skulle] även kunna utestånga vissa från att någonsin bli svenska medborgare. Kommittén ser medborgarskapet som en väg till samhörighet och ett led i integrationsprocessen. Ökade kvalifikationskrav skulle snarast få motsatt effekt, nämligen att samhörigheten totalt sett minskade i landet".
The quote is an illustrative example of the integration logic that has been—and still is—predominant in the Swedish policy, stressing the extension of *rights* as the primary mode of enhancing integration. The point here is that a language requirement would not promote but rather obstruct the process of integration, as it would imply unfair obstacles to accessing equal rights for certain categories of people. According to this view, the state’s role in promoting language proficiency should be to offer as good opportunities as possible, rather than introducing mandatory requirements. Or in the formulations of the Swedish Citizenship Committee: “Society’s starting point should be that all immigrants, of their own free will, do their best, given their abilities, to acquire knowledge of the Swedish language” (SOU 1999:34, 317). The same reasoning holds true for the issue of civic education, recently expressed in a government inquiry:

> It is not for the state to lay down conditions for citizenship requiring a passed civic education. Just like a democratic state should do for all other citizens, all citizens should be included generally, blindly and equally, without testing their level of knowledge. Besides, anything else would be a historical breach of the supporting, solidarity-based and inclusive idea underlying the Swedish people’s home and welfare state (SOU 2010:16, 25).

The absence of a formal language or civic education requirement in the Swedish case does not mean that these issues are considered unimportant. Instead, the crucial point is the aim to avoid individual testing (considering its potentially negative results in stigmatization and discretionary judgements). Consequently, there is a reliance on the notion that good teaching facilities together with the requirement of years of residence (normally five years) will ensure that those granted Swedish citizenship have obtained sufficient language skills. Hence, the requirement represents an approximation of how long a period is generally needed for an immigrant

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to achieve what is assumed to be a sufficient level of language proficiency to act as a citizen (SOU 1999:34).

During the past decade, the attitude described above, that has been predominant in the Swedish political debate thus far, has increasingly been challenged. Advocates of the introduction of an official language requirement have won increasing attention, most notably the Liberal Party (“Folkpartiet”) and the Moderate Party (“Moderata Samlingspartiet”). But reactions to these proposals have been strong, as in the 2002 Swedish election campaign when the Liberal Party’s proposal to introduce a language requirement for citizenship provoked a heated debate (Milani 2008). Furthermore, none of the parties in the Swedish parliament advocate language demands as a precondition for residence permits. For instance, in one pamphlet, the Liberal Party makes clear that “the Liberal Party does not want to ‘throw out’ persons without sufficient knowledge of Swedish from the country. Our demand only applies to the citizenship, nothing else” (Folkpartiet 2003).

To conclude, Sweden has certainly adapted to a general trend of putting increased emphasis on duties in terms of economic sanctions and incentives, but when it comes to cultural requirements, the predominant Swedish approach has been noteworthy reluctance.

**Concluding discussion**

In this chapter, I have used the Swedish case to argue that we should distinguish between two dimensions when analysing citizenship and integration policies. The first dimension has to do with the state’s approach to citizens’ ethnic affiliations, where options range from passive tolerance to active recognition of ethnic subgroups. The second dimension concerns conceptions of the common national identity, where policies may come closer to either the notion of demos or that of ethnos. A policy of civic integration and one of multiculturalism are both potentially legitimate from a liberal-democratic point of view, in so far as they are intended to promote integration to a “civic” (not ethnic) community of citizens. At the same time, they both run the constant risk of ending up in an illiberal notion of the nation as ethnos.

When it comes to the position of multiculturalism, there has been heavy criticism, the argument being that such a policy increases isolation and stigmatization, which in effect leads to a liberal’s “worst-case scenario” of ethnic segregation (cf. Figure 2.1). The critique has been present also at the political level to the effect that multicultural policies have largely been abandoned throughout Europe. Hence, there is indeed reason to talk of a
“retreat from multicultural policies”. However, as has been explained here, it would be erroneous to include the introduction of new conditions for residence permits or citizenship status in such a diagnosis. The new trend throughout Europe—to formulate stricter conditions as regards, e.g., integration courses and exams—has little to do with the question of multicultural recognition, but should rather be analysed along the ethnos-demos dimension, potentially implying a movement towards an ethnic notion of the nation.

This position can be contrasted to the one proposed by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (2000; cf. Koopmans et al. 2005). In a critical examination of their analytical framework, I contend that these authors confound the question of cultural rights with that of cultural requirements, with detrimental consequences for our understanding of current policy developments in Europe.

If the current trends of increasing cultural requirements were to be analysed along the vertical ethnos-demos dimension, as has been argued in this chapter, what then is the answer? Do these reforms represent a move towards a more communitarian notion of the nation as ethnos or do they rather imply a strengthening of the civic notion of demos? In the debate one can distinguish two principally different positions concerning this issue (cf. Bauböck and Joppke 2010; Wright 2008). The first position altogether rejects the new citizenship tests and mandatory courses because they put up a barrier for certain parts of the population—arguably lower-educated, less well-off immigrants from non-European countries. The other position concentrates on the specific modes and contents of the courses and tests, arguing that as long as they do not surpass a certain “liberal threshold”, they should be regarded as a useful tool to enhance integration.

In this chapter, we have seen that Sweden still largely adheres to the first position, which furthermore is connected to a Marshallian integration logic, emphasizing the extension of rights. On the other hand, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands represent three different varieties (and degrees) of the opposite logic, where rights are regarded as something that should be earned through individual efforts and achievements. More systematic and comparative research is needed to map out and analyse variations across countries as regards the modes and contents of the reforms in question, as well as the political context and the arguments put forward. Such research could also help in answering the normative question of how current reforms should be regarded from a liberal democratic point of view: as a move forwards or a move backwards.
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